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ABSTRACT 
Rationalisation of government subsidies has been prominent on the public policy 
agenda in India, since 1990, when the first comprehensive estimate of subsidies as 
unrecovered costs was made by Mundle and Rao (1991 )^ Even before that, 
although the full extent of (implicit and explicit) subsidies were not known, 
occasional concern about burgeoning amount of some of the major explicit 
subsidies - food, fertiliser and export (as also implicit subsidies in specific public 
services like irrigation) - were expressed. 
Since then, two White Papers on subsidies have been brought out by the 
Government of India, the latest being 2004, emphasizing the need for rationalisation 
of this significant component of government expenditure. There have been other 
documents of the government which have expressed similar imperatives regarding 
specific subsidies or subsidies as a whole, or have drawn attention to their 
magnitude (thereby implying the need for carefully thought out policies). With all this 
not much actual policy change has been observed keeping this issue alive for an 
agenda of economic reforms. 
Explicit subsidies, in any case do not show the full extent of subsidies because there 
are large unrecovered costs in the supply of various services that are subsidied at 
least from government's point of view, and these subsidies are far grater than what 
a simple comparison of public expenditures and receipts would indicate because of 
significant opportunity costs of past investments. 
Subsidies, as converse of an indirect tax, constitute an important fiscal instrument 
for modifying market-determined outcomes. While taxes reduce disposable income, 
subsidies inject money into circulation. Subsidies affect the economy through the 
commodity market by lowering the relative price of the subsidised commodity. 
^ Mundle, Sudipto and M. Govinda Rao, (1991), "Volume and Composition of Government 
Subsidies in India, 1987-88", Economic and Political Weekly, May 4. 
thereby generating an increase in its demand. Witli an indirect tax, the price of the 
taxed commodity increases, and the quantity at which the market for that commodity 
is cleared, falls, other things remaining the same. Taxes appear on the revenue side 
of government budgets, and subsidies on the expenditure side. 
Subsidies can have a major impact in augmenting welfare of the society provided 
these are designed and administered efficiently to serve a clearly stated set of 
objectives. However, subsidies can also be very costly if they are poorly designed 
and inefficiently administered. Subsidies in areas such as education, health and 
environment are advocated on grounds that their benefits are spread well beyond 
the immediate recipients, and are shared by the population at large, present and 
future. Subsidies are also used with redistributive objectives, particularly for 
ensuring minimum consumption levels of food and other basic needs. 
The present study examines the volume of subsidies and its fiscal implications at the 
State level taking the State of Uttar Pradesh as the case study. The size of Utter 
Pradesh government expenditures as a percentage of GSDP taken out to be about 
20 per cent in 2005-06. Uttar Pradesh witnessed high fiscal imbalances during 
1990s and in early 2000. Therefore, the computation of subsidies and their burden 
on State exchequer become very important. 
In the present exercise, the focus is on budgetary subsidies and the main objective 
is to uncover implicit subsidies. Accordingly, subsidies are measured here as 
"unrecovered" costs of governmental provision of goods/services that are not 
classified as public goods. In particular, the goods/services under reference are 
those that are categorised as social services and economic services. The 
unrecovered costs are measured as the excess of aggregate costs over receipts 
from the concerned budgetary head. 
The present work is divided into seven chapters. The first chapter is of introductory 
in nature. 
The concept of budgetary subsidies (definition and taxonomy), objectives, rationale, 
and mode of administering subsidies, scope and importance of the study, 
hypothesis to be tested, methodology adopted, data sources and limitations of the 
study are discussed in this chapter. 
Subsidies are defined in various forms according to their use. Subsidies are 
classifies as explicit and implicit subsidies. Explicit subsidies are directly mentioned 
in budget document. The implicit subsidies are defined by Mundle Sudipto and M. 
Govinda Rao (1991) as the difference between the costs of delivering various 
publicly provided goods and services and the recoveries arising from such 
deliveries". Thus in a budgetary context, it may be defined as "Unrecovered Cost in 
the public provision of private goods". 
Srivastava D.K., et. al. (2003) have explained subsidies, as converse of an indirect 
tax, constitute an important fiscal instrument for modifying market-determined 
outcomes. While taxes withdraw money from circulation, subsidies inject money into 
circulation. Subsidies affect the economy through the commodity market by lowering 
the relative price of the subsidised commodity, thereby generating an increase in its 
demand. With an indirect tax, the price of taxed commodity increases, and the 
quantity at which the market for the commodity is cleared, falls, other things 
remaining the same. Taxes appear on the revenue side and subsidies on the 
expenditure side of the government budgets. In a budgetary context, subsidies are 
taken as unrecovered cost of public provision of non-public goods, although the term 
may be defined in a variety of other ways. 
According to Rao Hemlata and H.K. Amar Nath (2003) the concept of subsidy used 
in Budget Document refers to the explicit payment made to producers to alter their 
price or output decisions or to consumers to encourage them to consume more 
because it is "meritorious" to do so. On the contrary, the National Accounting 
concept is broader as it includes, in addition of arising from the losses of 
departmental enterprises. Subsidies may be defined as "money granted by State or 
public body to individuals / firms or organizations (who has to bear a part of the cost) 
to bring down the cost by way of tax exemption, part payment by government, lower 
interest charges and so on. Or to bring down the final price of those goods and 
services, which have large externalities or which lead to distributive justice". For this 
part of assistance (subsidies), no equivalent compensation is received. 
Subsidies may be defined as "money granted by State or public body to individuals / 
firms or organizations (who has to bear a part of the cost) to bring down the cost by 
way of tax exemption, part payment by government, lower interest charges and so 
on. Or to bring down the final of those goods and services, which have large 
externalities or which lead to distributive justice". For this part of assistance 
(subsidies) no equivalent compensation is received. The following are some 
features of subsidies -
• Subsidies are money transfers from government. 
• Transfers are intended to encourage consumption of goods or services by 
individuals / firms / organizations. 
• Often the purpose of the subsidies is to reduce the cost or price of 
consumption of those commodities that have externalities or help achieving 
distributive justice. 
• In principle, it is possible to price these goods or services, but they are 
subsidised because government wants to encourage their consumption / 
production for externality or merit good reasons. 
• The recipient of subsidy may be required to bear some part of the cost 
(except when the goods have very high degree of externality). 
• Subsidies are like negative indirect taxes that bring down the price of goods / 
services. 
• An important feature of subsidies is that they have both substitution effect 
and the income effect. 
• Implicit subsidies give rise to unrecovered cost. 
• Over subsidisation could adversely affect environment and allocation of 
resources. 
• Subsidies may induce a number of efficiency losses. 
• Untargeted subsidies promote inefficiency and induce wastage of scarce 
resources. 
• Subsidies promote growth by increasing the level of critical inputs like health, 
education and infrastructure. 
• Subsidies are regressive in nature. 
Government provides subsidies for the following reasons: 
• Correcting market failure^ 
• Protecting national production from competition 
• Reducing import dependence 
• Encouraging national employment 
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Market failure occurs when private actions contradict the social ends of an efficient 
allocation of resources. 
• Ensuring balanced regional development 
• Enabling access to and affordability of/ basic services or goods by all 
• Stimulation of economic grow/th. 
Economic effects of subsidies broadly can be grouped into (i) allocative effects, (ii) 
redistributive effects, (ill) fiscal effects, (iv) trade effects (v) positive effects, and (vi) 
negative effects. 
To examine the issue of subsidies hypothesis proposed to be tested in this study is: 
"There are serious efforts as a part of fiscal correction measures by the 
Government of Uttar Pradesh to rationalise the subsidies for increase in social 
welfare". 
Chapter 2 is divided into two parts. First part discusses a theoretical rationale for 
subsidies. That allow to analyse two kinds of policy failure. The first policy failure 
focuses on the impact of hidden subsidies on welfare and on the effectiveness of 
other policies. Second policy failure results the ineffectiveness of the subsidies 
themselves. Second part of the chapter covers the review of the empirical studies 
related to subsidies. A closer examination of the empirical studies reveals that a 
huge amount of the subsidies is given by both Central and State governments. A lot 
of attention to subsidies in India is given after mid eighties. iVlost of the empirical 
work is done on the explicit subsidies like food, fertiliser, agriculture etc. The major 
work on implicit budgetary subsidies is done by National Institute of Public Finance 
and Policy. From the studies of NIPFP, it is clear that the burden of subsidies is very 
high on both Central and State governments and there is a need to rationalise the 
subsidies. 
To have a comprehensive understanding of the issue of subsidies in India, we have 
examined the trends and volume of Central budgetary subsidies in Chapter 3. The 
first part, analysed the overall trend of some of the major explicit subsidies given by 
the Central government and in second part, consist of discussion about implicit 
budgetary subsidies as computed in earlier studies. 
At constant prices (1999-00), total explicit subsidies of the Centre have increased 
from Rs. 22571 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 45481 crore in 2006-07 (RE). The average 
growth during the period 1990-91 to 2006-07 (RE) of explicit Central subsidies in 
real terms thus works out to be more than four per cent per annum. 
Food Subsidy is the difference between the price at which the Food Corporation of 
India (FCI) procures food grains from farmers, and the price at which PCI sells 
(Issue Price) either to traders or to the Public Distribution System (PDS), with the 
added cost borne by FCI storage and distribution of foodgrains. The subsidy 
ensures a reasonable high price to farmers (procurement price) and a reasonable 
low price to consumers (issue price) and food through PDS, The amount of 
consumer subsidy depends on the volume of foodgrains distributed through the PDS 
and the rate of subsidy which, in turn, depends on the difference between market 
and issue prices and the handling charges of the FCI. 
Explicit food subsidy (including subsidies on sugar) in India as given in annual 
budgets has increase from Rs 2450 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 24204 crore in 2006-
07(RE) with 17.14 per cent trend growth rate of per annum. Its share in total explicit 
subsidies, increased from 23 per cent in 1990-91 to 40 per cent in 2006-07(RE). 
Fertiliser subsidy is the difference between price paid to manufactures of fertilizer 
(domestic or foreign) and price received by farmers. The subsidy ensures cheap 
inputs to farmers, reasonable return to manufacturers, and stability in availability and 
price of fertiliser to farmers. 
The huge burden of fertiliser subsidy has given rise to considerable debate in the 
literature, whether these subsidies are going to farmers or to fertiliser industry or to 
someone else, in a way that cannot be easily observed. Fertiliser subsidy is borne 
by the Centre and attracts most attention. The quantum of fertiliser subsidy in the 
Central government budget is however increasing at a alarming rate to Rs 22452 
Crore in 2006-07(RE) from Rs. 4400 crore in 1990-91, representing a five-fold 
increase in subsidies. Trend growth rate of fertiliser subsidy was much higher 
between 1990-91 and 1999-00 compared to period of 2000-01 to 2006-07 (RE). 
Agriculture Subsidy means different things to different people. It comprises three 
components covering import policies, export policies and domestic policies. Explicit 
agriculture subsidy in India has increase from Rs 78 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 479 
crore in 2006-07(RE) with 14.61 per cent trend growth rate per annum. 
Power is subsidised for agriculture and domestic consumers through two sources (i) 
State support to State Electricity Boards (SEBs) in the form of write off of loans or 
interest, etc., and (ii) cross subsidising by charging higher prices from industrial and 
commercial consumers. In budget explicit power subsidies are given to Power 
Finance Corporation Ltd. and subsidies to Rural Electrification. These two consists 
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one per cent of total explicit budgetary subsidies in 2000-01 and it increases upto six 
per cent in 2006-07(RE). In nominal term it increases from Rs. 295 crore in 2000-01 
to Rs. 3450 crore in 2006-07(RE) with an annual growth of 47 per cent while in real 
term it increased from Rs. 286 crore to Rs. 2607 crore with an annual growth of 
about 45 per cent in the same period. 
It was for the first time when the petroleum subsidies were mentioned explicitly in 
the budget 2002-03. The subsidy for the petroleum sector was at third position after 
food and fertiliser. For LPG and kerosene the government subsidy were Rs. 5225 
crore. Petroleum subsidy accounted for Rs. 6573 crore in 2003-04 and after that 
these have decreased and estimated at Rs. 2840 crore in 2007-08 (BE). 
Chapter 4 is a brief review of finances of the State of Utter Pradesh. This chapter is 
divided in three major parts. First part deals with the macro view of economy of Utter 
Pradesh along with socials indicators and reform initiated. Second part compares 14 
major fiscal indicators of the State of Utter Pradesh with other major States of India. 
Time profile of fiscal scenario in terms of revenues (tax and non tax) and 
expenditure patterns are discussed in the third section of the chapter. 
As per population census 2001, Uttar Pradesh, with its 16,605 crore strong 
population, continued to be the most populous State in the country and accounts for 
16.17 per cent of India's 102.70 crore population. An economically strong Uttar 
Pradesh with its huge market could be an important engine of growth for the rest of 
the country. It has a large agriculture base, fairly well spread industrial activities, and 
some of the best learning centres in the country. 
An important feature of Indian fiscal federalism is the significant inter-State 
differences in fiscal indicators. Comparison of fiscal indicators are based on 14 fiscal 
indicators that are classified into four broad groups, viz., (i) deficit indicators, (ii) 
revenue performance, (iii) expenditure pattern, and (iv) debt position. Generally 
fiscal indicators are expressed in relation to Gross State Domestic Product (GSDP) 
at current prices. 
The finances of Utter Pradesh show marked deterioration in revenue and fiscal 
balance relative to GSDP towards the end of the nineties. The profile of fiscal 
imbalance after bifurcation, shown an improvement but has started deteriorating 
again. The quality of fiscal deficit has worsened considerably over the years. 
Relative to other States, fiscal imbalances in Utter Pradesh are among the largest. 
The most important threat to the State's economy comes from the financial 
management of the State government. Uttar Pradesh is critically indebted and the 
debt is on the verge of becoming unsustainable. Average primary deficit as a 
percentage of GSDP is more than the difference between real growth and the real 
interest rate. The primary deficit continues to be positive. This debt in Uttar Pradesh 
is relatively expensive, with higher interest rates rather than other States. Clearly, 
Uttar Pradesh needs to restructure its debt by adopting measures such as debt-
swapping. With a high fiscal deficit, little is left for development expenditure. This 
places serious constraints on the capacity of the State to stimulate economic 
activities. A comprehensive programme of reducing deficit should include both 
receipt as well as expenditure management and wide ranging reforms. Subsidies 
cover a major part of expenditure. Therefore, when we talk about expenditure 
management and reduction in deficits, analysis of subsidies become quite important. 
Many subsidies arise because government participate in the provision of purely 
private goods where its presence is not warranted either economically or 
technologically. 
Chapter 5 presents the estimation of budgetary subsidies in the Utter Pradesh. This 
chapter is divided into five parts. First part discusses about conceptual definition and 
adjustment for estimating budgetary subsidies in Utter Pradesh. Second part 
analysed transfer payments either made to individual in the form of grants-in -aid 
and direct transfer or assistance to local bodies or public sector undertakings. Both 
are treated as explicit subsidies and are netted out before the estimation of implicit 
subsidies. In third part a macro view of implicit subsidies along with recovery rates, 
share of social and economic services in implicit subsidies, per capita subsidies on 
current and constant prices and as a percentage of GSDP are presented. In the 
fourth section of the chapter a macro comparison of the implicit subsidies with 
earlier studies is done. In the last part of the chapter, a detailed sector wise analysis 
of social and economic services with patterns of the surplus is analysed. 
Transfers to individuals are income supplements and may be distinguished from 
price subsidies. Transfers, which are straight income supplements, need to be 
distinguished from subsidies. An unconditional transfer to an individual would 
augment his income and would be distributed over the entire range of his 
expenditures. A subsidy, however, refers to a specific good, the relative price of 
which has been lowered because of the subsidy with a view to changing the 
consumption/allocation decisions in favour of the subsidised good. 
In actual practice, all visible payments to individuals and factors of production are 
termed as explicit subsidies. But the problem is with the information available in the 
State budget about explicit subsidies is that administrative costs of these subsidies 
are not included. Therefore, explicit payments made to individuals, organisations, 
assistance given to public sector undertakings, co-operatives etc., and grants-in-aid 
to local bodies, are excluded from the estimation of cost of providing services. 
In Utter Pradesh, Grants-in-aid have increased more than four times from Rs. 
1941.32 Crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 7842.28 Crore in 2005-06. More than 90 per cent 
of these grants-in-aids are provided under social service, while a little amount goes 
in economic services. 
Transfers to individuals have increase from Rs. 1017.66 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 
3599.92 crore in 2005-06, registering a growth of 8.79 per cent per annum. In social 
services, it Increased from Rs. 300.99 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 2971.52 crore in 
2005-06 and with a growth of 16.49 per cent per annum. 
In Economic Services, transfers to individuals decreased by about 12 per cent (0.87 
per cent annually) from Rs. 716.67 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 628.40 crore in 2005-06. 
Though, integrated rural development programmes, and national programmes for 
rural employment such as 'Jawahar Rozgar Yojana', etc. cover major part of these 
transfers. 
Public sector undertakings play a vital role in economic development, employment 
generation, and social justice. The State government spends a huge amount 
through investment and lending in public undertakings. 
Economic Services cover major part of this assistance. Fisheries, Transport, and 
Power are major public sector undertakings in economic services that receive huge 
assistance from the State government. In social services government provide 
assistance for welfare programmes for SC, ST and OBCs, and social security to 
promote the welfare of the State. 
An implicit budgetary subsidy is defined as the difference between cost of providing 
services and recoveries made from the beneficiaries. Costs have two components, 
current costs, and capital costs. Recoveries comprise of revenue receipts, interest 
receipts, and dividends on investments. 
The current costs are known as revenue expenditure in the budget document. The 
revenue expenditure consists of expenditure on maintenance, (both salaries & 
wages and operation & maintenance cost), direct cash payment to public sector 
undertakings, co-operatives, local bodies and other agencies and also to individuals 
from whom no charges are levied by the State government. Annualised capital cost 
is the opportunity cost of investment. The State government's investment in 
provisioning of various services is given as capital outlay in the budget documents. 
Revenue receipts comprise from three main sources. The first is the tax revenue, 
the second non-tax revenue and the third one is grants from the Centre. 
The difference between receipts from user charges and current expenditure is the 
un-recovered variable cost. The un-recovered capital costs are the difference 
between annualised capital costs and interest plus dividends. The total un-
recovered costs are summation of these two. 
Implicit budgetary subsidies in the present study are inclusive of certain explicit 
subsidies, if stated explicitly in the finance accounts of Utter Pradesh (from where 
basic data have been collected). In these estimates, unrecovered costs, do not 
include the transfers as mentioned in the above section and grants-in-aid given to 
local bodies and other agencies. These estimates also do not cover the services 
under public goods category such as general services, relief on account of natural 
calamities, secretariat social services and secretariat economic services of the 
budgetary classification. 
Empirical analysis has done on the data taken from the Finance Accounts of Utter 
Pradesh for seven years that are 1990-91, 1993-94, 1995-96, 1998-99, 2001-02, 
2003-04, and 2005-06 with the consideration of stages of reform process and 
finances of the State government for comparative purpose. 
Our estimates show that implicit budgetary subsidies in nominal term have gone up 
from Rs. 4486.07 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 15928.39 crore in 2005-06 with 8.81 per 
cent annual growth rate. Economic Services absorbed major part of these subsidies. 
In social services, it has increased from Rs. 1285.28 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 
4989.88 crore in 2005-06 with an annual growth rate of 9.46 per cent. Major part of 
the subsidies in social services is absorbed by Health and Family Welfare followed 
by Education, 'Water Supply and Sanitation' and Social Welfare. 
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In economic services, subsidies increased fronn Rs. 3200.78 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 
10938.50 crore in 2005-05 with an annual growth of 8.54 per cent. Major part, 
approximately 33 per cent of subsidies in economic services, is covered by Irrigation 
and Flood Control followed by Energy, Rural Development, and Agriculture and 
Allied services. 
The per capita subsidies in the State are continuously increasing from Rs. 343.79 to 
Rs. 873.80 during the period from 1990-91 to 2005-06, registering an annual growth 
of 6.42 per cent per annum. 
There are six studies which have estimated implicit budgetary subsidies for the 
States and Union Government by defining them as unrecovered cost of provisioning 
of services by the various level of governments. Though the basic definition and 
basic methodology adopted are the same, but the methodology of arriving at various 
components of the estimation varied from one another. 
However, all these studies have estimated subsidies for a year or two using slightly 
different methodologies and adjustments. Because of the differences in their 
methodology, these studies are directly not comparable with each other. They are 
not comparable for two reasons i.e. a) varying depreciation rates are used, and b) 
adjustments made to the data are different. For example, Rao did not exclude the 
assistance given to PSU and co-operatives, Srivastava-Sen excluded only 
assistance to PSU, but not to co-operatives and the other studies excluded both, 
and treated them as explicit subsidies. However, in broad terms, a similar approach 
of measuring budgetary subsidies in a comprehensive way was used in these 
studies. 
Analysis of implicit budgetary subsidies in various sectors follows same criteria of 
budgetary classification. Budgetary classification has three categories of 
expenditure i.e., General Services, Social Services, and Economic Services. 
General Services are mostly administrative in nature and are public goods. Where 
as, social services and economic services provide services to the people, and 
beneficiaries can be identified. Most of these services are private or non-public 
goods in nature with varying degree of externalities. Similar pattern is followed by all 
the States including Uttar Pradesh. Expenditure on service provision in non-public 
goods is mainly categorised under social and economic services in the budget 
documents of the Government of Uttar Pradesh. 
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Social services consists of various human development related sectors, like 
Education, Health and family welfare, Water and Sanitation, Housing, Urban 
Development, and Welfare. Being associated with strong externalities and 
economies of scale, Education, Health, Water Supply, Sanitation and Housing in 
social service sector qualify for larger share in subsidies. Education improves 
sociability, occupational mobility, and voluntary responsibilities and law conformity. 
Improvement in health status is linked not only to the performance of the health care 
system, but also to health awareness, environmental sanitation, availability of 
potable drinking water, nutritional intake and various other social and cultural 
factors. Better health, water supply and sanitation, and housing facilitate lower level 
of morbidity, mortality and contain the spread of communicable disease. These 
would further enhance productive efficiency and help in equitable distribution of 
income. 
Investment in economic services will result in growth of the economy and economic 
development and investment in social services result in human development. 
Agriculture, rural development, irrigation, power, industries, and transport are the 
main sectors in economic services. Of this rural development is mainly of 
employment (wage) generator programmes for poverty alleviation and part of human 
development. 
While in most social and economic goods/services, State is unable to recover costs, 
there are some cases where the States Is able to generate surplus. These surpluses 
have been generated mainly in the economic services which account for about 65 
per cent to 100 per cent of total surplus and there are no clear-cut patterns of 
surplus generation. 
Chapter 6 deals with the classification of budgetary subsidies into merit and non-
merit goods on the basis of externalities. 
Goods and services are categorises based on their characteristics and classifies the 
implicit budgetary subsidies in Uttar Pradesh into these categories. The present 
chapter is organised into three sections. The first section focuses on characteristics 
and classification of goods and services. The second section details the 
classification of budgetary services in the Indian context as describes in earlier 
studies. The third section classifies the implicit budgetary subsidies in Uttar 
Pradesh. 
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In social services only Merit II goods and Merit goods with distributive justice (mainly 
consists welfare programmes) have shown a substantial increase. The share of 
impure public goods (which result into building social infrastructure) in total implicit 
subsidies have declined. In economic services, the share of Merit goods with 
distributive justice has increased. While the share of other categories has declined. 
While in most social and economic goods/services, State is unable to recover costs, 
there are some cases where the States is able to generate surplus. The total 
Surplus generates is Rs. 7.77 crore in 1990-91 and increases to Rs. 345.76 crore in 
2005-06 with a peak to Rs. 4456.36 in 2003-04 and it is just 0.17 per cent in 1990-
91, and 2.18 per cent in 2005-06 of subsidised sector with a peak 2.30 per cent in 
2001-02 . As a per cent of GSDP, surplus sector covers a negligible part. 
Chapter 7 summerises the findings of the study along with suggestions for the 
improvements in State finances in containing unnecessary budgetary subsidies 
along with an agenda for future research. 
Budgetary subsidies arise when the government fails to recover the cost of providing 
the services from the user charges by such means as fees, tariffs, and user 
charges. Subsidies also arise when government procures a commodity from sellers, 
and then sells it at prices that do not cover the procurement prices and cost of 
storage, handling, transmission, etc. such is the case of food subsidies in India. 
Apart from being costly and cumbersome, widespread, intervention by the 
government in the market impedes to respond to changing situations. 
Increasing burden of subsidies both implicit and explicit subsidies need to be revised 
in view of the State facing disturbing and fluctuating finances. An inter-State 
comparison shows that Uttar Pradesh is at the tail end in terms of growth of State's 
income and in many other development indicators. The State should reorient itself in 
modifying and directing its policies towards higher growth injecting sectors. 
Identifying the right sectors is itself a challenging task in the situation of weak 
finances. 
Subsidy reforms should aim at (i) reducing their volume relative to revenue receipts 
of the Central and the State governments, (ii) administering subsidies more directly 
to the targeted beneficiaries, thereby eliminating input-subsidies and focusing more 
on transfers as compared to price subsidies, (ill) making these subsidies transparent 
by showing them explicitly in the budget, and (iv) avoiding multiple subsidies to 
serve the same policy objective. 
Costs of service provision and/or low negligible recoveries through user charges are 
the two critical sides of subsidisation. Unit costs need to be reduced, wherever 
desirable and viable. Surplus employment and other operational inefficiencies must 
be reduced. 
Subsidy reforms, in the first instance, need to focus on selected sectors, which 
would yield maximum results and for those services for which there is considerable 
scope for higher recovery in the non-Merit category. In the case of Centre, the 
immediate focus of reform should be on food and fertiliser subsidies, and for State, it 
is important to attend to power and irrigation subsidies, while reforming the overall 
subsidy regime. 
There are some policy issues before the State government -
• To enable a debate on categorisation of services as per the externalities 
involved in consumption of goods and services. 
• To reduce the cost of provision of service by improving efficiency. 
• To revise the user charges regularly on the basis of inflation. 
• To specify the duration for which subsidy is given. 
• Subsidies to be limited to the intended beneficiaries and targeted groups. 
• Independent authorities to be set up to periodically review the quality of 
services and the user charges in various services. 
• More transparency in stating the burden of subsidies to the exchequer of the 
State. 
• If not reducing the subsidies, at least reorient them towards creating socio-
economic infrastructure and proper maintenance than high salary component 
in the cost of provision of services. 
• A mere concentration in to sectors like social welfare, power, irrigation, roads 
and bridges can help the government in generating and directing surpluses 
towards income and employment generating sectors. 
• Higher allocation for non-salary maintenance expenditure. 
The comprehensive analysis of the estimated values of the subsidies clearly shows 
that there is an increasing trend in the volume of subsidies in Utter Pradesh. Implicit 
budgetary subsidies have increased from Rs. 4486.07 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 
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15928.39 crore in 2005-06. Per capita subsidies in Utter Pradesh have also 
increased from Rs, 343.79 in 1990-91 to Rs. 873.80 in 2005-06. Recoveries have 
declined and costs have increased that shows inefficiency on the part of the 
government. Economic Services absorbed major parts, around 73 per cent of total 
subsidies in the State. Social Services are given much lesser subsidies, which is 
more welfare generating sector. Most of the subsidies are implicit, whereas explicit 
subsidies are negligible. This shows that subsidies in Utter Pradesh are not 
transparent and poody targeted. 
In this study we have constructed a discrete time series of estimated values of 
implicit subsidies for Utter Pradesh only. For further research, there is a need to 
compute the subsidies for other major State in India to analyse the inter-State 
variations in the volume of subsidies and policies of their rationalisation. 
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PREFACE 
Subsidies, as converse of an indirect tax, constitute an important fiscal instrument 
for modifying market-determined outcomes. WliiJe taxes reduce disposable income, 
subsidies inject money into circulation. Subsidies affect tlie economy through the 
commodity market by lowering the relative price of the subsidised commodity, 
thereby generating an increase in its demand. With an indirect tax, the price of the 
taxed commodity increases, and the quantity at which the market for that commodity 
is cleared, falls, other things remaining the same. Taxes appear on the revenue side 
of government budgets, and subsidies, on the expenditure side. 
Subsidies can have a major impact in augmenting welfare of the society provided 
these are designed and administered efficiently to serve a clearly stated set of 
objectives. However, subsidies can also be very costly if they are poorly designed 
and inefficiently administered. Subsidies in areas such as education, health and 
environment are advocated on grounds that their benefits are spread well beyond 
the immediate recipients, and are shared by the population at large, present and 
future. Subsidies are also used with redistributive objectives, particularly for 
ensuring minimum consumption levels of food and other basic needs. 
In this exercise, the focus is on budgetary subsidies and the main objective is to 
uncover implicit subsidies. Accordingly, subsidies are measured here as 
"unrecovered" costs of governmental provision of goods/services that are not 
classified as public goods. In particular, the goods/services under reference are 
those that are categorised as social services and economic services. The 
unrecovered costs are measured as the excess of aggregate costs over receipts 
from the concerned budgetary head. The study forms the basis for policy options to 
correct fiscal imbalances in the State of Utter Pradesh and warrants a careful 
calibration of budgetary subsidies with a view to make them more transparent and 
targeting to intended beneficiaries. 
The present study is divided into seven chapters. The first chapter is of introductory 
in nature. The concept of budgetary subsidies (definition and taxonomy), objectives, 
rationale, and mode of administering subsidies, scope and importance of the study, 
hypothesis, methodology adopted, data sources and limitation of the study are 
discussed in this chapter. 
Chapter 2 is divided into two parts. First part d]scusses a theoretical rationale for 
subsidies. That allow to analyse two kinds of policy failure. The first policy failure 
focuses on the impact of hidden subsidies on welfare and on the effectiveness of 
other policies. The second policy failure results in the ineffectiveness of the 
subsidies themselves. Second part of the chapter covers the review of the empirical 
studies related to subsidies. 
Chapter 3 analyses the trends of explicit Central budgetary subsidies in general and 
some of the major explicit subsidies of Central government in particular. This 
chapter also gives an overview of implicit Central budgetary subsidies as estimated 
by earlier studies. 
Chapter 4 is a brief review of finances of the State of Utter Pradesh and changes 
took place in the recent years. This chapter is divided in three major parts. First part 
deals with the macro view of the economy of Utter Pradesh along with social 
indicators and reform initiated. Second part compares 14 major fiscal indicators of 
the State of Utter Pradesh with other major States of India. A time profile of 
revenues (tax and non tax), expenditure patterns and overall fiscal scenario of Uttar 
Pradesh is discussed in the third part. 
Chapter 5 presents the estimation of budgetary subsidies in the Utter Pradesh. This 
chapter is divided into five parts. First part discusses about conceptual definition and 
adjustment for estimating budgetary subsidies in Utter Pradesh. Second part 
analyses transfer payments either made to individuals in the form of grants-in -aid 
and direct transfer or assistance to local bodies or public sector undertakings. 
Transfer payments are treated as explicit subsidies and are netted out before the 
estimation of implicit subsidies. In third part a macro view of implicit subsidies along 
with recovery rates, share of social and economic services in implicit subsidies, per 
capita subsidies on current and constant prices and as a percentage of GSDP are 
analysed. In the fourth section of the chapter, a macro comparison of the implicit 
subsidies with earlier studies is present. In the last part of the chapter, a detailed 
sector wise analysis of social and economic services with patterns of the surplus is 
given. 
Chapter 6 deals with the classification of budgetary subsidies into merit and non-
merit goods on the basis of externalities. The criterion of 'externality' determines 
whether and to what extent the services concerned should be subsidised. 
Chapter 7 presents summery and findings of the study along with suggestions for 
the improvements of State finances in containing unnecessary burden of budgetary 
subsidies along with an agenda for future research. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
India is a federal country with 28 States and 7 Centrally administered Union 
Territories. The total government expenditure of both Central and State 
governments taken together is about 30 per cent of the GDP (in 2005-06) and more 
than half of it is spent by States. With a structural adjustment programme in 1990-
91, government as a part of fiscal reforms for stabilisation tried to control the fiscal 
deficit and put emphasis on the reduction in subsidies at both levels - Centre and 
States. 
Subsidies, as converse of an indirect tax, constitute an important fiscal instrument 
for modifying market-determined outcomes. While taxes reduce disposable income, 
subsidies inject money into circulation. Subsidies affect the economy through the 
commodity market by lovi^ ering the relative price of the subsidised commodity, 
thereby generating an increase in its demand. With an indirect tax, the price of the 
taxed commodity increases, and the quantity at which the market for that commodity 
is cleared, falls, other things remaining the same. Taxes appear on the revenue side 
of government budgets, and subsidies, on the expenditure side. 
Subsidies can have a major impact in augmenting welfare of the society provided 
these are designed and administered efficiently to serve a clearly stated set of 
objectives. However, subsidies can also be very costly if they are poorly designed 
and inefficiently administered. Subsidies in areas such as education, health and 
environment are advocated on grounds that their benefits are spread well beyond 
the immediate recipients, and are shared by the population at large, present and 
future. Subsidies are also used with redistributive objectives, particularly for 
ensuring minimum consumption levels of food and other basic needs. 
In this context, the present study examines the volume of subsidies and its fiscal 
implications at the State level taking the State of Uttar Pradesh as the case study. 
The size of Utter Pradesh government expenditures as a percentage of GSDP taken 
out to be about 20 per cent in 2005-06. Uttar Pradesh witnessed high fiscal 
imbalances during 1990s and in early 2000. In this perspective, we would like to 
analyse the burden of subsidies and fiscal position of the State. 
1.1 Subsidies: Definition and Meaning 
What is subsidy? This is obviously an important question. How to define a subsidy 
has been the subject of intensive debate. What is crucial in identifying a subsidy is 
the choice of benchmark, both in theory and practice. In theory, the benchmark is 
the situation in which private welfare is maximized, hence prices should equal 
marginal private costs. Any deviation implies a subsidy. In practice, though, marginal 
costs can often not be determined any world market prices are commonly used as 
benchmark for identifying a subsidy. 
Subsidies comprise all measures that keeps prices for consumers below market 
level or keep prices for producers above market level or that reduce cost for 
consumers and producers by giving direct or indirect support. The term "Subsidy" 
has been used in the literature in a variety of ways, often implying different meaning 
and connotations. 
The word "Subsidy" is derived from the Latin word "Subsidium", meaning, "troops 
stationed in reserve" which implies 'coming to assistance from behind or indirectly". 
The dictionary (Concise Oxford) explains the term as: "Money granted by State, 
public body, etc., to keep down the prices of commodities, etc." The Joint Economic 
Committee of the U.S. Congress (1972) had defined Subsidy as government 
assistance for which no equivalent compensation is received in return, but the 
assistance is conditioned "on a particular performance by the recipient". 
Economists have even thought that the term should be differently defined for 
different context, Thus, Stephan Barg (1996) has suggested three different 
definitions for Economic, Fiscal and Environment issues respectively, which are as 
follows: 
Economic Definition 
"A Government - directed, marketing - distoring intervention which decreases the 
cost of producing a specific good or service, or increases the price which may be 
charged for it". 
This definition focuses on the use of government's taxation, expenditure or 
regulatory power to transfer a benefit from one group to another and how 
government policies should operate through the market-place, relating the topics 
such as improving economic efficiency, reducing unemployment and establishing 
appropriate policies. 
Fiscal Definition 
"A Government expenditure, provision for exemption from general taxation, or 
assumption of liability v^hich decreases the cost of producing a specific good or 
service, or which increases the price which may be charged for it". 
This definition focuses transfer from a government to the group or individual 
receiving the subsidy. It is most relevant when examining specific programmes that 
are existing or proposed, in order to see who will actually bear the costs or receive 
the benefits. Many of the commonly-discussed subsidies, or instruments that create 
subsidies, fall under this definition. Some examples include: 
Cash payments; 
Low interest loans; 
Subsidised services; 
R&D grants to industry; 
government-funded research; 
tax expenditures; 
training assistance; 
assumption of liability (e.g. loan guarantee, site clean up); and 
artificial assignment of liability (e.g. super-fund imposition of joint and several 
liability) 
Environmental Definition 
"An environmental subsidy consists of the value of uncompensated environmental 
damaged arising from any flow of goods or services". 
It can be seen that environmental subsidies have been defined in the broadest way 
incorporating any flow of benefits that arise from environmental degradation, even if 
they are not government - directed, and do not pass through a market mechanism, 
and reflect direct costs. 
For example, harvesting a forest without reforesting, or without recognizing non-
timber values, involves an unpaid leading to environmental damage. This amount to 
subsidization of these harvesters, to the extent of the unpaid cost, by the user of the 
environment, i.e. the society, 
Other Explanations of Subsidies as Used in Various Studies: 
Mundle, Sudipto and M. Govinda Rao (1991) have defined subsidies as 
"Government Subsidies may be defined as the differences between the cost of 
delivering various publicly provided goods and services and the recoveries arising 
from such deliveries". Thus in a budgetary context, it may be defined as 
"Unrecovered Cost in the public provision of private goods". 
Beers, Cees van and Andre de Moor (2001), "Subsidies comprise all measures 
that keeps prices for consumers below market level or keep prices for producers 
above market level or that reduce cost for consumers and producers by giving direct 
or indirect support." 
Two types of economic policy intervention stand out particularly in this definition. By 
regulating domestic prices and keeping them below world market prices, 
government support consumption. Subsidised consumer prices increases domestic 
consumption and this excess demand may induce additional imports and hence 
decrease foreign exchange revenues. Or governments may choose to subsidise 
production, for instance by imposing minimum price above market level. Producers 
expand supply and accelerate resource depletion, while public budgets are tapped 
to pay for surpluses. Both producer and consumer subsidies, either through 
overproduction or overconsumption, may be cause of environmental degradation. 
According to Thomas, Kenneth P. (2007), an investment incentive is a subsidy 
given to affect the location of investment. The goal may be to attract new investment 
or to retain an existing facility. Further, he explains, 
"A subsidy, in turn, is money given to a firm by government. This can take many 
forms: cash grants, tax measures, loan at beiow-market rates, loan at a below-
market interest rates, loan guarantees, capital injections, guaranteed excessive rate 
of profit, below-cost or free inputs including land and power, and purchasing goods 
from firms at inflated prices. This list is not exhaustive, but includes the type of 
support used in virtually all subsidies." 
According to Reddy, K.S. (1987), in a developing country where market system is 
not competitive and its income distribution is skewed the interplay of forces of 
demand and supply does not always lead to socially desirable results. For instance, 
if market forces are allowed to operate freely, prices of important consumer as well 
intermediate commodities will be beyond the reach of a majority of consumers and 
producers. Hence, Government intervention in the market is needed to moderate 
these adverse influences. One of the policy instruments in this direction is the 
provision of subsidies, where the consumers or produces will be allowed to pay less 
than the market price and gap will be filled by subsidies. Hence subsidies can be 
defined as a payment made by the government to fill the gap between prevailing 
market price and the price paid by the buyers. A subsidy given in the product market 
is called consumers subsidy and one provided in the factor market is called 
producers' subsidy. These subsidies can be broadly classified into direct and 
indirect subsidies. While direct subsidies are shown in the government budget under 
the sub-head "Subsidies" under relevant major heads, indirect subsidies are hidden 
under various entries in the budget. 
Srivastava, D.K. et. al, (2003) have explained Subsidies, as converse of an indirect 
tax, constitute an important fiscal instrument for modifying market-determined 
outcomes. While taxes withdraw money from circulation, subsidies inject money into 
circulation. Subsidies affect the economy through the commodity market by lowering 
the relative price of the subsidized commodity, thereby generating an increase in its 
demand. With an indirect tax, the price of taxed commodity increases, and the 
quantity at which the market for the commodity is cleared, falls, other things 
remaining the same. Taxes appear on the revenue side of the government budgets 
and subsidies on the expenditure side. In a budgetary context, subsidies are taken 
as unrecovered cost of public provision of non-public goods, although the term may 
be defined in a variety of other ways. 
According to Rao, Hemlata and H.K, Amar Nath (2003), the concept of subsidy 
used in Budget Document refers to the explicit payment made to producers to alter 
their price or output decisions or to consumers to encourage them to consume more 
because it is "meritorious" to do so. On the contrary, the National Accounting 
concept is broader as it includes, in addition of arising from the losses of 
departmental enterprises. Subsidies may be defined as "money granted by State or 
public body to individuals / firms or organizations (who has to bear a part of the cost) 
to bring down the cost by way of tax exemption, part payment by government, lower 
interest charges and so on. Or to bring down tlie final price of tliose goods and 
services, which have large externalities or which lead to distributive justice". For this 
part of assistance (subsidies), no equivalent compensation is received. 
Conceptually subsidy may be explained in three different ways. The first refers to 
the term used in consumer parlance, the explicit budgetary subsidies. The second is 
the concept used in National Accounts and this implies the converse of indirect 
taxes. The third concept was first used in the Mundle and Rao (1991) study and 
subsequent work that followed in National Institute of Public Finance and Policy 
(NIPFP), New Delhi. This definition of subsidy provides the most comprehensive 
estimate and would include both definition of subsidy provided to the consumers (in 
the form of income supplement and below cost provision) as well as to the 
producers (including those to cover production inefficiencies.) 
The unrecovered cost essentially represents the difference between the cost of the 
providing the services and the costs recovered from the consumers of the services 
through user charges. The difference can arise because: (i) the cost of providing the 
service is higher than the efficiency cost, (ii) the service is provided at the lower than 
marginal social cost to encourage its optimal consumption, (iii) it is found to be 
desirable to charge lower than marginal social cost to encourage its consumption by 
the poor and vulnerable section and (iv) its supply is designed inefficiently and user 
charges at optimal rates cannot be collected due to political reasons. The critical 
issue for policy is to estimate the last component and ensure that the subsidy is 
manages and targeted effectively to reach intended groups. 
1.2 Taxonomy of the Subsidy 
Subsidies may be defined as "money granted by State or public body to individuals / 
firms or organizations (who has to bear a part of the cost) to bring down the cost by 
way of tax exemption, part payment by government, lower interest charges and so 
on. Or to bring down the final of those goods and services, which have large 
externalities or which lead to distributive justice". For this part of assistance 
(subsidies) no equivalent compensation is received. The following are some 
features of subsidies -
• Subsidies are money transfers from government. 
• Transfers are intended to encourage consumption of goods or services by 
individuals / firms / organizations. 
• Often the purpose of the subsidies is to reduce the cost or price of 
consumption of those commodities that have externalities or help achieving 
distributive justice. 
• In principle, it is possible to price these goods or services, but they are 
subsidised because government v^ants to encourage their consumption / 
production for externality or merit good reasons. 
• The recipient of subsidy may be required to bear some part of the cost 
(except when the goods have very high degree of externality). 
• Subsidies are like negative indirect taxes that bring down the price of goods / 
services. 
• An important feature of subsidies is that they have both substitution effect 
and the income effect. 
• Implicit subsidies give rise to unrecovered cost. 
• Subsidy is a converse of a tax. 
• It is a redistribution of income. 
• Can reduce certain cost of production. 
• Over subsidisation could adversely affect environment and allocation of 
resources. 
• In a general equilibrium framework the introduction of subsidies in one 
market would reverberate in to the system through several channels. First, if 
the subsidy would serve as an input like power, diesel or irrigation, the 
benefit of the subsidy will be extended to all final outputs where the 
subsidised good is being used as an input, In particular, their unit cost would 
go down. This will have implication for the final incidence of the subsidy that 
will be dispersed through several markets. 
• Subsidies may induce a number of efficiency losses. 
• The effectiveness of subsidies depends on their design. In general subsidies 
that are administered to final consumption or production are considered to be 
more desirable since they can accrue to the target beneficiaries directly. 
• Untargeted subsidies promote inefficiency and induce wastage of scarce 
resources. 
• Subsidies promote growth by increasing the level of critical inputs like health, 
education and infrastructure. 
• Subsidies are regressive in nature. 
Subsidies have a critical bearing on all the three components of sustainable 
development - economic, social, and environmental. For instance, a producer or a 
consumer subsidy that lowers the price of a fuel to the consumer increases its 
demand and also enhances overall energy consumption. The positive social effects 
flow out of enhanced access to energy services and economic benefits from 
promotion of employment in the domestic industry. The impact on environment may 
be positive or negative according as the subsidy or support is being provided on 
more (fossil fuels) or less (renewable or energy efficient technologies) polluting 
energy sources and technologies. Subsidies take different forms. Some take the 
form of direct impact on price, such as grants and tax exemptions, while others work 
in a more indirect fashion, such as regulation that tilt the market in favour of a 
particular good or government-supported research and development. Governments 
provide subsidies either through the budget or off-the budget, the latter more so on 
account of political economy of or special interests associated with subsidy and tax 
policy. Accordingly, the classification of subsidies provided in Earth Council (1997) 
and OECD (1998) could be integrated and adapted to derive the following 
taxonomy. As can be seen, the classification is by the type of subsidy, impact on the 
government budget and its point of impact. 
Table 1.1 
Taxonomy of subsidies 
Points 
of 
impact 
Direct 
Subsidies 
Indirect 
subsidies 
Output 
Raw 
iVIaterial 
And 
Intermediate 
Product 
Inputs 
Capital and 
labour input 
or income or 
profit 
earnings 
Effects on Government Budget 
On-budget 
Grants or payments to consumers or 
producers 
• Deficiency payments 
• Sales premiums 
• Preferential sales tax and VAT rates 
• Tax credits, exemptions and 
allowances 
• Support to material and energy 
input (e.g. energy, fertilizers, 
irrigation water) 
• Provision of infrastructure and 
• complementary services below 
long run marginal cost 
• Support to non-material and non-
energy inputs (e.g. labour and 
capital equipment) 
• Accelerated depreciation 
allowances 
• Income tax concessions 
• Concessional credit, preferential 
loans, 
• loan or liability guarantees 
• Debt write-off 
• Provision of infrastructure and 
services at less than long run 
marginal cost 
• Support to research and 
development (e.g. on production 
techniques, safety and 
environmental protection) or 
government research and 
development expenditures. 
Off-budget 
Grants or payments to consumers or 
producers 
• Domestic market price support 
• Price regulation and quantity 
controls 
• Government procurement policies 
• Government brokered sales 
contracts 
• Trade-oriented support 
• Border protection (import and 
tariffs, 
• quantitative import restrictions, 
non tariff barriers) 
Materials and services in kind or below 
long run marginal cost 
• Concessional credit 
• Royalty concessions 
• Low rate of return requirements 
• Exemptions from certain 
environmental regulation 
Source; Earth Council 1997, and OECD 1998 
1.3 Rationale for subsidies 
Government provides subsidies for the following reasons: 
Correcting market failure^ 
Protecting national production from competition 
Reducing import dependence 
Encouraging national employment 
Ensuring balanced regional development 
Enabling access to and affordability of basic services or goods by all 
Stimulation of economic grov /^th. 
Subsidies are justified in the presence of positive externalities because in these 
cases considerations of social benefits require higher level of consumption than 
what would be obtained on the basis of private benefit only. 
In general, subsidies are advocated in the presence of positive externalities. In such 
a case, the social benefit from the consumption of a particular commodity or service 
is greater than the sum of the private benefits to the consumers. Primary education, 
preventive health cure, and research and development are prime examples of 
positive externalities. In these cases, private valuation of the benefits from such 
goods or services is less than their true value to the society, and normal pricing 
mechanism will not produce efficient outcomes. Subsidies can provide the 
necessary corrective measures in such cases. Subsidies have also been advocated 
for redistributive objectives, especially to ensure minimum level of food and nutrition 
to all section of the society. 
However, subsidies need to be financed. These may be financed through additional 
taxation or borrowings. Taxation leads to dead weight loss in welfare. Therefore, 
whether introducing a subsidy is a welfare augmenting measure or not can only be 
judged in terms of additional welfare loss from additional taxation. The implications 
of additional borrowings also need to be considered in a macro framework because 
of the pressure it may exert on interest rates and crowding out of private investment. 
^ Market failure occurs when private actions contradict the social ends of an allocation of 
resources. 
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Figure 1.1 
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As an illustration, in Figure 1.1, the private demand curve for a food {Dp) is below 
that of social demand curve {Ds) due to externalities. The supply curve (S) 
represents (social) marginal cost providing the good. 
Left to the market forces, the quantity consumed will be Qo, which is less than the 
socially optimal consumption Qi. The government can intervene in the market by 
giving a subsidy which is equal to a vertical distance between the two demand 
curves, per unit of the good. This would shift the private demand curves, per unit of 
the good. This would shift the private demand curve to coincide with the social 
demand curve, increasing the consumption of the good to Qi. The total amount of 
the subsidy is required to indicate by shaded area. The increase consumption 
results from the fact that although the total unit price increase from Po to Pi, the 
private cost is reduced to WQi, ZWbe'mg the element of subsidy in the price. 
In the above illustration, one market was considered at a time. However, subsidies 
would also have repercussions at other markets. For example, as consumer buy 
more of the product under consideration, the demand for other products may 
decline. Assuming production to be subject to increasing cost (positively sloped 
supply curve), this will lower their price. Similarly, as the output mix changes, so 
would the derived demand for various factors. The ideal analytical framework for 
consideration of subsidies, like that of taxes, is a general equilibrium framework. 
(Other illustrations may be considered distinguishing between cases where (i) the 
good is produced exclusively by private producers and (ii) by both private producers 
and government. Differentiation can also be made where the price includes a private 
cost element in addition to a social cost element with the good being produced 
entirely by the government. Differentiation in the extent of subsidy according to 
economic status or other considerations can also be examined in this analytical 
framework.) 
1.4 Mode of Administering a Subsidy 
A subsidy programme may be administered in a number of ways. Some alternative 
modes are as follows -
1. Subsidy to producers - A subsidy may be given to the producers of a good 
with the objective of augmenting its consumption. This would result in 
increasing the supply thereby enabling a higher consumption of the good. 
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Such subsidies may be given to offset losses of producers to ensure 
continued production. 
2. Subsidy to Consumers - A straightforward way of encouraging 
consumption of a good is by giving the subsidy directly to the consumers, 
which would result in an increase in the demand (at every price level). In 
general subsidy to consumers on final goods may be recommended in 
preference to other modes, as it is earlier to monitor the distribution impact of 
the subsidy in this case. 
3. Subsidy to Producers of Inputs - When a particular good can be produced 
by using different combinations of inputs, the use of a particular input is 
encouraged by providing subsidies on such an input being used in the 
production of the concerned good. This may also lead to lower prices for the 
consumers, and higher profit margins for the producers. The input subsidy 
can be provided in the form of cash subsidy to the producers of the input, per 
unit of output produced, or to the producers of the concerned good per unit 
of input based. 
4. Subsidies Through Public Enterprises - Subsidies may be administered 
through direct intervention in the market by setting up a public enterprises to 
produce / procure / distribute the goods in question or their inputs at chosen 
administered prices. The differences in the market price and the actual sale / 
purchase price leads to the subsidy, while the government has to the sustain 
the losses incurred by the enterprises. 
1.4.1 Cross Subsidy 
It is often possible to distinguish between classes of consumers for a good or a 
range of goods. For example a distinction can be made between commercial and 
domestic users of electricity. Similarly, within the broad group of petroleum products 
a distinction may be made between kerosene and diesel vis-a-vis petrol and turbine 
fuel. In a certain sectors with one or more products is subjected to administered 
price regime, it is possible to charge some consumers (product-wise or use-wise) a 
price which is more than cost as to finance a subsidy given to other consumers by 
charging them a price which is less than cost. Such intra-sectoral financing of a 
subsidy involves cross-subsidisation. In such cases, if a net subsidy is still left after 
cross-subsidisation. It will be a charge on the general budget. 
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1.4.2 Subsidy Targeting 
When subsidies are recommended because of market failure or other social 
objectives, they can be distributed among individuals according to a set of subjected 
criteria, e.g., (i) merit, (ii) income level, (iii) social group,(iv) regional, (v) product, etc. 
usually such discrimination itself is administratively costly. Two types of error arise if 
proper targeting is not done, i.e. exclusion errors and inclusion errors. In the former 
case, some of those who deserve to receive a subsidy get excluded and in the latter 
case, some of those who do not deserve to receive subsidy get included in the 
subsidy programme. 
1.5 Effects of Subsidy 
Economic effects of subsidies broadly can be grouped into (i) allocative effects, (ii) 
redistributive effects, (iii) fiscal effects, (iv) trade effects (v) positive effects, and (vi) 
negative effects. 
• Allocative effects relate to the sectoral allocation of resources. Subsidies 
help draw more resources towards the subsidised sector. 
• Redistributive effects, as between producers and consumers, and as 
between rural and urban population or between rich and poor population, 
generally depend upon the elasticities of demand of relevant groups for the 
subsidised good as well as the elasticities of supply of the same good, and 
the mode of administering the subsidy. 
• Subsidies have obvious fiscal effects since a large part of subsidies emanate 
from the budget. The directly increase fiscal deficits. Subsidies may also 
indirectly affect the budget adversely by drawing resources away from tax-
yielding sectors towards sectors they may have a low tax revenue potential 
• Often a regulated price, which is substantially lower than market clearing 
price, may reduce domestic supply and lead to an increase in imports. On 
the other hand, subsidies to domestic producers may enable them to offer 
internationally competitive prices, reducing imports or raising exports. 
• Subsidies could encourage sustainable agricultural and industrial practices 
and greater equity. In fact, they could play a crucial role in effecting the 
needed transition to more sustainable forms of development worldwide. 
• The dark side of the subsidy is that it can be counter productive. 
14 
Subsidies may also lead to perverse a unintended economic effects. They would 
result in inefficient resource allocation if imposed on a competitive market or where 
market imperfections do not justify a subsidy, by diverting economic resources away 
from areas where their marginal productivity would be higher. Generalised subsidies 
waste resources; further, they may have perverse distributional effects endowing 
greater benefits on the better-off people. For example, a price control may lead to 
lower production and shortages and thus generate parallel markets resulting in 
profits to operators in such markets and economic rent to privileged people who 
have access to the distribution of the good concerned at the controlled price. 
Subsidies have a tendency to self-perpetuate. They create vested interests and 
acquire political hues. Also, it is difficult to control the incidence of a subsidy since 
their effects are transmitted through the mechanism of the market, which often has 
imperfections after than those addressed by the subsidy. 
1.6 Approaches to Estimation of Subsidies 
Measurement of the magnitude of subsidies is not a straightforward exercise. 
Different approaches and conventions appear to have evolved in this context. 
Differences in methodologies arise with respect to 
i. source of information - budget based, national accounts or any other 
source; 
ii. coverage of transactions - cash subsidies only, implicit subsidies in soft 
loans, government guarantees; only budget based subsidies or also extra-
budgetary subsidies; gross cost to government or only net costs; 
iii. sectoral coverage - agriculture, manufacturing, etc.; 
iv. measurement basis - focus on recipients of subsidies or ultimate 
beneficiaries 
There are two major conventions in the estimation of subsidies relate to 
measurement through (i) the Budgets and (ii) the National Accounts. 
1.6.1 Budget-Based Approach 
Budgetary cost of subsidies is usually defines as budget outlays on a service net of 
cost recovery through user charges etc. it is commonly recognised that entries in the 
budget under the head of 'subsidies' would give a very incomplete picture of 
subsidies. Since explicit subsidies cover only a fraction of total subsidies. 
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Methodologies have been developed to also estimate implicit subsidies in the 
system as unrecovered cost of public services, at least for those public 
services/goods where the principle of non-rivalry and non-excludability is not 
applicable. In these cases, it should be possible to recover, at least in principle, the 
cost of providing services according to the extent of their consumption. It is a 
general practice to exclude pure public goods such as defence, general 
administration, etc., in the context of subsidies, although subsidies may arise even 
in the process of producing a pure public good. For example, in the case of defence 
expenditure, there may be a procurement subsidy in the purchase of defence goods. 
1.6.2 National Income Accounting Approach 
In the national income framework, subsidies net of indirect taxes, constitute the 
difference between product measures (GDP, GNP) at factor cost and at market 
prices. 
In national income accounts (NIA), indirect taxes are deducted and subsidies are 
added in order to arrive at estimates of gross domestic product (GDP) at factor cost 
from the estimates of GDP at current market prices. Indirect taxes that are part of 
the sale price of commodities do not create incomes for factors of production. 
These are, therefore, deducted from GDP at market prices to get at GDP at factor 
cost. On the other hand, subsidies have the reverse effect. A subsidy received by a 
firm will be paid out as wages, rents or profits, and would therefore, become an 
income of the factors of production. However, this component of their income is not 
generated by the sale of output. Hence, subsidies must be added to expenditure, 
i.e., GDP at market prices. 
In the Central Statistical Organisation's NIA methodology, subsidies include grants 
on current account which private industries, public corporations and government 
enterprises receive from the government. These may be in the form of direct 
payments or those estimated on the basis of differentials between buying and selling 
prices of government trading organisations. The NIA approach focuses only on 
firms/producers or government departments. It does not fully cover all the budgetary 
costs in the public provision of non-public goods. 
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1.7 Importance and Scope of the Study 
Reducing or rationalising subsidies to improve fiscal health is a challenging task and 
should be main focus of the economic reforms. The estimates made by earlier 
studies are not comparable over a period of time. The methodology of estimation of 
budgetary subsidies has undergone many changes and the conceptual definition 
used in various studies differs from each other. Justification of subsidies in certain 
services through classification of services, in these studies varies from one another. 
The Discussion paper brought out by the Ministry of Finance, Government of India in 
1997, cautioned for increasing burden of subsidies both explicit and implicit on 
exchequer of both Central, and State Governments, and suggested a need for 
reducing the same for improving the fiscal health of the governments. Therefore, it is 
necessary to estimate implicit budgetary subsidies with one single methodology and 
conceptual clarity over a period of time and examine whether there has been any 
impact of economic reforms (which have been initiated in India since 1991) on 
reducing or rationalising the implicit and explicit budgetary subsidies so as to 
improve the fiscal health and set an agenda for the future. 
The present study examines the implicit subsidies in terms of low cost recovery in 
the provision of services. The study forms the basis for policy options to correct 
fiscal imbalances in the State of Utter Pradesh and warrants a careful calibration of 
budgetary subsidies with a view to make them more transparent and targeting to 
intended beneficiaries. 
The earlier studies on State's subsidies have not computed subsidies for more then 
a year or a time series. If a change in the volume and composition of subsidies or 
efforts of the government in rationalising them are to be studied then a time profile of 
the volume and composition is essential. In the present study, we have constructed 
a discrete time series of the implicit subsidies in Utter Pradesh since 1990-91 to 
2005-06. Highlighted economic reforms in containing subsidies or rationalising them 
towards socio-economic development. The significance of the study is the 
estimation of subsidies of a State of India for seven years and categorisation of 
services to weed out unnecessary subsidies, in which, the role of the government 
can be reduced or withdrawn. 
After reviewing various earlier studies, the present study, uses the most suitable 
methodology with utmost conceptual clarity, in estimation of the implicit budgetary 
subsidies for the State of Uttar Pradesh for different years in a comparable manner 
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after initiation of economic reforms and various fiscal adjustment measures during 
the reform period. Attempts liave been made to estimate the volume and 
composition of explicit and implicit subsidies and tiptoes around policy measures 
required to target them. The important sectors of social and economic services are 
analysed in detail in this study. The study besides suggesting a prescriptive policy, 
also attempts to highlight the direction in which these implicit budgetary subsidies 
are moving. The study covers a discrete series of time period since 1990-91 till 
2005-06 by taking 1990-91 as the initial year of the concern economic reforms, 
1993-94 as first application for the assistance from the world bank, 1995-96 as 
structural adjustment loan from the World Bank and conditions attached to it, 2003-
04, write off the loans, and 2005-06, the latest year for which the data is available by 
using one common definition as adopted by Srivastava and Amar Nath (2001), 
Srivastava and Rao, (2003). 
1.8 Objectives of the Study 
The following are the objectives of the present study: 
1. To analyse the trends and volume of major budgetary subsidies in India; 
2. To estimate and to compare a discrete series of both explicit and implicit 
budgetary subsidies from non-public services for the State of Uttar Pradesh; 
3. To examine the trend and the composition of budgetary subsidies and 
recovery rate from non-public services provided by the State Government of 
Uttar Pradesh. 
4. To arrive at the meaningful inferences to suggest required measures to 
reduce or redirect the subsidies in favour of Social Welfare. 
1.9 Hypothesis 
The fiscal correction measures initiated since 1991, have no doubt given some 
indication that the governments, both at the Centre and the State level, have been 
serious about improving the finances of the government by various means. 
Rationalisation of subsidies is one of the serious concerns of the governments both 
at Union and the State levels. The impact of these measures on subsidies - implicit 
and explicit - in reorienting subsidies towards welfare including social or economic 
services needs to be captured. With this background, in our study, we want to test 
the following hypothesis -
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"There are serious efforts as a part of fiscal correction measures by the 
Government of Uttar Pradesh to rationalise the subsidies for increase in social 
welfare". 
1.10 Methodology 
To compute the subsidies we have used the same methodology which was used by 
Srivastava et.al. (2003), with a slight modification in transfer payments. 
The data relating to explicit budgetary subsidies have been provided in the Budget 
Documents or Finance Accounts of the Government. For consistency in statistical 
analysis, the study mainly depends on the Finance Accounts published by the 
Comptroller and Auditor General of India for collecting the required information on 
implicit budgetary subsidies. As such, there is no need for estimation process 
involved in arriving at the explicit budgetary subsidies. 
In the present study, the focus is on budgetary subsidies and the main objective is to 
estimate implicit subsidies in the State of Utter Pradesh during 1990-91 to 2005-06. 
Implicit budgetary subsidies have been defined as un-recovered costs of providing 
non-public goods, measured as the excess of aggregate costs over aggregate 
receipts. Non-public goods are classified as social and economic services in the 
budget documents. Costs have two elements: (1) Current costs or Variable costs 
and (2) Annualised capital costs. The current costs consists of revenue expenditures 
directly related to the provisions of services, and classified under different budgetary 
heads. Aggregate receipts consist of revenue from user charges and interest and 
dividend received from lending and investment, respectively. Transfer payments to 
individuals, which adds to income of the recipients and do not constitute the costs of 
providing services, are excluded from these expenditures. Whereas, the capital 
costs are considered, cumulative investment is separated from cumulative capital 
expenditure to arrive at capital stock. An imputed rate of return (cost of borrowing) is 
applied on investment and capital stock to arrive at opportunity or imputed costs of 
capital stock and investment and an estimated depreciation on capital stock to arrive 
at annualised capital costs. The receipts come in three forms: revenue receipts from 
the user charges, interest receipts on loans, and dividends on equity investment. 
Like the earlier studies a two per cent depreciation in nominal terms with an 
assumption of life span of 50 years on capital investment in public sector is 
assumed. But, here a different methodology is applied to adjust the capital stock. 
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which is a summation of nominal investments in historical prices into real terms and 
an adjusted depreciation rate (ADR) is arrived. The stimulated ADR also considers 
investment growth as one of the parameters. The depreciation rate thus, is arrived 
at by simulating the alternative values of parameters of inflation and growth rate of 
investment. Capital Stock is adjusted for conversion into real term and allows for a 
gestation period by Srivastava and Amar Nath methodology, but continues with the 
earlier assumption of 50-years life span for the capital invested in public sector. The 
imputed rate of interest is the actual cost of borrowing in the previous year by the 
Government. 
In terms of mathematical symbols, methodology of estimating implicit budgetary 
subsidies can be expressed as follows: 
1. The cost of providing public services can be defined as 
C = RX + (I + d*) Ko + iZo 
Where, 
RX = revenue expenditure on the service head net of adjustments 
i = effective interest rate 
d* = depreciation rate 
Ko = aggregate capital expenditure at the beginning of the period 
Zo = sum of loans and equity investment at the beginning of the 
period 
Adjustments in deriving RX relate to transfer to funds which are deducted and 
transfer from funds which are added. Transfers to individuals are also not counted, 
although these are separately compiled. Expenditure on running secretariat social 
and. economic services are also not counted as these relate to general 
administration, and are also not decomposable among different heads of services 
2. Receipt from providing services are defined as: 
R = RR + (l+D) 
Where, 
RR = revenue receipt 
I = interest receipt 
D = dividends 
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3. Implicit Budgetary Subsidy (S) is defined as: 
S = C - R 
Other parameters are effective interest rate and depreciation rate. The effective 
interest rate is obtained by dividing the interest payment in current year by 
outstanding debt at the beginning of the concerned year. Only three components of 
debt are considered for this purpose. They are a) Loans and Advances from Centre; 
b) Internal debt of the government and c) Small Savings and Provident funds. Table 
A1.1 (given in appendix) gives the estimated parameters. 
Estimation of depreciation costs should take into account, the fact that capital stock 
in the finance accounts presents an accumulation of past investments at different 
prices prevailing in different years in the past. 
The depreciation rate is to be calculated with reference to the stock of capital at the 
beginning of the year. This stock of capital is the sum of nominal investments in 
previous years. Since these are additions of nominal figures, all at different prices, 
the calculation of depreciation rate has to take this into account. The methodology 
used for this purpose is explained below. 
Let the life of a capital asset be T years. The rate of depreciation would be (1 / T) 
per year for the asset to be written off. For example, if T = 50 (years), 1 / T = .02. 
Let the current year be T + 1. The past years under consideration are from 1 to T. 
Let nominal investments in these years be written as 
ii , I2 IT 
Assuming an investment growth rate of z, we have 
I2 = ( 1 + z ) l i 
IT =(1+2)^-^1 
Thus, 
I1 = I T / ( 1 + Z ) ^ - ^ 
Correspondingly, 
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Ii = I T / ( 1 + Z ) 
I2 = I T / ( 1 + Z ) 
T-1 
T-2 
IT.I = I T / ( 1 + Z ) 
IT = I T 
T-1 If the long-term rate of inflation is ' i ' , a nominal amount of 1 in year 1, is (1 + i) in 
terms of the prices of the T'^  year. 
Then, the sum of \^, etc., in terms of the prices of the T'*" year can be written as 
v1 + Zy 
T-1 
+ h 
T-2 
= I T [ W ' - ' + W ' - ' + + 1] 
Where, 
w = 
^ 1 + i ^ 
Let, KT = (IT + IT-I + + ii) indicate aggregate capital expenditure obtained by 
summing investments measured in the prices of the respective years in which they 
were made. We can write: 
•^^=^^(^"•"1^ 
r 1 A 
1 + 
Vl + Zy 
+ ... + 
f 1 ^  
J + Z, 
T-1 
= IT[1 + X + ... + (X)'-'] 
Where, 
X = 1 / (1 + Z) 
or 
IT = K T / ( 1 + X + ... + X^-^) 
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Depreciation for one year in terms of the prices of year T is given by 
T IT(1 + W + W ' + ... + W^"') 
_ m (i+w+w^+-+w"-^) 
~[jj ' {^ + x+... + x'•') 
Depreciation in terms of prices of year (T + 1), i.e., the current year, can be obtained 
by multiplying the above expression further by (1 + i). Thus, if Kj (i.e., outstanding 
accumulated capital stock in nominal terms) is to be used as the base, the 
depreciation rate on this should be 
(1+i) 
We will refer to this expression as the adjusted depreciation rate (ADR). By 
simulating with alternative values of parameters (i, z) the following features 
regarding the impact of changes in the parameters on the depreciation rate can be 
derived. 
i. The higher inflation rate, the higher is the depreciation rate, for any given 
rate of growth of investment. 
ii. The higher investment growth rate, the lower is the depreciation rate for 
any given inflation rate. 
One more adjustment has been made. After investments are made the stock of 
capital does not always start yielding service immediately. Roughly ^/3"^ of capital 
stock for three years immediately preceding the reference year is not counted and 
depreciation rate accordingly is adjusted. 
There are several features and limitations of the estimation methodology, which 
arises from various assumption made or procedures followed at different steps. In 
particular, it may be noted that tax expenditures are not included in the estimates. 
Average life of an asset is assumed to be fifty years. Estimates are based on actual 
prices even if these are administered and not on the basis of market prices which 
would prevail in the absence of regulations. Subsidies arising from administered 
price regimes or off-budget subsidies are also not captured here. The estimation 
does not cover the inefficiency cost of in provision of services. 
23 
Implicit budgetary subsidies for non-public goods are classified based on the basis 
of merits and externalities involved. The recovery rates of both variable cost and 
capital costs are estimated and analysed for all the selected years. 
1.11 Data Sources 
The data required for the study are mainly collected from the Finance Accounts, 
published by the Comptroller and Auditors general every year. Information on the 
State income and capital formation are collected from the Central Statistics 
Organisation and the Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Uttar 
Pradesh. Data on State finances are collected from State Finances, Reserve bank 
of India, various issues for a time series analysis. Sufficient care is exercised while 
collecting the data from various sources for conceptual clarity and classification 
adjustment. Population data is taken from Central Statistical Organisation, 
Government of India, and Gross State Domestic Product data is obtained from 
"Gross Domestic Product of Indian States", EPW research foundation, Mumbai, for 
earlier years and Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Uttar 
Pradesh. 
• Since the required data for calculation of depreciation is not available, 
depreciation rate is taken to be 0.472 as estimated by Srivastava, C. 
Bhujanga Rao, Pinaki Chakraborti, and T.S. Rangamannar (2003). 
• To compute net expenditures the transfer to funds and transfer to individuals 
have been subtracted, as they do not add to the provision of service. 
• Grants-in-Aid and assistance to PSUs is also netted out as the service 
providers are outside the government and recovery of user charges are not 
appropriated by the government. 
• Though all these above items except transfers to funds are netted out they 
can be treated as explicit subsidies and are listed in a separate Table. 
• An adjustment is made in the data after bifurcation of the State on November 
8, 2000 for arriving capital cost, investment, loans, progressive figures of 
composite State of Uttar Pradesh as on November 8, 2000 that are yet to be 
apportioned between successor States of Uttar Pradesh and Uttaranchal 
(now Uttarakhand), which are shown in the bold letter in finance accounts, 
are divided on the basis of per cent of population of both States. 
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1.12 Limitations oftlie Study 
The ongoing research has come across many constraints during the course of the 
work. These constrains include both conceptual as well as statistical problems. Brief 
mention of the limitations of the study are as follows: 
1. We have not computed the implicit subsidies for the Central government of 
India, because that is out of scope of the study. Although we have discussed 
the quantum of implicit budgetary subsidies, as computed by the earlier 
studies. 
2. We have computed implicit budgetary subsidies in Utter Pradesh for selected 
years and not for each year during the study period. The calculation of 
subsidies for each year would have been very time consuming, more over, it 
is not excepted to have a significant change in each year. 
3. As the data for the calculation of depreciation rate is not available, we have 
taken it as suggested by the study of Srivastava, C. Bhujanga Rao, Pinaki 
Chakraborti, and T.S. Rangamannar (2003). 
4. The study assumes a life span of 50 years on capital stock, but not all the 
assets have the same life, some depreciate faster. 
5. Land as an asset may actually appreciate. 
6. The costs also include various cost of inefficiencies, the present study could 
not separate out the inefficiency cost in provision of services by the 
government. 
7. Simple ratio are calculated for the analysis and testing of the hypothesis. 
8. The classification of services made in the sixth chapter is purely discretionary 
and closer to the characteristics of these services. But one can move any of 
these services from one category to the other on relative degrees of 
externality. The exact externalities involved is not measured. 
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Chapter 2 
Theoretical Rationale of Subsidies 
and Review of Literature 
Dispensing subsidies is a part of the core business of governments, the counterpart 
of collecting taxes. It is widely recognised that government should intervene and 
concern themselves with issues that are important to society, and that otherwise 
would not survive without government intervention. Public intervention is usually 
motivated socially and economically. Social objective commonly involve the 
abatement of poverty or the protection of poor or economically vulnerable population 
groups. Governments provide income support for a minimum subsistence level or 
they subsidise access to basic living needs such as water, food, energy. They also 
intervene for economic objectives. Stimulating economic growth, enhancing or 
protecting employment and investments or providing infrastructures access are 
common goal of subsidy policies. 
This chapter is divided into two parts. First part discusses about theoretical rationale 
of subsidies in the context of the market failure, and the Second part is devoted to 
the review of empirical studies on subsidies. 
2.1 An Economic Analysis of Public Subsidies 
and Policy Failures 
No systematic attempt has been made yet to analyse the causes and consequences 
of public subsidies. The causes have to be looked for in a framework of political 
economy, while the consequences have to be analysed in a welfare economic 
framework. 
The main argument is that public subsidies can generate two kinds of policy failure. 
First, public subsidies can frustrate new government policies that aim to correct 
market failures. Second, they can generate unintended negative welfare effects that 
are larger than the positive welfare effects generated by achieving the goal of the 
subsidies. The policy failure arises especially when the officially intended goal is 
barely achieved or even counteracted. 
It is important to emphasise that there is nothing inherently bad about public 
subsidies. They are provided to achieve certain goals that are considered to improve 
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welfare in a society such as maintaining the income of farmers or miners, or 
providing basic goods and services for low-income groups. 
2.1.1 Public Subsidies and IVIarket Failures 
Standard welfare economics is concerned with the assessment of the total welfare 
of a group or society and the development of rational economic policies to maximize 
welfare. This is one of the fundamental propositions of welfare economics that 
presents a strong argument in favour of the market mechanism. 
Externalities and public goods are phenomena that weaken this argument. 
Externalities occur when consumption of individuals or production of firms are 
affected by actions of others individuals or firms without mediation of the market. 
These can be positive (social security system preventing widespread poverty) or 
negative (air or water pollution). 
The existence of externalities points to the failure of market to generate an efficient 
equilibrium, that is, an allocation of production and consumption that creates 
maximum private welfare. There is a need for government action to correct for 
market failures, particularly if externalities take the form of public goods like, for 
example, clean air. These are characterized by non-excludabiiity and non-rivalry. 
Non-excludability means that when a good is provided to one individual or firm, 
other cannot be excluded from consumption. Examples are clean air, police 
protection and so on. Non-rivalry means that use of a good by one individual or firm 
does not mean that at the same time other can not use it. Clean water, national 
parks and police protection are examples. Government action is necessary to 
provide for a public good like clean air. 
The government can use several instruments to correct for market failures. The 
most important instrument in welfare economics is the Pigouvian tax^ This is a tax 
that exactly incorporates the externality and leads to consumption and production 
patterns that are consistent with maximum welfare. 
Figure 2.1 shows the existence of an externality and a Pigouvian tax as a 
government action to correct for market failure such as water pollution. 
^ Generally, two approaches to correct market failures can be distinguished. The first 
approach is direct government intervention as suggested by Pigou and the focus here. 
The second approach is the distribution of property rights defining the property of 
externality and is based on Coase Theoram. 
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Figure 2.1 assumes a goods market with perfect competition among producers. Tlie 
marginal private cost curve of a producers, Sp^, intersects the demand curve at a, 
which means that qpm is the quantity demanded and supplied at a price Ppnv The 
market is in equilibrium and private welfare is maximized. However, the production 
also leads to water pollution and total costs to society are represented by the 
marginal social cost curve, Ssoc- This equals the marginal private costs plus the 
marginal external costs (additional costs caused by water pollution) due to the 
production of the good. The externality caused by the water pollution is abf . 
Government action by means of a Pigouvian tax dc is necessary to correct for the 
market failure. The price rises to psoc and the quantity demanded and supply 
declines to qso/. The external effect is reduced by abed to dcf, which is the optimal 
level of the external effect. Total welfare is the sum of consumer and producer 
surplus minus the external effect. Without government intervention consumer 
surplus is aeppriv and producer surplus is afppm. Total welfare without government 
intervention is aeppnv + afppm - abf= cef- abc. 
3 Less production automatically means a smaller externality effect. The magnitude of the 
externality reduction depends on the slop of supply curve compared with the slope of the 
demand curve, that is, the supply and demand elasticity. 
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Government intervention to correct for the market failure increases welfare. 
Introduction of a Pigouvian tax of cd generates total v\/elfare of cef. As abc > 0, cef > 
cef - abc and hence welfare has been increased as a result of government 
intervention. The external effect has been reduced by abed. Welfare, however, has 
increased by a lesser amount, abc. A part of external effect reduction, acd, is not a 
welfare increase as the improved welfare resulting from a smaller external effect has 
partly been cancelled out by reduced welfare caused by the reduction of consumer 
and producer surplus. The triangle acd called a dead-weight loss in the economic 
literature". 
Figure 2.2 shows that the introduction of public subsidies on the inputs of the 
producer, fg, shifts the marginal private costs curve downward to Ssub- Production 
increases to Qsub and the negative external effect increases to /)/. The increase is 
abji. Government action aggravates the external effect. The incorporation of the 
external effect requires a Pigouvian tax Ic that is higher than dc in a situation without 
the input subsidy. The addition Pigouvian tax Id, which is exactly the input subsidy of 
fg. In other words, the subsidy given to the producers should be taxed completely to 
reduce the external effect to efficient level. 
4 Parry and Bento (2000) call this triangle the primary cost of policy. 
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Figure 2.2 
Policy Failure Resulting from Public Subsidies 
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2.1.2 Public Subsidies and Policy Failures - Incorrect Policies 
A policy failure means that active government policy leads to welfare that is less 
than in case of correct policy. An example is the existence of an-environmentally 
damaging subsidy that conceals information about the real marginal costs of 
producing firms in a market and leads to environmental policy measures that are 
incorrect. 
Figure 2.3 shows relationship between government, the macroeconomic and social 
system, and the natural environment are presented. The government attempts to 
achieve certain economic and social aims such as increasing or maintaining 
employment and boosting productivity by using instruments as regulations, 
subsidies and taxes. This is shown by arrow 1. There is nothing inherently wrong 
with governments embarking upon a policy of subsidization. Subsidies may have 
positive welfare effects for society but these needs to be balanced against the 
(unintended) negative effects. Arrow 2 shows government interventions that are 
directly concentrated on protecting the natural environment, for example, defining 
protected areas. Arrow 3 is the central issue at stake and shows the effects of 
macroeconomic system, that is the aggregate of consumption and production, on 
the natural environment. It is here that the first arrow influences the natural 
environment and may undermine the effect of arrow 2, that is, direct environmental 
policy by the government such as Pigouvian taxes. This is first policy failure that will 
be elaborated in the present section. Many of the (often unintended) environment 
effects of arrow 3 can have a negative impact on welfare that is larger (in absolute 
value) than the positive welfare effects due to the government support of arrow 1. 
This is the second policy failure. The fourth arrow consists of the negative effects of 
environmental degradation of the economy. These are negative effects on 
employment and productivity due to health problems, early depreciation of capital 
goods and reduction of agricultural productivity because of soil damage. 
The hidden character is a special feature of many public subsidies for two reasons. 
First, whereas money transfers relating to on-budget subsidies are visible in the 
government budget, the indirect channels through which they increase negative 
environmental and social effects are hard to detect empirically. Second, in the case 
of off-budget subsidies the magnitude of subsidies remains unclear. Estimates at a 
global scale reveal that the magnitude of subsidies with negative welfare (and 
possibly perverse) effects are very large. 
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Figure 2.3 
Impact of Public Subsidies on the Economy 
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The hidden aspect of many public subsidies aggravates uncertainties in policy 
making. The fact that many public subsidies are concealed and have detrimental 
effects on the environment frustrates other government policies. For example, 
hidden subsidies that affect the natural environment negatively, frustrate 
environmental policies. 
Figure 2.4 focuses on producer subsidies, as these are dominant in most developed 
countries and have the most severe and indirect perverse effect. 
Figure 2.4 shows a partial equilibrium analysis with demand and supply curves 
under perfect competition in a closed economy. Point a is the equilibrium situation 
that results when private production costs include neither subsidies nor externalities 
taxes. In this case, the amount of qpnv is produces and private welfare maximized. 
The marginal external effect generated at this production level is ab, that is, the 
distance between the marginal private costs curve Spm and the marginal social cost 
curve Ssoc' The total external effect is abf. The total welfare is cef- abc. A Pigouvian 
tax equal to dc, that is the distance between the private cost curve and social cost 
curve at qsoc, would generate the socially optimal equilibrium. Total welfare would be 
cef, which is larger than cef- abc. 
Assume for simplicity that a constant producer subsidy equal to fg per unit of output 
(independent of the level of production) is provided. This shifts the supply curve Spm 
downward to Ssub and increases the level of production output that clears the market 
to Qsub- The social cost produced at this level of production is hj, i.e. sum of the 
marginal social cost due to the subsidy (hi) and the marginal externality cost (//). 
Total welfare is cef- hjc (> cef- abc). 
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Figure 2.4 
Inefficient Pollution Levels due to Hidden Producer Subsidies 
in a Closed Economy : Perfect Competition 
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When subsidy is hidden, the policymaker may incorrectly regard Ssub as the private 
production costs and qsub as the quantity based on the genuine private production 
costs, Qpriv. The point h is confused with point a. in that case dc, that is, the distance 
betv\/een Ssoc and Sp„v will mistakenly be regarded as the Pigouvian tax level 
associated with reducing the externality to its socially optimal level. However, taxes 
equal to dc = pm imposed on Ssub implies that the quantity produced and consumed 
will be reduced to qss, which is higher than the socially optimal quantity qsoc- This 
result is obtained by drawing a line parallel to Ssub through point k, which is located 
at a distance fg below point c, that is, ck = fg (at qsoc). Under this incorrect 
environment policy the subsidy creates an additional external cost, that is, above the 
optimal level, equal to qnf- cdf= qndc -The cost of providing the subsidy is equal to 
nmgf. These costs cancel out against the additional producer and consumer welfare 
in a situation of incorrect -government policy due to public subsidies is cef - qpc 
which is lower than cef as qpc > 0. If qpc < abc, a situation with perverse subsidies 
plus environment policy would be preferable over a situation without both public 
subsidies and an environmental policy. This occurs when subsidies is not too large. 
The steepness of the slopes of the demand and supply curves, that is the elasticity 
of demand and supply, determine the size of the welfare change due to perverse 
subsidies and incorrect environmental policy^. 
2.1.3 Intended Goals of Public Subsidies 
Public subsidies are introduced to achieve certain policy goals. Important policy 
aims underlying many subsidy policies are^: 
• stimulating economic growth by sector development; 
• protection of employment and investment; 
• reduction of external dependency by safeguarding domestic supply; 
• abatement of poverty by supporting low-income groups and provision of 
access to basic living conditions. 
5 Weitzman, M.L. (1974), 'Prices vs. quantities', Review of Economic studies, 41 477-99. 
Payments aimed at generating positive external effects, such as farmers preventing soil 
erosion, maintain biodiversity or avoiding rural-urban migration, cannot be considered as 
subsidies (with positive welfare effects) because the farmers have to render services to 
potential demanders, like government, private parties or NGOs, that pay a price in return. 
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Table 2.1 
Sector Subsidy Policy and Their Goals 
Developed Countries 
Consumer Subsidies Producer Subsidy 
Developing Countries 
Consumer Subsidies Producer Subsidy 
Natural Resources 
Agriculture 
Water 
Forestry 
Fisheries 
Mining 
Maintain farm income 
and domestic supply 
Increase farm 
production 
Sector Development 
Maintain fish income 
Employment and 
investment 
protection 
Support \ovj-\ncome 
groups 
Safeguard food 
security 
Access to drinking 
vi^ ater 
Support low-income 
groups 
Safeguard food 
security 
Increase farm 
production 
Sector 
Development 
Sector 
Development 
Sector 
Development 
Energy and Industry 
Energy 
Road transport 
Manufacturing 
Support low income 
group 
Stimulate 
employment 
Safeguard domestic 
supply 
Sector Development 
Employment and 
investment 
protection Sector 
development 
Support low-income 
groups Stimulate 
economic growth 
Access for low-
income groups 
Source: Beers and Moor (2001). 
Table 2.1 summarises subsidy policy goals that are generally considered important 
in both developed and developing countries in the natural resource sector and in the 
energy and industry sectors. It shows that these are differences in subsidy policy 
aims in some sectors, but also that the objectives might be quite similar in others. 
Many subsidy policies are motivated by economic and social considerations that are 
of a non-environmental nature. 
A first observation from Table 2.1 is that in developed countries more policy goals 
for producers than for consumer subsidies occur. In developing countries it is just 
the other way around. With regard to sectors, the table shows that public support in 
developing countries' agriculture and fisheries is aimed at safeguarding a domestic 
supply (food security) that is considered sufficient to guarantee economic 
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development. Governments in developing countries consider subsidies necessary to 
secure food supply. This is an important policy aim because lack of foreign 
exchange earnings limits sufficient food imports. In developed countries, agricultural 
support policies are more concentrated on producers to maintain farm income at an 
acceptable level. 
The policy aims to be achieved by subsidising forestry and mining can be 
summarised in sector development and support for lov\/-income groups. Forestry and 
mining are natural resource sector in which developing countries are more 
abundantly endowed than developed nations. The former countries have a 
comparative advantage in theses resources. Subsidizing the production of these 
sectors distort domestic production prices and lead to a production and export levels 
that are higher than justified on comparative advantage patterns. The result is that 
these countries sell out their resource base and hence subsidise the exploitation of 
their resources^. 
In the case of water, the main subsidy objective in both developed and developing 
countries is aimed at increasing farm production. In particular, irrigation subsidies to 
assist poor farmers are in this category. In the developing countries another aim can 
be added: securing access to drinking water for low-income groups. 
Finally, the main subsidy goal for manufacturing is to safeguard employment, this is 
valid for developed countries. 
Generally, governments favoured energy policies that were aimed at keeping energy 
prices low for both consumers and producers because -
• public concern with equity was greater than with efficiency; 
• there were fear that higher energy prices would boost inflation and impede 
economic growth; 
• a need existed to protect consumer from monopolistic practices by 
multinational oil companies. 
In addition, public concern over the degradation of the natural environment has 
increased and has resulted in a greater awareness of the negative environment 
effects of energy consumption and production. 
Although producer subsidies are much less dominant in developing than in developed 
countries, subsidies in these tv/o sectors are mainly producer-oriented. 
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Increasing factor mobility, especially labour mobility, is an important consideration in 
promoting and enhancing economic development by means of sector development. 
The most efficient allocation of production factors can be achieved when these are 
free to move to areas where they generate the highest returns. Particularly in 
developing countries, reduced mobility is a severe impediment to economic 
development. Encouraging physical mobility of low-income groups may improve 
employment opportunities and living conditions. Many road transport subsidies are 
of an off-budget character because they make the from of less than full cost 
recovery and thus lead to income transfers from the public budget to road users. 
2.1.4 Public Subsidies and Policy Failures: Ineffective Policies 
The microeconomic analysis focused on the welfare reduction introduced by public 
subsidies and the frustrated achievement of policy goals by other policy instruments 
the subsidies. The welfare analysis in this static framework takes into account the 
theoretical concepts of consumer and producer surpluses, and the negative external 
effects. Nothing has been assumed about whether the aim of the subsidy is 
achieved. Subsidies are often intended to redistribute welfare to group of consumers 
or producers that need them. An example is seen in agriculture subsidies that aim to 
maintain or increase the income of the agricultural producer. This is reflected in the 
producer surplus, that is, the excess of revenue over total variable costs (subtracting 
fixed costs generates profits). The impact of, for example an input subsidy on 
producer revenue depends on the slopes of the demand and supply curves. 
Leakage emerges if the producer revenue increases as a result of the input subsidy 
but a lesser extent than planned. 
For a given demand elasticity an increasing supply elasticity leads to a moderate 
increase of the externality and a large leakage effect. For a given supply elasticity 
an increasing demand elasticity generates large potential externality effects and a 
moderate leakage effect. 
Homogeneous product produced in the primary sector such as agricultural and 
energy products, generally have an elastic supply and an inelastic demand. As a 
result the leakage effects in these sectors are high while potential externality effects 
are moderate. Subsidies in these sectors have a high probability of not achieving 
their goals and will produce negative externalities although to a moderate extant. 
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The actual balance between leakage and externality generation is hard to calculate 
in practice and so are the numerical benefits of removing the subsidies, depending 
on: 
• the kind of subsidy; is it a consumer or producer subsidy? Generally a 
consumer subsidy is less distorting than a producer subsidy as the latter 
emerges earlier in the chain of economic activities; 
• the actual elasticity of input or output depending on whether it is an input or 
output subsidy; 
• the transmission of the effects on quantities and externalities from the market 
where the subsidy is provided to other markets, that is general equilibrium 
effects. For example, fossil fuel subsidies lead to higher production and/or 
consumption of fossil fuels. The extent of the increase depends on structural 
parameters such as the energy intensity of an economy and how dominant 
fossil fuels are in total energy use. 
2.2 Review of Literature 
In Indian context, the literature on subsidy in the form of empirical studies is 
available. In this section, we have reviewed them to examine the issues analysed 
and major findings related to subsidies. 
According to Gupta, Anand P. (1980) expenditure on subsidies galore in India and 
all government give them. Some of the subsidies are open, other are hidden. Some 
involve budgetary outgo, others (e.g., interest subsidy under the soft loans scheme 
of the Industrial Development Bank of India) do not. If one takes into account all 
subsidies, the total may now add up to about Rs. 40,000 million. 
As per the data compiled by the Central Statistical Organisation (CSO), the 
budgetary subsidies given by the Central and State governments amounted to RS. 
8,650 million in 1975-76. Of this, agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting accounted 
for Rs. 5,120 million; mining manufacturing and construction, Rs. 780 million; 
economic services : general administration, regulation and research, Rs. 620 million; 
electricity, gas, steam and water Rs. 320 million; transport and communication, Rs. 
90 million; other economic sen/ices, Rs. 1560 million; social security and welfare 
services, Rs. 130 million; housing and other community amenities, Rs. 10 million; 
and general administration, external affairs, public order and safety, Rs. 20 million. 
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The CSO data do not even tell how much of the subsidies were given by the Central 
government and how much by the State governments. 
According to Bagchi, A. (1981) the losses in the public undertakings are essentially 
nothing but subsidies not explicitly budgeted for by the government. He has 
attempted to derive an idea of the dimensions of the quantum of subsidy now being 
provided by the State Governments through the operations of public undertakings. 
He summed up that subsidies provided by State Governments through uneconomic 
and sub-optimal running of public enterprises are not inconsiderable. There is 
nothing to show that such expenditures of public funds are always undertaken after 
a careful consideration in the implications from the equity and efficiency angle. If the 
welfare of the community is to be maximised, operation of State Undertakings 
should be governed by well defined norms. 
Jackman, R. and R. Layard (1985), examined how taxes and subsidies by 
changing the incentives perceived by individual wage-setters, can alter wage-setting 
behaviour, and with it the natural rate of unemployment. They showed that a tax on 
wage offset by a subsidy on employment in a balanced budget package would 
reduce the equilibrium rate of unemployment for two types of reasons. First, it will 
alter wage-setting behaviour by changing the incentives perceived by wage-setters, 
in such a way as to raise the level of employment. Second, it will shift demand from 
high-wage to low-wage sectors, which given higher unemployment rates in the 
latter, will also reduce unemployment. The theoretical framework of this paper is 
imperfect competition, and unemployment is generated either because firm set 
"efficient wages" above the market-clearing level, or because of monopoly trade 
unions. 
According to Asha, P. (1986), budgetary subsidies of the Central Government have 
witnessed a large-scale growth since the fifties. They reveal two distinct phases in 
their growth pattern. While the first phase covering the period till the end of sixties 
was characterised by a modest growth prone to wide fluctuations, the second phase 
in the subsequent period witnessed a steady and phenomenal growth, both in 
volume and diversity. In the first phase spanning two decades the growth in central 
subsidies was only a little over three fold against over fifty-two times in the second 
phase of seventeen years. A rapid growth in subsidies which pre - empts 
considerable resources calls for a detailed examination, which is all the more 
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significant now because of the resource crunch faced by the government and its 
compulsions for meeting expenditure by resorting to deficit financing. 
Certain broad findings emerged form the study, in absolute terms, central subsidies 
reveals a tremendous growth. As a percentage of total expenditure (both 
developmental and non-developmental) they formed 8.5 per cent in 1986-87. Of the 
total, the share of developmental subsidies has generally been higher and within 
development subsidies more than 99 per cent is appropriated by economic services 
and less than one per cent goes to social services. This brings out the fact that 
ostensibly most of the subsidies are for productive purposes. 
According to Singh, Chhotan and Puran Chand (1986), among the agricultural 
production incentives, input subsidies are most powerful instruments for accelerating 
the growth of agricultural production. The social justification of subsidies lies in the 
fact that they should be equally distributed among the regions and groups of society 
for achieving the goal of rapid growth of agricultural sector. In this study an attempt 
has been made to (i) study the grov^^h of agricultural input subsidies in country, (ii) 
examine the regional and size class disparity in the use of agricultural input 
subsidies, and (iii) study the temporal changes in the use of agricultural input 
subsidies among the regions. The study confined to two major input subsidies, 
namely fertiliser and electricity for which the data pertaining to 1970-71 to 1982-83 
were used. Linear regression and tabular analysis are used as the analytical tools. 
The results of study shows that the use of agricultural input subsidies increased 
tremendously. Fertiliser subsidy increased at a faster rate. The results also indicate 
that there was a large inter-regional disparity in the use of subsidies and the 
inequalities widened over time. 
Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, and Maharashtra used about half of the total agricultural 
input subsidies but accounted for only 30 per cent of the gross cropped area of the 
nation. On the other hand, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Orissa received only 
nine per cent of the input subsidies but claimed 27 per cent of the gross cropped 
area of the country. 
There was also large inter-regional inequality in the use of agricultural input 
subsidies per hectare of gross cropped area. It was found to be the highest in 
Punjab (Rs. 216.18), followed by Tamil Nadu (Rs. 133.20), and Uttar Pradesh (Rs. 
100.99). In Rajasthan and Orissa, it was much lower, being of the order of Rs. 12.45 
and Rs. 15.21 respectively. 
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The regional differences in the benefits of input subsidies per unit of food grains 
production also prevailed. 
Foodgrains production was heavily subsidised in the State of Punjab, Tamil Nadu, 
Uttar Pradesh and Gujarat w/here the benefits of input subsidies v\/ere more than Rs. 
100 per tonne of foodgrains while it was only Rs. 22.25 and Rs. 27.25 per tonne of 
foodgrains in Orissa and Rajasthan respectively. The regions where the benefits of 
input subsidies were higher, increased lower costs of production of foodgrains, 
resulting in higher net income from crop production. 
Furthermore, the benefits of fertiliser input subsidy were biased against the small 
and marginal farmers and their share in the nation's fertiliser subsidy was only 30 
per cent. The use of fertiliser and electricity subsidies at the three point of time 
shows that during the early seventies and mid-seventies, both these subsidies had 
increased more as compared to the early eighties in all the States. This leads to 
unequal growth in input subsidies among the regions over time. Hence it is 
suggested that for growth in agricultural production on equity grounds, the critical 
input like fertiliser and electricity should be subsidised more in the backward region 
in addition to provision of other facilities. More input subsidies should be given to the 
small and marginal farmers, which will help them as well as encourage the poor 
region to utilise more inputs at lower cost resulting in higher income from crop 
production. 
Reddy, K.S. (1987), analysed the trends in subsidies of the Central and State 
governments and also estimated the extent of Central subsidies accruing to Andhra 
Pradesh. The policies pursued by the Central and State governments with reference 
to agricultural subsidies and industrial subsidies intended for the development of 
backward area are also studied. 
The major subsidies in the Central budget are on food, fertiliser, export, and interest. 
Analysis suggests that the expenditure on Central subsidies accruing to Andhra 
Pradesh increased at a higher rate as compared to other States. The direct 
subsidies provided by the State government also increased at a higher rate than 
those of other States. Perhaps the absorption capabilities of the State draw from 
Central pool has increased in the recent past due to the expansion of State's own 
subsidies. 
The primary objective of Gulati, Ashok (1989) was to quantify level and spread of 
subsidies on major agricultural inputs across States in India during 1980s. The 
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inputs covered are fertiliser, irrigation (canal), electricity and institutional credit. The 
concept of subsidy on these inputs is defined in a more economically meaningful 
sense, which differs significantly from the one generally delineated in government 
budgets. The study reveals that total input subsidy averaged over seven years, 
1980-81 to 1986-87, turns out to be about Rs. 9,000 crore at all-India level. It is 
approximately 17 per cent of net value added in Indian Agriculture. More than 70 per 
cent of total input subsidy in on irrigation through major and medium schemes. At 
State level, the share of Uttar Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh and Punjab in total input 
subsidy comes to about one-third while they account for only one-fourth of all-India 
gross cropped area. Input subsidies as a percentage of State domestic product in 
agriculture averaged over 1980-81 to 1986-87, are highest for Tamil Nadu (31.7 per 
cent), followed by Punjab (24.5 per cent), Haryana (23.0 per cent), Andhra Pradesh 
(21.3 per cent) and Uttar Pradesh (18.2 per cent). At the bottom end are the States 
like Himachal Pradesh (2.0 per cent), Assam (2.4 per cent), and Jammu and 
Kashmir (5.4 per cent). 
Poverty alleviation has been the overarching objective of the development strategy 
on India, although achievements have fallen far short of expectations. Over time a 
number of targeted and non-targeted poverty alleviation policies of varying extent of 
coverage and efficiency have been tried. Parikh, Kirit and T.N. Srinivasan (1990) 
compared the effectiveness of some of these policy interventions in alleviating 
poverty using counter-factual policy simulations with a sequential applied general 
equilibrium model of the Indian economy for the for the period 1980-2000. 
Specifically the simulated policies include (i) abolishing the existing subsidized 
public distribution of a specified amount of food grains to all urban residents or 
alternatively extending it to the rural areas and making it completely free; (ii) the 
introduction of a rural work programs (RWP) targeted at the poorest groups of 
varying efficiency in its design and execution as well as its success in targeting; (iii) 
abolition of the existing fertilizer subsidy and the use of part of the resources saved 
for augmenting aggregate investment and the remaining spent either on a rural 
works programme or on crating additional irrigated area. The results suggest that a 
well designed, executed and targeted RWP has the greatest impact in alleviating 
poverty. 
Shetty, S.L. (1990), opined that the magnitude and incidence of subsidies whether 
explicit or implicit, have spun out of control and their burden on government finances 
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are becoming unbearable resulting into declining public investment in agriculture 
and irrigation. 
Jha, Shikha (1991), in her study entitled "Factor Determining The Allocation Of 
Food Subsidies In India" tried to find out that, what determined the quantity of 
foodgrains distributed through the public distribution system in each State? Is it 
directly related to the needs of the people in the respective States? Does it depends 
on well-accepted criteria such as the extent of poverty, the skewness in income 
distribution, the market availability of the subsidised goods, etc.? Or is it simply a 
result of political pressure? The author used cross-section regression to analyse the 
importance of different factors for two different time point, 1970 and 1983. It is only 
for the former time point that she found statistically significant relationship in 
between PDS quantities distributed and well-accepted criteria. 
Jha, Shikha {1991a) analysed the effectiveness of self targeting in the Indian Public 
Distribution system and show that implicit targeting leaves a large scope for 
improvement. There is a wastage of the associated consumer subsidy in the sense 
that a substantial amount goes to the non-targeted population while a part of the 
deserving population is left out of the schemes due to various reasons. Hence, it is 
worth diverting resources to goods which are better targeted from goods which are 
poorly targeted. That is, even if targeting cannot be improved, switching of subsidies 
both between goods and areas can lead to improved distribution of subsidies to the 
poor. 
According to Sagar, Vidhya (1991), the fertilizer policy was formulated in the 
context of food security, it served its purpose, and food security was achieved, at 
least in the macro sense. Future demand for fertilisers has to be met through 
indigenous production, as it would be increasingly difficult to import in the coming 
years. However, this policy has had its cost too. The continuously increasing gap 
between the retention price and the sale price of fertilisers implies distortion in the 
economy resulting in large fiscal imbalances. Removal of such imbalances is 
necessary for the healthy growth of the economy. However, partial tinkering of some 
of the parameters of the retention price formula to reduce this imbalance has 
seriously affected the growth of indigenous production capacity. This may imply yet 
to another widening gap, between increasing demand for fertilisers and its supply, in 
the near future. 
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Gulati, Ashok and G.D. Kaira (1992), observed that farmers, fertiliser industry and 
consumers of foodgrains all seems to be benefiting from fertiliser subsidy in one way 
or the other, and in varying degrees. The burden of readjustment (hike in fertiliser 
prise) therefore, should fall on all the three fronts, almost simultaneously. 
On farmers' front, an increase in fertiliser price must be absorbed through 
appropriate increase in support / procurement prices of main fertiliser consuming 
crops such as wheat, rice and cotton because the farmer is not 'net-subsidised' on 
account of pricing of outputs and inputs. For fertiliser industry, situation warrants a 
comprehensive exercise involving computation of domestic resource cost (DRC) of 
producing fertiliser on plant and product-specific basis, with an objective to identity 
plants that need retrofitting and revamping to come to acceptable norms of 
efficiency. On consumers' front, there is urgent need to reorient the public 
distribution system (PDS) making it more sharply focused towards vulnerable 
section of society either by linking it with 'food for work' type programmes or by 
income targeting or by distributing coarser varieties of wheat and rice and coarser 
cereals, wherever possible. 
Rao, M. Govinda and Sudipto Mundle (1992), undertaken a detailed analysis of 
subsidies at the State level. Analysis covers budgetary subsidies of fourteen major 
States at two point of time 1977-78 and 1987-88. They focused on the trend over 
time in the flow of subsidies at the State level. They concludes that the rapid growth 
of expenditures on social services (which carry low cost recovery rates) and 
declining rates of cost recovery for economic services both have contributed to the 
rapid growth of subsidies. Moreover, the volume of budgetary subsidies to State 
Public Enterprises have been increasing. Subsidies have been maldistributed 
across States and across income groups within the States, indicating that the 
federal transfer mechanism has failed to achieve fiscal equalisation objectives. 
Author argued that redistribution objectives would in some cases be better served 
by pure income transfers. 
Ratha, D.K. and AtuI Sharma (1992) used an applied general equilibrium model to 
analysed macro effects of three policy instruments, namely fertiliser and food 
subsidies and investment on irrigation for agricultural development in India. The 
results show that if a choice has to be made among these policy instruments, 
investment on irrigation has the potential of tackling two persistent problems of the 
Indian economy - vulnerability of agriculture to weather conditions and lack of 
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purchasing power of a large section of tine populace to buy food - by way of 
reducing dependence on the rain God and improving income distribution. 
In this paper, they analysed the desirability of fertiliser subsidies and also explored 
the implications of two alternative policies using a CEG model of India. They found 
that -
• It is not desirable to abolish fertiliser subsidies if the objective is just to ease 
the burden of budget deficit. 
• When wages are not protected (fertiliser), input subsidy is batter than (food) 
output subsidy. Strong income effect which is generated by wage indexation 
results in the reversal of this conclusion that is output subsidy becomes 
preferable to input subsidy. 
• In comparison to price subsidies, investment on irrigation certainly promotes 
income distribution and perhaps, also growth. 
Jha, Shikha and P.V. Srinivasan (1994), explores through simulation exercises the 
implications of private storage and subsidised distribution of foodgrains for price 
stabilisation policies in India. A multi market equilibrium approach is used to 
incorporate the simultaneity in the determination of both the supply and demand for 
three major cereals rice, wheat and coarse cereals. The policy implications of the 
results obtained are relevant to the current debate on agricultural policy reforms in 
India. 
Under the PDS the government distributes to ration card-holders limited quantity of 
cereals, kerosene and sugar at subsidised prices. The distribution of cereals is 
supposed to protect the consumption of the poor by ensuring availability of food at a 
reasonable price particularly to the poorer segment of society. Parikh, Kirit S. 
(1995) examined the set of questions raised concerning effectiveness of Public 
Distribution System (PDS) and throw light on the impact of PDS on market prices 
and estimated the value of subsidy implicitly provided by multiplying the quantity 
purchased through PDS by difference between market and PDS prices for that 
commodity. The result showed that (i) the cost of PDS, which has been an important 
instrument of government policy, was rising; (ii). In the northern big States (Punjab, 
Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh) more than 95 per cent of 
the population do not purchase any cereals from the PDS. Except urban Delhi and 
Jammu & Kashmir, the PDS is almost irrelevant as far as cereals are concerned; (iii) 
PDS does provide substantial support to those poor who gets cereals from it in a 
few selected States. Yet, most of the poor in most States are not reached by the 
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PDS. The same amount of money spent on PDS if spent on employment schemes, 
would provide more of an income support to the poor. 
Government of Uttar Pradesh (1995) reported that since independence, India 
vigorously followed a policy of food security and accordingly initiated several 
promotional measures for increasing agricultural production. The government has 
been intervening, at various stages, in the process of agricultural production and 
accordingly making large allocations in the budgets to ensure a rapid growth in the 
key subsectors of agricultural economy. Some of the budgetary supports of the 
government have been termed as subsidy to agriculture. 
This study seeks to analyse the extent to which these budgetary allocation "called 
subsidy" has benefited farmers in the real sense and to what extent these have 
gone elsewhere. Some of the programmes of agricultural sectors involving direct 
subsidies to the farmers have also been evaluated for their impact on the 
production. Fertiliser, Food, Electricity and Irrigation and Institutional Credit area are 
generally classifies as largest beneficiary of the subsidies in Uttar Pradesh. 
Gulati, Ashok (1995) in the analysis of input subsidies in Indian agriculture reveals 
that subsidies have outlived that their aim and have become unsustainable. In order 
to release resources for higher investment in the agriculture sector, large scale price 
and institutional reforms are needed to relieve the pressure of subsidies on the 
exchequer. Under the circumstances, it makes much sense to improve terms of 
trade for agriculture and complement this by stepping up investment in agriculture 
through reduction in subsidies. The increased investment in agriculture appears to 
be a better bargain than short sighted measures such as subsidies. This is because 
of the fact that cultivate land in India is in short supply and raising productivity per 
unit of cultivable area will require heavy investments in irrigation, rural infrastructure, 
research and extension. Also, investment in basic infrastructure corrects for regional 
imbalances and promotes greater equity at farm level, while subsidies trends to 
accentuate inequity. 
Main point of this paper is that Indian agriculture in not 'net subsidised' but 'net 
taxed'; that overvalued exchange rate and high protection to industry has 
discriminated against agriculture; that subsidies on key inputs have lost their rational 
and are now crowding out productive investment, damaging environment, 
accentuating inequity and promoting inefficient cropping patterns; that rising prices 
of their inputs is only a partial solution to the ills of the input sectors-they must 
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experience institutional reforms to make the system sustainable. The sequence of 
reforming in agricultural subsidies must start from liberalising the output markets, 
opening them to exports and thereafter involving farmers in carrying out reforms in 
input markets - particularly for non-tradable inputs like canal water, electricity, and 
rural credit. It is only such a comprehensive package for reforms that can contribute 
towards accelerated and sustainable growth of Indian agriculture. 
Karnik, Ajit and Mala Lalwani (1996) examined the influence of interest groups in 
Indian agriculture. Specifically they were concerned with the provision of subsidies 
and public goods by the government in response to pressure of these interest 
groups. The results of their parametric and non-parametric exercises lead to believe 
that there is reasonable evidence of interest group influences in the framing of 
government policies with respect to supply of subsidies and agricultural public 
goods. 
George, P.S. (1996) observed that the procurement operations and distribution 
through the Public Distribution System (PDS) outlets involved a certain amount of 
subsidy. The PDS in India has close links with food security for vulnerable segments 
of the population, budgetary support for food subsidy and price policy. 
The total consumer subsidy depends on the quantity of food grains distributed 
through PDS and the rate of subsidy which in turn is determined by procurement 
price, handling charges of Food Corporation of India and the issue price. The rate of 
consumer subsidy is influenced by procurement price, handling charges and issue 
price. The handling charges include the procurement cost and the distribution cost. 
Pandey, Rita et. al. (1996), attempted to estimate the volume and composition of 
housing subsidies flowing from the Central and the State government in Tamil Nadu 
and Andhra Pradesh. In the Case of Central government, the estimates are based 
on flows of transfers, loans and investments, government supported borrowings by 
Housing and Urban Development Corporation (HUDCO) and National Housing Bank 
for the year 1991-92 to 1994-95. Also estimated the revenue loss due to tax 
concessions and subsidy to government employees in General Pool 
Accommodation (GPA). Estimates of housing subsidy in the States are based on 
annual flows of transfers and loans for housing through State budgets for the 
corresponding years. Further, estimates of subsidy at the beneficiary level through 
various housing programmes in Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh are also made. 
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Main conclusions that emerged from the analysis of the subsidy estimates are listed 
below-
• Housing subsidy from the Central government budget has almost doubled 
during the study period. 
• In term of share in total subsidy the urban sector has benefited more vis-a-
vis the rural sector in the year 1991-92 to 1992-93. However, in 1993-94, this 
has been reversed with the share of rural housing rising to 72 per cent. 
• Subsidy in a number of housing schemes of Central government flows 
through HUDCO and the State level housing agencies. There is absence of 
transparency with respect to actual investment flows into housing for the 
target group. 
• The estimates show that distribution of subsidies is in favour of rural housing 
in Andhra Pradesh. The Rate of recovery in rural housing schemes is low as 
compared to the rate of recovery in urban housing schemes. 
• In Tamil Nadu budgetary subsidies grew at a rate of 15 per cent during the 
period 1990-91 to 1993-94. 
• As a proportion of SDP, housing subsidy is low in Tamil Nadu when 
compared with the volume of housing subsidy in Andhra Pradesh. 
• In both the State the capital subsidy has accounted for bulk of the subsidy 
and ahs also increased steadily. 
Wolfson, Drik J. (1996), surveyed in his paper the most pressing conceptual issues 
involved in the use of fiscal instruments, for sustainable development with special 
reference to fossil fuels. Coal, oil and gas use exhibit the two key dimensions of 
environmental problem: (i) negative externalities of emission; and (ii) depletion of 
non-renewable. This paper begins by stating the case for fiscal intervention, as well 
as addressing the problem how to find the proper benchmark for setting the optimal 
price of energy, and how cross subsidisation can make things worse. It also 
discussed the tax design in a context of differential incidence analysis, and 
compress taxes with an approach that relies on tradable permits. Next, the 
economic issue involved are further clarified on the basis of empirical results. These 
results were then qualified by observations about modelling dilemmas, "double 
dividends", excess-burden, and the benefits of neo-classical dynamics. 
According to Hussain, Abid (1997) agricultural policies have an economy-wide 
impact and that there is a direct correlation between Indian agricultural performance 
and the standards of living of a majority of our population. 
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Undoubtedly, subsidies whicli were used for l<eeping tlie input prices low in 
agriculture were effective in improving agricultural growth to a certain extent, but it is 
important to make sure that they do not become a permanent feature of the Indian 
Economy. Subsidies result in inefficient allocation of resources. There is a growing 
criticism against the continuance of agricultural subsidies for the following reasons. 
First, these subsidies are fiscally unsustainable and lead to wasteful consumption. 
Second, they encourage misuse of resources also leading to environmentally 
malignant developments lil<e land degradation, water logging, depletion of ground 
water resources, salinity etc. Third, the delivering agencies have become 
economically unviable as their costs cannot be recovered and that they have lost 
their manoeuvrability to expand services to cover larger number of farmers. Fourth, 
they 'crowd out' public investment in irrigation, research and many other significant 
areas and adversely affecting the overall agricultural growth. It is possible that a 
progressive withdrawal of subsidy would induce farmers to interact more vigorously 
with global market and thereby boost levels of production and at the same maintain 
'input consumption level'. 
According to Strong, Maurice F. (1997), Government of both developing and 
industrialised countries have long made a practice of extending subsidies direct and 
indirect, to certain sectors and products for which they considered it in the national 
interest to provide special incentives. These range from agriculture, energy, natural 
resource development, transport, water, and fisheries to a variety of manufactured 
goods and commodities. The recent movement towards more open, market oriented 
economies, free trade and budgetary austerity have resulted in some modifications 
and reductions in these subsidies. But they continue to exact a heavy cost from 
people as taxpayers and consumers while distoring markets and undermining 
economic efficiencies. 
In principle, there can be no question that subsidies can be a useful and beneficial 
means of providing incentives to meet objective that governments believes are 
economically or socially desirable. But in practice such subsidies tend to become 
deeply entrenched in the expressions and interest of those who benefit from them, 
long after they have served their original purposes; there is also great resistance to 
any attempt to change these subsidies, even when their costs have reached a point 
where they far outweigh any conceivable benefits. 
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While explaining about 'Who gets the input subsidies', Dev, S. Mahendra (1997) 
explained that, "During the initial stages of the adoption of new technology in 
agriculture some of these subsidies may be justified as 'front-up cost'. Over time it 
was found, that the richer States and well-irrigated areas, certain crops, and 
sometimes rich farmers captured a disproportionately high share of the major input 
subsidy programmes of fertiliser, power, irrigation and credit. Besides, the farmers 
are not getting the entire amount so called 'agricultural subsidies'. Some estimates 
show that cultivators receive only 50 per cent of the budgeted fertiliser subsidy. 
Similarly, official and independent estimates show that large amount of power 
subsidy given to agriculture. First, it may be noted that cross subsidisation takes 
care of some of the losses due to agricultural sector. Secondly, the power subsidies 
are overestimates because we do not have meters in many States to indicate power 
consumed by agriculture. The unmetered supply of electricity to the agricultural 
sector is being misused to cover very high transmission and distribution (T&D) 
losses and pilferage. The T&D loss is fast increasing in the absence of adequate 
systemic improvements. Thus, farm power subsidies are overestimates and the 
farmers may be getting only a part of this subsidy. 
Godbole, Madhav (1997) in his work has studied for the subsidies of the two States 
namely Maharashtra and Jammu & Kashmir, where subsidies are eating deeply plan 
resources and undermining development. The paper differentiated between 'public 
goods' such as defence, law and order, general administration and justice and other 
goods. A distinction was made between 'merit' and 'non-merit' subsidies based on 
perceived significant externalities associated with merit goods/services. The study 
brought to the fore the massive magnitude of subsidies in the provision of economic 
and social services by the government. 
Gulati, Ashok and Anil Sharma (1997), the issue of subsidies in general and 
agricultural subsidies in particular, has attracted a lot of attention of policy makers in 
the on-going reform process. The rational of subsidising agriculture in developing 
countries generally stems from their role in either stimulating agricultural 
development or protecting the meagre income of some vulnerable cultivators, who 
may not have the risk bearing capacity. In developed countries, however, subsidies 
to farmers are generally extended to keep them in 'parity' with non-farming 
communities. There are two most common ways of subsidising agriculture. Firstly, 
the governments may pay much higher support / procurement prices for agricultural 
products than what farmers can get under free market environment, and secondly 
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by supplying inputs at below cost prices. Higher prices for farm products can 
provided mainly by insulting the domestic markets from the world economy through 
a restrictive trade policy. On the other hand, vital inputs like irrigation, water credit, 
electricity used in the agricultural sector can be subsidised through State exchequer. 
Of these two alternatives, subsidies on input are normally preferred because it is 
believed that benefits of government expenditure can be derived by the farmers only 
in proportion to their use of inputs. Input subsidisation also avoids raising food and 
raw material prices, thus avoiding the adverse effects on a growing industrial sector 
or the large mass of poor living in developing countries. However, most often, it is 
not just a single mechanism but a combination of both - higher output prices and 
lower input prices - which has been used to subsidise agriculture with objective 
varying from the need to raise domestic production and protect income of the 
farming community. 
Mayers, N., et. al. (1998) estimate that perverse subsidies in the world may amount 
to as much as $ 1.5 million, which is larger than the economies of all but five 
countries in the world ( using purchasing power parity for the GNPs of China and 
India). They argue that perverse subsidies have the capacity to exert a highly 
distortive impact on the global economy and to inflict large-scale injuries on 
environment. 
Pandey, Rita and P.S.A. Sundram (1997), estimated the subsidy to Central 
government employees through staff housing and draw some inferences about (i) 
the extent of subsidy to allottees in different income groups, (ii) effects of the 
subsidy on distribution of income, and (iii) the budgetary impact of the subsidy. 
Though the provision of staff housing is not guided by considerations either of 
profitability or high rate of return, the negative rate of return may, however, influence 
the allocation of funds needed to meet housing shortage and improve the quality of 
housing. 
Competitive populism of political parties has led to a distortion of the subsidy system 
in India. Ambirajan, S. (1999) examined the nature, causes, and consequences of 
growth of subsidies in India in general and Tamil Nadu in particular. The study 
showed that subsidies in Tamil Nadu are wasteful, corrupt, and regressive and 
counter-productive. The remedy of the problem lies in a comprehensive package of 
reforms involving improvement in the institutional structures and market 
organisation. 
53 
Gulati, Ashok and Sudha Narayanan (2000) tried to find out, who is getting 
benefits from subsidies? This paper estimated plant specific domestic resources 
cost of all urea plant in the country, and aggregate measure of support for selected 
commodities through power subsidies. It also gives some policy options both for the 
Centre to tackle fertiliser subsidy and to the State to minimise power subsidy. The 
paper is divided into thee parts, section I discuss about the existing policy of pricing 
fertiliser and power for agriculture, second section examines the very important 
question of who really benefits from these subsidies. Section III seeks to find a way 
out and in doing so address the issue of reform and how this would serve national 
interest. 
According to Gupta, Sanjeev (2000), the reform of the price subsidies has been a 
key element of IMF supported programs in many countries. These reforms have 
brought prices of subsidized items closer to their market-clearing levels and have 
sought to target any remaining subsidies to the needy. Reform is typically 
undertaken in the context of macroeconomic adjustment, and its major aim is to 
achieve fiscal savings consistent with stabilization of prices allocative efficiency and 
promote economic growth, but can - at least in the short run - have adverse social 
and political effects. These effects can be mitigated or eliminated by establishing 
social safety nets and, in some cases, by gradually phasing out subsidies. 
In his paper Panagariya, Arvind (2000), presented a systematic critique of the 
arguments for export subsidies. The arguments falls into two categories; those 
based on welfare maximisation as the objective and those that take export 
expansion or diversification towards manufactures as the target. In the former case, 
the argument often suffer form same flaws as the arguments for protection, 
advanced during 1950s through 1970s to promote import substitution. In the latter 
case, based on the Latin America experience, it is far from clear that export 
subsidies are the least-cost instrument for achieving export expansion or 
diversification 
The paper also reviewed briefly the experience of Latin America, East Asia and 
India with respect to export subsidies. Based on important study Nogues (1989), the 
author conclude that export subsidies are most costly instruments of achieving 
export expansion than other policies. In the case of India, innumerable export-
subsidy instruments have been in place for many years. Yet significant break in 
exports came only after substantial import liberalization and real exchange-rate 
depreciation were achieved in the 1990s. The East Asian experience is more 
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controversial. But even if one accept tiiat export sublidjfes played a positive role in 
these economies in view of the experience in India an'd Latin America, it is arguable 
that such experience can be replicated elsewhere with a high probabjlityof success. 
Pandey, Rita and D.K. Srivastava (2001) examined the interface between 
subsidies and environment with a view to highlighting both the positive and adverse 
roles that subsidies may play in affecting the environment. While subsidies will be 
interpreted in a broad way, focus will be on subsidies that emanate from government 
budget in India. In Environment is affected by subsidies in a variety of ways. On the 
other hand, there are subsidies specifically designed to promote or benefit some 
aspect of environment, e.g. subsidisation of an afforesatation programme. On the 
other hand, there are subsidies that, while promoting some other economic objective 
(like agricultural output), have an indirect, and sometimes unanticipated effects on 
environment. Often theses effects may be budgetary subsidies that have a bearing 
on environment, whether direct or indirect. While attempting to examine the nature 
and impact of the subsidy induced effects on affecting some aspect of the economy, 
and adversely affecting the environment during some phase of the life cycle of the 
subsidisation process. 
Some of the reasons that have been advances in support of farm subsidies are: 
food security and encouragement to use new farming methods. Farm subsidies 
have, however, put enormous strain on government budgets. In addition to straining 
budgets, subsidies distort prices of agricultural inputs and thereby affect levels of 
input use. This has an effect on the availability of inputs and resources used in 
agriculture. When supply of inputs is constrained by natural or other factors, the 
sustainability of agricultural development may be affected. Excessive and inefficient 
use of agricultural inputs such as fertilisers, water, and pesticides is also reported to 
have detrimental consequences for the environment and human health and welfare. 
Certain facts about the environment related (ER) budgetary subsidies in India are; 
• Subsidies identified as having a bearing on environment, account for less 
than one per cent of the GDP, Centre and States considered together. Of 
these subsidies having a clear positive impact on environment are only a 
small fraction. 
• Division of subsidies between Centre and States shows that environment 
related subsidies emanate relatively more from the State budgets. 
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• A profile of recovery rates for ER subsidies across States shows that the 
north-eastern States like Mizoram, Assam and Sikkim and also the hilly 
State of Jammu and Kashmir have extremely low recovery rates. 
• Inter-State comparisons of per capita ER subsidies broadly indicate that; 
(i) per capita subsidy is higher for States with higher per capita incomes; 
and (ii) a substantial share of ER subsidies pertain to irrigation. 
• Subsidies relating to major and medium irrigation, minor irrigation and soil 
and water conservation had the largest share in ER subsidies for most 
States. 
Srivastava, D.K. and C. Bhujanga Rao (2002) opined that budget subsidies in 
India are large, largely hidden, and mainly input-based, are generally regressive. 
These subsidies hide and promote inefficiencies. There is evidence that subsidies 
have sharply risen in the late nineties. These have grown because of excessive 
participation of governments in the provision of goods and services where there are 
no clear externalities. At the same time, critical areas like health and education have 
suffered where par capita expenditures have remained low although the degree of 
subsidisation may be high. The primary remedy is for the government to disengage 
itself from several sectors where its presence is not required, and in the remaining 
sectors, reasonable user charges should be charged and changes in user charges 
should be linked to increases in costs. 
Gayithri, K. (2003), observed that capital investment subsidy is an important fiscal 
concession aimed at promotion of industry in the backward regions. Government 
has sharply enhanced the scope and volume of concession during the reform 
phase. Concomitant to this amount of subsidy released has sharply increased. 
However, the scheme has not served its purpose very well as its financial benefits 
have largely accrued to regions that did not deserve subsidy, such as Bangalore 
Urban District, and many such units have ceased to exist. 
The scope and volume of concession under the scheme has varied from time to 
time. Introduction of economic reforms and the formulation of New Industrial Policy 
(NIP) have resulted in a stiff interstate competition to attract industrial investment. 
One of the strategies that State government adopted was to announce very 
attractive fiscal incentives. A review of Karnataka Government's industrial policy 
packages over a period clearly account for the sharp increase that has taken place 
in the scope and volume of concessions during the reform phase. Capital 
investment subsidy being an explicit subsidy, the fiscal burden is tantamount to an 
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increased direct expenditure by the government. Departmental statistics reveal that 
subsidy released to the industrial units in the State has increased sharply. Such a 
sharp increased is very burdensome to the State government, which is dready 
reeling under huge an increase in fiscal and revenue deficit. Ironically, this sharp 
increase coincide with reform phase, which advocated a reduction in subsidies of all 
kinds. 
Deshpande, R.S., M.J. Bhenede and T. Raveendra Naika (2003) attempted to 
quantify food and agriculture subsidies in Karnataka and examined the allocative 
implication of agricultural subsidies. They tried to analyse few important issues 
emerging in the context of subsidies provided to the agricultural sector. Their 
important recommendations are following: 
(i) it is essential to reduce the ever-increasing burden of subsidies in agriculture 
sector and direct these funds towards more productive investment in the sector 
especially towards infrastructure development; (ii) the State government should 
restrict its expenditure on food subsidy by confining to BPL families identified by the 
Central Government. This will reduce expenditure by almost half the present 
volume; volume (iii) the prices of foodgrain supplied through PDS should be fixed 
such that are the subsidies are under manageable limit; (iv) the problems of loss 
making public undertakings should be identified clearly. The loss making public 
undertaking should be closed or merged with other enterprises, if they do not serve 
any social purpose. 
According to Rao, Hemlata and H.K. Amarnath ( 2003) analysis of various social 
and economic services in Karnataka States shows that cost recoveries are not only 
low but also have declined over the years. Both implicit and explicit subsidy 
constitutes a large proportion of NSDP. There is a need to rationalise subsidies, 
prune unnecessary subsidies arising out of inefficiency, misutilisation, wrong 
prioritisation, and defective policies. 
According to Vivekananda, M. (2001), there is a phenomenal increase in power 
sector subsidy In Karnataka. As there is considerable cross subsidisation from 
industrial and commercial sectors to agriculture sector, the subsidy between 
different sectors shows large differences. In the aggregate, while the unit cost of 
supplying power in 1999-2000 was Rs. 2.90 per KWh, the cost was Rs. 2.06. The 
gap has been steadily increasing over the years from 10 paisa/KWh in 1991-92 to 
84 paisa in 1999-00. This has resulted in widening the deficit year after year. 
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Gulati, Ashok and Sudha Narayana (2003), explained the key issues of agriculture 
subsidies and some of the important issues taken up for detailed examination. The 
basic objective is to measure the degree of support to Indian agriculture, demystify 
the large input subsidies supposedly flowing to agriculture, and find out ways and 
means to contain these open ended subsidies. The challenge is daunting, and 
therefore special efforts is made to understand the complexities of the issues 
involved, and suggest policy measure that can take care of them. The ultimate 
criterion is to ensure efficiency in the use of resources, reasonable equity in the 
distribution of gains, and financial and environmental sustainability in agricultural 
operations and programmes. 
Rao, M. Govinda (2003) in a edited book entitled "Volume and Composition of 
Budgetary subsidies in Karnataka" highlighted that the search for policy options to 
correct fiscal imbalances at the State level warrants a careful calibration of 
budgetary subsidies, with a view to making them more transparent and targeting 
them to intended beneficiaries. Subsidies can be targeted to intended beneficiaries 
either through pure income transfers or subsidising items of their consumption of 
desired services. Direct transfer payments are transparent, and their beneficiaries 
can be explicitly targeted. As pure redistributive device, this should be preferred 
policy instrument. However, if the intention is to induce higher consumption of 
specified public services, subsidies would be necessary. The problem, however, is 
that the total volume of subsidies involved is often not known, it can have 
unintended allocative consequences and its distributive implications remain unclear. 
Raju, K.V. and H.K. Amar Nath (2003), analysed the irrigation subsidy in the 
Karnataka. According to them over the last three decades, Karnataka has focused 
more on creating irrigation potential. Although, it has resulted in spending more on 
creating capabilities, there has been no commensurate increase in revenue 
generation. Unfortunately, increased expenditure (in nominal terms) in the irrigation 
sector has not resulted in improvement of social services, mainly owing to 
considerable increase in non-plan expenditure both under capital and revenue 
heads. 
Narayana, M.R. (2003), analysed higher education subsidies in Karnataka, the 
paper estimates the volume and composition of implicit subsidies in the Karnataka 
for selected years from 1990-91 to 2000-01. The detailed analysis shows that in all 
levels and all types of higher education, recurring cost constituted more than 90 per 
cent of the total cost of providing educational services. At the same time, although 
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there are variations, cost recovery by way of students' fee in the government 
institutional was not very significant. The highest recovery rate was in collegiate 
technical education followed by collegiate medical education. 
Saleth, R. Maria and G.S. Bhasri (2003), studied subsidy in water supply and 
sanitation sector in Karnataka. In terms of coverage and quality of service levels, 
both rural and urban water supply in Karnataka are better then the national average. 
There are problems such as concurrent competitions from other sectors, risk 
associated with water quality deterioration, groundwater depletion, investment 
requirement in the context of poor cost recovery and severe resources crunch on 
the State budget. An upward revision of water rates is a key component of the 
strategy for subsidy reduction; administrative reforms in terms of resizing the 
bureaucracy, administrative streamlining, and decentralisation are possible steps to 
meet the challenges for future demand. 
Gayithri, K. (2003), has observed that government of Karnataka has initiated a 
number of housing schemes with an explicit subsidy component. In addition, implicit 
subsidy arising out of non-recovery of costs has also increased. On the policy front, 
multiplicity of programmes and a number of departments involved in the design of 
these programmes are the issues that deserve close attention. There is also a 
duplication of programmes by the Central and the State government agencies, 
therefore, administrative costs of designing and implementing tend to be higher. 
Howes, Stephen and Rinku Murgai (2004), examined the agricultural power 
subsidy as a case study, and situate India's growing subsidy bill within the context of 
a trend towards agricultural protectionism, while there are ways to reduce India's 
subsidies through a combination of efficiency improvements and tough decisions, 
progress in this direction to date has been disappointingly small, if not negative. 
There is no assured path forward, and sustained reduction in the subsidy bill will 
require institutional experimentation. 
Anand, Mukesh and Raghvendra Jha (2004) explained that (i) subsidy estimated 
as the unrecovered costs of the present consumption programme should not exceed 
the budgetary deficit; (ii) not all of the individual burden of tax and non-tax 
expenditure in commensurate with the individual consumption of publicly provided 
goods and services. This essentially results in some redistribution. This 
redistribution, however, does not affect the budget (and can be termed as 
interpersonal transfer); (iii) valuation or estimation of the subsidy involves subjective 
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judgements and qualitative assessment especially when estimating the social rate of 
discount or the rate of time preference; (iv) the money or the rupee in the hands of 
government may be chosen as the numeraire and a rupee of tax collected from a 
rich individual may entail a lesser cost to the government (that is, the social planner, 
and may be also the particular individual) than a rupee of tax collected from a poor 
individual. Analogously, a subsidy generated by the rich may be valued lov\/er 
(socially) than one reaching poor. However, the latter set of all adjustments leads us 
to social valuation (not concern of this paper) as distinct from the actual (financial) 
estimate of burden; (v) finally, the use of opportunity cost concept (as earlier used 
by taking resource to the market rate of interest) is not justifiable in the context of 
this methodology. This is especially true when the expenditure programme of the 
government is oriented towards activities that really do not function in the mature 
markets to warrant the use of market rate. 
Singh, R. (2004), examined the issue of inter-crop, inter-regional, and inter-class 
equity in fertiliser subsidy distribution in terms of shares of different farm classes, 
crop and States in total fertiliser use on different size categorise of farmers. The 
paper shows that paddy and wheat cultivators are the major beneficiaries of fertiliser 
subsidy. Interstate disparity in fertiliser consumption still remains high, though it has 
been falling over the years. More significant is the finding that there prevails a fair 
degree of inter-class equity in distribution of fertiliser subsidy, contrary to the widely 
prevalent impression. A uniform approach to reduction of all types of subsidies is not 
justified. Instead a well through out, properly sequenced, gradualist and regionally 
differentiated approach to subsidy reduction needs to be adopted. 
Subsidies have been used in India as an important instrument of development policy 
to fulfil growth and distributional objectives. In the agriculture sector, with accounts 
for the bulk of the subsidies, input and credit subsidies have been extensively used 
along with support prices to boost agricultural output by promoting adoption of new 
technology particularly by the resource poor and risk averse marginal and small 
farmers. 
This paper also shows that fertiliser subsidy is not as regressive as power and 
irrigation subsidies, which account for a much larger part of agricultural subsidies. 
Hence, a uniform approach to reduction of all types of subsidies is not justified. 
Instead a more well thought out, regionally differentiated, properly sequenced and 
gradualist approach to subsidy reduction will have to be adopted. A dual price 
system for fertiliser for different categories of farmers, though justified on equity 
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grounds, will not be practicable manage. However, it may be possible to have 
regionally differentiated level of fertiliser subsidy to push fertiliser use in States 
which are lagging. This needs to be supported by appropriate extension efforts for 
encouraging optimum and balanced use of fertiliser. 
According to Tilak, J.B.G. (2004), though public subsidisation of many social and 
economic services in common services is common feature of most countries of the 
world, of late with increasing budgetary constraints, many began raising questions of 
the rational of government subsidies, and arguing favour of drastic reduction, if not 
eliminating altogether of subsidies. Concentrating on education sector, this paper 
review some of the well known arguments in favour of, and counter arguments 
against public subsidies. Much of the controversies are around subsidies in higher 
education. It has been shown that the level of subsidies in education in India is not 
particularly high, nor is the rate of the cost recovery particularly low, in comparison 
with the developed and developing countries. It has also been found that some of 
the specific subsidies in education are fairly progressively distributed. 
According to Barde, Jean-Phillipe and Outi Honkatuki (2004/2005) the objective 
of governments' subsidies to various economic activities are presented as to 
promote economic growth, employment and income. Subsidies distort prices, affect 
resources allocation decisions and change the amount of goods or services 
produced or consumed in an economy. Policies providing subsidies are generally 
introduced for various social and economic reasons, but they are generally ignored. 
Subsidies can thus result in a policy failure and be harmful to the environment. In 
agriculture, for example they can lead to overuse of pesticides and fertilisers and in 
fisheries to the overexploitation of the fish stock. Fuel tax rebates, subsidies to road 
transport, and low energy prices generally stimulate the consumption of fossil fuels 
and green house gas emission and increase congestion and air pollution. 
Bhatia, M.R., C. A. K. Yesudian, A. Gorter, K. R. Thankappan (2006), observed 
that reproductive and child health services in India are tax financed and provided 
through supply side financing mechanisms. Some of the limitations of supply side 
financing are the inability to target the poor, lack of user choice, and the absence of 
linkage between provider payments and performance. Hence, there is a need to 
develop innovative financing mechanisms, which are able to target scarce resources 
at those who can not afford to pay. One option is demand side financing. Demand 
side subsidies are not only better at targeting subsidies to the poor, but by linking 
subsidies with output, also provide the right incentive for efficiency. 
61 
According to Jain, Virendra (2006), the electricity subsidy distribution pattern needs 
to be scrutinised to assess whether the policy benefits small producers, a normative 
argument often made while granting non-discriminatory electricity subsidies to the 
agricultural sector. This study highlighted the existence of disparities in the flow of 
electricity subsidy between the advanced and backward regions. While the medium 
and large farmers reap the major benefits of the subsidy, the poor small farmers, 
especially in the backward areas, remain excluded due to their non possession of 
electricity connections. In a nutshell, this paper questions the justification for 
introducing such a policy and puts forward the case for user charges based on open 
access to electricity. 
According to Komives, Kristin, et, al. (2006) Subsidies for utility services are 
widespread in the water supply, sanitation, and electricity sectors. One motivation is 
to improve social welfare of the poor by facilitating their access to and use of such 
services, as well as by redistributing resources to augment their purchasing power. 
At the same time, such subsidies have often been seen engendering resources use 
inefficiencies and financially weak utilities, which hobble efforts to expand and 
improve services. Those adverse consequences have often been used to argue 
against charging consumers less than cost of services. The impact of subsidies on 
both count has been subject of much controversy. 
Chanda, T.K. (2007) observed that issue of subsidies is of special importance as it 
has direct relationship with food which is the basic necessity of life. Various 
countries provide subsidy to agriculture in different names. Developed countries 
provide huge amount of subsidy to support the farm sector. Subsidy on food and 
fertiliser in India has grown manifold over the years. However, it is far lower in India 
than many countries, Indian agriculture is now passing through a very difficult 
phase. There are reports of stagnation in growth in agriculture, particularly of 
foodgrains in the recent years in India. Majority of the farmers are not able to get 
even survival income. Therefore, agriculture sector needs strong support for fulfilling 
the objective of the Second Green Revolution in India. The paper presents a 
detailed analysis of various issues of subsidy, including the objectives, importance, 
amount and type of subsidies provided to the agriculture sector by developed and 
developing countries. 
According to Lalwani, Mala (2007), the opportunity provided by high growth and a 
comfortable revenue situation to make a serious attempt to boost allocations for 
education and agriculture has been allowed to slip away. The high priority status 
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accorded to these sectors in the budget speech is not bacl<ed by numbers. Instead 
the numbers have been played around with - such gimmickry only serves to make 
budgets lose their credibility. Further, the track record of the government fails to 
inspire confidence that the fiscal targets will attained. One cannot help but conclude 
that Budget 2007-08 appears to be long on words alone. 
OECD (2007), the functional classification of spending shows that there is 
considerable scope for reorienting public expenditure, particularly in the area of 
outlays for government enterprises and subsidies. In India, around two third of the 
total government outlays (excluding interest but including loans) is on functions 
other than general administration and defence. One half of this is spent on support 
to commercial undertakings and subsidies for the food and the agriculture sector. 
Three quarters of the transfers to enterprises go to electricity, gas, water and 
communication enterprises, either in the form of outright subsidies or as capital 
transfers to cover losses and / or finance expansion. A large part of the total sum 
spent on the enterprises is provided as loans. However, given that most of the 
State-owned utilities are loss-making, such loans do not represent a source of future 
income for the government but rather a source of future subsidy payments. 
Aside from subsidies and transfer to public utilities, a considerable part of the 
subsidy on food, fertilisers and kerosene results in the waste of public money due to 
faulty delivery. Given the proportion of families living below the poverty line, the 
government has put into place a programme to ensure that low income families are 
able to purchase a number of basic product at subsidised prices through a network 
of "fair price shops". Overall expenditure on food and agriculture subsidies was 
equivalent to 1.6 per cent, of which food subsidies amounted to 0.8 per cent of GDP 
in 2004, double their level of 1990. Analysis for the programme shows that it is 
bedevilled by poor administration and corruption. Nationwide, over one-third of the 
grain distributed through the system is diverted either by the shopkeepers or through 
the existence of "ghost" ration cards. The beneficiaries of this diversion are officials 
in State government and the Food Corporation of India and wholesale and retail 
dealers. In addition, one-fifth of the grain goes to people wrongly included in the 
programme, bringing the total loss to 58 per cent. In two of the poorest States, Bihar 
and Uttar Pradesh, the loss roses to 98 per cent and 80 per cent respectively for 
fertilisers, only 68 per cent of the subsidy is estimated to accrue to farmers, with the 
bulk being paid to large farmers in irrigated areas. 
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Ramana, M.V. (2007), estimated the cost of producing heavy water at the IVlanuguru 
plant by analysing the available budget figures and assuming reasonable values for 
other factors that affects the cost and whose values are not publicly available. Their 
results suggest that the production cost significantly exceed the price charged under 
even extremely favourable and unrealistic assumptions. Nuclear power, therefore, is 
being subsidised through the provision of cheap heavy water. 
According to Thomas, Kenneth P. (2007), since the investment incentives are 
subsidies, they share with all subsidies to capital three important potential 
drawbacks that affect efficiency, equity and the environment. This is not to say that 
subsidies are always bad policy; far from it. Some policy goals can be usefully 
addressed with subsidies, but whether the benefits will offset those potential 
problems when they do occur must be addressed on a case-by-case basis. 
According to Mohan, Rakesh (2008), while subsidies may provide short-term 
benefits, they tend to hinder long-term investments as well as encourage inefficiency 
in the use of resources. This issue is important in the context of agricultural 
development, especially in the context of domestic-demand-supply gaps of major 
crops and elevated international prices. Public investment in agriculture declined 
from 3.4 per cent of agricultural GDP during 1976-80 to 2.6 per cent during 2005-06, 
while budgetary subsidies to agriculture increased from three per cent (1976-80) to 
seven per cent of agricultural GDP (2001-03). It is observed that greater emphasis 
on slapping up public investment and containment of subsidies, while adhering to 
the fiscal consolidation, is likely to pay rich dividends. It would not only engender 
current growth impulses but also contribute to food securing and domestic price 
stability. 
Major Studies - Though there are many studies on direct subsidies like food, 
fertilisers, export subsidies etc., the concept of implicit budgetary subsidies in India 
started with Mundle and Rao (1991) followed by Tiwari (1996), Srivastava and Sen 
(1997), Srivastava and Amar Nath (2001), Srivastava et.al. (2003), Kumar et.al. 
(2004). These studies concentrated on quantifying various hidden subsidies by 
defining them as unrecovered costs in provision of public goods/services. They 
classify the government services in various categories to initiate debate on subsidies 
for essential or less essential services. Mundle and Rao (1991) and Tiwari (1996) 
used the same budgetary classification of services such as general as public goods 
and subsidies on non-public goods as for social and economic services were 
estimated and broad indications were given on preferences towards certain sectors 
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in provision of subsidies. Srivastava and Sen (1997) classified non-public services 
into merit and non-merit goods. Since these studies mainly concentrate on 
estimation methodology, volume and composition it is necessary to look at them in 
detail. 
Mundle, Sudipto and M. Govinda Rao (1991), has defines government subsidies 
as the difference between the cost of delivering various publically provided goods or 
services and the recoveries arising from such services. They estimated total volume 
and composition of government subsidies in India in the year 1987-88, after costing 
government services on a user charges basis for Central government and fourteen 
major State governments. The exercise shows that the annual volume of subsidies 
was huge, amounting to Rs. 42.324 crore or almost 15 per cent of the GDP and 
observed that they were inequitably distributed. 
Pure transfer payments are transparent and their beneficiaries are explicitly 
targeted. The explicit subsidy, as revealed in the budget for 1987-88, amounted to 
only Rs. 5,982 crore. 
The results show that the large concentration of subsidies were in more developed 
States. They observed patterns of higher per capita subsidy levels were in the 
States with higher capacity to raise revenues. The federal transfer policy has failed 
to achieve its major objective, namely, offsetting the lower revenue raising 
capacities of fiscal disadvantaged States. It is suggested that there is a necessity to 
reform them in a more egalitarian direction. 
Tiwari, A.C. (1996), did a continuation of Mundle and Rao (1991) study, but it 
covers other related aspects and issues also. The study covers the subsidies 
provided by the Central and the same fourteen State governments in the year 1992-
93 i.e. almost two years after the economic reforms initiated in 1991-92 had been 
place. The estimates include both explicit and implicit subsidies. 
Results showed that the total volume of subsidies in providing social and economic 
services was Rs. 95,375 crore and formed 15.20 per cent of the GDP. The share of 
Central Government was Rs. 36,829 crore and constituted 5.87 per cent of GDP, 
that of States Rs. 58,544 crore and covered 9.33 per cent of GDP. Out of total 
subsidies, explicit subsidies (including 'assistance' to non-government educational 
institutions and other 'assistance') amounted to only about Rs. 21,000 crore and 
constitute 22 per cent. Thus, the level of implicit subsidies was much higher (78 per 
cent). 
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There were large inter-State variation in tlie level of subsidies. Generally, Subsidy 
rates for social and economic services were significantly lower in low income States 
compared with high and middle income States. 
An inter-country comparison with subsidy levels prevailing in some other countries 
had also been attempted. Even if the comparison in not of like of like, it appears that 
level of subsidy as a percentage of GDP prevailing in India higher than prevailing in 
developing and developed countries for which the data were available. 
Srivastava, D,K. and Tapas K. Sen (1997), provided an estimation of (i) the 
aggregate volume of government subsidies; (ii) its distribution across services 
provided by the government; and (iii) the extent of subsidisation in different services. 
Some general observations on the incidence of the major subsidies, and their 
implications for efficiency, are also made. Some of the major subsidies in India have 
been discussed individually, including distributional pattern of their benefits. The 
Central and State government both are covered in the study. 
Main findings of the study were (i) that explicit subsidies in the budget of the Central 
government accounted for only about 30 per cent of the total Central Subsidies in 
1994-95; (ii) when a comprehensive view of the Central subsidies is taken, it is the 
subsidies on economic services of the non-merit kind that dominated the scenario; 
(iii) recovery rates of less than ten per cent in these cases indicating over 
subsidisation by a wide margin; and (iv) highlight the considerable potential for 
raising recovery rates and thereby mitigating the draft on fiscal deficit that originates 
from maintain subsidies at such unduly high leaves. 
A reduction in the quantum of subsidy level can be achieved through (i) a reduction 
in level of provision of governmental services and (ii) by increasing the relevant user 
charges, fees, etc., by increasing the price of the service. In each case, there would 
be beneficial secondary effects if resource allocation becomes more efficient as a 
result of release of resources from pre-emptive claims by the government, or as a 
result of better alignment of prices of resources to their true opportunity costs. 
The design of a suitable subsidy reform package needs to be carefully considered. 
This task calls for prioritisation and phasing. Sectors where the extent of 
subsidisation is extremely high and not easily justified, need to be targeted first. For 
the Centre, as well as for the States, a sustained programme of reducing and 
restructuring of subsidy regime can improve overall efficiency of the system, and 
make a significant positive impact on the fiscal profile of the country. In designing a 
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subsidy reform programme, sector-level and State-specific, studies should now be 
undertaken. 
Srivastava, D.K. and H.K. Amar Nath (2001) in their study revisited the subsidies 
and focused on the CA.-v.t»^ budgetary subsidies. What to subsidise , how to 
subsidise, and how mush to subsidise are three burning issu^. Main featur^of this 
study are (i) reclassification of subsidies within the merit and non-merit categories 
using information on expenditure heads, where necessary; (ii) modification of 
methodology of calculating depreciation costs; (iii) estimation of implicit and explicit 
central budgetary subsidies, estimation of "excess" subsidisation by grouping 
goods/services in to three broad categories deserving high, intermediate, and low 
subsidisation; (iv) qualification of scope of subsidy reduction under alternative 
assumptioQif (v) identification of the ways and means of subsidy reduction. 
The main findings of the study were, subsidies both explicit and implicit, emanating 
from the Central budget is estimated at Rs. 43,000 crore in 1995-96, and Rs. 48,000 
crore in 1996-97. This amount is about 40 per cent of Centre's net revenue receipts. 
The recovery rates are as low as 8.26 per cent of cost for services and 16.58 per 
cent for economic services. Of the total subsidies, nearly 60 per cent are in the non-
merit category deserving less subsidisation. The category where a high degree of 
subsidisation may be considered desirable, account for only 4 to 6 per cent of total 
subsidies. Using a sensitivity analysis, making alternative assumptions about the 
average degree of subsidisation for different categories, it would appear that excess 
subsidisation is about 70 per cent of total subsidies. Subsidies can thus be cut down 
to nearly 30 per cent of their present level while maintaining a desirable degree of 
subsidisation in the relevant category. 
Srivastava, D.K., C. Bhujanga Rao, Pinaki Chakraborty and T.S. Rangamannar 
(2003) provided an estimate of budgetary subsidies for 1998-99 for central and 
State government and discuss some of the key subsidy related issues in the Indian 
context. Main findings of the study are aggregate Central budgetary subsidies in 
1998-99 are estimated to be Rs. 79828 crore, amounting to 4.59 percent of GDP at 
current market prices, and constituting 53.40 percent of the net revenue receipts of 
the Centre, which, as an item, is the highest draft on revenue receipts as compared 
to estimates for earlier years. 
The Central subsidies decreased from 4.25 percent of the GDP in 1994-95 to 3.49 
percent of the GDP in 1996-97. Reversing the trend of a decline since 1994-95, they 
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increased to 4.59 percent of GDP in 1998-99. Four reasons account for the 
inordinate increase in tiie central budgetary subsidies in 1998-99: (i) the impact of 
salary revisions in the wake of the recommendations of the Fifth Central Pay 
Commission; (ii) the deterioration of position of railways from a surplus sector into a 
subsidy sector; (iii) large increase in explicit subsidies of the Centre; and (iv) 
increase in other input costs unaccompanied by any improvement in recovery rates. 
The explicit subsidies, especially in food have risen sharply since 1996-97. 
In the case of Central subsidies, economic sector subsidies are nearly five and half 
times as large as those for the social sector. Economic sectors arranged in 
diminishing order of size of subsidies are: agriculture and allied services, industry 
and minerals, energy, general economic services, and transport. Current costs 
dominate total costs in both social and economic services, and more so in social 
services. The energy sector is a notable exception where the capital costs have a 
much larger share. 
Budgetary subsidies of the State governments amounted to 8.96 per cent of the 
GDP and about 90 percent of their revenue receipts. After adjustment for salary 
arrears paid in 1998-99, the State budgetary subsidies are estimated at 8.47 percent 
of the GDP. Relative to the GDP, aggregate budgetary subsidies of the State 
governments have fallen in 1998-99 as compared to the earlier available estimates 
for 1994-95. The recovery rate has also fallen. This can only be explained by a fall in 
expenditure (relative to GDP), revenue and capital, allocated to social and economic 
services in the State budgets. 
Agriculture and irrigation sectors accounted for the largest share in the State 
subsidies, followed by elementary education, energy, secondary education and 
medical and public health. 
Per Capita State subsidies generally showed a regressive pattern: the higher the per 
capita income of a State, the higher is the per capita subsidies. Per capita subsidies 
in education and health showed a regressive pattern where, in comparative terms, 
low subsidies are available to residents of low income States and vice-versa. 
In 1998-99, aggregate budgetary subsidies of the Central and State governments 
are estimated to be 13.54 percent of GDP at market prices, and 85.8 percent of the 
combined revenue receipts of the Centre and States. After adjustment done for 
salary arrears paid in 1998-99, the aggregate all India subsidies are estimated to be 
about 13 percent of GDP. 
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As compared to 1994-95, subsidies as percentage of GDP have virtually remained 
unchanged. Although central subsidies have increased as percentage of GDP, the 
State subsidies show a small fall. The relative share of the Centre is about one-third 
of the total subsidies, and that of the States, about tivo-thirds. 
Agriculture, irrigation, energy, and industry and minerals have the highest shares in 
that order, followed by elementary education. 
Subsidy reforms must focus on selected sectors in the first instance which would 
yield maximum results. In particular, attention can be focused on food and fertiliser 
subsidies at the Central level, and agriculture, irrigation, power, industries, and 
transport sectors at the State level. 
In their Study Kumar, Surender, Tapas K. Sen, N.J. Kurian (2004), updated the 
estimates of Central budgetary subsidies for 2002-03 and 2003-04, and highlighted 
continuing concerns with the size, relevance, and effects of these subsidies. In the 
last few years, the budgetary subsidies of Central government have increased 
sharply. This is true of explicit as well as implicit subsidies. Total Central budgetary 
subsidies amounted to 4.25 per cent of GDP in 2003-04 and 4.18 per cent of GDP in 
2003-04. For these subsidies, in both social and economic services, current cost 
dominated, but with a much larger margin in social services. 
Three reasons accounted for the inordinate increase in the Central budgetary 
subsidies, viz. (i) the transformation of petroleum sector from a surplus sector into a 
subsidy sector, (ii) an increase in the share of explicit subsidies; and (iii) increase in 
other input costs unaccompanied by any improvement in recovery rates. 
Operational inefficiency leads to higher cost of production. This creates a wedge 
between subsidies that are actually received by the user charges of the services is 
attended by several types of inefficiencies. Apart from direct costs like overstaffing, 
poor maintenance of assets, procedural delay, and delay in talking critical decisions, 
there are systemic inefficiencies. Moreover, subsidy interventions by the 
government distort market prices and often lead to sub-optimal use of inputs in the 
economy, thereby raising overall costs in the system. As a result of these and other 
inefficiencies, the costs associated with governmental provision of services tend to 
be high. 
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Chapter Overview 
Two kinds of policy failures have been emphasised in the theoretical rationale of 
subsidies. First, public subsidies can frustrate new or existing government policies 
other than the subsidy instruments. Second, public subsidies can generate 
unintended negative welfare effects that are larger than the positive welfare effects 
generated by achieving their goals. 
Both policy failures are analysed in a standard welfare economics framework. With 
regard to the first policy failure, it is shown that government actions aimed at 
internalizing the negative welfare effects are frustrated by the existence of so-called 
hidden off-budget subsidies. These are often hidden for two reasons. In the first 
place, the indirect channels along which on-budget subsidies affect the natural 
environment and equity are not clear to policy makers, second, it is difficult to 
recognize and estimate the size of off-budget subsidies. It is also shown that public 
subsidies affect international trade flows. Hidden producer subsidies may frustrate 
environmental policies such that an economy, which in the optimal environmental 
policy situation would import a good, starts to become an exporter. 
From the review of empirical studies, it is clear that a huge amount of the subsidies 
is given by both by the Central and State governments. A lot of attention to 
subsidies is given after mid eighties in India. Most of the work is done on the explicit 
subsidies like food, fertiliser, agriculture etc. The major work on implicit budgetary 
subsidies is done by National Institute of Public Finance and Policy. From the 
studies of NIPFP, it is clear that the burden of subsidies is very high on both Central 
and State governments and there is a need to rationalise the subsidies. In the next 
chapter, we will discuss the status of Central government subsidies in India. 
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Chapter 3 
Central Government Subsidies in 
India: Trends and Volume 
Subsidies accounted for a significant part of government expenditure, but only a part 
of these subsidies is visible in government budgets. The visible subsidies known as 
explicit subsidies while the invisibles are known as implicit subsidies. Major explicit 
subsidies are given by the Central government. State government are not giving 
much as explicit subsidies as compare to implicit subsidies (in the form of 
unrecovered cost). The main scope of our study is to compute and analyse implicit 
budgetary subsidies in the State of Uttar Pradesh. But, to have an comprehensive 
understanding of the issue of subsidies in India, we are examining the trends and 
volume of Central budgetary subsidies in this chapter. In first part, we are analysing 
the overall trend and some of the major explicit subsidies of the Central government 
and in second part, we are discussing about implicit budgetary subsidies as 
computed in earlier studies. 
3.1 Explicit Subsidies by Centrai Government: A Time Profile 
The aggregate explicit subsidies of the Central government are given in Table 3.1, 
They have increased in nominal term from Rs. 10728 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 60181 
crore in 2006-07 (RE). This represents an average growth of about 11.50 per cent 
per annum. At constant prices (1999-00), total explicit subsidies of the Centre have 
risen from Rs. 22571 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 45481 crore in 2006-07 (RE). The 
average growth during the period 1990-91 to 2006-07 (RE) for explicit Central 
subsidies in real terms thus works out to more than four per cent per annum. Per 
capita subsidies have also increased from Rs. 12.79 to Rs. 53.64 during the same 
period with an annual growth of about 9 per cent. As a percentage of GDP, explicit 
subsidies were 2.08 per cent in 1990-91 and since than it has declined steadily to 
1.59 per cent in 2006-07 (RE) with few fluctuations in the intervening periods. The 
growth of subsidies in real terms is lesser than the average growth rate of the 
economy during the study period. 
From the table 3.1, it is apparent that the growth of subsidy was much higher 
between 1990-91 and 1999-00 compared to period of 2000-01 to 2006-07 (RE). 
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Table 3.1 
Explicit Subsidies in the Central Government Budget 
Years 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1990-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 RE 
2007-08 BE 
Subsidies 
(In Rs. Crore) 
10728 
10257 
10108 
11464 
12487 
13228 
16298 
20238 
25489 
27792 
29175 
33559 
44100 
47737 
49397 
51618 
60181 
63133 
Annual 
Percentage 
Change 
-4.39 
-1.45 
13.42 
8.92 
5.93 
23.21 
24.17 
25.95 
9.04 
4.98 
15.03 
31.41 
8.25 
3.48 
4.50 
16.59 
4.91 
Asa 
percentage 
of GDP 
2.08 
1.73 
1.48 
1.45 
1.35 
1.22 
1.29 
1.44 
1.58 
1.56 
1.52 
1.60 
1.95 
1.88 
1.72 
1.58 
1.59 
1.47 
per capita 
12.79 
11.98 
11.59 
12.85 
13.72 
14.25 
17.23 
20.99 
25.93 
27.76 
28,63 
32.27 
41.76 
44.53 
45.36 
46.67 
53.64 
55.48 
Subsidies 
at constant 
price 
(1999-00=100) 
22571 
18973 
17175 
17711 
17573 
17058 
19500 
22711 
26472 
27792 
28255 
31557 
39944 
41805 
40998 
41173 
45481 
46032 
TGR 
1990-07 
1990-00 
2000-07 
13.34 
12.56 
11.89 
Source: (Basic data) - Indian Public Finance Statistics, Govt, of India (Various Issues). 
Note; TGR refers to Trend Growth Rate of 1990-91 to 2006-07, 1990-91 to 1999-00, and 
2000-01 to 2006-07 (BE). 
Figure 3.1 shows the time profile of the explicit subsidies. Explicit subsidies have 
increased at current prices as well as at constant prices (base year 1999-00), during 
the period 1990-91 to 2007-08, it is apparent from the Figure 3.1, between 1990-91 
and 1995-96 the rate of growth is less than that of later years. Subsidies at current 
prices increased at a faster rate than that of constant prices. The relative 
importances of different subsidies have changed over the period. Figures 2A, 2B, 
and 2C show the changes in the relative shares of major subsidies over time. Some 
of the major subsidies given by the Central government like food, fertiliser, 
agriculture, power, and petroleum are discussed detail in the following sections. 
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3.2 Food Subsidies 
Food Subsidies are the difference between the price at which the Food Corporation 
of India (FCl) procures food grains from farmers, and the price at which FCI sells 
(Issue Price) either to traders or to the Public Distribution System (PDS), with the 
added cost borne by FCI storage and distribution of foodgrains. The subsidy 
ensures a reasonable high price to farmers (procurement price) and a reasonable 
low price to consumers (issue price) and food through PDS. The amount of 
consumer subsidy depends on the volume of foodgrains distributed through the PDS 
and the rate of subsidy which, in turn, depends on the difference between market 
and issue prices and the handling charges of the FCI. 
The system of food subsidies in India actually comprises following three elements, 
all of which is not necessarily termed as food subsidies internationally. 
(i) The first element is a farmers' subsidy, which is conceptually the 
difference between the price paid by the FCI to the farmers and other 
agencies, and the national market price that would have prevailed in the 
absence of these purchases. 
(ii) The second element is a subsidy to the FCI to defray the expenses of 
handling, storage, and transport of foodgrains, including those of 
maintaining a buffer stock and storage and transit losses. All this 
together may be called administrative costs. 
(iii) The third element (which is generally called food subsidy in the 
international literature) is consumer subsidy, conceptually equal to the 
hypothetical market price that would have prevailed had there been no 
public intervention minus the price charged by the Public Distribution 
System (PDS). 
The purchase prices of the FCI are communicated to it through instructions from 
the government. The government notifies the prices at the harvest time taking 
into account the recommendations of the Committee on Agricultural Costs and 
Prices (CACP). CACP determines the minimum support prices (MPS) to 
recommend broadly on the basis of cash costs, some input cost like wages of 
family labour and returns to owned capital, and an overall rate of return. In 
practice, the notified purchase prices have been consistently higher than the 
MPS recommended by the CACP in recent years. 
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An official committee also recommends the volume of buffer stock to be maintained 
for the purchases of food security. This amount, plus the amount needed to run the 
PDS, constitutes the minimum operational stocks of the FCI. However, the 
purchases of the FCi are open-ended in that it has to accept all the grains that are 
sold to it at the declared purchase price. For several years now, the purchases of 
FCI have been much larger than minimum required, resulting in mounting stocks, in 
principle, a similar system should be at work regarding several agricultural products 
and food items, but in practice, the system operates for only wheat and rice^ 
PDS includes a huge network of exclusive retail outlets through which foodgrains 
are supplied to the consumers at the prescribed issue prices. From June 1997, the 
earlier universal and uniform subsidy system was changed in to a targeted PDS 
(TPDS), to make the greater part of the subsidies available to the poor. Consumers 
below the poverty line (BPL) paid a price lower than those above the poverty line 
(APL), and the quantity of foodgrains that the BPL families were entitled was also 
higher than the APL families. 
Table 3.2 shows the details of explicit food subsidy (including subsidies on sugar) in 
India as given in annual budgets. It has increase from Rs 2450 crore in 1990-91 to 
Rs. 24204 crore in 2006-07{RE) with 17.14 per cent of trend grovi^h rate of per 
annum. Its share in total explicit subsidies, increased from 23 per cent in 1990-91 to 
40 per cent in 2006-07(RE). At constant prices, food subsidies of the Centre have 
risen from Rs. 5155 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 18292 crore in 2006-07(RE) with an 
annual growth of 8.24 per cent in real term. The per capita food subsidy has 
increased around ten times from Rs. 2.92 to Rs. 21.57, which is a significant 
increase in 15 years. 
Over all TGR, shows that it has increased in nominal term with an average of 17.14 
per cent and it is also much higher in between 1990-91 and 1999-00 with respect to 
2000-01 to 2006-07 (RE). (See Table 3.2) 
* There are some schemes of smaller magnitude (in terms of current levels of expenditure) 
like the market support operations of NAFED and a scheme for subsidy to small and 
marginal plantations for insurance against product price fluctuations. While schemes have 
the potential of snowballing into substantial burdens on the budget unless capped at a given 
level, the present analysis does not deal with these schemes. 
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Table 3.2 , -X -^  
Central Government Subsidies on Food (inclu'^mg Sugar) 
Years 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1990-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 RE 
2007-08 BE 
Subsidies 
(In Rs, Crore) 
2450 
2850 
2800 
5537 
5100 
5377 
6066 
7900 
9100 
9435 
12060 
17499 
24176 
25183 
23280 
23077 
24204 
25696 
Annual 
Percentage 
Change 
16.3 
-1.8 
97.8 
-7,9 
5.4 
12.8 
30.2 
15.2 
3.7 
27.8 
45.1 
38.2 
4.2 
-7.6 
-0.9 
4.9 
6.2 
Share in 
Total 
Subsidies 
{%) 
23 
28 
28 
48 
41 
41 
37 
39 
36 
34 
41 
52 
55 
53 
47 
45 
40 
41 
Subsidies 
as a 
percentage 
of GDP 
0.48 
0.48 
0.36 
0.52 
0.37 
0.34 
0.44 
0.49 
0.52 
0.54 
0.63 
0.84 
1,07 
0.99 
0.81 
0.70 
0.64 
0.60 
Per capita 
Subsidies 
2.92 
3.33 
3.21 
6.21 
5.60 
5.79 
6,41 
8.20 
9.26 
9.43 
11.84 
16.83 
22.89 
23.49 
21.38 
20.87 
21.57 
22.58 
Subsidies 
at constant 
price 
(1999-00=100) 
5155 
5272 
4758 
8554 
7177 
6934 
7258 
8865 
9451 
9435 
11680 
16455 
21898 
22054 
19321 
18407 
18292 
18736 
TGR 
1990-07 
1990-00 
2000-07 
17.14 
16.91 
9.75 
Source: (Basic data) - Indian Public Finance Statistics, Govt, of India (Various Issues). 
Note; TGR refers to Trend Growth Rate of 1990-91 to 2006-07, 1990-91 to 1999-00. 2000-
01 to 2006-07 (RE). 
Figure 3.3 shows that an upward trend in subsidy for food. It reveals that there is 
slight decline in 1992-93 and it increased in 1993-94. There is a significant increase 
between 1999-00 and 2002-03. 
The main benefits of food subsidies for the society as a whole relate to the resultant 
food security provided to the citizens, particularly the poor, through the availability of 
cheap foodgrain. Further, the system aims to continue providing incentives to the 
farmers to keep food grain production at a level that would be required to maintain 
food security for the country. 
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3.3. Fertiliser subsidies 
Fertiliser subsidy is the difference between price paid to manufactures of fertilizer 
(domestic or foreign) and price received by farmers. The subsidy ensures cheap 
inputs to farmers, reasonable return to manufacturers, and stability in availability and 
price of fertiliser to farmers. 
In order to control the fluctuations in fertiliser prices, the Government of India 
regulates this marlcet through a pricing system l<nown as Retention Price Scheme 
(RPS). The RPS was first introduced for nitrogenous fertiliser in November 1977. 
This was extended to complex fertilisers in 1979. The RPS is essentially a cost plus 
approach with some norms for capacity utilisation and conversion coefficients. The 
plant specific retention prices (RP) are revised every quarter so that price increases 
in plant inputs can be taken into account. The retail prices of fertilisers is fixed and is 
uniform throughout the country. The difference between the retention price (adjusted 
for freight and dealer's margin) and the price at which the fertilisers are provided to 
the farmers is paid back to the manufacturer as subsidy. Transportation cost are 
also compensated based on equated freight computed on a normative basis. 
The huge burden of fertiliser subsidy has given rise to considerable debate in the 
literature, whether these subsidies are going to farmers or to fertiliser industry or to 
someone else, in a way that cannot be easily observed. Gulati and Narayana (2003) 
examined this issue of incidence. They analyzed the issue by posing a 
counterfactual: if there was free trade of fertilisers, what would have been paid by 
the farmers for the imported fertilisers? This requires estimation of farm-gate cost of 
improved fertilisers, comprising of the cost, insurance, freight (c.i.f.) price, dealers 
margin and all the holding expenses (Marketing and transportation) from the ship to 
the market from where the farmers buys fertilisers. The difference of the 
counterfactual price of plausibly imported fertilisers with the price that the farmers 
actually pay would provide an idea of the implicit subsidy that the farmers' group is 
receiving. In other words, the difference between the hypothetical farm gate cost of 
imported fertiliser and the actual price paid by the farmers, multiplied by the quantity 
of fertilisers consumed is the value of fertiliser subsidy accruing to the farmers. The 
difference between the government's allocations under fertiliser and the plausible 
subsidy received by the farmers would be the share of subsidy to the industry (which 
may also be interpreted as the inefficiency cost of domestic production of fertilisers). 
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Fertiliser subsidy is borne by the Centre and attracts most attention. Table 3.3 
shows that the quantum of fertiliser subsidy in the Central government budget it is 
however increasing at a alarming rate to Rs 22452 crore in 2006-07(RE) from Rs. 
4400 crore in 1990-91, representing a five-fold increase in subsidies. Its share in 
total subsidies was at peak point in 1993-94 (57 per cent) and declined to 37 per 
cent in 2006-07(RE). Per capita fertiliser subsidy has increased from Rs. 5.24 in 
1990-91 to Rs. 20.01 in 2006-07 (RE) registering growth of about 9 per cent per 
annum. Fertiliser subsidy as a percentage of GDP, this has decreased from a peak 
of 0.85 per cent in 1990-91 to 0.59 per cent in 2006-07(RE). Trend growth rate of 
fertiliser subsidy was much higher between 1990-91 and 1999-00 compared to 
period of 2000-01 to 2006-07 (RE). 
Figure 3.4 Show the increasing trends in fertiliser subsidies, though subsidies had 
declined in 1993-94, and during 2001-02 to 2003-04. 
80 
Table 3.3 
Fertiliser Subsidies: Time Profile 
Years 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1990-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 RE 
2007-08 BE 
Subsidies 
(In Rs. Crore) 
4400 
4800 
5796 
4399 
5755 
6735 
7578 
9918 
11596 
13244 
13811 
12596 
11015 
11847 
16127 
18370 
22452 
22451 
Annual 
Percentage 
Change 
9.09 
20.75 
-24.10 
30.83 
17.03 
12.52 
30.88 
16.92 
14.21 
4.28 
-8.80 
-12.55 
7.55 
36.13 
13.91 
22.22 
0.00 
Share in 
Total 
Subsidies 
(%) 
41 
47 
57 
38 
46 
51 
46 
49 
45 
48 
47 
38 
25 
25 
33 
36 
37 
36 
Subsidies 
as a 
percentage 
of GDP 
0,85 
0.81 
0.85 
0.56 
0.62 
0.62 
0.60 
0.71 
0.72 
0.74 
0.72 
0.60 
0.49 
0.47 
0.56 
0.56 
0.59 
0.52 
Per capita 
Subsidies 
5.24 
5.61 
6.65 
4.93 
6.32 
7.26 
8.01 
10.29 
11.80 
13.23 
13.55 
12.11 
10.43 
11.05 
14.81 
16.61 
20.01 
19.73 
Subsidies 
at constant 
price 
(1999-00=100) 
9257 
8879 
9848 
6796 
8099 
8685 
9067 
11130 
12043 
13244 
13375 
11845 
9977 
10375 
13385 
14653 
16968 
16370 
TGR 
1990-07 
1990-00 
2000-07 
10.16 
13.27 
9.71 
Source: (Basic data) - Indian Public Finance Statistics, Govt, of India (Various Issues). 
Note: TGR refers to Trend Growth Rate of 1990-91 to 2006-07, 1990-91 to 1999-00, 2000-
01 to 2006-07 (BE). 
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3.4 Agriculture Subsidies 
Support to agriculture means different things to different people. It comprises three 
components covering import policies, export policies and domestic policies. Import 
policies refer essentially to border protection through trade barriers such as 
quantitative restrictions, quotas, and tariffs on imports, which, in the process, create 
(and maintain) a wedge between domestic and world market prices of commodities. 
Export policies includes those that either promote exports (through instruments like 
subsidies and marketing arrangements that make exportable of a country more 
competitive) or those that constrain exports (most often through canalization and 
restriction of exports, as also export taxes and other similar instruments). Domestic 
policies encompass a wide range of policy instruments like input subsidies, 
government intervention in the markets, direct payments to farmers, price supports 
for farm produce, etc. that aspire to meet domestic goals ranging from protection of 
farm incomes to environmental consideration. A concept that takes in to account the 
overall effect of import, export and domestic policies is one way of comprehensively 
defining support. Usually, however, border protection through import policies 
discussed in the context of trade policies rather than support to agriculture. 
A second and more restricted concept of support is one that excludes border 
protection measures from consideration. Support to agriculture, when specified this 
way can be bifurcated. First, there are export policies, commonly taken to 
specifically mean export subsidies or taxes. Considered among the most distorting 
of trade policy measures, export subsidies are usually paid out to exporter to cover 
the difference between higher domestic prices and lower world market prices, in 
order to make exports more competitive. Second, there are domestic support 
policies which include policies that support domestic prices at desired and pre-
determined levels, input subsidies, and many other kinds of direct payments. 
Domestic support and export subsidies are really two sides of the same coin. Export 
subsidies are, more often than not, fallout of domestic support policies that maintain 
domestic prices of agricultural products within a country at levels higher than 
international prices. It is hence natural that discussions on support to agriculture 
recognises this link and include export subsidies too as part of support to 
agriculture. 
It is only agricultural policies that affect directly domestic production alone (and no 
imports or exports), the resulting concept would be in the nature of domestic support 
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to agriculture. This, in itself, encompasses a wide range of instrument with different 
objectives and impact. They may be classifies as -
Price Support is usually operating through administers prices, it offers a sort of 
minimum price for the producers, so that if market prices were to fall below this 
level, the government would intervene to buy produce at this price. It is found in 
various modified forms all over the world, as intervention price in the European 
Union; a loan rates in the United States; or as minimum support price in India, etc. 
While minimum support price is by no means the only type of administered price, it 
is the most common. 
Direct Payments category includes a wide range of different types of income 
support paid out directly to farmers under certain conditions. Thus may be of 
different kinds, deficiency payments, area and headage payments, insurance and 
disaster payments, subsidisation payments, diversion payments (to retire recourses 
temporary) as also compensatory payments (as part of reform process). Each of 
these instruments may be employed for vastly different purposes and hence have 
very different impact on the sector. 
Input Cost comprises those measures that transfer money to producers through 
lowering input costs. These include explicit or implicit subsidies on purchased farm 
inputs like fertiliser, power, water, farm credit etc. Conversely, there may be 
measures in place to increase input costs. An example of this is tax on pesticides in 
order to discourage its use for environmental reasons. 
General Services refers to measures that reduce cost to the agricultural sector as a 
whole and are not received directly by producers such as government transfers to 
agricultural research and development, extension services, training and agricultural 
infrastructure. 
There are some Other Supports which may be measures other than price support 
and direct payments, like certain tax concessions specific to agriculture or local or 
sub-national level funding for agriculture. 
Of all the different means of domestic support to agriculture, however, two are most 
common -
a) subsidisation through input prices, by charging input at below the cost of 
production / supply, generally used in developing countries; and 
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b) subsidisation by paying Iniglier support prices to farmers for output tinan what 
would prevail in a free trade (open economy) market. 
Since higli output prices offer producers incentives to increase production, they 
typically entail supply contracts designed to prevent situations of over-production. 
The opposite may be true where the aim is to keep output prices low (especially that 
of food). Here, the government suppresses output prices and may employ pricing 
and distribution controls to agricultural commodities to ensure steady and affordable 
supply of food to urban areas. At the same time, it may provide cheap inputs to 
agricultural producers. With such a catch-all perspective domestic support examines 
the net effect of input subsidisation and price policy on the output side to determine 
the extent of net-subsidisation in agriculture. 
It is believed that the various subsidies do not reach their target. Hence, it is 
essential to demystify the number that are presented as subsidy to see who really 
are the beneficiaries : the farmers, the consumers, or some other group in a manner 
not easily detectable. The subsidy regime therefore needs to be reformed for 
various reasons. At the same time it is also important to examine the efforts at input 
subsidy reform so far and evaluate them in the light of demystification exercise so 
that they may be put on the right track. 
Table 3.4 shows the details of explicit agriculture subsidy in India as given in 
budgets. It has increase from Rs 78 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 479 crore in 2006-
07(RE) with 14.61 per cent of trend growth rate of per annum. Its share in total 
explicit subsidies, was 0 .73 per cent in 1990-91 and estimated at almost the same 
in 2007-08(BE), while it was at a peak point of 1.14 per cent in 2000-01. At constant 
prices, agriculture subsidies of the Centre have risen from Rs. 164 crore in 1990-91 
to Rs. 362 crore in 2006-07(RE) with an annual growth of about five per cent in real 
term. 
Over all TGR, shows that it has increased in nominal term with an average of 14.61 
per cent and it was also much higher in between 1990-91 and 1999-00 with respect 
to 2000-01 to 2006-07 (RE). 
Figure 3.5 shows that there is an upward trend in agriculture subsidies with many 
fluctuations in between the period from 1990-91 and 2007-08 (BE). 
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Table 3.4 
Agriculture Subsidies of Central Government in India 
Years 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-95 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1990-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 RE 
2007-08 BE 
Subsidies 
(In Rs. Crore) 
78 
10 
62 
90 
133 
64 
149 
145 
149 
248 
332 
374 
116 
86 
284 
373 
479 
452 
Annual 
Percentage 
Change 
-87.18 
520.00 
45.16 
47.78 
-51.88 
132.81 
-2.68 
2.76 
66.44 
33.87 
12.65 
-68.98 
-25.86 
230.23 
31.34 
28.42 
-5.64 
Share in 
Total 
Subsidies 
(%) 
0.73 
0.10 
0.61 
0.79 
1.07 
0.48 
0.91 
0.72 
0.58 
0.89 
1.14 
1.11 
0.26 
0.18 
0.57 
0.72 
0.80 
0.72 
Subsidies 
as a 
percentage 
of GDP 
0.02 
0.00 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.02 
0.02 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
Per capita 
Subsidies 
0.09 
0.01 
0.07 
0.10 
0.15 
0.07 
0.16 
0.15 
0.15 
0.25 
0.33 
0.36 
0.11 
0.08 
0.26 
0.34 
0.43 
0.40 
Subsidies 
at constant 
price 
(1999-00=100) 
164 
18 
105 
139 
187 
83 
178 
163 
155 
248 
322 
352 
105 
75 
236 
298 
362 
330 
TGR 
1990-07 
1990-00 
2000-07 
14.61 
23.14 
7.36 
Source: (Basic data) - Indian Public Finance Statistics, Govt, of India (Various Issues). 
Note: TGR refers to Trend Growth Rate of 1990-91 to 2006-07, 1990-91 to 1999-00, 2000-
01 to 2006-07 (RE). 
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3.5 Power Subsidy 
The power sector in India is constitutionally (Under Article 246) a joint responsibility 
of the States and the Central government as it is a concurrent subject. It was 
envisaged that while the Centre would take charge of overall development of the 
power sector, the State would be responsible for power generation and distribution. 
Thus, in all States, SEBs have been constituted as autonomous organisations, 
which are fully integrated vertically, entrusted with the responsibility of planning, 
generation of power and its distribution to all the consumers. Their counterparts in 
smaller States and Union territories and Electricity Departments (EDs). Although the 
Central Government does participate and support the States in certain area (as in 
power generation), the performance of the Indian power sector depends chiefly on 
the working of the SEBs. 
Power is subsidised for agriculture and domestic consumers through two sources (i) 
State support to State Electricity Boards (SEBs) in the form of subventions or write 
off of loans or interest, etc., and (ii) cross subsidising by charging higher prices from 
industrial and commercial consumers. Subsidies that remain unrecovered after 
these are carried forward as losses by the SEBs or remain as unpaid dues of the 
SEBs to Central undertakings or State governments. Power subsidies largely 
subsidise inefficiencies. Two main sources of inefficiencies are: (i) transmission and 
distribution losses which include, apart from technical losses, a large portion of theft, 
and (ii) over employment of personnel whose contribution at the margin in the 
provision of service may be zero. The power sector is characterised by shortage, 
poor quality, and frequent breakdowns. Both industry and agriculture suffer on this 
account. 
In Agriculture, power subsidy is the difference between the cost of generating and 
distributing electricity to farmers by SEBs and the price paid by farmers to SEBs. 
This act as an incentive to farmers to invest in pump sets, bore well, etc. 
Table 3.5 represents the explicit power subsidy. In budget explicit power subsidies 
are given to Power Finance Corporation Ltd. and Subsidies to Rural Electrification 
only. These two consists one per cent of total explicit budgetary subsidies in 2000-
01 and it increases upto six per cent in 2006-07(RE). In nominal term it increases 
from Rs. 295 crore in 2000-01 to Rs. 3450 crore in 2006-07(RE) with an annual 
growth of 47 per cent while in real term it increased from Rs. 286 crore to Rs. 2607 
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crore with an annual growth of about 45 per cent in the same period. Per capita 
power subsidy has increased fro Rs. 0.29 to Rs. 3.07 during the study period. As a 
percentage of GDP it covers only 0.01 per cent in 2000-01 and risen to 0.09 per 
cent in the 2006-07(RE). Figure 3.6 shows that power subsidies increased 
tremendously after 2004-05 because of transmission and distribution to rural 
electrifications. "With the objective of providing electricity-for-all by 2009, the Rajiv 
Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikarn Yojana (RGGVY) was launched in 2005. At a project 
cost of nearly Rs 30,000 crore, the government claims to have electrified over 50 
per cent of the unelectrified (or de-electrified) villages. Unfortunately, RGVVY seems 
to be focusing almost exclusively on the extension of supply infrastructure into rural 
areas with little or no regard to the ability of the system to ensure flow of electricity 
through the wires".(Srivastava, Leena, TERI.) 
Table 3.5 
Explicit Power Subsidies 
Years 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 RE 
2007-08 BE 
Subsidies 
(In Rs. Crore) 
295 
345 
260 
192 
450 
1400 
3450 
3983 
Annual 
Percentage 
Change 
16.95 
-24.64 
-26.15 
134.38 
211.11 
146.43 
15.45 
Share in 
Total 
Subsidies 
(%) 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
0.00 
1.00 
3.00 
6.00 
6.00 
Subsidies 
as a 
percentage 
of GDP 
0.02 
0.02 
0.01 
0.01 
0.02 
0,04 
0,09 
0.09 
Per capita 
Subsidies 
0.29 
0.33 
0.25 
0.18 
0.41 
1.27 
3.07 
3.50 
Subsidies at 
constant 
price 
(1999-00=100) 
286 
324 
235 
168 
373 
1117 
2607 
2904 
TGR 
2000-07 46.69 
Source: (Basic data) - Indian Public Finance Statistics, Govt, of India (Various Issues). 
Note: TGR refers to Trend Growth Rate of 2000-01 to 2006-07 (RE). 
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3.6 Petroleum Subsidies 
During the study period, the crude oil prices have created enormous pressure on the 
Indian economy. There is a decline in prices during recent happening of melt down / 
economic crises. In India, the price of petroleum products like LPG, Kerosene that 
are used by different strata of society are subsidised. Presently LPG and Kerosene 
are subsidised to a significant extent. Because of easy availability and substantial 
scope for misuse, subsidy on such products of mass consumption attracts the 
middlemen to divert such products for unintended uses at a substantial cost to the 
public exchequer. 
There has been concern about the subsidies because administered price fixation is 
often done in a manner that is not transparent. It also ignores sound economic 
principles of efficiency and sometimes equity too. These subsidies are support to be 
open ended. There is even doubt whether the benefits have accrued to those who 
were to be real beneficiaries. The petroleum subsidies are significant; however; they 
are far from progressive. 
As part of the energy sector reforms, the government has attempted to bring prices 
for many of the petroleum products (naphtha, furnace oil, LSHS, LDO and bitumen) 
in the line with international prices. The most important achievement has been the 
linking of diesel prices to international prices and a reduction in subsidy. However, 
LPG and Kerosene, consumed mainly by the domestic sectors, continue to heavily 
subsidised. 
Retail selling price of petrol and diesel for the consumers is calculated by taking in 
account-
(i) Basic price at refinery level on import parity basis 
(ii) Freight upto depots 
(iii) Marketing Cost and Margin 
(iv) State Specific Irrecoverable levies 
(v) Excise duty 
(vi) Delivery charges from depot to retail pump outlet 
(vii) Sales tax and other local levies 
(viii) Dealer's commission 
The basic selling price of petrol and diesel are uniform at all locations throughout the 
country. As per the existing arrangements between the oil marketing companies 
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(OMCs) and refineries, the element at (i) is revised on fortniglitly basis depending 
upon the prevalent international prices. The marketing costs and the margins, 
dealers' commission, delivery charges within free dealing zones are uniform. The 
prices at various locations vary depending upon the distance from the refinery, rate 
of sales tax and other local levies. 
Although the OMCs were granted freedom to fix retail selling prices of petrol/diesel 
on fortnightly basis, in reality, the prices were revised after informal clearance from 
Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas (MoP & NG). In order to mitigate the hardship 
of oil companies, the government has worked out a new methodology with effect 
from august 01, 2004, allowing OMCs limited freedom to revise the price of MS/HSD 
within a price band. The concept of price band is based on the principles of rolling 
average price of these products in the international markets. Accordingly, oil 
companies are permitted to carry out autonomous adjustments in price in a band of 
±10 per cent of the mean of rolling average C & F prices of last 12 months and last 
quarter (three months). In case of breach of this band, the OMCs have to approach 
the government to modulate the excise duty rates so that the spiralling prices 
prevailing in the international markets do not cause undue hardships to the 
consumers. 
In a gazette notification issued in November 1997, the government set a timetable 
for the staged phase-down of subsidies on kerosene and LPG. The stated policy 
called for retention of smaller universal price subsidies: 33.3 per cent for kerosene 
and 15 per cent for LPG for household use. The subsidy phase-down was originally 
planned to be completed by the time of sector deregulation in April 2002, but has 
fallen behind schedule. The government later decided that the subsidy on domestic 
LPG and PDS kerosene would be provided on a specified flat rate basis from the 
Consolidated Fund from April 1, 2002. In this situation, the government reimburses 
the firms for the cost of subsidy. The cost to the government is now carried as a line 
item in the budget and is called the petroleum subsidy. Earlier, the profits or losses 
from the cross subsidisation constituted the so-called oil pool deficit and was carried 
out on the books of the State owned oil companies. 
In the year 2002-03 budget, it was for the first time when the petroleum subsidies 
mentioned explicitly. The subsidy for the petroleum sector was on third position after 
food and fertiliser. For LPG and kerosene the government subsidy were Rs. 5225 
crore. In 2003-04 petroleum subsidy accounted for Rs, 6573 crore and after that it 
decreased and estimated at Rs. 2840 crore in 2007-08 (BE). As per a formula a 
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formula worked out by the petroleum ministry, tlie subsidy bill is shared equally 
between the upstream and downstream oil companies and the government. In 
interpreting these numbers, it is important to note that they are inclusive of all 
government taxes, including import duties on kerosene and LPG. Another 
consideration is that about one-half of the kerosene and one-third of the LPG 
consumed are produced locally. These subsidy figures thus represent an upper 
bound rather than the actual costs to the government and oil companies. As a per 
cent of GDP, petroleum subsidy was decreased from 0.23 per cent to 0.07 per cent 
during 2002-03 to 2006-07 (BE). Per capita petroleum subsidy has declined from 
Rs. 4.95 to Rs. 2.50 with an annual decline of about 16 per cent. In real term at 
constant prices, it has declined from Rs. 4377 crore in 2002-03 to Rs. 2105 in 2006-
07 (BE), with an annual decline of more than 18 per cent (see Table 3.6). 
There are two reasons why explicit petroleum subsidies decreasing sharply; i) 
decontrolled of the prices; ii) losses are shown outside of the budgets. (See Figure 
3.7) 
Table 3.6 
Explicit Petroleum Subsidies 
Years 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 RE 
2007-08 BE 
Subsidies 
(In Rs. Crore) 
5225 
6292 
2956 
2683 
2785 
2840 
Annual 
Percentage 
Change 
20.42 
-53.02 
-9.24 
3.80 
1.97 
Share in 
Total 
Subsidies 
(%) 
11.85 
13.18 
5,98 
5.20 
4.63 
4.50 
Subsidies as 
a 
percentage 
of GDP 
0.23 
0.25 
0.10 
0.08 
0,07 
0.07 
Per capita 
Subsidies 
4.95 
5.87 
2.71 
2.43 
2,48 
2.50 , 
Subsidies at 
constant 
price 
(1999-00=100) 
4733 
5510 
2453 
2140 
2105 
2071 
TGR 
2000-07 -19.03 
Source: (Basic data) - Indian Public Finance Statistics, Govt, of India (Various Issues). 
Note: TGR refers to Trend Grov /^th Rate of 2000-01 to 2006-07 (RE). 
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3.7 Implicit Central Budgetary Subsidies 
As mention earlier, explicit subsidies provide only a limited idea of tine overall 
volume of budgetary subsidies. For a full view of subsidies, one should also 
compute the implicit subsidies. Computation of implicit budgetary subsidies is not a 
straight forward exercise and moreover we are concentrating on the State 
government subsidies particularly Uttar Pradesh. Therefore, we have not computed 
the implicit subsidies of Central government. But to have an idea of implicit 
subsidies of Central government we have reviewed earlier studies on implicit 
subsidies in which subsidies estimated as unrecovered cost of non-public goods and 
services provided by the government. The unrecovered cost essentially represents 
the difference between the cost of providing the services and the costs recovered 
from the consumer of the services through user charges. The difference can arise 
because: 
• the cost of providing the services is higher than the efficiency cost; 
• the services is provided at lower than marginal social cost to encourage its 
optimal consumption; 
• it is found to be desirable to charge lower than the marginal social cost to 
encourage consumption by the poor and vulnerable section; and 
• its supply is designed inefficiently and user charges at optimal rates cannot 
be collected due to political reasons. 
Comprehensive estimates of Central budgetary subsidies using a broadly similar 
methodology are now available for eight years in the time span of 1987-88 to 2003-
04. For the Centre, Six studies provide estimates for eight years. The first in the 
series was that by Mundle and Rao (1992). Subsequent studies are by Tiwari 
(1996), Srivastava and Sen (1997), Srivastava and Amar Nath (2001), Kumar, 
Surender et.al. (2004). These years are 1987-88, 1992-93, 1994-95, 1995-96, 1996-
97 and 1998-99, 2002-03, 2003-04. National Institute of Public Finance and Policy 
do these all studies. 
Table 3.7 shows a time profile of estimated Central budgetary subsidies for these 
eight years over the sixteen-year period from 1987-88 to 2003-04, as estimated in 
different studies from time to time. Because of differences in the methodology of 
estimation, the estimates are not directly comparable. However, in broad terms, a 
similar approach of measuring budgetary subsidies in a comprehensive way was 
used in these studies. There is a greater comparability in the last three estimates. In 
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1987-88, Central budgetary subsidies were estimated to be 4.53 percent of GDP. In 
1992-93, these increased to 4.92 percent of GDP. One major factor for this increase 
may have been the salary revisions following the recommendations of the Fourth 
Central Pay Commission. It would be evident that since 1994-95, subsidies in the 
Central budget fell to 3.49 percent of GDP in 1996-97. Thereafter, the subsidies 
show a sudden upward movement, rising from a level of 4.59 percent of GDP in 
1998-99 but declined marginally to 4.19 per cent in 2002-03 and 3.85 per cent in 
2003-04. (It is seen that although in the middle of the 1990s the subsidies were 
contained, they increase sharply in the later part of the decade following pay 
revision). Thus, the attempts to contain and target subsidies appear to have yielded 
hardly any result over the sixteen-year period. 
Central budgetary subsidies were estimated at Rs. 103546 crore for 2002-03, and 
106663 crore in 2003-04. Thus, in a span of one year, subsidies appear to have 
increased by Rs. 3117 crore. There are two possible reasons. First, the explicit 
subsidies (food, fertiliser, etc.) increased by a margin of Rs. 3637 crore from a figure 
of Rs. 44110 crore in 2002-03 to Rs. 47737 in 2003-04 (Table A3.1). Second, 
implicit cost and subsidies in social services has increased. 
Subsidies, as percentage of fiscal deficit was, around 60 per cent in 1987-88 as 
computed by Mundle and Rao. This ratio was highest in 1992-93 as computed by 
Tiwari. In between 1994-95 and 2002-2003, it was around 71 per cent. Again, it has 
increased to 80 per cent in 2003-04 (see Figure 3.8). It is clear from earlier studies 
that ratio of subsidies to fiscal deficit was more than 70 per cent during last 15 
years. To reduce the burden of fiscal deficit, subsidies should be 
curtailed/rationalised. 
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Table 3.7 
Implicit Budgetary Subsidies: Review of Selected Years 
(Rs. Crore) 
Years 
1987-88 
(M-R) 
1992-93 
(Tiwari) 
1994-95 
(NIPFP) 
1995-96 
(NIPFP) 
1996-97 
(NIPFP) 
1998-99 
(NIPFP) 
2002-03 
(NIPFP) 
2003-04 
(NIPFP) 
Subsidies 
16065 
36829 
43089 
42941 
47781 
79828 
103546 
106663 
Revenue 
Receipts 
37037 
74128 
91083 
110130 
126279 
149485 
231748 
263026 
Fiscal 
Deficit 
27044 
40173 
57703 
60243 
66733 
113348 
145073 
132103 
GDP at 
Maritet 
Prices 
354343 
748367 
1012770 
1188012 
1368208 
1740935 
2469664 
2772194 
Subsidies as Percentage of 
Revenue 
Receipts 
43.38 
49.68 
47.31 
38.99 
37.84 
53.40 
44.68 
40.55 
GDP 
4.53 
4.92 
4.25 
3.61 
3.49 
4.59 
4.19 
3.85 
Fiscal 
Deficit 
59.40 
91.68 
74.67 
71.28 
71,60 
70.43 
71.38 
80.74 
Sources: 1. Mundle and Rao (1992), Tiwari, A.C. (1996), Srivastava et.al. (1997), Srivastava 
and Amar Nath (2001). Srivastava et.al. (2003), Kumar et.al (2004). 
2. Revenue Receipts and Fiscal Deficit and GDP: Central Statistical Organization 
and Economic Survey 2003-04. 
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3.8 Summary 
From the above analysis it is clear that explicit Central budgetary subsidies have 
increased during last two decades. Food subsidies are around 40 per cent of total 
explicit subsidies followed by fertiliser. Subsidies have not only increased in current 
prices but also in real terms. Over the period, the relative importance of major 
subsidies given by the Central government like food, fertiliser, agriculture, power, 
and petroleum have changed. Raito of subsidies to fiscal deficit is also significantly 
high. There is an increasing trend with some fluctuations in different years. Per 
capita subsidies have also increased. Increasing subsidies at alarming rate have 
generated burden on fiscal condition of the country. 
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Chapter 4 
Economy of Uttar Pradesh: 
An Overview 
Before we study the quantum and volume of the subsidies in Uttar Pradesh, it will be 
more appropriate if we review the situation of the economy of the State and 
particularly its fiscal profile. It is also important to compare the main macro economic 
indicators of the Uttar Pradesh with the other major States of the country. This 
chapter covers the following aspects; first section is on trends of development and 
status of the State. The second section discusses fiscal reforms initiated in the 
State. Third section covers comparison with all other major States in India. Fourth 
section is on imbalance fiscal scenario of the Uttar Pradesh and the last section 
summarise the finding and the justification for the Subsidies. 
4.1 A Macro View of Uttar Pradesh 
As per population census 2001, Uttar Pradesh, with its 16,605 crore strong 
population, continued to be the most populous State in the country and accounts for 
16.17 per cent of India's 102.70 crore population. It is also the fourth largest State in 
geographical area covering 9.0 per cent of the country's total geographical area, 
encompassing 294,411 square kilometres and comprising of 83 districts, 901 
development blocks, and 112,804 inhabited villages. The density of population in the 
State is 473 persons per square kilometres as against 274 for the country. An 
economically strong Uttar Pradesh with its huge market could be an important 
engine of growth for the rest of the country. It has a large agriculture base, fairly well 
spread industrial activities, and some of the best learning Centres in the country. 
Resource-wise, Uttar Pradesh is rich region with its fertile soils, good climate, plenty 
of surface and ground water and diverse flora and fauna. The State thus presents 
highly favourable conditions for agricultural development. It is also endowed with 
large forest resources (mostly confined to the Hill region) as well as livestock 
resources, although of a poor quality. The economy of the State is dominated by the 
agricultural sector, which contribute 40 per cent of the Gross State Domestic 
Product (GSDP) and 75 per cent of employment. The State is, however, deficient in 
mineral resources. 
The erstwhile State of Uttar Pradesh was partitioned into two States in November 
2000. One retained the original name, while the other has been cherished 
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Uttaranchal (now Uttarakhand) which is 28'*" State of India. Uttaranchal has been 
carved out by combining 13 adjoining districts in Garhwal and Kumaun hill region, 
spread over a area of 53483 sq. kms. and is ranked at 18'*" place with its share at 
1.69 per cent of the area of the country. It has a population of 84.8 lakh person (as 
per the census 2001), of which males accounted for 51 per cent and females 49 per 
cent. 
In the context of State finances, this partitioning has affected the two States 
asymmetrically. UP has the larger share of population (about 95 per cent) relative to 
the share in the area (about 82 per cent). Uttar Pradesh has also lost out in terms of 
share of forest and sources of Hyde! Energy. It has however, a much larger share of 
industry and agriculture. These changes affects both tax and non-tax revenue 
resources. The expenditure profile is also asymmetrically affected. 
The Uttar Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2000 delineated the criteria of distribution of 
revenues, authorisation of expenditure and apportionment of assets and liabilities. 
As per the notification of Ministry of Finance, Government of India, 96.7 per cent of 
the tax devolution to UUP was assigned to the new Uttar Pradesh, and the rest, i.e., 
the 3.3 per cent was assigned to Uttaranchal this arrangement was done as, by the 
time the reorganisation of the State was completed, and as per Twelfth Finance 
Commission, 95.34 is assigned to UP and rest 4.65 to Uttaranchal. The calamity 
relief fund was divided on the basis of the geographical area of the two States. The 
total of the cash balances in all treasuries of the State of the Uttar Pradesh and the 
credit balance of the State with the Reserve Bank of India and any other bank were 
divided between the two States on the basis of their respective population size. 
According to provisions, tax arrears should be collected and distributed according to 
the location of the assessing authority. Loan should be realised on the basis of the 
location of public sector enterprises. For the appointment of liabilities, public debt as 
on 5"" November 2000 has to be divided on per capita terms between the two 
States. The GPF and EPF balances have also to be divided on the basis of the 
number of employees in the two States, as allotted. 
However, the economic performance of the State over the year has fallen behind the 
rest of the country. During the post reform period of 1993-94 to 2000-01 the real 
GSDP at factor cost (1993-94 prices) in divided Uttar Pradesh had an average 
annual growth of 4.22 per cent as against all India average growth of 6.3 per cent. 
During the most recent period of 2004-05 to 2006-07, the average growth of GSDP 
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at current prices (1999-2000) has been just about 12.63 per cent as against all India 
average of 14.76 per cent. 
The result of poor overall economic activity and high population growth is reflected 
in extremely slow growth in per capita income as compared to all-India growth 
figure. The per capita income of the State was Rs. 15054 in 2005-06 at 14'^  among 
15 major States, Bihar is the at tail end with Rs. 8838 per capita income, while 
Haryana at the top with Rs. 43506 per capita income. State was also one of the 
lowest in the country with Rs. 4787 per capita income except Orissa (Rs. 4726) and 
Bihar (Rs. 3620) in 1993-94. The per capita of the State in 1950-51 at Rs. 259 was 
very close to the national per capita income of Rs. 267, short by only Rs. 8 i.e. 3 per 
cent only. The average annual growth in total income of the State in the period from 
1951 to 1974 was always far less than the country. 
The post-1974 period was, however, marked by a significant improvement in the 
income of the State. The State achieved a growth of 5-7 per cent per annum, which 
is higher than the national growth of 5.3 per cent. But this gain in higher growth rate 
of total income in the State was lost due to increase in the growth rate of population 
from 1.8 per cent per annum in 1961-71 to 2.3 per cent in 1971-81 which is higher 
than the country's population growth rate of 2.2 per cent. 
The structure of State income shows that the contribution of primary sector has 
declined to 41 per cent of the State income though the sector still sustain 73 pe-^  
cent of the total working force. This shows the continued pressure of working 
population in the primary sector. The share of secondary sector, on the other hand 
has gone up to 20 per cent of the total State income which now employ 9 per cent of 
the total workers in the State. This percentage is the lowest among all the majoi 
Indian States except Bihar (4.6 per cent in 1991 census), Madhya Pradesh (8.4 pe-
cent in 1991), and Orissa (7.5 per cent in 1991). The share of tertiary sector has 
been more impressive from 25 per cent in 1970-71 to 37 per cent in 1994-95 and 
the percentage share of workers employed by this sector has risen from 15 per cent 
to 18 per cent in 1991. It thus shows that the U.P.'s growth has been more capital 
intensive than labour intensive, more urban based than rural based and the shift 
income from primary to other sectors is not accompanied by corresponding change 
in employment pattern. 
Agriculture sector is the prime mover of economic growth in Uttar Pradesh. A vast 
majority of the population in the State virtually relies on agriculture for its livelihood. 
Agriculture performance of Uttar Pradesh is too dismal during the past two decades, 
: J2 
The State is bestowed with rich natural resources. The available resources are 
mismanaged and injudicially used due to excessive population pressure and 
absence of growth-oriented policies. Public investment in agriculture is rapidly 
declining, which is swallowed by the mammoth amount of subsidies on irrigation 
fertiliser, power and credit. Average size of land holdings are tiny (about 0.9 ha) 
fragmented and showing symptoms of degradations. 
Speed of agricultural growth has slowed down at a much lower level. Diversification 
of agriculture in favour of high value and commercial crops (like sugar, fruits and 
vegetables), livestock products and poultry has enormous potential to augment farm 
income and generate employment opportunities in rural areas. Agro-processing 
sector holds tremendous potential, which need to be encouraged. Lack of suitable 
agro-based raw material and complex policies restrain the private sector 
participation in agro-processing venture. Adding value to agricultural products 
through processing would go a long way in improving agricultural performance in the 
State. In an era of liberalisation and globalisation, the State government must 
aggressively launch programmes to boost agricultural diversification and agro-
processing. 
However recently, Uttar Pradesh has performed reasonably well in the organised 
manufacturing, communication, banking, and primary sectors. It has lagged in vital 
segments of infrastructure such as power, water supply, and railways. Similarly, 
growth in real estate and trade, hotels and restaurants, and unorganised 
manufacturing is also suffered. Service growth is also linked to the share of 
industrial activity in GSDP, which is low in the case of Uttar Pradesh. At the national 
level, the share of industry and service during 2005-06 was 20.80 per cent and 
60.90 per cent respectively. In Uttar Pradesh, the corresponding numbers are 22.96 
per cent and 45.75 per cent. This means that at the national level the dominance of 
agriculture has reduced significantly compared to Uttar Pradesh. Therefore, 
manufacturing activity in Uttar Pradesh must increase in size, scale and scope as far 
as possible. 
Poverty estimation in India is based on (a) the concept of poverty time which is the 
prescribed minimum calorie intake necessary for a normal human being to survive 
and (b) size and distribution of population by expenditure obtained from the 
household consumption surveys conducted by national sample survey. 
Evidently, Uttar Pradesh has seen a fall in the incidence of poverty. Poverty has 
fallen from about 57 per cent in 1973-74 to 42 per cent in 1987-88 and from about 
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41 per cent in 1993-94 to 31 per cent in 1999-00. However, this achievement is far 
below the all-India figure of 26 per cent. The differences in poverty levels with 
respect to national figures are more pronounced in urban areas in compared to rural 
areas. Rural poverty has gone down by 11 percentage points as against a fall of 4 
percentage points in urban Uttar Pradesh. There has been urbanisation in the root 
of poverty in Uttar Pradesh during the last two decades. Further, there has been 
increase in the intensity of poverty in the State over all these years. 
4.2 Social Indicators of Uttar Pradesh 
Table 4.1 shows, main social indicators of the fifteen major States of India. It is clear 
from the Table that Utter Pradesh is ranked at 13'^  or 14'^  position among the major 
States. Bihar and in some cases Orissa, are the only two States which lag behind 
U.P. in terms of social development indicators like medical facilities, teacher-pupil 
ratio in primary schools, birth rate, death rate, infant mortality rate, literacy, per 
capita income, electrification of villages, per capita power consumption etc. Uttar 
Pradesh is often seen as a case study of development in a region of India that 
currently lag behind other parts of the country in terms of a number of important 
aspects of well being and social progress. Their region consists of Bihar, Madhya 
Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh. There are important differences between 
these four States. But the cause of social backwardness in these four different 
States, never the less, appear to have much in common and recent comparative 
research have pointed to many similarities in the social, cultural and even political 
makeup of these States which have contributed to their backwardness. 
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Table 4.1 
Social Indicators for UP and Other States 
Sates 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
Assam 
Bihar 
Gujarat 
Haryana 
Karnataka 
Kerala 
Madhya 
Pradesh 
Maharashtra 
Orissa 
Punjab 
Rajasthan 
Tamil Nadu 
Uttar Pradesh 
Rank of UP 
West Bengal 
INDIA 
IMR 
2006 
56 
67 
60 
53 
57 
48 
15 
74 
35 
73 
44 
67 
37 
71 
(13) 
38 
57 
Life 
Expectancy 
2001-05 
65.2 
59.0 
60.1 
65.0 
66.0 
66.9 
76.3 
57.5 
68.1 
59.2 
70.1 
62.2 
67.1 
59.3 
(12) 
65.5 
63.9 
Literacy Rate 
Total 
2001 
61.11 
64.28 
47.53 
69.97 
68.59 
67.04 
90.92 
64.11 
77.27 
63.61 
69.95 
61.03 
73.47 
57.36 
(14) 
69.22 
65.38 
Per Capita 
NSDP 
(In Rs.) 
2005-06 
21372 
12821 
7319 
26672 
29504 
21238 
13722 
14784 
13732 
12645 
28607 
15738 
23358 
11534 
(14) 
20548 
20936 
Persons 
below 
poverty line 
(In Per cent) 
15.8 
19.7 1 
41.4 
15,8 
i 
14.0 i 
25.0 
15.0 
38.3 
30.8 
46.4 
8.4 
22.1 
22.5 
32.8 
(12) 
24.7 
27.5 
Source: Government of India, Econonnic Survey, Ministry of Finance. 
Health 
Life in Uttar Pradesh is short and uncertain. Female expects to less than be 55 
years and the under-five mortality rate is as high as 141 per thousands. In these 
respects Uttar Pradesh resembles Sub-Saharan Africa for with 53 years of life 
expectancy and 160 under five mortality rate. Among all major Indian States, Uttar 
Pradesh has the highest under five mortality rate, the second highest crude death 
rate and the third lowest life expectancy figure. The number of maternal deaths per 
100,000 live births in the State estimated to be 931 in the mid 1980s. If a girl is born 
in Kerala she can expect to live 20 years longer than if she is born in Uttar Pradesh. 
The probability that she will die before the age of one is more than six times as high 
in Uttar Pradesh than in Kerala. According to the recent National Family Health 
survey, Uttar Pradesh comes second to Bihar among the major Indian States in 
terms o1 the incidence of under nutrition among children below the age of five. This 
corroborate as well as explain to a large extent the lower possibility of child survival 
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in Uttar Pradesh. Further, the demographic transition of UP. has been slow. Among 
all the major Indian States, Uttar Pradesh has the highest birth rate and the highest 
fertility rate. 
Education 
In terms of human development indicators, Uttar Pradesh lags behind most Indian 
States. As per the 2001 Population Census, UP's literacy rate (57 per cent) was 
lower than the national average (65 per cent), and female literacy (43 per cent) in 
particular was lower than other States of India, except Bihar. At the same time 
however, a comparison of the 1991 and 2001 census findings provides some 
grounds for optimism, as literacy rates in UP has been increasing faster than all 
India average. 
Female literacy situation in Uttar Pradesh is dismal. Only one out of four females in 
the 7+ age group was able to read and write in 1991. This figure go down to 19 per 
cent for rural areas, 11 per cent for the scheduled castes, 8 per cent for scheduled 
castes in rural areas, and 8 per cent for the entire rural population in the most 
educationally backward districts. 
The problems of education system is existing due to public apathy. The schools are 
in disarray, privately run school are functional, but beyond the reach of ordinary 
people. The State government has under taken many programmes to literate the 
total population of the State. There are special programmes like World Bank aided 
District Primary Education Project (DPEP). Steps are being taken with the help of 
NGOs and other organizations to raise people's participation. 
4.3 State Public Sector Undertakings in Utter Pradesii 
There are 41 SPSU in the State, which have incurred a loss of Rs. 1193.48 crore in 
2002-03. Of these, 19 companies earned a profit of Rs. 226.56 crore, and 22 
companies incurred a loss of Rs. 1419.99 crore. The performance of profitable 
ventures is thus overshadowed by the financial situation of loss-making enterprises. 
The SPSUs account for an employment of 173349 and the average annual salary 
paid to an employee was put at Rs. 1.15 lakh in 2002-03. In view of the recurring 
losses, the State SPSUs are characterised by overstaffing, high overhead costs and 
high wage bills. 
The total paid-up capital as of march 31, 2003 was Rs. 8588.53 crore. Accumulated 
losses of the State's SPSUs amounted to a total of Rs.9672.81 crore in the 2002-03. 
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These losses exceeded the paid-up capital and free reserves of the State's 
enterprises. The accumulated term loans from the State government is of the order 
of Rs. 4750.70 crore amounting to an estimated 42 per cent of the total PSU 
outstanding debt, which adversely affects the fiscal position of the State. Working 
capital loans from the State was estimated to be another Rs. 12.40 crore as on 
March 31, 2003. 
Majority of the SPSUs are small to medium-sized companies and they have become 
unviable in the prevailing competitive environment. There are 16 companies with an 
investment of Rs. 5 crore or less and there are 13 companies with a turnover less 
than Rs. 5 crore. There are only 13 companies with an investment of more than Rs 
100 crore and 14 companies with the same turnover. 
4.4 Reforms Initiated 
After independence period, economic growth in Uttar Pradesh has lagged behind 
other major States. The gap between UP and the rest of India widened substantially 
during the 1990s, as the annual growth rate of Gross State Domestic Product 
(GSDP) slowed down to over two percentage points per year slower than for India 
as a whole. Power shortages, low rates of capital formation and low productivity of 
existing irrigation systems and road networks, along with the underdevelopment of 
human capital were among the main causes of economic stagnation in UP 
particularly in the agricultural sector. In 1999, the Government of Uttar Pradesh 
embarked upon a comprehensive reform program with assistance from the World 
Bank. Wide-ranging fiscal reforms, productivity of the government as well as 
sectoral reforms were initiated by the government. While the primary objective of the 
reform program was to address the fiscal crisis facing the State government, and the 
reforms undertaken were also expected to have a significant impact on raising 
incomes and the standard of public service delivery, as well as on reducing poverty 
in the State. Since the actual impacts of reforms on the poor are complex and can 
be difficult to anticipate, a carefully designed monitoring system was needed to track 
changes both in outcomes (e.g., incomes, literacy, morbidity, etc.) as well as in key 
intermediate variables (e.g., access to services, infrastructure, etc.) that have an 
impact on living standards. In response, the GoUP, with the help of the World Bank, 
set up a Poverty Monitoring System (UP PSMS) 
The Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA) is the Government of India's flagship programme 
to Universalise Elementary Education in the country, and is being implemented in 
partnership with State governments. The program seeks to open new schools in 
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those habitations which do not have schooling facilities and strengthen existing 
school infrastructure through the provision of additional class rooms, toilets, drinking 
water, maintenance grants, and school improvement grants. Existing schools with 
inadequate teacher strength are provided additional teachers, while the capacity of 
existing teachers is being strengthened by extensive training, grants for developing 
teaching learning materials and strengthening of the academic support structure at 
the cluster, block and district levels. The SSA has a special focus on girl's education 
and children with special needs, and seeks to bridge social, regional and gender 
gaps in educational attainments. Important objectives of the program include 
ensuring: 
• that all children complete five years of primary schooling by 2007 
• that all children complete eight years of elementary schooling by 2010 
• a bridging of all gender and social gaps at the primary stage by 2007, and 
• universal retention by 2010. 
In 2002-03, about 66 per cent of UP's population had above-the-poverty-line (APL) 
cards and 21 per cent had below-the-poverty-line (BPL) cards, while about 13 per 
cent did not have any PDS card of any type whatsoever. Commensurate with the 
higher poverty level in rural areas, rural households were much more likely than 
urban dwellers to have BPL cards. Overall the share of the UP population who 
possessed BPL cards declined from 26 to 21 per cent between 1990-2000 and 
2002-03 (Table 4.2). A major policy change related to the PDS was introduced in 
December 2000, when the Government of India launched the Antyodaya Anna 
Yojana scheme, entitling the poorest sixth of the population (about 10 of 65 million 
BPL—below the- poverty-line—households nationwide) to purchase 25 kg of food 
grains at highly subsidized issue prices (Rs. 2 and 3 per kg for wheat and rice, 
respectively, compared to Rs. 4.15 and Rs. 5.65 respectively for BPL households) 
from fair-price shops. About 3 per cent of UP's population reported being 
beneficiaries of this scheme in 2002-03. PSMS-II shows that this new scheme was 
reasonably well-targeted towards poor households. About 53 per cent of Antyodaya 
beneficiaries were selected from among the poorest one-third of UP's population 
Still, about 23 per cent of all Antyodaya beneficiaries were from the richest one-third 
of the population. Targeting of Antyodaya is better than targeting of BPL: 39 per cent 
of BPL beneficiaries were selected from the poorest one-third, while 30 per cent 
from the richest group. Both these schemes performed better at targeting than if the 
cards had been distributed at random among the population, so in this sense, both 
schemes can be described as being targeted towards the poor. 
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Table 4.2 
Share of Households with APL and BPL Cards 
(Per cent 
TYPE OF CARD 
No cards 
APL cards 
BPL cards 
of which Antyodaya 
Total: 
1999-00 
OVERALL 
9.6 
54.7 
25.8 
100.0 
RURAL 
8.3 
62.6 
29.1 
100.0 
URBAN 
15.0 
73.4 
11.6 
100.0 
2002-03 
OVERALL 
12.9 
55.9 
21.3 
(3.3) 
100.0 
RURAL 
10.4 
64.5 
25.1 
(3.9) 
100.0 
URBAN 
22.5 
71.3 
15.1 
(0.7) 
100.0 
Source: Monitoring poverty in Uttar Pradesii -A report on tiie Second Poverty and Social 
Monitoring Survey (PSMS II) 
There has been a sizable decline in the proportion of the population that benefits 
from other government programs. These programs include old age pension 
disability pension, widowhood pension, benefits for pregnancy, subsidized credit and 
Jawahar Rozgar Yojana (JRY) and are intended for the welfare of the poor and 
other vulnerable groups. The proportion of households benefiting from one of the 
above schemes has gone down from 5.6 to 4.2 per cent between 1999-00 and 
2002-03. This decline is observed both in rural and urban areas of the State. This 
decline may be partly explained by the administrative cap kept on the number of 
beneficiaries in any district under these schemes, while the number of households 
has grown resulting in the proportion falling. Concerned departments would be 
better placed to provide a factual answer to the phenomenon of decline in the 
proportion of beneficiaries. 
An important component of public sector reforms is power sector reforms. In 1998 
the Government of India enacted the Electricity Regulation Commission Act to set 
up Electricity Regulation Commission both at the Centre and in the States to 
rationalise tariff, adopt transparency, promote efficiency and ensure fair rate of 
return to investors. As a sequel to this the UP Electricity Reform Act, 1999 was 
enacted. Accordingly, the UP State Electricity Board (UPSEB) was reorganised into 
three corporations, viz., the UP Power corporation Ltd. (UPPCL) as a principal 
successor to the UPSEB, the UP Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Ltd. (UPRVUNL) and 
the UP Jal Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Ltd. (UPJVUNL). 
The expert group headed by Shri. M.S. Ahluwalia, in its report given in May 2001 
has recommended, besides paring off the dues after verification, a one-time 
settlement of the arrears through a scheme of writing of 50 per cent of the 
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interest/surcharge arrears and securitising the balance interest and principal in long-
term bonds. For future, the SEBs will continue to get power facility from CPSUs on 
prompt payment without the backlog of arrears. The SEBs have to enter into an 
agreement with CPSUs to ensure regular power purchases. In the July 2001 report, 
the commission recommended reforms, which involve huge investments for a 
Modified Accelerated Power Development Programme for the Tenth Plan. The 
Economic Survey of the Government of India for 2001-02 reported that in 2000-01 a 
new plan scheme known as the Accelerated Power Development Programme 
(APDEP) was initiated to promote financial assistant to States to undertake 
Renovation and Modernisation Programmes of Thermal and Hydel power stations. 
The UP government sign a MoU with the central government in this regard. The 
MoU is a joint commitment to undertake reforms in a time-bound manner. The Uttar 
Pradesh Government, as part agreed restructuring has made adjustment in the 
2003-04 budget, which involved writing off of debt as well as securitisation of some 
dues. 
Since power is a key component of infrastructure, UP must attract private sector 
players in all these fields, viz., generation, transmission, and distribution in the light 
of the new and recently announced electricity policy by the Central Government. 
The private sector can play an effective role at least in generation and distribution in 
the first instance. 
4.5 Fiscal Indicators of Major States in India: A comparison 
An important feature of Indian fiscal federalism is the significant inter-State 
differences in fiscal indicators. Comparison of fiscal indicators are based on 14 fiscal 
indicators that are classified into four broad groups, viz., (i) deficit indicators, (ii) 
revenue performance, (iii) expenditure pattern, and (iv) debt position. Generally 
fiscal indicators are expressed in relation to Gross State Domestic Product (GSDP) 
at current prices. Study of fiscal indicators is based on four different periods i.e. 
1990-91, 1995-96, 2000-01, and 2003-06. The period 2003-06 presents the average 
value of these three years. 
Major deficit indicators, which demonstrate the financial status of the States' are 
given in Table 4.3. 
Gross Fiscal Deficit - Average ratio of gross fiscal deficit to GSDP in Uttar 
Pradesh during 2003 to 2006 was 5.70 per cent. Which was higher than most of the 
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states in India, only lesser than Himachal Pradesh (8.50 per cent) and Madhya 
Pradesh (6.00 per cent). If we go back to previous years and look at the position of 
the State, it ranked at 10-12 position among fifteen major States and the situation is 
became worst during 2003-06. Only in Tamil Nadu GFD-GSDP ratio is minimum 
since 1995-96 to 2003-06. 
Revenue Deficit - shows deficit in deficiency in current revenue to cover current 
expenditure. Revenue deficit as a per cent of GSDP in Utter Pradesh is also high. 
Utter Pradesh ranked at 12"" position during 2003-06. Position of Utter Pradesh is 
almost same since 1990-91. On the contrary, only Karnataka is a revenue surplus 
State [in 1990-91 (0.11 per cent), 1995-96 (0.11 per cent), and during 2003-06 
(Average) (0.70 per cent)]. 
Primary Deficit - Primary deficit is computed by subtracting interest payment from 
fiscal deficit, which is the indicative of requirement of additional public debt. PD-
GSDP ratio is lesser than one per cent (2003-06) in nine States out of fifteen States. 
PD-GSDP ratio is high in Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, and Uttar Pradesh. 
Though most of the major States are at many times in a better position in 
comparison of previous years, but Utter Pradesh is performing only marginally 
better. 
The ratio of Revenue Deficit to Gross Fiscal Deficit, which indicates the pre-
emption of borrowing for current expenditure, shows decline in the case of several 
States during 2003-06 vis-a-vis 2000-01. RD-GFD ratio is high in Uttar Pradesh, 
West Bengal, Punjab, Maharashtra, Haryana, and Kerala. 
The ratio between Revenue Deficit and Revenue Receipts is also high in Uttar 
Pradesh, West Bengal, and Himachal Pradesh. While this ratio is low in Karnataka, 
Haryana, and Madhya Pradesh. 
If we look at revenue performance as a ratio to GSDP, we find that own tax revenue 
of the State is performing below average among all major States. As an average of 
2003-06, Own Tax Revenue (Table 4.4) as a percentage of GSDP is 6.60 per cent 
while Karnataka is performing the best with 10.50 per cent. If we go back to previous 
years the position of Uttar Pradesh is not good since 1990-91, it is below average, 
while Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Kerala, and Haryana accounted for higher ratios 
(more than 8.0 Per cent) during both 2000-01 and 2003-06(average), while West 
Bengal and Bihar, and Himachal Pradesh occupied lowest position. 
I l l 
In contrast to the trends in Own Tax Revenues, about half of the State governments 
showed deterioration in Own Non-Tax-GSDP ratio (Table 4.4). Uttar Pradesh's own 
non-tax performance as a percentage of GSDP is also than the below average then 
the major States. Uttar Pradesh's own non-tax-GSDP ratio is only 1.20, 2.00, 1.07, 
and 1.10 per cent in 1990-91, 1995-96, 2000-01, and 2003-06 respectively. It is the 
highest in Haryana and Punjab and lowest in West Bengal among all major States 
during the period of 16 years from 1990-91 to 2005-06. 
States like Bihar, West Bengal, and Kerala had the ratio less than 1.0 per cen. The 
low level of non-tax revenue is partly due to low cost recovery (i.e. ratio of non-tax 
receipts to non-plan revenue expenditure) from sectors such as education, medical, 
and public and family welfare, irrigation, power, and roads. There is a wide variation 
across the States in terms of cost recovery. West Bengal, Tamil Nadu, and Kerala 
were legging behind the Uttar Pradesh in 1990-91. 
Current Transfers (i.e., sharable Central taxes and grants-in-aid) (Table 4.5) as a 
ratio to GSDP were high for States like Bihar, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan 
and Uttar Pradesh, reflecting the principle of horizontal equity in such fiscal 
transfers. 
Expenditure pattern of the States shows development and non-development 
expenditures, social sector expenditure and capital outlays of the States. As 
indicated in table 4.5, when we examining development expenditure as a ratio to 
GSDP of each States, it is highest in Himachal Pradesh (17.5 per cent in 2000-01, 
and 19.9 per cent in 2003-06). While development expenditure is lowest in West 
Bengal (7.6 per cent in 2003-06) and in Punjab (6.8 per cent in 2000-01). In Uttar 
Pradesh, development expenditure-GSDP ratio is not high in 1995-96 (5.6 per cent) 
and in 2000-01 (8.2 per cent). While this has increased to 14.00 per cent in 2003-06 
and ranked at 12"" position among all major States, which shows positive sign in 
economy. 
Non-development Expenditure and GSDP ratio is highest in Uttar Pradesh non-
development expenditure and GSDP and ranked at 11"" position since 1990-91 to 
2003-06 among major States (Table 4.5). This ratio is 5.1, 6.7, 8.0, and 9.1 per cent 
in 1990-91, 1995-96, 2000-01, and 2003-06 respectively. 
Social Sector Expenditure (i.e., social services, rural development, food storage 
and warehousing) under both revenue and capital account as a ratio to GSDP are 
indicating in Table 4.5. Amongst all the States, Bihar (12.8 per cent), Himachal 
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Pradesh (12,4 per cent), Rajasthan (8.7 per cent) continued to have higher level of 
social sector expenditure in 2003-06. On the other hand, Kerala (0.7 per cent), 
Haryana (4.2 per cent), Punjab (4.2 per cent) have lower level of SSE-GSDP ratio in 
2003-06. Uttar Pradesh also had lower level of SSE-GSDP ration in 1990-91 (5.3 
Per cent), 1995-96 (3.6 per cent), and 2000-01 (4.5 Per cent), while the ratio has 
increased in 2003-06 to 7.0 per cent and ranked at 10'*" position among all major 
States. 
Most of the State Governments showed an increased in ratio of Capital Outlays to 
GSDP during 2003-06 over 2000-01 (Table 4.5). Madhya Pradesh (4.5 per cent), 
Himachal Pradesh (3.8 per cent), and Utter Pradesh (3.4 per cent) maintain higher 
proportion of capital outlay. While West Bengal (0.7 Per cent), Kerala (0.7 per cent), 
and Punjab (1.0 per cent) have lower proportions. 
Table 4.6 presents the debt-GSDP ratio of Major States in India. States like 
Haryana, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, and Maharashtra continued to have relatively 
lower debt-GSDP ratio (below 35.0 per cent) during 2003-06, and 2000-01, while 
States like Bihar, Orissa, and Uttar Pradesh had much higher debt-GSDP ratio at 
more than 55.0 per cent during 2003-06 and more than 35.0 per cent in 2000-01. 
Ratio of Interest Payments to Revenue Receipts is continuing to be highest in 
West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Orissa. This ratio is low in Tamil Nadu, 
Karnataka, and Madhya Pradesh (See Table 4.6). 
Per capita revenues and expenditures of the major States for 2006-07 presented in 
Table 4.7 which bring out some important features. First, there were wide inter-State 
variations in revenues in both per capita terms and as a percentage of Gross State 
Domestic Product. These variations indicate differences both in revenue capacity 
and efforts. Second, although fiscal dependence of the State on the Centre varied 
inversely with per capita income, per capita expenditures in high income States 
were subsequently higher. 
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Table 4.6 
Debt and Interest Payments 
Major States 
Andhra Pradesh 
Bihar 
Gujarat 
Haryana 
Himachal Pradesh 
Karnataka 
Kerala 
Madhya Pradesh 
Maharashtra 
Orissa 
Punjab 
Rajasthan 
Tamil Nadu 
Uttar Pradesh 
West Bengal 
Source: State Fina 
DEBT/GSDP 
1990-91 
18.43 
27.40 
20.23 
18.47 
35.28 
18.01 
24.56 
17.82 
14.56 
35.88 
33.89 
22.79 
14.91 
23.55 
19.67 
nces - A 
1995-96 
18.38 
31,04 
15.34 
18.68 
39.37 
17.13 
23.78 
25.03 
11.39 
31.23 
32.09 
24.50 
15.11 
24.96 
19.56 
Study of E 
2000-01 
24.57 
59.04 
26.80 
23.14 
50.26 
21.31 
33.15 
33.18 
17.83 
50.62 
37.26 
37,23 
19.53 
36.68 
32.92 
Budgets, 
2003-06 
(Average) 
43.30 
76.70 
38.50 
29.10 
79.80 
29.90 
42.30 
42.50 
33.30 
62.90 
51.60 
52.00 
30.20 
58,50 
48.20 
Reserve E 
• ' — • 1 
Interest Payments /Revenue Receipts 
1990-91 
1.61 
2.24 
1.73 
1.58 
3.00 
1.69 
1.88 
1.40 
1.30 
2.89 
1.64 
1.98 
1.23 
1.98 s 
1.57 
iank of In 
1995-96 
1.85 
3.12 
1.83 
1.80 
3.69 
1.81 
2.17 
2.35 
1.28 
3.09 
3.51 
2.48 
1.56 
2.77 
2.05 
2000-01 
2.61 
4.14 
2.82 
2.62 
5.10 
2.30 
3.13 
3.03 
2.08 
5.26 
3.14 
4.06 
2.13 
4.12 
3.66 
2003-06 
(Average) 
23.40 
22.40 
28.80 
18.90 
32.10 
14,90 
26.60 
19.20 
21.80 
28.20 
27,10 
28.40 
16,70 
27.90 
48.30 
dia, Various Issues 
Table 4.7 
Selected Fiscal indicators 2006-07 
State 
Andhra Pradesh 
Bihar 
Gujarat 
Haryana 
Himachal Pradesh 
Karnataka 
Kerala 
Madhya Pradesh 
Maharashtra 
Orissa 
Punjab 
Rajasthan 
Tamil Nadu 
Uttar Pradesh 
West Bengal 
Per Capita 
6SDP 
32533.0 
10286.0 
44332.5 
48213.8 
43535.4 
36037.8 
39742.1 
18984.1 
46307.9 
25997.6 
43436.1 
22210.8 
37635.2 
16308.2 
30739.3 
Per Capita 
Dev 
Expenditure 
4977.2 
2105.3 
4558.4 
5717.8 
7541.5 
5173.7 
4243.7 
2872.0 
4587.2 
2649.9 
4885.9 
3101.1 
4698.3 
2368.9 
2419.5 
Per Capita 
Own 
Revenues 
3788.0 
530.9 
4056.2 
5736.0 
3690.8 
4567.3 
3841.6 
1863.2 
4236.6 
1945.3 
4362.7 
2301.3 
4729.4 
1607.7 
1598.7 
Per Capita 
Transfers 
1768.1 
1952.9 
1432.1 
1008.9 
6996.9 
1733.4 
1773.4 
1841.9 
1383.3 
2568.5 
1612.2 
1735.7 
1454.0 
1631.9 
1550.0 
Tax-GSDP 
Percentage 
9,6 
4.8 
7,5 
9,3 
5.4 
11.7 
9.0 
8.0 
8.2 
5.7 
8.5 
8.1 
11.4 
8.1 
4.8 
Source: Rao, Sen and Jena (2008) 
117 
4.6 Fiscal Scenario of Uttar Pradesh: A Time Profile 
The finances of Utter Pradesh show marked deterioration in revenue and fiscal 
balance relative to GSDP towards the end of the nineties. The profile of fiscal 
imbalance after bifurcation, shown an improvement but has started deteriorating 
again. The quality of fiscal deficit has worsened considerably over the years. 
Compare to other States, fiscal imbalances are largest in Utter Pradesh. The 
outstanding feature of Undivided Utter Pradesh's (UUP's) finance was the mounting 
fiscal imbalance where the revenue surplus of 0.64 per cent of GSDP in 1987-88 
transformed into a deficit in 1988-89 reaching a peak of 5.40 per cent in 1998-99. 
Upto 1998-99, the deteriorating fiscal situation can be clearly divided into three 
phases: the first phase from 1987-88 to 1990-91, the second from 1991-92 to 1995-
96, and the last from 1996-97 to 1998-99. The year 1999-00 could possibly be seen, 
as the beginning of another phase of improvement. In 1999-00, it improved to 4.19 
per cent of GSDP. The fiscal deficit increased from 2.56 per cent of GSDP in 1987-
88 to a peak of 7.22 per cent in 1998-99. It marginally improved to 6.41 per cent in 
1999-00. In fact, after reorganisation of UP, the trend towards improvement was 
further strengthened until 2005-06, when a sharp deterioration occurred. 
There is a significant change in fiscal scenario of Utter Pradesh since 1987-88, 
therefore, we are analysing fiscal situation of Utter Pradesh since 1987-88 instead of 
1990-91 
The three phase profile of fiscal imbalances as shown by revenue, fiscal and 
primary deficits is shown in Figure 4.1. In 1987-88, there was a revenue surplus of 
0,65 per cent of GDSP. It turned into revenue deficit in the next year which 
continued to raise upto 1990-91. in the second phase, although the revenue account 
remained in deficit, the position of fiscal deficit visibly improved during 1991-92 to 
1995-96. Since 1996-97, the profile of fiscal imbalance sharply deteriorated with the 
rise in revenue as well as fiscal deficits. However, another phase of improvement is 
visible from 1999-00 to 2006-07, with the exception of 2003-04, where the sharp 
deterioration was due to the power sector adjustments. 
118 
<T\ 
I 
0) 
u 
c 
_ro (0 
e 
wm^ 
ro 
u <A 
• • • 
o 0) 
«*-
o %m 
0 . 
^ S | * 
\ 
- % 
- \ 
• % 
\ %• 
"^ ^^  
- \ 
- % 
"^S. m 
< 
\ 
- % 
""^ ^ 
^ % 
"^ 
A j , 
•^ ^ 
- \ 
""^ ^ 
- % 
/ • ^ 
'SU 
% . 
«> 
' "6V 
S 8 8 8 8 8 '8 E 
T-1 1 
daS9»"33J3d 
Q 
>« 
ro 
f 
"u 
M -(U 
Q 
"TO 
u 
.^ U -
+ 
• ^ 
Q 
3 
C 
OJ 
> 
on 
\ 
3 
3 
r" 
o 
00 
Si 
» -
E p 
T3 
<D 
3 
Q . 
E 
o O 
'6 o 
1 -
3 
O 
CO 
The share of revenue deficit in fiscal deficit, which is indicative of the quality of fiscal 
deficit, has also sharply deteriorated. In 1990-91, nearly 40 per cent of fiscal deficit 
was claimed by revenue deficit. This share rose to nearly 75 per cent in 1998-99 
After that, it has started to fall showing improvement in the utilisation of fiscal deficit, 
with 2003-04 being an exception. In 2003-04, the revenue deficit amounted about 
112 per cent of fiscal deficit. This, however, was due to one-time adjustments in the 
electricity sector. The dimensions of fiscal imbalances, based on some key 
indicators, are summarised in Table 4.8. It appears that both the earlier phases, 
fiscal deterioration started with salary revisions in tandem with Fourth and Fifth Pay 
Commissions. In the late nineties, the deterioration is sharper, combining the 
influence both of salary revision and interest payments which has risen following the 
steadily rising fiscal deficit combined with the rising cost of borrowing in the nineties. 
Table 4.8 
Fiscal Imbalances: Key Indicators 
(PercenttoGSDP) 
Year 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
Revenue 
Deficit 
-0.63 
1.26 
1.89 
1.90 
0.96 
1.23 
1.26 
1.88 
1.95 
2.21 
2.99 
5.03 
3.90 
3.47 
3.25 
2.49 
8,26 
2.89 
0.46 
-1.52 
Fiscal Deficit 
2.54 
3.77 
4.55 
4.75 
3.77 
4,51 
3,48 
4.47 
3.65 
4.15 
4.90 
6.73 
5.97 
5.62 
5.21 
4.62 
7.40 
5.36 
3.68 
3,18 
Primary 
Deficit 
0.80 
2.07 
2.64 
2.74 
1.50 
2.03 
1,16 
1.57 
0.88 
1.32 
1.87 
3.54 
2.45 
1.50 
0.89 
1.19 
2.90 
0.46 
0.36 
-1.24 
Revenue 
Deficit/Fiscal 
Deficit* 
-24,86 
33.55 
41.53 
40.04 
25.54 
27.34 
36.29 
42.02 
53.43 
53.38 
61,03 
74.76 
65.35 
61,77 
62.50 
53.88 
111.62 
53,80 
12,58 
-50.97 
Outstanding 
Debt 
21,15 
20.55 
24.19 
25.31 
25.78 
25.88 
27.08 
27.71 
27.51 
27.71 
26,42 
28.90 
31.35 
35.51 
38,50 
42.50 
44.30 
48.03 
49,31 
48.82 
Sources (Basic Data): Finance 
Note: * Includes Reserve Fund 
Accounts of Uttar Pradesh for various years, 
and Deposits. 
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In the late nineties, almost all States went through a difficult phase in respect of 
State finances. In a comparative perspective, however, the position of fiscal 
imbalances in Uttar Pradesh has been one of the worst. The ratio of revenue to 
fiscal deficit in UUP was 74.76 per cent in 1998-99, which was the highest among 
the major States. Thus, while the experience of growing fiscal imbalance during the 
nineties is shared by all State, UP's finance proved to be particularly vulnerable to 
the impact of rise in revenue expenditures claims on salaries, pensions and interest 
payments. The outstanding liabilities of the State government show an explosive 
growth since 1999-00. It rose to a level of 38.13 per cent of GSDP in 1998-99 to 
48.82 per cent in 2006-07. 
4.7 Trends in State Finances 
Relative to GSDP, every major component of revenue receipts, i.e., own tax 
revenue, central transfers, and own non-tax revenue fell during 1987-88 to 1999-00. 
That was accompanied by an unhealthy structural shift in expenditure, while interest 
payments, pensions, and salary expenditure raised sharply, capital expenditure fell. 
During the period from 1987-88 to 1998-99, the revenues of the State relative to 
GSDP declined by more than 2 percentage point from 13.33 to 10.79 per cent. 
There has been an improvement since then. The revenue receipts in 2005-06 and 
2006-07 are 16.56 and 20.21 per cent of GSDP. These are highest levels of 
revenue efforts seen since 1987-88. The relevant magnitudes are given in Table 
4.9. This improvement has been mainly due a rise in own tax revenue and also due 
to marginal increase in transfer from Centre. 
During 1987-88 to 1998-99, the general fall in revenue receipts was accompanied 
by a rise in expenditure from 15.89 per cent of GSDP in 1987-88 to 18.83 per cent in 
1999-00. Within this margin of increase in the ratio of aggregate expenditure to 
GSDP, a large structural change needs to be highlighted. This relates to the 
committed expenditure like interest payments, pension, and salaries, which 
increased, and capital expenditure, and non-interest and non-pension revenue 
expenditures, which fell. Most of the increase was due to only two component of 
expenditure, namely, interest payments and pensions, which went up respectively 
by margins of 2.04 and 0.89 percentage points of GSDP during 1987-88 to 1999-00. 
On the other hand, capital expenditure became a casualty of the adjustment 
process, falling from 3.19 to 2.22 per cent of GSDP over 1987-88 to 1999-00, and a 
decline of 0.97 percentage point. In 2006-07, the revenue expenditure increased 
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sharply from 16.61 per cent of GSDP to 18.39 per cent. This was due partially to a 
rise in interest payments from 3.44 per cent of GSDP in 2002-03 to 4.42 per cent in 
2006-07. Pension payments also increased from 1.35 per cent to 1.89 per cent of 
GSDP between these years. A larger part of the increase was due however to 
adjustments in power sector involving writing off and securitisation of debt in respect 
of the power sector entities. 
The structural changes in the fiscal profile of UP are summarised in Table 4.10 
where a comparison is made in respect of selected fiscal aggregates, considered 
relative to GSDP, in 2006-07 and three benchmark years, viz., 1987-88, 1990-91 
and 1999-00. Expect for non-tax revenues, the resultant structural changes are the 
same in the two comparisons. Compared to 1990-91, the emergent picture indicates 
that: 
• own tax revenues declined over the years but reached the same level as in 
1990-91. Throughout the period 2000-01 to 2006-07 (except 2001-02), the tax 
GSDP ratio has remained above 6 per cent of GSDP. This represents a 
significant improvement in UP's tax-GSDP ratio; 
• own non-tax revenues increased by 0.18 percentage point during 1990-91 and 
1999-00 (although compared to 1987-88, this shows a fall of 0.30 percentage 
point) and 0.95 percentage point during 1999-00 and 2006-07. 
• central transfers fell by 1.00 percentage points; and same has increased in 
2006-07 by 4.46 percentage points; 
• interest payment increased by 1.76 percentage points dunng 1990-91 and 
1999-00. They have continued to rise reaching up to a level of 4.90 per cent in 
2004-05 and also declined to 4.42 per cent in 2006-07; 
• pensions increased by 0.75 percentage point during 1990-91 to 1999-00, and 
have continued to rise to 1.55 percentage of GSDP in 2006-07; 
• capital expenditure fell by 0.65 percentage point between 1990-91 and 1999-
00. In 2007-08 this is 4.80 per cent of GSDP; 
• revenue deficit increased by 2.27 percentage point (by 4.83 percentage point 
as compared to 1987-88) while in 2006-07 it has decreased by 5.81 
percentage point as compared to 1999-00; 
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Table 4.10 
Fiscal Profile of Uttar Pradesh: Summary of Structural Changes 
(During 1999-00 to 2006-07) 
Own-tax Revenues 
Own Non-tax 
Revenues 
Central Transfers 
Interest Payment 
Pension 
Capital Expenditure 
Revenue Deficit 
Fiscal Deficit 
Primary Deficit 
Outstanding Debt* 
1987-88 
5.02 
1.47 
6.85 
1.75 
0.30 
3.19 
-0.64 
2.56 
0.81 
24,40 
1990-91 
4.94 
0.99 
6.83 
2.03 
0.36 
2.87 
1.92 
4.79 
2.76 
25.52 
1999-00 
5.43 
1.16 
5.83 
3.79 
1.11 
2.22 
4.19 
6.41 
2.63 
33.67 
1999-00 
minus 
1987-88 
0.41 
-0.30 
-1.02 
2.04 
0.81 
-0.97 
4.83 
3.85 
1.82 
9.27 
1999-00 
minus 
1990-91 
0.49 
0.18 
-1.00 
1.76 
0.75 
-0.65 
2.27 
1.62 
-0.14 
8.15 
2006-07 
7.61 
2.11 
10.28 
4.42 
1.55 
4.80 
-1.62 
3.18 
-1.24 
48.82 
2006-07 
minus 
1999-00 
2.18 
0.95 
4.46 
0.63 
0.44 
2.58 
-5.81 
-3.23 
-3.86 
15.15 
Sources (Basic Data): Finance Accounts of Uttar Pradesh for various years 
Note: * includes Reserve Fund and Deposits. 
• fiscal deficit increased by 2.27 percentage points (3.85 W\Vr\ respect to 1987-
88); it has come dovi^ n in recent years (except 2003-04) and estimated at 3.67 
per cent of GSDP in 2006-07; and 
• outstanding debt rose by 8.15 percentage point betv\/een 1990-91 to 1999-00. 
It lias continued to rise to 15.15 percentage point during 2000-01 to 2006-07, 
During 1999-00 to 2007-08, one notable change is the improvement in own tax 
revenue at 8.07 per cent of GSDP. On the other hand, there is no significant change 
has taken place in total expenditure of the State. 
Revenues: Tax and Non-Tax 
The growth rates year-wise and trend growth rate (TGR) of main State taxes are 
shown in Table 4.11. From 1990-91 to the period prior to reorganisation, the TGR of 
total own tax revenues was 12.78 per cent and over the period 2000-01 to 2007-08 
was 14,55 per cent. There is also considerable volatility in the year-to-year growth in 
almost all taxes. The TGR for sales tax is higher than the average TGR by a little 
less than 1 percentage point during 1990-91 to 1999-00 and little higher than 1 
percentage point during 2000-01 to 2007-08. The TGR of stamp duty and 
registration fees are also higher than the aggregate own tax revenues. In comparing 
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growth rates in the period after reorganisation, it should be noted that in 2000-01 
growth rates are negative due to the reorganisation of the State and are not 
comparable with previous and latter years. The high growth rates in latter years are 
particularly noteworthy. 
Table 4.11 
Growth Rate of Selected Tax Revenues in Utter Pradesh 
(Per cent Per Annum) 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
T6R 
(1990-00) 
TGR 
(2000-07) 
State's Own 
Tax 
Revenues 
3.88 
18.53 
29.14 
10.50 
11.12 
6.32 
18.06 
12.11 
15.31 
10.97 
13.03 
18.85 
16.80 
-5.92 
23.59 
6.54 
15.38 
20.17 
29.29 
12.78 
14.55 
Sales Tax 
14.27 
22.67 
25.65 
12.98 
6.46 
6.34 
21.23 
13.87 
17.07 
13.30 
13.28 
14.39 
19.99 
0.73 
15.59 
7.87 
15.67 
26.96 
31.40 
13.48 
15.71 
State Excise 
Duties 
-31.55 
24.80 
71.70 
-1.27 
23.63 
8.17 
15.42 
4.89 
14.18 
6.14 
16.18 
30.34 
5.28 
-12.38 
30.27 
-3.24 
8.65 
14.98 
18.18 
12.06 
9.05 
Taxes on 
Vehicle 
75.74 
-11.73 
7.71 
8.87 
10.72 
-4.34 
9.71 
16.10 
11.22 
19.40 
26.83 
142.36 
6,05 
-7.37 
23.02 
9.39 
14.61 
24.41 
-26.47 
16.69 
8.69 
Stamp Duty 
and 
Registration 
Fees 
0.58 
23.20 
15.98 
23.76 
3.43 
15.45 
18.80 
16.35 
19.09 
9.25 
7.93 
14.13 
7.83 
12.56 
45.43 
10.46 
16.82 
11.72 
36.81 
14.16 
20.63 
Other Taxes 
23.70 
1.32 
4.08 
10,68 
20.88 
-5.17 
8.35 
12.75 
2.48 
8.28 
7.77 
-15.98 
66.84 
-66.26 
42,88 
20.77 
39.90 
-20.79 
109.16 
6.02 
10.20 
Sources (Basic Data): Finance Accounts of Uttar Pradesh for various years. 
Note: TGR refers to trend growth rate for the period 1990-91 to 1999-00 and 2000-01 to 2006-07 
Own Tax Revenues 
The composition of State's own tax revenues as given in Table 4.12 has also 
undergone considerable change. The composition of tax revenues has shifted 
towards sales tax due to the below unity buoyancies of other taxes. There is a 
marginal improvement in the share of stamp duties and registration fees since 2001-
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02. Relative share of taxes has gone down substantially during the nineties. This 
trend has continued in the more recent years also. The major problems in the case 
of sales tax are - (i) levy of tax mostly at first point; (ii) extensive evasion; (iii) under-
valuation; (iv) problem related with consignment transfers; (v) multiplicity of tax 
rates. 
Table 4.12 
Share of Different Taxes in Own Tax Revenues 
(Per cent) 
Year 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1995-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
Sales Tax 
47.97 
52,78 
54.62 
53.14 
54.28 
52.00 
52.01 
53.41 
54.25 
55.08 
56.23 
56.35 
54.24 
55.72 
59.66 
55.80 
56.50 
56.64 
59.84 
50.82 
State Excise 
Duties 
24.85 
16.37 
17.24 
22.92 
20,46 
22.76 
23,15 
22,64 
21,19 
20.98 
20.06 
20.62 
22.62 
20,39 
18,99 
20,01 
18,18 
17,12 
16,38 
14,97 
Taxes on 
Vehicle 
2,57 
4.35 
3,24 
2,70 
2,66 
2.65 
2,38 
2,22 
2,29 
2.21 
2.38 
2.67 
5.45 
4,95 
4,87 
4,85 
4,98 
4,94 
5,12 
2.91 
Stamp Duty 
and 
Registration 
Fees 
12.59 
12.19 
12.67 
11.38 
12.73 
11.85 
12,87 
12,95 
13.44 
13.88 
13.66 
13.04 
12.53 
11.56 
13.84 
16.28 
16.88 
17.09 
15.89 
15.82 
other Taxes 
12.02 
14.31 
12.24 
9,85 
9.87 
10.73 
9.57 
8.79 
8.84 
7.85 
7.66 
7.31 
5.17 
7.38 
2.65 
3.06 
3.47 
4.21 
2,77 
4.48 
State's Own 
Tax 
Revenues 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100,00 
100,00 
100,00 
100,00 
100,00 
100,00 
100.00 
100,00 
100.00 
100,00 
100,00 
100,00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
Share In 
Total Tax 
Revenues 
52,67 
53,91 
51,55 
57,83 
56,15 
53.35 
53,77 
55,20 
52,07 
50,94 
49,59 
57,82 
55,69 
54.83 
50.34 
54.10 
50.51 
51.04 
50.88 
49.76 
Sources (Basic Data): Finance Accounts of Uttar Pradesh of various years. 
Experience in other States has shown that lowering of stamp duty rates can have a 
significant positive impact on tax revenue generated from this source, especially 
when accompanied by credible valuation procedures of properties. In an earlier 
study, the Uttar Pradesh Resource Mobilisation and Taxation Reforms Committee 
(1996) had observed that high rates of stamp duty, complicated and non transparent 
system of registration, paucity of stamps, lack of rational and scientific system of 
valuation, requirement of large number of no objection certificates (NOCs) and 
absence of efficient executive machinery are some of the reasons for extensive 
evasion and avoidance of stamp duty. State excise duties are undoubtedly a 
potentially high-yielding source for larger revenue mobilisation. 
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Figure 4.3 
Composition of Revenues in Uttar Prasesh 
2006-07 
Share In Central 
Taxes 
38% 
\ 
Own Non-tax 
Revenues 
11% 
Source: Computed from Table 4.9 
Figure 4.4 
Structure of Own Tax Revenue in Uttar Pradesh 
2006-07 
other Taxes 
4% 
lamp uu 
registration Fees \ 
Taxes on Vehicle ^ • ^ •'•^^ 
3% f 
State Excise 
Duties 
% 15% 
Source: Computed from Table 4.12 
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Table 4.13 gives the estimated buoyancies of own tax revenues of major States for 
three periods viz., 1990-91 to 2006-07, 1990-91 to 1999-00, and 2000-01 to 2006-
07. For the period from 1990-91 to 2006-07 Uttar Pradesh's buoyancy of own tax 
revenues is more than unity and highest among all major States and in the period it 
is around to unity, while in the period II in compare to other States it is at second 
highest point. 
Table 4.13 
Buoyancy of Own Tax Revenue: Major States 
AP 
Bihar 
Gujarat 
Haryana 
HP 
Karnataka 
Kerala 
MP 
Maharashtra 
Orissa 
Punjab 
Rajasthan 
Tamil Nadu 
UP 
V\/B 
1990-91 to 2006-07 
(Over all Period) 
1.14 
1.18 
0,93 
1.11 
1.10 
1.09 
1.07 
1.21 
1.06 
1,19 
1.11 
1.23 
1.11 
1.23 
0.87 
1990-91 to 1999-00 
(Period 1) 
0.93 
0.99 
0.89 
0.90 
1.02 
0.91 
1.04 
1.42 
0.91 
0.82 
0.87 
1.01 
0.95 
0.95 
0.71 
2000-01 to 2006-07 
(Period II) 
1.34 
1.02 
0.93 
1.16 
1.27 
1.43 
1.16 
1.41 
0.95 
1.29 
1.78 
1.42 
1.51 
1.52 
1.23 
Source : 
Non-Tax Revenue 
There are four non-tax revenue sources, which together account for 64 per cent of 
total non-tax revenues. These are interest receipts, receipts from the general 
sen/ices, receipts from education, sport, art & culture in social services, and receipts 
from royalties from minerals in the category of economic services. Considered 
together, own non-tax revenue relative to GSDP has fallen in UUP, as already given 
in Table 4.9. There is further fall in this ratio even after the formation of a separate 
State. 
Table 4.14 presents the share of various categories of non-tax revenues in the total 
non-tax revenues of utter Pradesh. It is clear from this Table that share of interest 
receipts has declined significantly from 50.92 per cent in 1987-88 to 12.69 per cent 
in 2006-07. Share of general services had suddenly increased to 40.25 per cent in 
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2006-07, where as it was ranging between 9 and 14 per cent in earlier years. The 
major share comes from social and economic services. 
Table 4.14 
Share of Non-Tax Revenues 
(In Per cent) 
Year 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
Fiscal 
Services 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.08 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.06 
0.05 
0.29 
0.01 
0.04 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0,00 
0.00 
0.00 
Interest 
Receipts 
50.92 
36.87 
41.08 
47.82 
42.70 
35.72 
37.63 
37.17 
36.97 
37.09 
37.60 
29.02 
23.70 
27.01 
30.41 
26.93 
28.84 
21.98 
15.63 
12.69 
Dividends 
and Profits 
0.61 
2.90 
0.16 
0.29 
0.43 
0.31 
0.51 
0,93 
0.28 
0.53 
0.45 
0.42 
0.29 
0.45 
0.36 
0,41 
0.35 
0.34 
0.27 
0.14 
General 
Services 
9.16 
14.18 
8.08 
10.42 
11.45 
8.29 
8.53 
14.88 
13.84 
12.91 
14.61 
22.60 
16.57 
13.46 
18.67 
16.45 
12.46 
12.66 
12.24 
40.75 
Social 
Services 
8,29 
6.26 
13.05 
11.04 
13.49 
17.23 
6.82 
8.16 
8.10 
11.04 
12.89 
15.03 
14.77 
16.74 
15.85 
18.79 
15.66 
25.48 
35.81 
14.74 
Economic 
Services 
31.02 
39.80 
37,63 
30.43 
31.93 
38.37 
45.50 
38,86 
40.81 
38.38 
34.40 
32.64 
44.67 
42.31 
34.71 
37.41 
42.69 
39.54 
36.06 
31.69 
Total 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
Source: Sources (Basic Data): Finance Accounts of Uttar Pradesh of various years. 
The importance of forestry and wild life, has come down in the new Uttar Pradesh. 
In the case of forestry and wild life, revenue in UP, just as in many other States, 
have stagnated after the Supreme Court decision linking felling of trees to scientific 
management of forest. Since most forest are now in Uttaranchal, remaining forest in 
UP, are likely to make only a small contribution to UP's non-tax revenues. 
In the economic service, while at the beginning of the period, the sale of timber and 
other forest produce contributed the largest share, by the end of the year 1993-94 
the Mineral concession fees, Rent and Royalties had become the largest contributor 
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to non-tax revenues. This may, in part, be due to certain discrete revisions in the 
royalty rates. In the social services, Secondary Education has continued to be the 
largest contributor of fees collected. 
Resource Transfers from the Centre 
The Central government devolves its revenues to States in the form of tax 
devolution and also gives grants in aid to the States. These two together constitute 
the revenue transfers from the Central government to States. In addition to revenue 
transfers, the Central government also lends to States for various plan schemes 
through Planning Commission in ratio of loan and grant component. It is the Finance 
Commission, vi/hich recommends tax devolution and deficit filling grants. In addition 
to these, the Central government ministries and departments transfer resources to 
States under various Central and centrally sponsored schemes. Financing of these 
schemes completely made by the Central government and the share of Centre 
contribution varies from scheme to schemes. 
Resource transfers from the Centre to UP fell significantly both because transfers 
relative to GDP fell for all States, and also the share of UP in the transfer to States 
fell during the nineties. There has been some improvement in recent years. Table 
4.15 shows the details of resources transfers from the Centre. Disaggregation into 
the components of the central transfers reveal that the contribution of share in 
central taxes has increased while that of grants has declined. This is due to the fact 
that, while both share in central taxes and central grants declined as percentage of 
GSDP, the fall in grants was steeper. While revenue augmentation will serve to 
restore UP's fiscal health. 
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Table 4.15 
Source 
Composition of Central Transfers 
(In Per cent) 
Years 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
Share in 
Central 
Taxes 
65.89 
61.28 
68.67 
52.75 
53.62 
53.36 
56.54 
59.76 
68.52 
72.25 
76.66 
72.20 
74.18 
76.54 
75.58 
82.43 
84.25 
78.39 
77.26 
72.36 
Grants 
from 
Centre 
34.11 
38.72 
31.33 
47.25 
46.38 
46.64 
43.46 
40.24 
31.48 
27.75 
23.34 
27.80 
25.82 
23.46 
24.42 
17.57 
15.75 
21.61 
22.74 
27.64 
Non-plan 
Grants 
4.03 
4.25 
3.59 
8.63 
6.91 
4.88 
2.24 
1.55 
11.53 
5.59 
2.06 
2.30 
3.24 
2.58 
3.36 
3.24 
3.61 
1.74 
8.60 
11.04 
Plan 
Grants 
30.09 
34.46 
27.75 
38.62 
39.47 
41.76 
41.21 
38.59 
19.95 
22.16 
21.29 
25.50 
22.58 
20.89 
21.06 
14.34 
12.14 
19.86 
14.14 
16.60 
Total 
Grants 
34.11 
38.72 
31.33 
47.25 
46.38 
46.64 
43.46 
40.24 
31.48 
27.75 
23.34 
27.80 
25.82 
23.46 
24.42 
17.57 
15.75 
21.61 
22.74 
27.64 
Total 
Transfer 
(Rs. 
Crore) 
2711.88 
2881.81 
3351.03 
4370.51 
5093.75 
6368.94 
6281.91 
6625.59 
7346.88 
8404.11 
9281.45 
7993,52 
10082.47 
11818.65 
13480.66 
13140.80 
15754,67 
19204,54 
23560,93 
30238.71 
Total 
Transfer 
/GSDP 
6.85 
6.08 
6.19 
6.83 
6.83 
7.81 
7.46 
6.73 
6.61 
6.28 
6.45 
4.96 
5.83 
6.53 
7.08 
6.40 
7.01 
7.93 
8.61 
10.01 
Revenue Expenditures 
The structure of revenue expenditure has undergone a significant change during 
1987-88 to 2007-08. In considering the expenditure trends, it is appropriate to 
consider the period, while UP was undivided as distinct from the period afterwards. 
As per the TGR estimated over the period 1990-91 to 1999-00 and 2000-01 to 2006-
07(Table 4.16), interest payment grew by about 19 per cent per annum, while 
pension payments grew by 26 per cent per annum on an average in between 1990-
91 and 1999-00. But after bifurcation of the State TGR of interest and pension 
payments reached at lower level of about 7 and 10 per cent per annum during 2000-
01 to 2006-07, respectively. Revenue expenditure on education grew by about 13 
per cent, while that on medical and public health grew by about 11 per cent per 
annum in earlier periods. While in later period, it reached to about 10 per cent in 
education and about 16 per cent in medical and public health. Expenditures on 
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economic services grew with TGR of around 8 per cent in the first period while by 
about 10 per cent in second period. The growth in expenditure was thus dominated 
by the growth in interest payments and pensions. There was a fall in the growth of 
interest payments after the bifurcation, because of a fall in the nominal interest 
rates. The pre-emptive claims of committed expenditures of interest payments and 
pensions is also clearly brought out by the changes in the structure of revenue 
expenditure as it is clear from Table 4.16. The share of interest payment in total 
revenue expenditure increased from about 13.83 per cent in 1990-91 to more than 
26.61 per cent in 2004-05, and that of pensions increased from 2.51 per cent to 
more than 7 per cent, during the same period. Correspondingly, the shares of social 
services and economic services have both gone down, the latter by a much larger 
margin about 10 percentage points. 
There is sharp increase in the ratio of interest payments to total revenue expenditure 
in post-division years. It has increased to about 26 per cent between 2001-02 and 
2004-05 and declined to 19 per cent in 2006-07. This together with pension payment 
of 8 per cent, nearly 34 per cent of revenue expenditure in 2004-05, is claimed by 
interest payments and pensions only. 
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Capital Expenditure 
The burden of adjustment of falling revenue receipts fell significantly on capital 
expenditures which has steadily declined relative to GSDP. Most of these declined 
was in capital outlay. In the pre division years, capital expenditure as per cent of 
GSDP declined from 3.51 to 2.19 over the period 1987-88 to 1999-00. IVlost of this 
declined was in capital outlay that fell from 2.72 per cent of GSDP in 1987-88 to 
1.35 per cent in 1999-00 (Table 4.9). 
Table 4.17 shows changes in the composition of capital expenditure and highlights 
the fall in the share of capita! outlay which declined from 51.62 per cent of total 
capital expenditure in 1987-88 to 42.67 per cent in 1999-00. On the other hand, the 
repayments continued to accelerate claiming an increasing share of total capital 
expenditure and peaking in 1998-99 with a share of 63 per cent in capital 
expenditure. This trend has been further strengthened in the post division years. 
Table 4.17 
Composition of Capital Expenditure 
Capital Outlay 
Loans and Advances 
Repayment of Loans 
& Advances 
of Which 
Central Loan 
Interest Debt 
Total 
Capital Outlay 
Loans and Advances 
Repayment of Loans 
& Advances 
of Which 
Central Loan 
Interest Debt 
Total 
1987-88 
51.62 
14.92 
33.46 
17.95 
15.51 
100.00 
1997-98 
33.22 
32.10 
34.68 
17.42 
17.26 
100.00 
1988-89 
48.76 
22.98 
28.26 
20.17 
8.09 
100.00 
1998-99 
21,05 
16.08 
62.87 
10.04 
52.84 
100.00 
1989-90 
42.68 
22.63 
34.69 
18.93 
15.75 
100.00 
1999-00 
42,67 
26.54 
30.80 
13.90 
11.90 
100.00 
1990-91 
30,82 
26,88 
42,30 
11.74 
30.55 
100,00 
2000-01 
52,49 
14.76 
32,75 
24.57 
8.18 
100,00 
1991-92 
16.95 
37,65 
45,40 
10.99 
34.41 
100.00 
2001-02 
50.62 
7.49 
41.89 
20.40 
21.49 
100.00 
1992-93 
31.10 
36,59 
32,32 
11.96 
20.36 
100,00 
2002-03 
37,76 
8,00 
54,23 
36.20 
18.03 
100,00 
1993-94 
21.82 
27,25 
50,94 
12.72 
38.22 
100.00 
2003-04 
47.67 
6.35 
45.97 
34.21 
11.76 
100.00 
1994-95 
20.95 
46.42 
32.63 
11.11 
21.52 
100,00 
2004-05 
36,62 
4,07 
59,31 
40.51 
18.80 
100,00 
(In 
1995-96 
31,14 
29.29 
39.58 
17.73 
21.84 
100.00 
2005-06 
59.58 
4.68 
35,75 
8.08 
27.66 
100,00 
=er cent) 
1996-97 
35,99 
39,72 
24,72 
18.81 
5.91 
100.00 
2006-07 
76,42 
4.03 
19,55 
6.45 
13.10 
100,00 
Sources (Basic Data): Finance Accounts of Uttar Pradesh for various years. 
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Plan Expenditure 
Trends in plan expenditure point out disturbing features: (i) Inigh and unacceptable 
revenue intensity, and (ii) falling plan revenue expenditure as proportion of non-plan 
revenue expenditure. In the post-division years, there has been a fall in the share of 
plan revenue expenditure. There has also been fall in the ratio of plan expenditure to 
non-plan revenue expenditure. Table 4.18 provides a profile growth of plan and non-
plan revenue expenditures, as also plan capital outlay. The ratio of plan revenue 
expenditure to total plan has also been indicated for the decade of the nineties and 
beyond. This ratio has been in the range of 63 to 72 per cent up to 1999-00. It may 
be recalled that the desirable ratio is only 30 per cent in relation to which the grant-
loan proportions of plan assistance were determined in the Gadgil Formula. In the 
post-division years, plan revenue intensity fell except in 2001-02; it was 83 per cent 
it is estimated 43 per cent in 2006-07. As such, there has been an improvement in 
the composition of plan expenditure in the post-division years. The high revenue-
intensity only reflects the relatively large salary expenditure in the plan scheme. 
Table 4.18 also indicates that the TGR of plan revenue expenditure was 7.84 per 
cent whereas that for non-plan revenue expenditure was 14.21 per cent. It is 
because of the much higher growth of the latter, that the ratio of plan to non-plan 
revenue expenditure fell from 30.55 per cent in 1990-91 to about 16 per cent in 
1998-99. In 1999-00, there was an improvement in this ratio, but it is still nearly 14 
percentage point below that in 1990-91. 
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Table 4.18 
Trends of Plan and Non-Plan Expenditure in Uttar Pradesh 
(In Rs. Crore) 
Year 
(1) 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
Plan 
Revenue 
Expenditure 
(2) 
2267.03 
1977,02 
2196.80 
2285.72 
2763.54 
2524.44 
3267.94 
3262.62 
3589.80 
4090.39 
3686.01 
3564,66 
3574.82 
3275.98 
5098.09 
6444.81 
9986.03 
Non-Plan 
Revenue 
Expenditure 
(3) 
7421.17 
8422.18 
10493.94 
10994.41 
12660.12 
15031.42 
15939.76 
18932.41 
22485.05 
24557.34 
27346.60 
28215.25 
29363.68 
46945,14 
39512.26 
40172.33 
46685.15 
Plan Capital 
Outlay 
(4) 
1035.65 
809.67 
1133.88 
1000.44 
1074.69 
1168.39 
1614.48 
1455.64 
2118.59 
1976.44 
2862.28 
706.98 
3361.38 
3379,70 
5106.42 
8750.55 
13254.03 
Total Plan 
(Col 2+4) 
(5) 
3302,68 
2786,59 
3330,68 
3286,15 
3838.23 
3692.83 
4882,42 
4718,26 
5708,39 
6066,83 
6548,29 
4271,64 
6936,20 
6655,68 
10204,51 
15195,47 
23240,06 
Plan 
Revenue 
Expenditure 
as%of 
Total Plan 
(6) 
68,64 
70.95 
65.96 
69.55 
72.00 
58.36 
66.93 
69.15 
62.89 
57.42 
56.29 
83.45 
51.54 
49.22 
49.96 
42.41 
42,97 
Plan 
Revenue 
Expenditure 
to Non-Plan 
Revenue (%) 
(7) 
30.55 
23.47 
20.93 
20.79 
21.83 
16.79 
20.50 
17.23 
15.97 
16.59 
13.48 
12.63 
12.17 
6.98 
12.90 
16.04 
21.39 
TGR 
1990-00 
2000-07 
7.84 
17.56 
14.21 
9.76 
9.73 
43,17 
Source: (Basic Data); Finance Accounts of Uttar Pradesh for various years. 
Note : TGR Refers to 1990-91 to 1999-2000, and 2000-01 to 2006-07 
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Debt and Contingent Liabilities 
The cost of borrowing has steadily increased for the State until 1999-00. After that 
with a fall in nominal interest rates in general and also partly due to debt swap 
scheme, there has been a decline in the average cost of borrowing. In more recent 
years, the debt-swap extended by the Central Government has also helped UP with 
a reduction in its effective interest rate. Table 4.19 shows that effective interest rate 
rose from 8.72 per cent in 1987-88 to 12.43 per cent in 1999-00. Since then it has 
fallen to 8.78 per cent in 2006-07. The fall in interest rates occurred in the case of 
market borrowings as well as Central loans. The sharp increase in the interest rates 
in 1994-95, 1996-97, and 1997-98, when average cost of borrowing has became 
17.55, 14.04 and 15.67 per cent respectively, are specially notable. 
For many years, a double damage to State finances of UP was caused due to high 
cost of borrowings and using it mostly for current expenditures. As shown in Table 
4.9, a growing proportion of fiscal deficit has been used for financing revenue deficit, 
and correspondingly, a lower and lower proportion of borrowed resources became 
available for capital outlay and lending. The changing composition of fiscal deficit is 
shown in Table 4.20. 
Table 4.19 
Effective Rate of Interest: Selected Debt Instruments 
(In Percent) 
Internal Debt of the 
State Government 
1987-
88 
11,83 
1988-
89 
10.72 
1989-
90 
10.33 
1990-
91 
9.20 
1991-
92 
11.08 
1992-
93 
10.14 
1993-
94 
5.37 
1994-
95 
15.95 
1995-
96 
11.03 
1996-
97 
14.50 
of which 
Market Borrowing 
Loans & Adv. From the 
Central Government 
Small savings, 
Provident Funds etc. 
Total 
12.86 
7.28 
12.79 
8.72 
11.20 
7.75 
9.87 
8.57 
11.17 
8.33 
10.29 
8.97 
9.74 
8.92 
11.99 
9.33 
11.64 
9.73 
10.76 
10.16 
10.08 
9.97 
11.52 
10.20 
4.69 
10.48 
10.69 
9.39 
17.55 
11,10 
11.17 
12.26 
11.04 
11,43 
11.18 
11.31 
14.04 
11,73 
11.55 
12.32 
Internal Debt of the 
State Government 
1997-
98 
14.84 
1998-
99 
13.86 
1999-
00 
12.89 
2000-
01 
11.01 
2001-
02 
13.24 
2002-
03 
7.07 
2003-
04 
14.51 
2004-
05 
14,20 
2005-
06 
9,56 
2006-
07 
9,38 
of which 
Market Borrowing 
Loans & Adv. From the 
Central Government 
Small savings, 
Provident Funds etc. 
Total 
15.67 
10.07 
20.44 
12.63 
13.09 
12.25 
12.48 
12.65 
12.58 
12.53 
11.29 
12.43 
12.30 
12.17 
10.97 
11.62 
11.63 
12.90 
7.89 
12.29 
11.08 
12.78 
7.93 
9.76 
10.39 
12.60 
6.85 
12.62 
9.75 
12.08 
6.54 
12.48 
10.38 
7.84 
5.75 
8.68 
8.83 
6,51 
9.30 
8.78 
Sources (Basic Data): Finance Accounts of Uttar Pradesh for various years. 
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Table 4.20 
Composition of Fiscal Deficit 1987-88 to 2007-08 
(In Percent) 
Years 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
Capital Outlay 
38.39 
25.16 
34.23 
29.98 
23.50 
25.78 
24.10 
22.01 
18.03 
22.83 
32.11 
35.87 
39.95 
55.98 
43.50 
86.44 
145.43 
Net Lending 
21.57 
49.29 
38.43 
33,73 
34.48 
20.79 
22.53 
16.95 
7.22 
11.83 
6.12 
1.62 
6.16 
-67.61 
2.70 
0.98 
5.53 
Revenue 
Deficit 
40.04 
25.54 
27.34 
36.29 
42.02 
53.43 
53.38 
61.03 
74.76 
65.35 
61.77 
62.50 
53.88 
111.62 
53.80 
12.58 
-50.97 
Total Fiscal 
Deficit 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
Sources (Basic Data); Finance Accounts of Uttar Pradesh for various years. 
The change in the structure of public debt in UP showed a movennent tov\/ards 
higher cost sources in the nineties away from borrowing from the central 
government and increasing dependence on market borrowing and small savings 
and provident funds. The structure of liabilities as highlighted in Table 4.21 shows a 
shift towards high cost market borrowing until the nineties. The recent lowering of 
interest rates would help in easing out this burden facilitated further by swapping 
high cost debt to the Centre with new borrowing at a lower rate. 
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Table 4.21 
Structure of Outstanding Debt 
(In Per cent) 
Internal Debt of 
the State 
Government 
of which 
Market 
Borrowing 
Ways & Means 
Advances 
Others 
Loans & Adv. 
From the Central 
Government 
Small savings, 
Provident Funds 
etc. 
Total 
Internal Debt of 
the State 
Government 
of which 
Marl<et 
Borrowing 
Ways & Means 
Advances 
Others 
Loans & Adv. 
From the Central 
Government 
Small savings. 
Provident Funds 
etc. 
Total 
1990-91 
22.45 
1991-92 
22.47 
1992-93 
21.36 
1993-94 
21.87 
1994-95 
23.67 
1995-96 
22.18 
1996-97 
22.00 
1997-98 
23.40 
1998-99 
22.49 
18.70 
1.92 
1.84 
66.08 
11.47 
100.00 
18.64 
1.89 
1.94 
65.02 
12.50 
100.00 
19.34 
0.60 
1.42 
65,90 
12.74 
100.00 
19.79 
1.47 
0.61 
64.94 
13.19 
100.00 
19.08 
2.84 
1.74 
62.89 
13.44 
100.00 
20.80 
1.23 
0.15 
64.35 
13.47 
100.00 
21.54 
0.37 
0.10 
64.10 
13.90 
100.00 
21.63 
1.25 
0.52 
62.74 
13.86 
100.00 
21.57 
0.00 
0.92 
62.61 
14.90 
100,00 
1999-00 
23.95 
2000-01 
32.74 
2001-02 
36.02 
2002-03 
41.28 
2003-04 
45.48 
2004-05 
56.02 
2005-06 
62.35 
2006-07 
54.98 
21.49 
1.17 
1.29 
61.15 
14.90 
100.00 
21.04 
3.76 
7.94 
52.79 
14.47 
100.00 
21.60 
0.09 
14.33 
49.34 
14.64 
100.00 
21.81 
1.05 
18.42 
45.09 
13.54 
100.00 
23.08 
-0.04 
22.44 
39.81 
14.70 
100.00 
24.44 
-0.03 
31.61 
29.69 
14.29 
100.00 
25.44 
-0.01 
36.91 
23.76 
13.90 
100.00 
24.76 
-0.03 
40.25 
20.74 
14.28 
100.00 
Sources (Basic Data): Finance Accounts of Uttar Pradesh for various years. 
4.8 Decentralisation: Finances of Local Bodies 
Management of expenditure responsibilities could be significantly improved by 
decentralising functions and financial activities to the local bodies. With 73''' and 74"' 
amendments to the constitution, the management of local finances has become an 
integral component of State finances. There are 52908 Panchayati Raj Institutions 
(rural local bodies) and 623 urban bodies, namely nagar palika in UP. Prior to the 
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73''' and 74'^ amendments to the constitution the State government has been giving 
grants-in-aid to the third-tier administrative units. The First State Finance 
Commission which was set up in October 1994, reviewed the position of local 
bodies and reported that the system of passing on assistance through grants-in-aid 
was unsatisfactory. The commission had recommended that the local bodies should 
be given a regular share of taxes, duties, tolls and fees levied by the State 
government, and pooled together. The share of urban bodies was fixed at 7 per cent 
and of the Panchayati Raj Institutions at 3 per cent of such pooled gross revenue. 
The inter-se distribution among them was to be based on 80 per cent population and 
20 per cent area. The commission also recommended that all outstanding loans and 
interest thereon should be converted into grants. 
The State government accepted the recommendations but stipulated that funds from 
taxes would be released taking in to account the performance profile of the local 
bodies. The recommendations of first finance commission were in force till March 
2001. 
The Twelfth Finance Commission (TFC) made specific recommendations based 
upon a formula of five variables with different weights assigned. 
Based on these criteria, the TFC recommended grants-in-aid to be passed on to the 
local bodies. 
4.9 Main Observations 
It is clear from the above analysis that the Economy of Utter Pradesh is very poor as 
compared to other major States of India. Health, Education, and other Infrastructure 
sectors need to be improved. 
The most important threat to the State's economy comes from the financial 
management of the State government. Uttar Pradesh is critically indebted and the 
debt is on the verge of becoming unsustainable. Average primary deficit as a 
percentage of GSDP is more than the difference between real growth and the real 
interest rate. The primary deficit continues to be positive. This debt in Uttar Pradesh 
is relatively expensive, with higher interest rates rather than other States. Clearly 
Uttar Pradesh needs to restructure its debt by adopting measures such as debt-
swapping. With a high fiscal deficit, little is left for development expenditure. This 
places serious constraints on the capacity of the State to stimulate economic 
activities. A comprehensive programme of reducing deficit should include both 
receipt as well as expenditure management and wide ranging reforms. Subsidies 
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cover a major part of expenditure. Therefore, when we talk about expenditure 
management and reduction in deficits, analysis of subsidies become quite important. 
Many subsidies arise because government participate in the provision of purely 
private goods where its presence is not warranted either economically or 
technologically. 
Ministry of Finance of the Union Government bring out a Discussion Paper (DP 
1997) on the subject of subsidies. This paper had taken a broad view of subsidies 
considering these as unrecovered costs of public provision of non-public goods and 
services financed by the budget. The DP 1997 had argued that the proliferation of 
subsidies in India flowed from an undue expanse and growth of governmental 
activities in the provision of private goods. Apart from public goods like defence and 
maintenance of law and order, the government had extended itself into various 
social and economic sectors producing a wide range of private goods and services. 
However, in many of these areas, costs tended to be very high and cost recoveries 
poor, giving rise to an undue growth both in the extent and volume of subsidies 
implicit in the budgetary provision of these services. 
In the next chapter, we have estimated the budgetary subside in Utter Pradesh and 
analyse their trends and volume. 
143 
Chapter 5 
Budgetary Subsidies in 
Uttar Pradesh: Trends and Volume 
Fiscal position of Utter Pradesh is very poor as compared to other major States of 
India; it is clear from the previous chapter. The fiscal deficit as a percentage of 
GSDP is very high and revenue performance is not satisfactory. It is generally been 
said that government should reduced the subsidies to improve the fiscal health of 
the State. Therefore, the study of volume and trends of subsidies in Utter Pradesh 
becomes quite relevant. 
The estimation of costs and recoveries in provision of services is not a 
straightforward exercise. The expenditure pattern is dominated by committed 
expenditure like interest payment and salaries. Expenditure on welfare programmes 
dominates in development expenditure. The decline in development expenditure 
(expenditure on social and economic services) as a result of fiscal crisis and FRBM 
regulations has not affected welfare expenditure (on water supply & sanitation, rural 
housing, welfare of SC, ST, & OBC, social welfare, other social services, labour 
welfare, rural development, small scale industries, food storage and warehousing). It 
is clear from the Figure 5.1 that share of the developmental expenditure in total 
expenditure has declined sharply from around 65 per cent to 50 per cent during 
1990-91 to 2005-06. Whereas the welfare component of developmental expenditure 
remained around 22 percent leaving very little for maintenance of services. Even to 
improve the revenue from user charges, the government has to improve the quality 
of services by increasing allocations on operation and maintenance in the current 
expenditure. This can explained by citing one example from the existing health 
facilities. Diagnostic equipments are installed in the government hospitals, without 
any allocation for their maintenance, resulting in the payment of salaries of the 
technicians without using these equipments, which subsequently go idle without 
proper maintenance. Thus, there are no prospects of recovery, as services are not 
provided effectively. This can be termed as the inefficiency cost in provision of 
services. However, it is difficult to estimate these inefficiency costs due to non-
availability of information on unusable infrastructure. Therefore, the cost is 
overestimated by not netting out various cost of inefficiency. 
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While several subsidies are explicitly stated in the Union budget, the State budget 
shows only few subsidies explicitly. IVIost of the explicitly stated subsidies are 
transfer payments to individuals like scholarships, stipend, pensions (old age), etc, 
Therefore, explicit subsidies provide only a limited idea of the overall volume of 
budgetary subsidies in the system. Since observed or explicit subsidies cover only a 
fraction of total subsidies, methodologies have been developed to estimate the 
implicit subsidies in the system as unrecovered cost of public provision of goods / 
services that are not classified as public goods. In these cases, it should be possible 
to recover, at least in principle, the cost of providing services according to the extent 
of their consumption. It is a general practice to exclude pure public goods such as 
defence, genera! administration etc., as these goods/services are financed by tax 
revenues, although subsidies are implicit in these cases too. For example in the 
case of defence expenditure, there may be a procurement subsidy in the purchase 
of defence goods. 
In the present exercise, the focus is on budgetary subsidies and the main objective 
is to uncover implicit subsidies. Accordingly, subsidies are measured here as 
"unrecovered" costs of governmental provision of goods/services that are not 
classified as public goods. In particular, the goods/services under reference are 
those that are categorised as social services and economic services. The 
unrecovered costs are measured as the excess of aggregate costs over receipts 
from the concerned budgetary head. The aggregate costs comprise two elements: 
(i) current costs, and (ii) annualised capital costs. Current costs consist of revenue 
(current) expenditures directly related to the provision of services classified under 
different heads. Transfers to funds are not included as these do not contribute to the 
provision of service in the current cost. Transfers from funds are included. Transfers 
to individuals are also separated out, as these add to incomes of individuals and do 
not constitute provision of goods/services. For capital costs, we distinguish between 
three forms of government investment resulting in accumulated capital stock. If 
services are departmentally provided, there is investment in physical capital. In 
addition, there is investment in the form of equity and loans including those given to 
public enterprises. The annualised cost of capital is obtained by applying the interest 
rate at which funds have been borrowed by the government to capital stock. This 
represents the opportunity cost of capital. In the case of physical capital, a 
depreciation cost is calculated, in addition. The receipts come in three forms: 
revenue receipts from the user charges, interest receipts on loans, and dividends on 
equity investment. 
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In this chapter, an effort has been made to classify the expenditures in to various 
categories such as transfers, grants-in-aid, assistance and the cost of providing 
services. And further, the unrecovered costs have been estimated for different years 
using an acceptable methodology to make the estimates comparable. Classification 
of expenditures is explained in the first section. The second sections briefs about the 
estimation of subsidies in Utter Pradesh at a macro level and a comparison is made 
with the earlier studies. The third section analyses the unrecovered cost and the 
other direct expenditures at sectoral level along with patterns of surplus. The last 
section draws up some broad conclusions. 
5.1 Subsidies and Transfers 
Transfers to individuals are income supplements and may be distinguished from 
price subsidies. Transfers, which are straight income supplements, need to be 
distinguished from subsidies. An unconditional transfer to an individual would 
augment his income and would be distributed over the entire range of his 
expenditures. A subsidy, however, refers to a specific good, the relative price of 
which has been lowered because of the subsidy with a view to changing the 
consumption/allocation decisions in favour of the subsidised good. In this sense, 
transfers and subsidies can be considered respective obverses of direct and indirect 
taxes. Even when subsidy is hundred percent, i.e., the good is supplied free of cost, 
it should be distinguished from an income-transfer (of an equivalent amount). 
Transfer payments can be better targeted at specific income groups as compared to 
free or subsidised goods. Price subsidies focus on the consumption levels of 
specific goods (e. g., education, health, and food). However, subsidised prices also 
have associated income effects leading to an increase in the consumption of other 
(non-subsidised) goods. Though these transfers are subsidies, since they do not 
constitute the cost of providing a service, these transfers are maintained separately, 
and are part of total subsidies given in the sector. 
Transfers to / from funds are, however, needs to be excluded. As the flows from 
funds are repaid subsequently and double entry. Withdrawals from funds are like a 
temporary loan and repaid subsequently. Transfers to individuals are also separated 
out as these add to incomes of individuals and do not constitute cost of provision of 
goods / services. Grants-in-aid are netted out as these are directly given to local 
bodies for providing service in their related areas and the user charges levied are 
not passed on to the State government. Since the State is not providing services 
directly and revenue from user charges are not accrued to the State exchequer. 
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These are not included in the cost of provision of services. However these 
expenditures like transfer payments to individuals and grants-in-aid are also part of 
overall subsidies and these may also include assistance given to PSUs. 
5.2 Explicit Subsidies 
In actual practice, all visible payments to individuals and factors of production are 
termed as explicit subsidies. But the problem is with the information available in the 
State budget about explicit subsidies is that administrative costs of these subsidies 
are not included in these subsidies. Therefore, explicit payments made to 
individuals, organisations, assistance given to public sector undertakings, co-
operatives etc., and grants-in-aid to local bodies, are excluded from the estimation 
of cost of providing services. They are treated as part of overall subsidies. The 
above said explicit subsidies drawn from the Finance Accounts of the government of 
Utter Pradesh are examined here as follows. 
Grants-ln-Aid 
Grants or grants-in-aid are money transfers from one government to the other (like 
Central to the State, or from State to local bodies) and assistance given to 
government departments or to commercial undertakings or to autonomous bodies to 
perform certain duties of the government or for performing certain services. Grants 
are like direct transfer payments that enhance the income of the recipients and have 
direct income effect. Recovery of financial cost is not stipulated in the case of 
grants. These are not included in the calculation of subsidies, because the revenue, 
if any, accrued from the beneficiaries are appropriated by the local bodies or they 
may be performing certain duties allotted to these by the State. 
Much of these grants cannot be treated as subsidies either explicit or implicit as they 
are part of devolution process in the decentralised federal setup. But some of the 
grants also contain subsidies which may be merit in nature. Grants given to local 
bodies for maintenance of water supply can be treated as subsidies, where the local 
bodies appropriates the recoveries from users in the form of user charges and also 
that the user is identifiable and the quantity of consumption can be measured. Since 
the recovery of financial cost is not stipulated by the grantee i.e. the State 
government. In such cases grants can not be included in the cost. 
In Uttar Pradesh, grants-in-aid have increased from Rs. 1941.32 crore in 1990-91 to 
Rs. 7842.28 crore in 2005-06 (Table 5.1). It has increased about four hundred per 
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cent with an annual growth rate of 9.75 per cent, in social services, grants increased 
from Rs. 1795.54 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 7777.99 crore in 2003-04, which is also, 
more than four hundred percent increased with 10.27 per cent growth per annum. 
While in economic services, it has declined by about 55 per cent from Rs. 145.78 
crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 64.76 in 2005-06. There is an increase in grants-in-aid in the 
area of development and research. These areas are Dairy Development, 
Agricultural Research & Education, and Other Scientific Research. In Dairy 
development, grants have increased about ten times with a highest annual growth of 
16.38 per cent and increased from Rs.0.80 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 7.99 crore in 
2005-06. In Agricultural Research & Education, it is Rs. 47.36 crore in 2005-06 while 
it was Rs. 21.22 crore in 1990-91 that is more than double. Likewise, Agricultural 
Research & Education in the major head 'Other Scientific Research', grants-in-aid 
has increased to Rs. 7.60 crore in 2005-06 while it was Rs. 2.10 crore in 1990-91. It 
is more than three and half times. Grants to Village and Small Scale Industries also 
increased with a growth of 3.60 per cent per annum from Rs. 0.17 crore in 1990-91 
to Rs. 0.25 crore in 2005-06. There is a fall in the Crop Husbandry and Hill areas. 
Grants given to Crop Husbandry was Rs. 117.35 crore in 2002-03, it has came to nil 
in 2005-06. Same in the case of Hill areas. Grants to Hill areas came to zero in 
2005-06 from Rs. 3.16 crore in 2001-02. There is a slight increase in grants to 
Animal Husbandry from Rs. 0.43 crore in 2003-04 to Rs. 1.04 crore in 2005-06. 
In social services. General Education absorbs more than 97 per cent of grants-in-
aid. In, general education it has increased by 10.30 per cent per annum, from Rs. 
1748.65 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 7608.80 crore in 2005-06. In Water and sanitation, 
it has increased about five times from Rs. 10.44 crore to Rs. 48.36 crore during the 
same period with an annual growth of 10.76 per cent. In Urban Development, it has 
increased by more than nine times with a highest annual growth of 16 per cent and 
increased from Rs. 11.20 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 103.76 crore in 2005-06. Social 
security & welfare fell down by 40 per cent from Rs. 4.85 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 
2.91 crore in 2005-06. Share of social services in total grants has increased from 
92.50 per cent in 1990-91 to 97.17 per cent in 2005-06. This higher share is mainly 
due to transfers under social welfare schemes like wage employment, self 
employment, education assistance programmes. 
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Table 5.1 
GRANTS-IN-AID in Utter Pradesh 
(In Rs. Crore) 
Total Grants (A+B) 
A 
2202 
2203 
2215 
2217 
2225 
2230 
2235 
2250/52 
B 
2401 
2403 
2404 
2405 
2415 
2425 
2551 
2851 
3425 
Social Services* 
General Education 
Technical Education 
Water Supply & Sanitation 
Urban Development 
Welfare of SCs, STs and 
OBCs 
Labour & Employment 
Social Security & Welfare 
Other Social Services 
Economic Services* 
Crop Husbandry 
Animal Husbandry 
Dairy Development 
Fisheries 
Agri. Research & Education 
Co-operation 
Hill Areas 
Village & Small Scale 
Industries 
Other Scientific Research 
1990-91 
1941.32 
1795.54 
1748.65 
20.38 
10.44 
11.20 
0,00 
0.00 
4.85 
0.03 
145.78 
117.35 
0.00 
0.82 
0.00 
21.22 
0.96 
3.16 
0,17 
2.10 
1993-94 
2059.82 
2006.21 
1948.74 
27.76 
6.94 
18.20 
0.00 
0,12 
3,97 
0,47 
53.61 
0.10 
0.00 
2.29 
0.74 
40.34 
2.30 
1.64 
0.16 
6.03 
1995-96 
2851.15 
2780.48 
2720,97 
28.45 
1.27 
27.31 
0.00 
0.05 
2.40 
0,03 
70.66 
0,01 
0,00 
3.02 
0.00 
57.08 
1.67 
2.01 
0.43 
6.43 
1998-99 
5025.52 
4938.67 
4761.01 
43.22 
0.98 
131.23 
0,00 
0,00 
2,22 
0.01 
86.85 
0,01 
0,00 
1,54 
0.00 
72.83 
4.35 
2.81 
0.00 
5.31 
2001-02 
5540.71 
5481.89 
5356.41 
19.24 
0,00 
105.07 
0,07 
0.00 
1.05 
0.06 
58.82 
0,00 
0,00 
2.19 
0.00 
49,62 
0,00 
0.00 
0.03 
6.98 
2003-04 
5790.37 
5717.75 
5595.09 
12.34 
10.11 
98.02 
0.11 
0.00 
1,02 
0,05 
72.62 
0.00 
0.43 
4.23 
0.00 
46.39 
2,01 
0.00 
0.25 
19.31 
2005-06 
7842.28 
7777.53 
7508,79 
13,56 
48.36 
103,76 
0,09 
0,00 
2,91 
0,06 
64.76 
0.00 
1,04 
7.99 
0,15 
47.36 
0,37 
0,00 
0.25 
7.60 
Memo Items 
Grants in Social Services as a % of 
Revenue Expenditure in social services 
Grants in Economic Services as a % of 
Revenue Expenditure in economic 
services 
Grants in aid as a % of Total Revenue 
Expenditure 
54.37 
5,30 
20.35 
50.32 
1.53 
15.51 
51.80 
1,96 
16,24 
56.98 
1.82 
19.27 
59.37 
1.11 
17.43 
55.89 
1.09 
11.53 
51.12 
0.84 
16.75 
Source: Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective years. 
Note : "Social services & Economics services are after excluding Relief on natural calamities 
& secretariat social services and secretariat economic services are excluded in 
these estimates as public goods. 
Transfer Payments to Individuals 
There are some expenditure on items which are in the nature of transfer of 
resources to individuals. These are known as transfer payments to individuals. The 
objective of these transfers is to enhance the income of the recipients for 
consumption of certain goods and services. The discretion is left to the recipients 
after he receives. In the case of transfer payment, recovery of cost is not stipulated. 
This is like a negative tax. 
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Major items of these transfers are scholarships in education, employee's medical 
insurance, compensation in health and family welfare, labour welfare, and 
rehabilitation of bonded labour, pensions such as old age, destitute and 
handicapped in social welfare. All of these items fall under the category of social 
services. Crop Husbandry, compensation, and assistance to the poor, assistance for 
self employment generation etc. are some of the transfer payments in economic 
services. 
Transfers to individuals have increase from Rs. 1017.66 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 
3599.92 crore in 2005-06 (Table 5.2), registering a growth of 8.79 per cent per 
annum. In social services, it increased from Rs. 300,99 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 
2971.52 crore in 2005-06 and with a growth of 16.49 per cent per annum. In General 
Education transfers payments are slightly higher (Rs. 3.01 crore) in 2005-06 than 
what it was in 1990-01 (Rs. 2.29 crore) but during this entire period there was a lot 
of fluctuations. It was ever high Rs. 7.56 crore in 2001-02. Medical & Public Health 
shows that Employees State Insurance Scheme has received higher transfers in 
each years, it has increased from Rs. 16.23 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 41.39 crore in 
2005-06. Compensation for Family Welfare shows a 1.89 per cent growth per 
annum over the period. While welfare programmes absorb major amount of 
transfers. Such as Welfare for SC, ST& OBC and Child and Women welfare, 
Rehabilitation programmes. Pensions under social security scheme and 
Government Employees Insurance Schemes. Both the areas jointly show a growth 
of 17.22 per cent per annum. 
In Economic Services, transfers to individuals decreased by about 12 per cent (0.87 
per cent annually) from Rs. 716.67 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 628.40 crore in 2005-06. 
Though, integrated rural development programmes, and national programmes for 
rural employment such as 'Jawahar Rozgar Yojana', etc. cover major part of these 
transfers. But transfers in both the areas as a whole decreased by around 23 per 
cent. In special programmes for rural development decreased from Rs. 194.44 crore 
to Rs. 65.99 crore by 6.95 per cent annually and in rural employment transfers 
decreased from Rs. 508.67 crore to Rs. 484.21 crore over the period. Audit Fee 
under the major head Co-operation, has increased from Rs. 9.56 crore in 1990-91 to 
Rs. 30.10 crore in 2005-06 with annual growth rate of 7.95 per cent. 
Transfer payments to individuals are advocated instead of indirect or implicit 
subsidies, as they add to the incomes of the beneficiary leaving very little scope for 
inefficiency, as incurred in administration of these budgetary subsidies. 
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Table 5.2 
Transfers to Individuals 
Total 
A 
2202 
2210 
2211 
2225 
2235 
B 
2401 
2425 
2501 
2505 
2551 
3475 
Social Services* 
General Education 
Medical & Public Health 
Family Welfare 
Welfare of SCs, STs and OBCs 
Social Security & Welfare 
Economic Services* 
Crop Husbandry 
Co-operation 
Special Programmes for 
Rural Development 
Rural Employment 
Hill Areas 
Other Gen. Eco. Services 
1990-91 
1017.66 
300.99 
2,29 
16.23 
14.27 
136.71 
131.50 
716.67 
0.00 
9.56 
194.44 
508.67 
3.53 
0.47 
1993-94 
1086.48 
420.01 
2.20 
18.14 
10.16 
174.12 
215.39 
666.47 
0.00 
14.75 
124.62 
502.72 
23.83 
0.55 
1995-96 
956.98 
576.64 
3.18 
19.22 
12.41 
269.87 
271.97 
380.34 
0.00 
16.46 
138.41 
214.76 
10.28 
0.43 
1998-99 
1501.73 
1029.75 
2.03 
32.69 
6.65 
613.19 
375.19 
471.98 
0.00 
21.59 
144.16 
279.64 
26.54 
0.06 
2001-02 
1503.66 
1146.69 
7.56 
33.73 
21.98 
637.42 
446.00 
356.97 
1.68 
20.05 
26.03 
309.19 
0.00 
0.03 
(In 
2003-04 
2086.29 
1617.86 
1.74 
38.67 
17.17 
786.60 
773.69 
468.43 
4.57 
24.08 
52.42 
387.23 
0.00 
0.13 
^s. crorei 
2005-05 
3599,92 
2971.52 
3.01 
41.39 
18.90 
1466.54 
1441.59 
628.40 
48.01 
30.10 
65.99 
484,21 
0.00 
0.08 
Memo Items 
Transfer to Individuals as a % of 
Revenue Expenditure in Social 
Services 
Transfer to individuals as a % of 
Revenue Expenditure in Economic 
Services 
Transfer to individuals as a % of 
Total Revenue Expenditure 
9.11 
26.08 
10.67 
10.54 
19.06 
8.18 
10.74 
10.54 
5.45 
11.88 
9.88 
5.76 
12.42 
6.72 
4.73 
15.81 
7.03 
4.15 
19.53 
8.15 
7.69 
Source: Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective years. 
Note : *Social services & Economics services are after excluding Relief on natural 
calamities and secretariat social services and secretariat economic services are 
excluded in these estimates as public goods. 
Transfer to Funds 
In calculating the current costs, revenue expenditure on the service head is to be 
taken after netting out transfer to funds and transfer from funds. This is because 
when funds are transferred to reserve funds, they are earmarked for use on a later 
time, and do not constitute current spending. On the other hand, transfers from the 
reserve funds add to the current spending on the service. Though, it is counted 
twice and netted out. 
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Assistance to Public Sector Undertakings 
Public sector undertakings play a vital role in economic development, employment 
generation, and social justice. The State government spends a liuge amount 
through investment and lending in public undertakings. 
Economic Services cover major part of this assistance. Fisheries, Transport, and 
Power are major public sector undertakings in economic services that receive huge 
assistance from the State government. In social services government provide 
assistance for welfare programmes for SC, ST and OBCs, and social security to 
promote the welfare of the State. 
Table 5.3 
Assistance to Public Sector Undertakings 
Total 
A 
2225 
2235 
B 
2404 
2405 
2408 
2425 
2801 
2851 
3055 
3453 
Social Services* 
Welfare of SCs, STs and OBCs 
Social Security & Welfare 
Economic Services* 
Dairy Development 
Fisheries 
Food Storage & Warehousing 
Co-operation 
Power 
Village & Small Scale Industries 
Road Transport Services 
Foreign Trade/Export 
Promotion 
1990-91 
5.41 
1.43 
0.74 
0,69 
3.98 
0,00 
3,29 
0.03 
0.46 
0.00 
0,00 
0.21 
0,00 
1993-94 
95.52 
0.52 
0.00 
0.52 
95.00 
4.54 
5.48 
0.00 
0.00 
84.78 
0.00 
0,20 
0,00 
1995-96 
74.22 
33.24 
29,02 
4.22 
40.98 
0.03 
5.50 
0.00 
0.82 
34.30 
0.00 
0,32 
0,00 
1998-99 
19.39 
17.00 
16.86 
0.13 
2.39 
0.00 
0.97 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
1.42 
0.00 
2001-02 
9.84 
0.99 
0.50 
0,49 
8.85 
0.00 
7.52 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0,05 
1,27 
(In Rs, Crore) 
2003-04 
9.94 
1.14 
0,50 
0,64 
8.80 
0.00 
8.57 
0,00 
0,00 
0.00 
0.09 
0,05 
0.09 
2005-06 
6.38 
1.43 
0,55 
0,88 
4.95 
0,00 
4,88 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,07 
0.00 
Memo Items 
Assistance to PSUs as a % of Revenue 
Expenditure in Social Services 
Assistance to PSUs as a % of Revenue 
Expenditure in Economic Services 
Assistance to PSUs as a % of Total 
Revenue Expenditure 
0.04 
0,14 
0,06 
0.01 
2.72 
0.72 
0.62 
1,14 
0.42 
0.20 
0,05 
0,07 
0,01 
0,17 
0,03 
0.01 
0.13 
0,02 
0,01 
0,05 
0,01 
Source: Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective years. 
Note : *Social services & Economics services are after excluding Relief on natural calamities 
& secretariat social services and secretariat economic services are excluded in 
these estimates as public goods. 
Assistance to Public sector Undertakings have increased tremendously from Rs. 
5.41 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 95.52 crore in 1993-94, and 74.22 crore in 1995-96. 
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After that amount of assistance suddenly gone down to Rs. 19.29, 9.84, 9.94 and 
Rs. 6.28 crore in 1998-99, 2001-02, 2003-04 and 2005-06 respectively. There is no 
clear cut trend in assistance given to public sector undertakings. 
In social services, this assistance has suddenly increased to Rs. 29.02 crore in 
1995-96, while it was zero in previous. The assistance was reduced to 16.86 crore 
in 1998-99 and after that it is around Rs. 0.50 crore. 
Major part of assistance has given to economic services. It have increased from Rs. 
3.98 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 95 crore in 1993-94, and 40.98 crore in 1995-96. The 
main reason of this increase is due to assistance is given to electricity boards by the 
State government. After these years, assistance to PSU has decreased ton Rs. 
2.39, 8.85, 8.80, 4.95 crore in 1998-99, 2001-02, 2003-04 and 2005-06. 
5.3 Conceptual definition and adjustments for Implicit 
Budgetary Subsidies 
An implicit budgetary subsidy is defined as the difference between cost of providing 
services and recoveries made from the beneficiaries. Costs have two components, 
current costs, and capital costs. Recoveries comprise of revenue receipts, interest 
receipts, and dividends on investments. 
Current Costs 
The current costs are known as revenue expenditure in the budget document. The 
revenue expenditure consists of expenditure on maintenance, (both salaries & 
wages and operation & maintenance cost), direct cash payment to public sector 
undertakings, co-operatives, local bodies and other agencies and also to individuals 
from whom no charges are levied by the State government, through these particular 
agencies may collect and appropriate the revenue earned out of user charges or 
sale of the goods and services they offer. Cash payments to individuals add to the 
incomes of the people and do not include in the cost of provision of services. 
Though all of these expenditures are subsidised, they are not part of the cost of 
providing a service directly by the government. Revenue expenditures are also 
include transfers from and to the reserve funds and these are not the expenditures 
made in the providing of services. Therefore, transfer payments to individuals, 
transfer to funds, assistance to public sector undertakings and co-operatives, and 
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grants-in-aid to local bodies and institutions estimated separately are not included in 
the estimation of current cost. 
Annualised Capital Costs 
Annualised capital cost is the opportunity cost of investment. The State 
government's investment in provisioning of various services is given as capital 
outlay in the budget documents. These capital investments are accumulated at 
historical prices and are given as investment at the end of the financial year in the 
Finance Accounts of every year. Capital investment in the beginning of the year is 
calculated by subtracting capital outlay during the year from the accumulated capita! 
investment at the end of that year. Capital stock is the accumulated capital outlay 
net of investment made by the government. The opportunity cost of capital is 
basically the cost of depreciation and cost of borrowing (imputed rate of interest) of 
the accumulated capital cost. To adjust the capital stock summed up at historical 
prices into real prices, depreciation rate has used (already explained in chapter 1). 
This is arrived at by simulating the growth rate of investment and inflation. Another 
component of annualised capital cost is imputed rate of return on investments made 
in public sector undertakings and co-operatives, which the government would have 
earned by investing in the banks or repaying the debt. The third component of 
annualised capital cost is imputed interest rate on loans and advances made by 
State to public sector undertakings and other departmental commercial 
undertakings. Here the imputed rate of return is defined as average cost o^  
borrowing. 
• Capital expenditures, receipts, and recoveries on procurement and supply of 
"Grain Supply Scheme. Food Procurement Scheme. Food Grain Supply 
Scheme, and Supar Khandsah Scheme" are not included in estimating the 
capital cost under Food Storage and Warehousing. Since these expenditures 
are consumption based expenditure rather than capital nature. 
Receipts 
Revenue receipts comprise from three main sources. The first is the tax revenue 
the second non-tax revenue and the third one is grants from the Centre. Non-tax 
revenue consist of interest receipt and individuals and the revenue from user 
charges like fee, charges etc. in provisioning of services. Interest receipt and 
dividends are returns on capital investments and the other non-tax revenue is from 
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user charges. The tax revenues are excluded from the receipts, with assumption 
that public goods and services and subsidies, to certain extent, need to be financed 
by them. Receipt from the user charges are therefore, the recovery of variable cost 
and interest and dividend the receipt are the recovery of capital costs. Recoveries of 
variable and capital costs together constitute the receipts in the estimation of implicit 
subsidy. The break-up of interest receipts and dividends from each sector is worked 
out on the basis of details given in the no. 18 and 14 statements of the Finance 
Account. 
• In this study, receipt of Rs. 1087.19 crore in 2005-06 are netted out from power 
sector, as the amount is transferred from Central government for the 
transmission and distribution under rural electrification scheme. 
Un-recovered Costs 
The difference between receipts from user charges and current expenditure is the 
un-recovered variable cost. The un-recovered capital costs are the difference 
between annualised capital costs and interest plus dividends. The total un-
recovered costs are summation of these two. 
Rate of Recovery 
The rate of recovery is defined as the ratio of receipts to the costs. The balance, i.e., 
100 minus recovery rate is subsidy rate. The ratio of revenue receipts to the current 
costs is the rate of recovery of variable cost, and that of capital return like interest 
and dividend to the annualised capital cost is the rate of recovery of capital cost. 
5.4 Estimates of Implicit Budgetary Subsidies in 
Uttar Pradesh 
Implicit budgetary subsidies in the present study are inclusive of certain explicit 
subsidies, if stated explicitly in the finance accounts of Utter Pradesh (from where 
basic data have been collected). In these estimates, unrecovered cost, do not 
include the transfers as mentioned in the above section and grants-in-aid given to 
local bodies and other agencies. These estimates also do not cover the services 
under public goods category such as general services, relief on account of natural 
calamities, secretariat social services and secretariat economic services of the 
budgetary classification. Methodology is already specified in the first chapter of the 
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study and while the adjustment made and conceptual definitions used are already 
explained in the earlier section of this chapter. 
Empirical analysis has done on the data taken from the Finance Accounts of Utter 
Pradesh for seven years that are 1990-91, 1993-94, 1995-96, 1998-99, 2001-02 
2003-04, and 2005-06 with the consideration of stages of reform process and 
finances of the State government for comparative purpose. 
Implicit budgetary subsidies in nominal term have gone up from Rs. 4486.07 crore in 
1990-91 to Rs. 15928.39 crore in 2005-06 with 8.81 per cent annual growth rate. 
Economic Services absorbed major part of these subsidies. 
In Social Services, implicit budgetary subsidies in Utter Pradesh have increased 
from Rs. 1285.28 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 4989.88 crore in 2005-06 with an annual 
growth rate of 9.46 per cent (Table 5.4). Major part of the subsidies in social 
services absorbed by Health and Family Welfare followed by Education, 'Water 
Supply and Sanitation' and Social Welfare. Subsidies in Health and Family Welfare 
sector were Rs. 622.68 crore in 1990-91 and increased up to Rs. 2668.78 crore in 
2005-06, registering 430 per cent increase with 10.19 per cent growth per annum. It 
covers 50 per cent of total subsidies given to Social Sen/ices. In Education, Sports, 
Art & Culture subsidies increased from Rs. 316.03 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 1198.66 
crore in 2005-06 with 9.29 per cent growth per annum. Subsidies in this sector cover 
more than 24 per cent of total subsidies. Water Supply, Sanitation, Housing, and 
Rural Development show a 7.73 per cent growth of per annum. It has increased 
from Rs. 260.65 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 796.50 crore in 2005-06; it covers about 
18.5 per cent of total subsidies. In Social Welfare Sector, subsidies started 
increasing from Rs. 72.17 crore in 1990-91 and reached to 317 crore in 2003-04 and 
fell down to Rs. 296.96 crore in 2005-06. This sector covers only 6.8 per cent of 
subsidies and shows 9.89 per cent growth per annum. Other Social Services, which 
cover less than one per cent of total subsidies shows 5.08 per cent per annum 
growth, and have increased from 13.77 crore to 28.95 crore during the same period. 
In Economic Services, subsidies increased from Rs. 3200.78 crore in 1990-91 to 
Rs. 10938.50 crore in 2005-05 with an annual growth of 8.54 per cent (Table 5.4). 
Major part, approximately 33 per cent of subsidies in economic services, is covered 
by Irrigation and Flood Control followed by Energy, Rural Development, and 
Agriculture and Allied services. In irrigation and Flood Control, subsidies started 
increasing from 1287.76 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 3092.84 crore in 2003-04 and it fell 
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to Rs. 2678.70 crore in 2005-06. It shows an annual growth of five per cent. Energy 
sector cover 19 per cent of total subsidies and it shows 8.92 per cent growth per 
annum, subsidies increased from Rs. 442.10 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 2895.87 crore 
in 2003-04 and fell to Rs. 1584.82 in 2005-06. Rural Development, which covers 
19.36 per cent part of subsidies, shows 10.92 per cent of per annum growth in 
subsidies, which is highest growth among all sector in economic services. Subsidies 
increased from Rs. 536.55 crore to Rs. 2541.26 crore during the period. Agriculture 
and allied activities shows 10.29 per cent growth per annum and about 14 per cent 
of total subsidies is given under this sector. In this sector, subsidies increased from 
Rs. 410.72 crore to Rs. 1783.65 crore, over the period of fifteen years. Industry and 
Mineral, which covers less than three per cent part of total subsidies in economic 
services shows 8.92 per growth per annum and subsidies increased from Rs. 
120.26 crore in 1990-91 to Rs, 433.49 crore in 2005-06. Transport sector shows 
growth of 10.69 per cent per annum. It increased from Rs. 401.79 cores in 1990-91 
to Rs. 1842.59 crore in 2005-06; it covers 13.39 per cent of total subsidies. 'Other 
Economic Services' sector gets least part of subsidies, which is 0.51 per cent. It 
shows 7.98 per cent growth of per annum. Subsidies increased from Rs. 23.61 crore 
to Rs. 74.70 crore during the same period. 
The overall recovery rate has decreased from 4.78 per cent to 3.19 per cent during 
the period. However, the recovery rate shows a fluctuating trend. The same had 
increased 4.73 per cent in 1993-94 and fell down to 4.05, 3.96, and 3.93 per cent in 
1995-96, 1998-99 and 2001-02 respectively. It has again increased in 2003-04 to 
4.37 per cent. Recovery rate in Social Services was 3.70 per cent in 1990-91, and it 
fell down to 2.91 per cent in 1993-94 and started rising continuously to 3.20, 4.28, 
and 4.50 per cent in 1995-96, 1998-99, and 2001-02 respectively. Again, it fell down 
to 2.21 per cent in 2003-04 and increased up to 3.02 per cent in 2005-06. Most of 
the recoveries are made in Education, Sports, Art and Culture sector. 
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Table 5,4 Continued 
Implicit Budgetary Subsidies in Uttar Pradesh 
MEMO ITEMS 
1990-91 1993-94 1995-96 1998-99 2001-02 2003-04 2005-06 
Total Subsidies as a % age of GSDP 
7.01 7.23 7.04 6.88 6.29 5.58 5.82 
Total Cost as a % age of GSDP 
7.36 4.89 7.34 7.16 6.54 6.88 6.01 
Total Recovery as a % age of GSDP 
0.35 0,36 0.30 1 0.28 0.25 0.30 0.19 
Source: Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective years, 
Economic Services show decreasing trend in recovery, it decreased from 5,21 per 
cent in 1990-01 to 3.28 per cent in 2005-06. In 1993-94, it has increased to 5.42 per 
cent and start felling down to 4.37, 3.83, and 3.74 per cent in 1995-96, 1998-99, and 
2001-02 respectively and increased in 2003-04 up to 5.02 per cent, again dip to 3,25 
per cent in 2005-06. 'Other Economic Services', 'Agriculture and Allied Services', 
and 'Irrigations' cover major recoveries. Energy sector shows least recoveries from 
cost of providing services. 
Sector wise share of each sector in the total budgetary subsidies, can be better 
understood by Figure 5,3 and 5.4 [Table A5.1 (appendix)]. On an average only 27 
per cent of total budgetary subsidies are give under Social Services and rest 73 per 
cent under Economic Services. The share of Social Services in total budgetary 
subsidies has a decreasing trend. It has decreased from 28,65 per cent in 1990-91 
to 28,03, 27,91, 27,90, 25.06, and 23.45 per cent in 1993-94, 1994-96, 1998-99, 
2001-02, and 2003-04 respectively. It increased to a higher level 31.22 per cent in 
2005-06, Health and family welfare whose share is more than 50 per cent and 
Education with 24 per cent share dominate other sectors. 
On the contrary, in Economic Services, its share in total implicit budgetary subsidies 
has increasing trend. In 1990-91, its share was 70.28 per cent which increased to 
71.97, 72,09, 72.10, 74,94, and 76,55 per cent in 1993-94, 1994-96, 1998-99, 2001-
02, and 2003-04 respectively. It decreased to a lower level to 68,78 per cent in 
2005-06. Share of Irrigation, Energy, Rural Development, and Agriculture is higher 
than other sectors. 
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Figure 5.3 
Sectoral Share of Subsidies within Social Services 
(Average -1990-91 to 2005-06) 
1% 
24% 
/ 
• Education, Sports, Art and Culture 
: 24 % 
I Health and Family Welfare : 50 % 
M Water Supply, Sanitation, Housing 
and Urban Development: 18% 
• Social Welfare and Welfare of 
SC, ST, OBC : 7 % 
m Other Social Services: 1 % 
Source: Computed from Table A5.1 
Figure 5.4 
Sectoral Share of Subsidies within Economic Services 
(Average -1990-91 to 2005-06) 
• Agriculture And Allied 
Services 
• Rural Development 
a Irrigation and Flood Control 
• Energy 
• Industries And Minerals 
• Transport 
B Other Economic Services 
33% 
Source: Computed from Table A5.1 
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As a per cent of Gross State Domestic Product, (hereafter GSDP) total implicit 
budgetary subsidies have increased from 7.01 per cent in 1990-91 to 7.23 per cent 
in 1993-94, after that it declined to 7.04, 6.88, 6.29 per cent in 1995-96, 1998-99, 
and 2001-02 respectively. It increased to 6.58 per cent in 2003-04. And finally, it 
dips to 5.82 per cent in 2005-06. Though there are several fluctuations in the 
intermediate periods, but overall trend of budgetary subsidies as a per cent of GSDP 
is declining. 
Table 5.5 
Implicit Budgetary Subsidies in Uttar Pradesh as a Percentage of GSDP 
TOTAL 
SOCIAL SERVICES 
Education, Sports, Art and 
Culture 
Health and Family Welfare 
Water Supply, Sanitation, 
Housing and Urban 
Development 
Social Welfare and Welfare of 
SC, ST, and OBC 
Other Social Services 
ECOMONIC SERVICES 
Agriculture And Allied Services 
Rural Development 
Irrigation and Flood Control 
Energy 
Industries And Minerals 
Transport 
Other Economic Services 
1990-91 
7.01 
2.01 
0.49 
0.97 
0.41 
0.11 
0.02 
5.00 
0.64 
0.84 
2.01 
0.66 
0.19 
0.63 
0.04 
1993-94 
7.23 
2.03 
0.45 
1.12 
0.31 
0.11 
0.02 
5.20 
0.78 
0.88 
1.87 
0.83 
0.12 
0.70 
0.02 
1995-96 
7.04 
1.97 
0.57 
0.95 
0.32 
0.10 
0.02 
5.08 
0.57 
0.83 
1.92 
0.99 
0.12 
0.61 
0.03 
1998-99 
6.88 
1.92 
0.56 
0.81 
0.39 
0.13 
0.02 
4.96 
0.60 
1.05 
1.62 
0.96 
0.12 
0.57 
0.04 
2001-02 
6.29 
1.56 
0.33 
0.75 
0.33 
0.14 
0.01 
4.72 
0.61 
0.94 
1.41 
1.05 
0.08 
0.60 
0.02 
2003-04 
6.58 
1.54 
0.30 
0.81 
0.29 
0.14 
0.01 
5.04 
0.74 
0.86 
1.38 
1.29 
0.11 
0.64 
0.03 
2005-06 
5.82 
1.82 
0.44 
0.97 
0.29 
0.11 
0.01 
4.00 
0.65 
0.93 
0.98 
0.58 
0.16 
0.67 
0.03 
Source: Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective years. 
In Social Services, ratio of subsidies to the GSDP is declining from 2.01 per cent in 
1990-91 to 1.82 per cent in 2005-06. In economic services, it is fluctuating towards 
down side. Subsidies as a percentage of GSDP increases from 5.00 per cent in 
1990-91 to 5.20 per cent in 1993-94 and start decreasing to 5.08, 4.96, 4.72 per 
cent in 1995-96, 1998-99, and 2001-02 respectively. It increased to 5.04 per cent in 
2003-04 and finally, gone down to 4.00 per cent in 2005-06 
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The Per Capita Subsidies in tlie State are continuously increasing from Rs. 343.79 
to Rs. 873.80 during the period from 1990-91 to 2005-06, registering an annual 
growth of 6.42 per cent per annum. During the period from 1990-91 to 1998-99, per 
capita subsidies increased at a higher rate and become double, while during 2001-
02 to 2005-06 it increased at a slower rate by 19 per cent. 
In Social Services, it is much lesser than Economic Services but rising continuously 
with a 7.05 per cent growth of per annum. Per capita budgetary subsidies increases 
from Rs. 98.50 in 1990-91 and reached at Rs. 196.89 in 1998-99. In 2001-02, it fell 
down to Rs. 178.72 and again increased in 2003-04 to Rs. 197.91 and in 2005-06 to 
Rs. 273.74. Among the social services Health and education, and Water and 
Sanitation shows main priority than other sectors. 
In Economic Services, Per Capita Budgetary Subsidies are at higher side with 6.15 
per cent grov\rth of per annum. It increases from Rs. 245.30 in 1990-91 to Rs. 600.07 
in 2005-06. Per Capita budgetary subsidies increase sharply between 1995-96 and 
1998-99 from Rs. 385.08 to 508.73, and between 2001-02 and 2003-04 from Rs. 
534.36 to 645.98. It is highest in 2003-04 and after that, these declined in 2005-06 
by about eight per cent. Irrigation, Energy, and Rural Development are the priority 
sectors in Economic Services. 
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Table 5.6 
Per Capita Subsidies in Social and Economic Services 
At Current Prices 
TOTAL 
SOCIAL SERVICES 
Education, Sports, Art and 
Culture 
Health and Family Welfare 
Water Supply, Sanitation, 
Housing and Urban 
Development 
Social Welfare and Welfare of 
SC, ST, and OBC 
Other Social Services 
ECONOMIC SERVICES 
Agriculture And Allied 
Services 
Rural Development 
Irrigation and Flood Control 
Energy 
Industries And Minerals 
Transport 
Other Economic Services 
1990-91 
343.79 
98.50 
24,22 
47.72 
19,97 
5,53 
1.06 
245.30 
31,48 
41,12 
98.69 
32.19 
9.22 
30.79 
1.81 
1993-94 
434.86 
121.89 
27.64 
67.53 
18.89 
6.54 
1.29 
312.97 
47.00 
52.78 
112,49 
50,05 
7,37 
41,86 
1,42 
1995-96 
534.20 
149.12 
43.44 
72.10 
24.22 
7,59 
1,76 
385.08 
43.16 
63.14 
145.97 
75.09 
8.95 
46.43 
2.34 
1998-99 
705.62 
196.89 
57,83 
83.56 
40.15 
13,36 
1.99 
508.73 
61.48 
107,90 
165.83 
98.37 
12.74 
58.77 
3.64 
2001-02 
713.09 
178.72 
37,53 
84,51 
39,74 
15,32 
1,52 
534.36 
69,25 
106,24 
159.25 
118.93 
9.58 
68.35 
2.76 
(In 
2003-04 
843.89 
197.91 
38.57 
103.39 
36.69 
18.09 
1.18 
645.98 
95,24 
109,75 
176.46 
165.22 
13.95 
81.80 
3,56 
Rupees) 
2005-06 
873.80 
273.74 
65,76 
146.40 
43,69 
16,29 
1,59 
600.07 
97,85 
139,41 
146.95 
86,90 
23,78 
101,08 
4.10 
Source: Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective years. 
In real term, Per capita Subsidies in the State (Table 5.7) have fluctuating trend. It 
was Rs. 731.48 in 1990-91 and decreased to Rs. 683.27 in 1993-94 and 697.95 in 
1995-96. It rose in 1998-99 to Rs. 720.78 and fell down to Rs. 706.03 in 2001-02 
and again rose to Rs. 746.81 in 2003-04 and finally at a lower point Rs. 699.04 in 
2005-06. 
In Social Services, per capita implicit subsidies at constant prices increased 
marginally from Rs. 209.57 in 1990-91 to Rs. 218.99 in 2005-06. 
In Economic Services, per capita subsidies in real term rose from Rs. 521.90 in 
1990-91 to Rs. 571.67 in 2003-04 and then decreased to Rs. 480.05 in 2005-06. 
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Table 5.7 
Per Capita Subsidies in Social and Economic Services 
At Constant Prices (1999-00) 
TOTAL 
SOCIAL SERVICES 
Education, Sports, Art and 
Culture 
Health and Family Welfare 
Water Supply, Sanitation, 
Housing and Urban 
Development 
Social Welfare and Welfare of 
SC, ST, OBC 
Other Social Services 
ECONOMIC SERVICES 
Agriculture And Allied Services 
Rural Development 
Irrigation and Flood Control 
Energy 
Industries And Minerals 
Transport 
Other Economic Services 
1990-91 
731.48 
209.57 
51.53 
101.53 
42.50 
11.77 
2.25 
521.90 
66.97 
87.49 
209.98 
68.50 
19.61 
65.51 
3.85 
1993-94 
683.27 
191.51 
43.42 
106.11 
29.69 
10.28 
2.02 
491.75 
73.85 
82.93 
176.75 
78.64 
11.59 
65.77 
2.22 
1995-96 
697.95 
194.83 
56.75 
94.21 
31.65 
9.92 
2.30 
503.12 
56.39 
82.50 
190.72 
98.10 
11.69 
60,66 
3.06 
1998-99 
720.78 
201.12 
59.08 
85.36 
41.01 
13.64 
2.03 
519.66 
62.80 
110.22 
169.39 
100.48 
13.02 
60.03 
3.72 
2001-02 
706.03 
176.95 
37.26 
83.67 
39.34 
15.17 
1.51 
529.07 
68.56 
105.19 
157.68 
117.76 
9.49 
67.67 
2.73 
(In 
2003-04 
746.81 
175.14 
34,13 
91.49 
32,47 
16.01 
1,05 
571.67 
84,29 
97,12 
156.16 
146,21 
12,34 
72,39 
3,15 
Rupees) 
2005-06 
699.04 
218.99 
52.61 
117.12 
34,96 
13,03 
1,27 
480.05 
78,28 
111.53 
117,56 
69,52 
19,02 
80.86 
3.28 
Source: Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective years. 
5.5 Historical Estimates of Subsidies in Uttar Pradesh: 
A Macro Comparison wittt Earlier Studies 
There are six studies which have estimated implicit budgetary subsidies for the 
States and Union Government by defining them as unrecovered cost of provisioning 
of services by the various level of governments. Though the basic definition and 
basic methodology adopted are the same, but the methodology of arriving at various 
components of the estimation varied from one another. Mundle Sudipto and M.G. 
Rao (1991), Tiwari, A.C. (1996), Srivastava D.K. and Tapas K. Sen (1997) 
Srivastava D.K. and H.K. Amar Nath (2001) and Srivastava D.K., C.B. Rao, Pinaki 
Chakraborty, and T.S. Rangamannar (2003), Kumar Surender, Tapas K. Sen and 
N.J. Kurion (2004) estimated subsidies for Union Government and States in India for 
the years 1987-88, 1992-93, 1993-94,1995-96 & 1996-97, 1998-99, and 2002-03 & 
2003-04 respectively. Uttar Pradesh one of the States for which they have 
estimated. 
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Mundle and Rao (1991) separated all public enterprises from expenditure, and taken 
depreciation rate to be two per cent in real term. Mundle-Rao, Tiwari, Srivastava-
Sen used same methodology but estimated the subsidies for single year but their 
studies are covering different years. In Srivastava-Sen study, they separated the 
surplus sectors from subsidising sector, so that subsidies are not underestimated to 
the time of surplus and the relevant recovery rate is not overestimated. 
Snvastava and Amar Nath (2001) made substantive changes in the methodology 
particularly applying an adjusted depreciation rate to convert the capital stock 
summed up at historical prices in real prices by stimulating the growth rates of 
investment and average inflation through investment deflator, and reduce the 
depreciation rate from 10.5 per cent (2 + 10 Average inflation) to near five per cent, 
which reduce over estimation of capital cost. They also netted out the expenditures 
incurred in the form of assistance to public sector undertakings, co-operatives, and 
grants-in-aid to local bodies in addition to transfer payments. Expenditure on relief 
on account of natural calamities was considered as public good by Srivastava and 
Amar Nath (2001). But the study was limited to the computation of implicit budgetary 
subsidies for Central government only. Kumar and Sen also estimated volume and 
composition of explicit subsidies but their study was also confined to Central 
governments. 
However, all these studies have estimated subsidies for a year or two using slightly 
different methodologies and adjustments. Because of the minor differences in their 
methodology, these studies are directly not comparable with each other. They are 
not comparable for two reasons i.e. a) varying depreciation rates are used, and b) 
adjustments made to the data are different. For example, Rao did not exclude the 
assistance given to PSU and co-operatives, Srivastava-Sen excluded only 
assistance to PSU, but not to co-operatives and the other studies excluded both 
treated them as explicit subsidies. However, in broad terms, a similar approach of 
measuring budgetary subsidies in a comprehensive way was used in these studies. 
Mundle and Rao stopped at estimating implicit budgetary subsidies of non-public 
implicit budgetary goods at aggregation. Where as Srivastava & Sen tried to classify 
the non-public goods in merit and non-merit, Srivastava-Amar Nath and Srivastava 
et.al further classified the merit goods in to Merit I and Merit II goods and so on. This 
classification opened up a debate on what should be the recovery rate for each of 
these categories. 
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On comparing, our estimated values of subsidies with, tlie estimates made by 
Srivastava and Sen (1997) for the year 1993-94 and Srivastava et.al. (2003) for the 
year 1998-99, we found that -
• The estimates of Srivastava and Sen (for 1993-94), and Srivastava et.al. (for 
1998-99) were higher than that of present study. The costs and receipts were 
higher than that in the present study because of the following reasons: Firstly, 
they included the grants-in-aid to local bodies and assistance given to co-
operatives in the estimation of current cost. Secondly, the capital cost was not 
adjusted for inflation. Thirdly, another limitation of their study was the many 
items on receipts side as fee collected for sale of documents, fines were 
excluded from the user charges in the estimation of revenue from user 
charges. Since fee and fines is paid by beneficiaries of service, the present 
study includes them in estimation of current receipts. Fourth, while calculation 
current receipts they have not netted out transfers to individuals from 
Revenue Receipts. 
• Over estimation of cost and under and over estimation of receipts are 
responsible for over estimation of implicit subsidies by Srivastava and Sen 
(for 1993-94), and Srivastava ed. al. (for 1998-99). 
Comparison with Srivastava and Sen Study - overestimation of cost and receipt 
is more than 33 per cent than in comparison of present study. Percentage of 
overestimation is higher in social services than in economic services.(Table 5.9, 
Figure 5.7). 
Overall subsidies estimated by Srivastava and Sen for Uttar Pradesh in 1993-94 is 
Rs. 9287.00 crore with comparison to Rs. 6089.28 crore of the present estimation, 
which is more than 34.44 per cent higher than of present study. 
In social services, overestimation of subsidies is more than 58 per cent. They have 
estimated subsidies Rs. 4100 crore while in present study subsidies are Rs. 1707 
crore. Overestimation in education and welfare programmes is much higher than 
other sectors. As they have not excluded Grant-in-aid, to the non-govt. educational 
institutions and assistance to voluntary organisations and local bodies for social 
welfare. 
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On the other hand in economic services over estimation of cost and subsidy is 14.85 
and 15.52 per cent respectively. They have estimated subsidies to Rs. 5188 crore, 
while in present study subsidies are Rs. 4383 crore. 
Comparison with Srivastava et.al. Study - overestimation of cost is 38 per cent 
than in present study and in receipt is 18 per cent in comparison of present the 
study. Percentage of overestimation is higher in social services than in economic 
services. (Table 5.10, Figure 5.8) 
Overall subsidies estimated by Srivastava and Bhujanga for Uttar Pradesh in 1998-
99 was Rs. 18110 crore with comparison to Rs. 11082 crore in the present 
estimation, which is more than 39 per cent high than present study. 
In social services, overestimation of subsidies is about 65 per cent. Srivastava and 
Bhujanga have estimated subsidies Rs. 8805 crore while in present study subsidies 
are Rs. 3092 crore. The difference in cost and receipt are more than 64 and 25 per 
cent respectively. They have estimated cost as Rs. 8990 crore and receipts as Rs. 
185 crore, while in present study it cost is as Rs. 3230 crore and receipt is Rs. 138 
crore. 
In economic services, overestimation is much lesser than social services. 
Overestimation of subsidies is about 14 per cent. In their study subsidy in economic 
services is Rs. 9305 crore, while in present study subsidy is Rs. 7990 crore. This 
difference is in cost and receipt is also about 14 per cent. 
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Table 5.8 
Historical Estimates of Subsidies in Uttar Pradesh 
A Macro Comparison 
Mundle - Rao (1987-88) 
Tiwari (1992-93) 
Srivastava - Tapas (1993-94) 
Srivastava et.ai. (1998-99) 
Total Cost Total Receipts Subsidy 
(Rs. Crore) 
3894.52 
8080.37 
8839.49 
18710.00 
515.05 
557.22 
500.64 
755.00 
3379.47 
7523.15 
8338.85 
17955.00 
Recovery 
Rate 
(Percent) 
13.22 
6.90 
5.66 
4.04 
Own Estimates 
1990-91 
1993-94 
1995-96 
1998-99 
2001-02 
2003-04 
2005-06 
4711.33 
6391.75 
8161.53 
11538.70 
12459.18 
15467.70 
16453.90 
225.26 
302.48 
330.37 
456.51 
489.19 
676.70 
525.51 
4586.07 
6089.28 
7831.16 
11082.19 
11969.99 
14791.00 
15928.39 
4.78 
4.73 
4.05 
3.96 
3.93 
4.37 
3.19 
Sources: 1. Mundle and Rao (1991), Tiwari A.C. (1996), Srivastava, D.K., and Sen 
Tapas (1997), Srivastava D.K. ed.al (2003). 
2. Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for 
respective years. 
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Figure 5.7 
Comparison of Srivastava and Sen Study (1997) for the Year 1993-94 
with Own Estimates of Implicit Budgetary Subsidies in Uttar Pradesh in 1993-94 
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Figure 5.8 
Comparison of Srivastava ed.al (2003) for the Year 1998-99 
with Own Estimates of implicit Budgetary Subsidies in Uttar Pradesh for 1998-99 
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5.6 Sectoral Analysis of Implicit Budgetary Subsidies 
Analysis of implicit budgetary subsidies in various sectors follows same pattern of 
budgetary classification. Budgetary classification has three categories of 
expenditure i.e., General Services, Social Services, and Economic Services. 
General Services are mostly administrative in nature and are public goods. Where 
as, social services and economic services provide services to the people, and 
beneficiaries can be identified. Most of these services are private or non-public 
goods in nature with varying degree of externalities. Similar pattern is followed by all 
the States including Uttar Pradesh. Expenditure on service provision in non-public 
goods is mainly categorised under social and economic services in the budget 
documents of the Government of Uttar Pradesh. Social Services comprise mainly of 
human development sectors and the Economic Services consist of services that can 
generate economic activity and economic development. 
5.6.1 Social Services 
Social services consists of various human development related sectors, like 
Education, Health and family welfare. Water and Sanitation, Housing, Urban 
development. Welfare. Being associated with strong externalities and economies of 
scale. Education, Health, Water Supply, Sanitation and Housing in social service 
sector qualify for larger share in subsidies. Education improves sociability, 
occupational mobility, and voluntary responsibilities and law conformity. 
Improvement in health status is linked not only to the performance of the health care 
system, but also to health awareness, environmental sanitation, availability of 
potable drinking water, nutritional intake and various other social and cultural 
factors. Better health, water supply and sanitation, and housing facilitate lower level 
of morbidity, mortality and contain the spread of communicable disease. These 
would further enhance productive efficiency and help in equitable distribution of 
income. Allocations for provision of social services have increased substantially. 
Share of Social Services in total services is given in Table 5.11, which shows that 
social sector covers only about one third of total revenue expenditure and a major 
part is going to other services. In social services, capital expenditure covers only a 
little part of total capital expenditure and it is varies between 3.53 per cent and 16.52 
per cent during 1990-91 to 2005-06. 
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Table 5.11 
Share of Social Services in Total Expenditure 
Years 
1990-91 
1995-96 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
Total 
Revenue 
Expenditure 
9538.36 
17555.86 
31792.70 
32938.51 
50221.11 
44610.35 
46817.14 
Revenue 
Expenditure 
on Social 
Services 
3392.91 
5499.08 
9336.59 
10308.04 
10354.35 
13089.72 
15609.70 
Revenue 
Expenditure 
on Social 
Services as a 
per cent of 
Total 
Revenue 
Expenditure 
35.57 
31.32 
29.37 
31.29 
20.62 
29.34 
33.34 
Total Capital 
Outlay 
1177.58 
1129.36 
3555.56 
3794.38 
9320.35 
5653.34 
8711,23 
Capital 
Outlay on 
Social 
Services 
131.96 
186.62 
211.06 
288.19 
328.85 
496.21 
1158.83 
(In Rs. Crore) 
Capital 
Outlay on 
Social 
Services as a 
per cent of 
Total capital 
Outlay 
11.21 
16,52 
5.94 
7.60 
3.53 
8.78 
13.30 
Source: Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective years. 
Table 5.12 presents breakup of costs, receipts, and subsidies in Social Service. 
Actual costs of providing services in various sectors of social services have 
increased from Rs. 1334.64 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 5163.14 crore in 2005-06. The 
cost has gone up by about four times during the period with an annual growth of 
9.44 per cent. In relative terms as a per cent of GSDP, cost has gone down from 
2.09 per cent in 1990-91 to 1.89 per cent in 2005-06. On an average basis, 14.32 
per cent of these costs is of capital investment in nature and increased from 9.75 
per cent in 1990-91 to 13.57 per cent in 2005-06. 
Recoveries made through user charges show an increasing trend and have 
increased about three times. It increased with an annual growth rate of 7.94 per 
cent. It was Rs. 49.36 crore in 1990-91 and continuously increased to Rs. 51.09 
crore, 72.30 crore, Rs. 138.27 crore, Rs. 140.25 crore in 1993-94, 1995-96, 1998-
99, 2001-02 respectively. It decreased in 2003-04 and reached at Rs. 78.46 crore. 
This is because of technical education, which was a surplus sector in this year and it 
is not included in subsidised sectors. In 2005-06, recoveries reached at a highest 
point of Rs. 155.13 crore. More than 55 per cent of total receipts in social services 
are from education sector and about 24 per cent are from health and family welfare. 
In relative terms, recoveries as a per cent of GSDP have decreased form .08 per 
cent in 1990-91 to 0.6 per cent in 2005-06. Rate of recoveries to the cost in social 
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services is of fluctuating nature towards down side. It was 3.70 per cent in 1990-91 
and fell down to 2.91 per cent in 1993-94. Again, these have increased to 3.20, 
4.28, and 4.16 per cent in 1995-96, 1998-99, and 2001-02 respectively. Further 
recovery rates have dip to 2.21 and 3.00 per cent in 2003-04, 2005-06 respectively. 
Table 5.12 
Costs, 
Costs 
Receipts 
Subsidies 
Recovery Rate 
Receipts as a % of 
6SDP 
Costs as a % of GSDP 
Subsidies as a % of 
GSDP 
Per Capita Subsidies 
Per Capita Subsidies 
at Constant Prices 
(1999-00) 
! 
! 
i 
Receipts and subsidies 
1990-91 
1334.64 
49.35 
1285.28 
3,70 
0.08 
2.09 
2.01 
98.50 
209.57 
1993-94 
1757.86 
51.09 
1706.76 
2.91 
0.06 
2.09 
2.03 
121.89 
191.51 
1995-96 
2258.34 
72.30 
2186.04 
3.20 
0.07 
2.03 
1.97 
149.12 
194.83 
> in Social Servi 
1998-99 
3230.50 
138.27 
3092.23 
4.28 
0.09 
2.01 
1.92 
196.89 
201.12 
2001-02 
3148.21 
140.25 
3007.95 
4.45 
0.07 
1.65 
1.58 
178.72 
176.95 
ces 
2003-04 
3547.25 
78.45 
3458.79 
2.21 
0.03 
1.58 
1.54 
197.91 
175.14 
2005-06 
5153.14 
155.13 
5008.01 
3.00 
0.06 
1.89 
1.83 
274.73 
219.78 
Source; Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective years. 
The difference between the costs and receipts is defined as implicit budgetary 
subsidies in the study. Implicit budgetary subsidies in social services have increased 
in nominal term from Rs. 1285.28 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 5008.01 crore in 2005-06 
with an annual growth of 9.49 per cent. Subsidies have increased sharply during 
1995-96 to 1998-99 (about 41.45 per cent), and during 2003-04 to 2005-06 (about 
44.37 per cent). On the contrary, implicit budgetary subsidies as a per cent of GSDP 
have decreased from 2.01 per cent in 1990-91 to 1.83 per cent in 2005-06, with an 
annual decline of 0.62 per cent. As a per cent of GSDP subsidies are 2.03, 1.97, 
1.92, 1.58, 1.54 per cent in 1993-94, 1995-96, 1998-99, 2001-02, and 2003-04 
respectively. In human resource development sectors like education, health and 
family welfare, water supply and sanitation, the implicit budgetary subsidies as a per 
cent of GSDP have declined. This may be due to FRBM regulation. Per capita 
subsidies increased from Rs. 98.50 in 1990-91 to Rs. 274.73 in 2005-06 with an 
annual growth of 7.08 per cent. While at constant prices per capita subsidies is 
almost same at starting point and at end point, through there are some fluctuation in 
the intermediary period. It was Rs. 209.57 in 1990-91 and goes down to Rs. 191.51 
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in 1993-94, goes up to Rs. 194.83, Rs. 201.02, in 1995-96 and 1998-99 
respectively. Again, fall down to Rs. 176.95, Rs. 175.14 in 2001-02, 2003-04. 
Finally, it is Rs. 219.78 in 2005-06 marginally higher than 1990-91. 
Details of Costs, Receipts, and Subsidies in each sector with miner head are given 
in Appendix Table A5.2 to A5.12. 
Education is known as a vital and important link with the achievement of income 
and health security. Spread of education among all groups and women has 
extremely significant implications for the economic progress of any State. Education 
also increase self-esteem and social dignity, reduce vulnerability and 
powerlessness. Impact of education is directly on virtually all dimensions of 
deprivation (physical, social, economic, political, and psychological). 
Table 5.13 
Implicit Subsidies in Education, Sports, Art and Culture 
Costs 
Receipts 
Subsidies 
Recovery Rate 
Costsasa%ofGSDP 
Receipts as a % of 
GSDP 
Subsidies as a % of 
GSDP 
Per Capita Subsidies 
Per Capita Subsidies 
at Constant Prices 
(1999-00) 
Siiare in total 
Subsidies in Social 
Services 
o 
u 
a: 
c 
u 
OJ 
a. 
c 
a: 
QJ XT 
C "' 
— U 
1990-91 
349.93 
33.90 
316.03 
9.69 
0.55 
0.05 
0.49 
24.22 
51.53 
24.59 
1993-94 
416.93 
29.94 
386.99 
7.18 
0.50 
0.04 
0.46 
27.64 
43.42 
22.67 
1995-96 
686.17 
49.38 
636.79 
7.20 
0.62 
0.04 
0.57 
43.44 
56.75 
29.13 
1998-99 
1009.68 
101.34 
908.34 
10,04 
0.63 
0.06 
0.56 
57.83 
59.08 
29.37 
2001-02 
718.53 
85.15 
633.37 
11.85 
0.38 
0.04 
0.33 
37.63 
37.26 
21.06 
2003-04 
675.94 
0.00 
675.94 
0,00 
0.30 
0.00 
0.30 
38.57 
34.13 
19.49 
2005-06 
1277.95 
79.28 
1198.66 
6,20 
0.47 
0.03 
0.44 
55.76 
52,61 
23,93 
Source: Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective years. 
Table 5.13 shows the implicit subsidies in education sector. This sector covers, 
general and technical education, 'sports and youth welfare', and 'art and culture'. 
Costs for providing these services in education sector has increased by more than 
three and a half times with an annual growth of 9.02 per cent. In absolute term, it 
has increased from Rs. 349.93 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 1277.95 crore in 2005-06. In 
respect of relative terms, cost as a per cent of GSDP has decreased from 0.55 per 
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cent in 1990-91 to 0.47 per cent in 2005-06. On an average basis, 9.34 per cent of 
total cost is of capital investment in nature and increased by 3.64 per cent annually 
from 5.19 per cent in 1990-91 to 8.87 per cent in 2005-06. 
Recoveries made through user charges increased by more than double with an 
annual growth of 5.83 per cent. Though elementary education is free, we find some 
receipts from elementary education also, in the form of contributions and some 
refunds from capital receipts. In secondary education, receipts are in the form of 
tuition fee and examination fee and in technical education, in the form of fee and 
ready material in workshops. Recoveries was Rs. 33.90 crore in 1990-91 and 
decrease to Rs. 29.94 crore in 1993-94 than increased to Rs. 49.38 and Rs. 101.34 
crore in 1995-96, and 1998-99. After that, decreased to Rs. 85.15 crore in 2001-02, 
because in this year, adult education and general receipts are surplus sector and 
they are not included in subsidy. In 2003-04, recoveries dipped to zero, in this year 
technical education is surplus sector because of major receipts from the sale of 
material prepared in workshops of technical colleges. In 2005-06, it rose to Rs. 
79.28 crore. As a per cent of GSDP, these recoveries have decreased from 0.05 per 
cent in 1990-91 to 0.03 per cent in 2005-06. Recovery rate to cost is fluctuating and 
has falls down from 9.69 per cent in 1990-91 to 7.18 per cent 1993-94. These have 
increased to 7.20, 10.04, and 11.85 per cent in 1995-96, 1998-99, and 2001-02 
respectively. In 2003-04, it went to zero and rise again in 2005-06 to 6.20 per cent. 
Subsidies in education sector cover more than 24 per cent of total subsidies given 
under social services. Implicit budgetary subsidies increased in nominal term from 
Rs. 316.03 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 1198.66 crore in 2005-06 with an annual growth 
of 9.29 per cent, which is at second place within the social service. While in relative 
term as a percentage of GSDP, subsidies has declined from 0.49 per cent in 1990-
91 to 0.44 per cent in 2005-06 with a yearly decline of 0.80 per cent. 
Per capita subsidies of this sector increased from Rs. 24.22 in 1990-91 to Rs. 65.76 
in 2005-06 with an annual growth of 6.89 per cent. While, at constant prices per 
capita subsidies increased with an annual growth of only 0.14 per cent. It increased 
from Rs. 51.53 in 1990-91 to Rs. 52.61 in 2005-06. 
Health and Family Welfare, which covers 50 per cent of total budgetary 
subsidies in social services, shows highest share and priority among all the sector in 
the State. One reason may be that Uttar Pradesh is most populous State and 32.8 
per cent of population is living below poverty line, ranked 12 among all the State of 
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the country. Table 5,14 presents the detail of implicit budgetary subsidies in health 
and family welfare sector. 
Costs of providing health care and family welfare services including medical 
education have increased by 10.19 per cent annually, which is also highest among 
all the sectors of social services. Cost has increased from Rs. 631.95 crore in 1990-
91 to Rs. 2709.42 in 2005-06. In relative term, as a per cent of GSDP, cost is 0.99 
per cent in 1990-91 and 2005-06 with fluctuations in the intermediatory period, On 
an average basis, 8.31 per cent of total cost is capital investment in nature 
(Appendix Table A5.12). 
Table 5.14 
Implicit Subsidies in Health and Family Welfare 
Costs 
Recoveries 
Subsidies 
Recovery Rate 
Costs as a % of GSDP 
Receipts as a % of GSDP 
Subsidies as a % of GSDP 
Per Capita Subsidies 
Per Capita Subsidies at 
Constant Prices 
(1999-00) 
Share in total Subsidies 
in Social Services 
O 
c 
OJ u 
Q-
C 
a QJ 3 u 
1990-91 
631.95 
9.28 
622.67 
1.47 
0.99 
0.01 
0.97 
47.72 
101.53 
48,45 
1993-94 
959.52 
13.89 
945.62 
1,45 
1,14 
0.02 
1,12 
67.53 
106.11 
55.40 
1995-96 
1066,18 
9,15 
1057,03 
0,86 
0.96 
0.01 
0,95 
72,10 
94.21 
48.35 
1998-99 
1329.91 
17.54 
1312.37 
1.32 
0.83 
0.01 
0,81 
83.56 
85.36 
42.44 
2001-02 
1453.94 
31.63 
1422.31 
2.18 
0.76 
0.02 
0,75 
84.51 
83.67 
47.78 
2003-04 
1855.26 
43,18 
1812.08 
2.33 
0.83 
0.02 
0,81 
103,39 
91,49 
52,24 
2005-06 
2709.42 
40.63 
2668.78 
1.50 
0.99 
0.01 
0.97 
146.40 
117.12 
53.48 
Source: Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective years. 
Recoveries, in this sector, are from manufacturing of drugs, some receipts from 
hospitals and dispensaries, and sale of vaccines. In 1990-91 recoveries was Rs. 
9.28 crore, and have been increasing continuously with an annual growth rate of 
10.35 per cent, and reaches at Rs. 40.64 crore in 2005-06. Recoveries as a per cent 
of GSDP are only 0.01 and 0.02 per cent throughout the study period. Recovery rate 
to cost is increased form 1.47 per cent in 1990-91 to 1.50 per cent in 2005-06. 
These were high in 2001-02 (2.18 per cent), 2003-04 (2.33 per cent) and low in 
1995-96 (0.86 per cent). 
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Subsidies of tills sector in nominal term increased steadily in the decade of ninety 
and after that increased sharply as the government is promoting medical education 
and research in the State. Subsidies increased from Rs. 662.67 crore in 1990-91 to 
Rs. 2668.78 in 2005-06 with an annual growth rate of 10.19 per cent, which is 
highest among all sectors. While in relative term as a per cent of GSDP, subsidies is 
at the same point with some fluctuations in the intermediator/ period. It is 0.97 per 
cent of GSDP in 1990-91 and goes up to 1.12 per cent in 1993-94. After that, started 
decline to 0.95, 0.81, 0.75, and 0.81 per cent in 1995-96, 1998-99, 2001-02, and 
2003-04 respectively. Finally, it reaches to 1990-91 level of 0.97 per cent in 2005-
06. 
Per capita subsidies are highest in this sector, it increased from Rs. 47.72 crore in 
1990-91 to Rs. 146.40 per cent in 2005-06 with an annual growth of 7.76 per cent.. 
While, at constant prices per capita subsidies has increased by only 0.96 per cent 
annually. It increased from Rs. 101.53 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 117.12 in 2005-06. 
Water Supply, Sanitation, Housing, and Urban Development, this sector is 
divided into two major parts one is 'Water supply and Sanitation' and other one is 
'Housing and Urban Development'. As a whole, this sector amounted to 18 per cent 
of total subsidies in social services. Table 5.15 provides the details of implicit 
subsidies in this sector. 
The demand for water supply and sanitation services is growing fast due to the 
interactive effects of the demographic growth, economic development, and 
improvement in living standards. In view of economic and welfare contributions as 
well as political compulsions, there is always a constant budgetary pressure for 
additional resource allocation to meet increasing demand for these services both in 
rural and urban areas. 
Water supply and Sanitation is characterised by higher current costs and lower 
capital cost. Maintenance of water supply though done by the local bodies, mainly 
with grants-in-aid from the State government. The second problem in this sector is 
that user fee though negligible, is collected, and appropriated by the local bodies. 
Water supply, like health and elementary education is a sensitive subject and is 
closer to public goods [Rao, Amar Nath, and Vani (2004)]. 
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Table 5.15 
Implicit Subsidies in Water Supply, Sanitation, 
Housing and Urban Development 
Costs 
Recoveries 
Subsidies 
Recovery Rate 
Cos tsasa%ofGSDP 
Receipts as a % of GSDP 
Subsidies as a % of GSDP 
Per Capita Subsidies 
Per Capita Subsidies 
at Constant Prices 
(1999-00) 
Share in total Subsidies 
in Social Services 
o 
(J 
l/i 
c 
c 
03 
u 
(U 
a. 
a: 
c 
C OJ 
1990-91 
263.52 
2.87 
260.65 
1.09 
0.41 
0.00 
0.41 
19.97 
42,50 
20.28 
1993-94 
268.88 
4.31 
264.57 
1.60 
0.32 
0.01 
0.31 
18.89 
29.69 
15.50 
1995-96 
361.72 
6.62 
355.10 
1.83 
0.33 
0.01 
0.32 
24,22 
31.65 
16.24 
1998-99 
634.07 
3.50 
630.57 
0.55 
0.39 
0.00 
0.39 
40.15 
41.01 
20.39 
2001-02 
652.12 
14.77 
637.35 
2.26 
0,34 
0.01 
0.33 
39.74 
39.34 
21.41 
2003-04 
668.48 
25.45 
643.03 
3.81 
0.30 
0.01 
0.29 
36.69 
32.47 
18.54 
2005-06 
810.05 
13,55 
796.50 
1.67 
0.30 
0.00 
0,29 
43.69 
34.96 
15.96 
Source; Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective years. 
Costs of providing water and sanitation facility has increased by about three and a 
half times from Rs. 195.49 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 670.47 crore in 2005-06 with an 
annual growth of 8.56 per cent. In relative terms as a per cent of GSDP, cost has 
decreased from 0.31 per cent in 1990-91 to 0.24 per cent in 2005-06. Share of 
capital cost in total cost has increased from 1.37 per cent to 14.09 per cent during 
the period from 1990-91 to 2005-06. This is because of implementation of 
recommendations of Ninth Finance Commission and activation of plan and schemes 
related to water supply and sanitation facility. 
Recoveries are negligible in this sector though they increased from Rs. 0.02 crore in 
1990-91 to Rs. 1.70 crore in 2005-06 with an annual growth of 35.11 per cent. 
Recovery rate to the cost is also negligible but having increasing trends. This has 
increased from 0.01 per cent in 1990-91 to 0.25 per cent in 2005-06. 
In water supply and sanitation, subsidies have increased in nominal term with an 
annual growth of 8.55 per cent from Rs. 195.48 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 668.77 crore 
in 2005-06. But, in relative term as a per cent of GSDP, subsidies have a declining 
trend with some fluctuations during the period of study. They have declined 1.48 per 
cent annually. Per capita subsidies in this sector increased about than two and a 
half times from Rs. 14.98 to Rs. 36.69 in 2005-06 with an annual growth of 6.15 per 
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cent. While, at constant prices, per capita subsidies are decreasing. They have 
declined from Rs. 37.87 in 1990-91 to Rs. 29.25 in 2005-06 with an annual decline 
of 0.55 percent. 
Second component of this sector is related to housing and urban development. 
Housing is a basic requirement for human survival and dignity. Housing 
development has been an important area of intervention by the governments not 
only in India but also in most of the countries of the world. Government intervention 
in housing sector is justified on the grounds of efficiency and equity [Rosen, Harvey 
and Perry Harvey S. (1985)]. The issue of efficiency relates to externalities in 
housing consumption and equity relates to the redistribution objective of the 
government. Provision of subsidised housing helps the poor and downtrodden to 
enjoy better standard of living. 
An active participation by the governments in India, both at the Central and State 
level has resulted in the formulation of a number of programmes for housing 
development. State governments have a grater role to play, as housing 
development is a State subject. Along with the growth in expenditure, there is a 
proliferation of subsidies. In view of growing fiscal burden, the State government is 
facing and resources inadequacy, there is need to target these subsidies and 
ensure cost recoveries from those who can afford. There are also issues on the 
appropriateness of alternative instruments of redistribution and problems of targeting 
[Gayithri K., (2003)]. 
Majority of expenditure under housing is on government residential buildings where 
in the residential quarters are given to the government employees under less than 
market rate of rent. The recoveries from house rents are given in the respective 
departmental expenditures and are not shown under this major head. The remaining 
expenditure is under rural housing for the poor which is of public goods in nature. As 
far as concerned about recoveries we find very negligible recoveries in water supply 
and sanitation. This is because major expenditure under this head is through local 
bodies and special purpose vehicle like Boards and corporations. Any recoveries 
made by these agencies do not accrue to the State government and there may be 
under estimation of receipts and overestimation of costs. Since the information from 
local bodies is not available, it is difficult to arrive at accurate amount of subsidies. 
However, since these recoveries do not reach the spending agency (State 
government). Entire unrecovered cost can be treated as subsidy from State 
government's point of view. 
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Costs of providing services to housing and urban development in Utter Pradesh 
have increased by more than three times with an annual growth of 5.77 per cent 
during last fifteen years. This has increased from Rs. 68.03 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 
157.70 crore in 2005-06. Cost as a per cent of GSDP has decreased from 0.11 per 
cent in 1990-91 to 0.06 per cent in 2005-06. Share of capital cost in total cost has 
increased with from 71.46 per cent in 1990-91 to 84.02 per cent in 2005-06 
(Appendix Table A5.12). 
Recoveries increased from Rs. 2.86 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 11.85 crore in 2005-06 
with an annual grov^^h of 9.95 per cent. Recovery rate to the cost is fluctuating. It 
increased from 4.20 per cent in 1990-91 to 7.51 per cent in 2005-06. 
Subsidies in this sector increased in nominal term with an annual growth of 5.52 per 
cent from Rs. 65.17 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 145.86 crore in 2005-06. But in relative 
term as a per cent of GSDP, subsidies have a declining trend with fluctuations in 
between. These have decreased from 0.10 per cent in 1990-91 to 0.09, 0.09 per 
cent in 1993-94, 1995-96 and increased in 1998-99 to 0.13 per cent. Subsidies 
again have decreased to 0.10, 0.8, and 0.05 per cent in 2001-02, 2003-04, and 
2005-06 respectively. Per capita subsidies have increased from Rs. 4.99 in 1900-
91 to Rs. 8.00 in 2005-06 with an annual growth of 3.19 per cent. While, in real term 
at constant prices, per capita subsidies is declining. These declined from Rs. 10.63 
in 1990-91 to Rs. 6.40 in 2005-06 with an annual decline of 3.32 per cent. 
Social Welfare and Welfare of SO, ST, and OBC, which covers different welfare 
programmes and economic development of Scheduled Casts (SC), Scheduled 
Tribes (ST) and Other Backward Classes (OBC), child and women welfare, working 
and safety conditions for labour and their general welfare, social security for 
disabled persons, and different pension and insurance schemes for the welfare of 
society. Table 5.16 shows the implicit budgetary subsidies in Social Welfare and 
Welfare of SC, ST, and OBC. 
Costs of providing these services have been continuously increasing with an annual 
growth of 9.91 per cent from Rs. 75.05 crore to Rs. 94.29, 118.03, 226.16, 266.40, 
and 326.45 crore in 1993-94, 1995-96, 1998-99, 2001-02, and 2003-04 respectively. 
But in 2005-06, it has decreased to Rs. 309.65 crore. In relative terms as a per cent 
of GSDP, cost in this sector has decreased from 0.12 per cent in 1990-91 to 0.11 
per cent in 1993-94, and 1995-96 and increased to 0.14 per cent in 1998-99, and 
2001-02, 0.15 per cent in 2003-04, and again decreased to 0.11 per cent in 2005-
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06. On an average basis, 48.01 per cent of total cost is capital investment in nature. 
In has increased from 22.56 per cent in 1990-91 to 57.83 per cent in 2005-06 with 
an annual growth of 6.48 per cent. 
Table 5.16 
Implicit Subsidies in Social Welfare and Welfare of SC, ST, OBC 
Costs 
Recoveries 
Subsidies 
Recovery Rate 
C o s t s a s a % o f GSDP 
Receipts as a % of GSDP 
Subsidies as a % of GSDP 
Per Capita Subsidies 
Per Capita Subsidies 
at Constant Prices 
(1999-00) 
Share in total Subsidies 
in Social Services 
1 
1 
1 
if 
1990-91 
75.05 
2.88 
72.17 
3.84 
0.12 
0.00 
0.11 
5.53 
11.77 
5.61 
1993-94 
94.29 
2.72 
91.57 
2.88 
0.11 
0.00 
0.11 
6.54 
10.28 
5.37 
1995-96 
118.03 
6.74 
111.28 
5.71 
0.11 
0.01 
0.10 
7.59 
9.92 
5.09 
1998-99 
222.16 
12.40 
209.76 
5.58 
0.14 
0.01 
0.13 
13.36 
13.64 
6.78 
2001-02 
266.40 
8.54 
257.86 
3.20 
0.14 
0.00 
0.14 
15.32 
15.17 
8.66 
2003-04 
326.45 
9.44 
317.00 
2.89 
0.15 
0.00 
0.14 
18.09 
16.01 
9.14 
2005-06 
309.65 
12.67 
296.98 
4.09 
0.11 
0.00 
0.11 
16.29 
13.03 
5.95 
Source: Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective years. 
Recoveries made through from providing services in this sector are negligible and 
covers only eight per cent of total recoveries of social services. In this sector, 
recoveries are coming only through labour and employment as a fee collection of 
registration of Trade Unions and fees realised under Factory Act and some other 
receipts from the sale of ready materials in industrial training institutes. It has 
increased from Rs. 2.88 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 12.67 crore in 2005-06 with an 
annual growth of 10.38 per cent. Recovery rate to the cost is fluctuating, it has 
decreased from 3.84 per cent 1990-91 to 2.99 per cent in 1993-94, and increased to 
5.71, 5.58 per cent in 1995-96, 1998-99. After that these have decreased to 3.20, 
2.89 per cent in 2001-02, 2003-04, again increased to 4.09 per cent in 2005-06. 
This sector amounted 6.69 per cent of total subsidies in social services. In nominal 
term subsidies of this sector has increased with an annual growth of 9.89 per cent. 
This have been continuously increased from Rs. 72.17 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 
91.57, 111.28, 209.76, 257.86, and 317.00 crore in 1993-94, 1995-96, 1998-99, 
2001-02, and 2003-04 respectively. But in 2005-06 subsidies has decreased to Rs. 
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296.98 crore. In relative term as a per cent of GSDP, subsidies are at the same 
point with some fluctuations in the intermediatory period. It was same in 1990-91 
and 1993-94 at 0.11 per cent and goes down to 0.10 in 1995-96, goes up to 0.13, 
0.14, and 0.14 per cent in 1998-99, 2001-02, 2003-04.it has again at 0.11 per cent 
in 2005-06. 
Per capita subsidies increased about three times with an annual growth of 7.47 per 
cent during the study period. It has increased from Rs. 5.53 per cent in 1990-91 to 
Rs. 16.29 in 2005-06. While, at constant prices, per capita subsidies increased with 
an annual growth of 0.68 per cent only. It has increased from Rs. 11.77 in 1990-91 
to Rs. 13.03 in 2005-06. 
Other Social Services consumes least part of subsidies. This sector covers 
Information & Publicity, Broadcasting, and Other social services. Cost of providing 
services under this head has increased more than two and a half times from Rs. 
14.20 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 37.95 crore in 2005-06 with an annual growth of 6.77 
per cent (Table 5.17). As a per cent of GSDP, this cost was 0.02 per cent in 1990-91 
and reduced to 0.01 per cent in 2005-06. On an average basis, 9.39 per cent of total 
cost is capital investment in nature. 
Recovehes in this sector are mainly from information and publicity {Suchna 
nideshalaya ki shrawan yojnao se hone wali aaye) and miscellaneous receipts from 
other social services. Other social services are at surplus side in 1995-96, 1998-99, 
2001-02, and 2003-04. Recoveries has increased from Rs. 0.42 crore in 1990-91 to 
Rs. 8.91 crore in 2005-06 with an annual growth of 22.62 per cent. 
This sector amounted less than one per cent of total subsidies in social services. In 
nominal term subsidies to this sector has increased with an annual growth of 5.08 
per cent. This has increased from Rs. 13.77 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 91.57, 28.98 
crore in 2005-06. In real term as a per cent of GSDP, subsidies have decreased 
from 0.02 per cent 1990-91 to 0.01 per cent in 2005-06. 
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Table 5.17 
Implicit Subsidies in Other Social Services 
Costs 
Recoveries 
Subsidies 
Recovery Rate 
Costs as a % of GSDP 
Receipts as a % of GSDP 
Subsidies as a % of GSDP 
Per Capita Subsidies 
Per Capita Subsidies 
at Constant Prices 
(1999-00) 
Siiare in total Subsidies 
in Social Services 
<LI 
O 
o 
c 
u 
OJ 
Q -
c 
c 
1990-91 
0.00 
0.42 
13.77 
2.98 
0.02 
0.00 
0.02 
1.06 
2.25 
1.07 
1993-94 
0.00 
0.23 
18,01 
1.27 
0.02 
0.00 
0.02 
1.29 
2.02 
1.06 
1995-96 
0.00 
0.41 
25.82 
1.57 
0.02 
0.00 
0.02 
1.76 
2.30 
1.18 
1998-99 
0.00 
3.49 
31.20 
10.06 
0.02 
0.00 
0.02 
1.99 
2.03 
1,01 
2001-02 
0.00 
0.17 
25.65 
0.64 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
1.52 
1.51 
0.86 
2003-04 
0.00 
0.38 
20.74 
1.80 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
1.18 
1.05 
0.60 
2005-06 
0.00 
8.99 
28.95 
23.70 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
1.59 
1.27 
0.58 
Source: Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective years. 
Per capita subsidies have increased with an annual growth of 2.76 per cent during 
the study period. They have increased from Rs. 1.06 per cent in 1990-91 to Rs. 1.59 
in 2005-06. While, at constant prices, per capita subsidies decreased with a decline 
of 3.73 per cent. They have decreased from Rs. 2.25 in 1990-91 to Rs. 1.27 in 
2005-06. 
5.5.2 Economic Services 
Investments in economic services will results in growth of the economy and 
economic development and investment in social services results in human 
development. Agriculture, rural development, irrigation, power, industries, and 
transport are the main sectors in economic services. Of this rural development is 
mainly of employment (wage) generator programmes for poverty alleviation and part 
of human development. 
Implicit budgetary subsidies in economic services cover 72.48 per cent of total 
budgetary subsidies as indicated in Table 5.18. 
Costs of providing services have increased from Rs. 3376.68 crore in 1990-91 to 
Rs. 11404.93 crore in 2005-06 with an annual growth of 8.45 per cent. In relative 
term as a per cent of GSDP, cost has decreased from 5.2 per cent in 1990-91 to 
188 
4.17 per cent in 2005-06 with ups and down in the intervening period. On an 
average basis, 47.28 per cent of total cost is of capital investment in nature. 
Recoveries made from providing services have increased from Rs. 175.90 crore to 
Rs. 370 crore with an annual growth of 5,09 per cent during the entire period. But as 
a per cent of GSDP, recoveries have decreased from 0.27 per cent in 1990-91 to 
0.14 per cent in 2005-06. The recovery rate as a per cent of cost has fluctuating 
trends. It was 5.21 per cent in 1990-91, increased to 5.42 per cent in 1993-94, after 
that recover rate start to fall down and reached at 3.74 per cent in 2001-02. In 2003-
04, it increased again to 5.02 per cent and in 2005-06, it dips to a lowest point, 3.25 
per cent. Recovery rate of variable cost has decreased from 9.39 per cent to 5.42 
per cent during the period. 
Table 5.18 
Costs, Receipts and Subsidies in Economic Services 
Costs 
Receipts 
Subsidies 
Recovery Rate 
Recoveries as a % of 
GSDP 
Cost as a % of GSDP 
Subsidies as a % of GSDP 
Per Capita Subsidies 
Per Capita Subsidies at 
Constant Prices 
(1999-00) 
01 
o 
u 
vi 
a: 
c 
c 
QJ 
CL 
C 
1990-91 
3376.68 
175.90 
3200.78 
5.21 
0.27 
5.28 
5.00 
245.30 
521.90 
1993-94 
4633.90 
251.38 
4382.51 
5.42 
0.30 
5.50 
5.20 
312.97 
491.75 
1995-96 
5903.19 
258.07 
5645.12 
4.37 
0.23 
5.31 
5.08 
385.08 
503.12 
1998-99 
8308.20 
318.24 
7989.97 
3.83 
0.20 
5.16 
4.96 
508.73 
519.66 
2001-02 
9342.39 
348.94 
8993.45 
3.74 
0.18 
4.91 
4.72 
534.36 
529.07 
2003-04 
11920.45 
598,24 
11322.21 
5.02 
0.27 
5.30 
5.04 
645.98 
571.67 
2005-06 
11404.93 
370.39 
11034.54 
3,25 
0,14 
4.17 
4.03 
505.34 
484.27 
Source: Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective Years. 
In economic services subsidies have increased in nominal term from Rs. 3200.78 
crore to Rs. 11034.54 crore, during the period of 15 years from 1990-91 to 2005-06 
with an annual growth of 8.60 per cent. But as a per cent of GSDP, these have 
fluctuating trend. 
Per capita subsidies in economic services have increased annually by 6.21 per cent 
during last of fifteen years. It has increased from Rs. 243.30 to Rs. 605.34 it was 
highest in 2003-04. While at constant price per capita subsidies decreased by 0.50 
per cent annually, from Rs. 521.90 in 1990-91 to Rs. 484.27 in 2005-06. 
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To understand the structure of the subsidies and priorities of the State in economic 
services, it is better to analysis it sector wise. The main sectors are discussed here 
and miner head wise details of costs, receipts, subsidies, and break of costs and 
receipts are given in Appendix Table from A5.13 to A5.23. 
Agriculture and Allied Services, is the key sector in Uttar Pradesh and engages 
about 65 per cent of workforce, most out them are below poverty line. So, it is a 
priority sector of government intervention. In spite of being, a priority sector it covers 
on an average only approximately 14 per cent of total subsidies provided under 
economic services. The sector mainly covers the Crop Husbandry, Soil and Water 
Conservation, Animal Husbandry, Dairy Development, Fisheries, Forestry and Wild 
Life, Plantations, Food Storage & Warehousing, Co-operation. Table 5.19 shows the 
details of costs and recoveries including implicit subsidies in agriculture and allied 
services. 
Costs of providing these services have increased from Rs. 513.22 crore in 1990-91 
to Rs. 1847.05 crore in 2005-06 with an annual growth of 8.91 per cent. This was 
highest in 2003-04, and sharply increased in between 1995-96 and 1998-99 (about 
67 per cent) and in between 2001-02 and 2003-04 (about 46 per cent). As a per 
cent of GSDP, cost has decreased from 0.80 per cent in 1990-91 to 0.67 per cent in 
2005-06, while in 2003-04 it was 0.86 per cent. Share of capital cost in total cost 
have increased sharply in recent years. It has increased from 3.6 per cent in 1990-
91 to 34.70 per cent in 2005-06. 
Recoveries made from providing these services have fluctuating trend. It was Rs. 
102.50 crore in 1990-91 and decreased to Rs. 22.77, Rs. 38.48 crore in 1993-94, 
and 1995-96. It increased to Rs. 158.53, Rs. 166.26, and Rs. 270.97 crore in 1998-
99, 2001-02, and 2003-04 respectively. Again, recoveries are at lower side Rs. 
63.40 in 2005-06. These fluctuations are due to forestry sector at surplus side in 
these years. Like wise recoveries, recovery rate to cost is also having fluctuations. 
This rate has fallen sharply from 19.97 per cent in 1990-91 to 3.34 per cent in 1993-
94. 
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Table 5.19 
Implicit Subsidies in Agriculture and Allied Services 
Costs 
Recoveries 
Subsidies 
Recovery Rate 
Costs as a % of GSDP 
Receipts as a % of GSDP 
Subsidies as a % of GSDP 
Per Capita Subsidies 
Per Capita Subsidies 
at Constant Prices 
(1999-00) 
Share in total Subsidies 
in Economic Services 
0 
u 
a: 
c 
c 
u 
Q. 
c 
C 
01 " 
Q. C 
£ o 
1990-91 
513.22 
102.50 
410.72 
19.97 
0.80 
0.16 
0.64 
31.48 
66.97 
12.83 
1993-94 
680.94 
21.11 
658.17 
3.34 
0.81 
0.03 
0.78 
47.00 
73.85 
15.02 
1995-96 
671.17 
38.48 
632.68 
5.73 
0.60 
0.03 
0.57 
43.16 
56.39 
11.21 
1998-99 
1124.05 
158.53 
965.51 
14.10 
0.70 
0.10 
0.60 
61.48 
62.80 
12.08 
2001-02 
1331.72 
166.26 
1165.46 
12.48 
0.70 
0.09 
0.61 
69.25 
68.56 
12.96 
2003-04 
1940.33 
270.97 
1669.36 
13.97 
0.86 
0.12 
0.74 
95.24 
84.29 
14.74 
2005-06 
1847.05 
63.40 
1783.65 
3.43 
0.67 
0.02 
0.65 
97.85 
78,28 
16.31 
Source: Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective years. 
Subsidies in this sector have increased by more than four times with an annual 
growth of 10.29 per cent during the study period. Subsidies have increased from Rs. 
410.72 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 1783.65 crore in 2005-06. Subsidies increase 
sharply from 1995-96 to 1998-99 (about 53 Per cent) and in from 2001-02 to 2003-
04 (about 43 per cent). In 1993-94, 1995-96, and 2005-06 forestry was surplus 
sector. In relative terms subsidies as a per cent of GSDP in this sector, is almost 
same with some fluctuations. Through, in some years, forestry is at surplus side, but 
per capita subsidies increased from Rs. 31.48 in 1990-91 to Rs. 97.85 in 2005-06 
with an annual growth of 7.85 per cent. While at constant prices, these have 
increased from Rs. 66.97 to Rs. 78.28, during the period with an annual growth of 
1.05 per cent only. 
Rural Development which is an important sector of economic services, cover more 
than 19 per cent of subsidies, mostly financed by Union government under various 
Central and Centrally sponsored plan schemes. Though it is welfare expenditure, it 
is categorised as a component of economic services as it generates employment 
and reduces inequalities of income and result in an economic activity. Programmes 
for rural development, rural employment, and hill areas under special area 
programmes are the main categories of this sector. Though these are welfare 
programmes, there are revenues from contribution of the beneficiaries and not 
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through user charges. These recoveries are from hill areas and other rural 
development programmes, in which trainings, soil and water tasting and community 
development are major heads of expenditure. Table 5.20 is presenting the subsidies 
in this sector. 
Table 5.20 
Impiicit Subsidies in Rural Development 
Costs 
Recoveries 
Subsidies 
Recovery Rate 
Costsasa%ofGSDP 
Receipts as a % of GSDP 
Subsidies as a % of GSDP 
Per Capita Subsidies 
Per Capita Subsidies at 
Constant Prices 
(1999-00) 
Share in total Subsidies in 
Economic Services 
o 
o 
a: 
c 
U 
ec: 
0) -^ 
— u 
1990-91 
545.67 
9.12 
536.55 
1.67 
0.85 
0.01 
0.84 
41.12 
87.49 
16.76 
1993-94 
746.92 
7.82 
739.09 
1.05 
0.89 
0.01 
0.88 
52.78 
82.93 
16.86 
1995-96 
961,21 
35.59 
925.61 
3.70 
0.86 
0.03 
0.83 
63.14 
82.50 
16.40 
1998-99 
1735.45 
40.77 
1694.68 
2.35 
1.08 
0.03 
1.05 
107.90 
110.22 
21.21 
2001-02 
1811.82 
23.80 
1788.01 
1.31 
0.95 
0.01 
0.94 
106.24 
105.19 
19.88 
2003-04 
2044.05 
120.45 
1923.60 
5.89 
0.91 
0.05 
0.86 
109.75 
97.12 
16.99 
2005-06 
2574.77 
33.51 
2541,26 
1,30 
0,94 
0.01 
0.93 
139,41 
111.53 
23,23 
Source: Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective years. 
Costs of providing services in rural development have an increasing trend. It has 
increased from Rs. 545.67 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 2574.77 crore in 2005-06, which 
is almost five times higher. It has increased with an annual growth of 10.90 per cent, 
which is higher among all the sectors in economic services. In relative terms as a 
per cent of GSDP, costs have increased from 0.85 per cent in 1990-91 to 0.94 per 
cent in 2005-06. Share of capital cost in total costs have increased from 22.05 per 
cent to 31.70 per cent and recovery rate of variable costs decreased from 2.14 per 
cent to 1.91 per cent during the period. 
There are many transfers to individuals in this sector. But the receipts from these 
services are negligible in comparison of cost, though they are registering an annual 
growth of 9.06 per cent. Receipts have decreased from Rs. 9.12 crore in 1990-91 to 
Rs. 7.82 crore 1993-94 and increased to Rs. 35.59, and 40.77 crore in 1995-96 and 
1998-99. Again decreased to Rs. 23.80 crore in 2001-02 and again increased in 
2003-04 to 120.45 crore and finally stands at 33.51 crore in 2005-06. As a per cent 
of GSDP, recoveries have also fluctuating from 0.01 per cent to 0.05 per cent 
192 
throughout the study period. Due to less recovery, subsidies are higher during the 
period. The recovery rate of the sector varies in between 1.67 per cent and 5.89 per 
cent of total cost throughout the reference period. Since majority of expenditure 
under rural development has welfare motive and directed towards poverty 
alleviation, one can not expect any recoveries. The major recoveries here are those 
from contractors in the form of fee and refunds. 
Subsidies have increased from Rs. 536.55 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 2541.26 crore in 
2005-06 with an annual growth of 10.93 per cent. As a per cent of GSDP, implicit 
budgetary subsidies have slightly increased with fluctuating trend in the middle 
period. It was 00.84 per cent in 1990-91, with fluctuation in between it finally stood at 
00.93 per cent in 2005-06. Per capita subsidies in rural development have increased 
from Rs. 41.12 to Rs. 139.41 with an annual growth of 8.84 per cent, while per 
capita subsidies at constant prices have increased from Rs. 87.49 to Rs. 111.53 
during the period. 
Resource-wise, Uttar Pradesh has plenty of surface and ground water. Irrigation 
and Flood Control is also a priority sector in the State and it is the lifeline of 
agriculture. It covers the highest share of subsidies in economic services. Its share 
is 33 per cent. In spite of it being priority sector, implicit budgetary subsidies 
increased only in nominal terms not in real terms. 
Table 5.21 
Implicit Subsidies In Irrigation and Flood Control 
Costs 
Recoveries 
Subsidies 
Recovery Rate 
Costs as a % of GSDP 
Receipts as a % of GSDP 
Subsidies as a % of GSDP 
Per Capita Subsidies 
Per Capita Subsidies 
at Constant Prices 
(1999-00) 
Share in total Subsidies in 
Economic Services 
o 
u 
c. 
c 
a. 
a: 
c 
a. c 
— u 
1990-91 
1331.53 
43.77 
1287.76 
4.19 
2.08 
0.07 
2.01 
98.69 
209.98 
40.23 
1993-94 
1758.33 
183.14 
1575.19 
15.02 
2.09 
0.22 
1.87 
112.49 
176.75 
35.94 
1995-96 
2284.44 
144.54 
2139.91 
7.96 
2.05 
0.13 
1.92 
145.97 
190.72 
37.91 
1998-99 
2688.69 
84.21 
2604.47 
2.96 
1.67 
0.05 
1.62 
165.83 
169.39 
32.60 
2001-02 
2813.74 
133.49 
2680.25 
5.38 
1.48 
0.07 
1.41 
159.25 
157.68 
29.80 
2003-04 
3247.46 
154.62 
3092.84 
5.33 
1.44 
0.07 
1.38 
176.46 
156.16 
27.32 
2005-06 
2877.42 
198.71 
2678.70 
8.07 
1.05 
0.07 
0.98 
145.95 
117.56 
24.49 
Source: Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective years. 
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As indicated in Table 5.21 costs of providing services of Irrigation and Flood 
Controls have increased from Rs. 1331.53 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 2975.60 crore in 
2005-06 with an annual growth of 5.51 per cent. This increment is mainly because of 
major and medium irrigation (6.66 per cent annually) and of command area 
development (5.74 per cent annually). As a per cent of GSDP, this cost is 
continuously decreasing from 2.08 per cent in 1990-91 to 1.09 per cent in 2005-06, 
On an average basis, 49 per cent of total cost is of capital investment in nature in 
this sector. 
Recoveries are made through providing water for major and medium irrigation and 
other purpose. They have increased from Rs. 43.77 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 183.14 
crore in 1993-94. After that, recoveries have decreased to Rs. 144.54, 84.21, 133.49 
and 154.62 crore in 1995-96, 1998-99, 2001-02 and 2003-04 respectively. Finally, 
recoveries increased to Rs. 198.71 crore in 2005-06 (Table 5.21). Recoveries are 
registering 10.19 per cent growth per annum. In relative term, as a per cent of 
GSDP, recoveries are also of fluctuating in nature and vary in between 0.05 per cent 
and 0.22 per cent. The recovery rate as a per cent of costs also have increased 
from 3.29 per cent in 1990-91 to 6.68 per cent in 2005-06. 
In nominal term, subsidies registering an annual growth of 5.26 per cent and have 
increased about two times during the period, from Rs. 1287.76 crore in 1990-91 and 
continuously increased upto Rs. 3094.78 crore in 2003-04. But, it has decreased in 
2005-06 to Rs. 2774.26 crore due to higher recoveries made from commercial 
irrigation. While as a per cent of GSDP, subsidies decreased from 2.01 per cent to 
1.01 per cent with a yearly decline of 4.46 per cent during the period. 
Per capita subsidies of this sector are highest among all the sectors. These have 
increased from Rs. 98.69 in 1990-91 to Rs. 152.22 in 2005-06 with an annual 
growth of 2.93 per cent. While at constant prices, per capita subsidies have 
decreased from Rs. 209.98 to Rs. 121.77 during the period, with a yearly decline of 
3.57 per cent. Lower user charges result in to wastage of water, decaling soil texture 
and soil erosion. All these result in ecological imbalances. 
The Energy sector provides two types of energies, namely Power and Non-
conventional Energy. The Power industry in Uttar Pradesh is fairly large even after 
separation of Uttrakhand and predominantly government-owned. As a power sector 
reforms State government has made an adjustment in 2003-04 by undenA/riting a 
loan of Rs. 12277.44 crore, raised by UPSEB and electricity supply companies. The 
194 
transmission and distribution losses increase the expenditure in power sector winile 
external and central assistance have not resulted in equivalent increase in revenue 
from user charges. The main problem of power sector is absence of accountability. 
Entire transmission and distribution losses are shown as unmetered power 
consumption in rural and agriculture sector. If one does a scientific estimate of 
power consumption in agriculture sector with the number of pump sets and average 
duration of power supply to the agriculture sector, it will be clear about both the 
agriculture consumption and transmission and distribution losses. Since the study is 
looking at costs involved through State budget documents in power sector and 
subsequent recoveries, the analysis is limited only to financial implication on the 
State exchequer. Table 5.22 shows the details of energy sector. 
Costs of providing services in energy sector is almost equal to subsidies as 
recoveries come through only from non-convention energy sources and that are 
negligible in the State. 
So that per cent of recovery rate to cost is zero per cent throughout the period 
except 0.05 per cent in 2003-04 and 0.15 per cent in 2005-06. Share of capital cost 
in total cost is falling from 100 per cent to 11.69 percent (Appendix Table A5.23). 
Table 5.22 
Implicit Subsidies in Energy Sector 
Costs 
Recoveries 
Subsidies 
Recovery Rate 
Costs as a % of GSDP 
Receipts as a % of GSDP 
Subsidies as a % of GSDP 
Per Capita Subsidies 
Per Capita Subsidies 
at Constant Prices 
(1999-00) 
Sliare in total Subsidies in 
Economic Services 
01 
4-1 
c 
01 
CL. 
£ 5 
1990-91 
420.10 
0.00 
420.10 
0.00 
0.66 
0.00 
0.66 
32.19 
68.50 
13.12 
1993-94 
700.82 
0.00 
700.82 
0.00 
0.83 
0.00 
0.83 
50.05 
78.64 
15.99 
1995-96 
1100.75 
0.00 
1100.75 
0.00 
0.99 
0.00 
0.99 
75.09 
98.10 
19.50 
1998-99 
1544.95 
0.04 
1544.91 
0,00 
0.96 
0.00 
0.96 
98.37 
100.48 
19.34 
2001-02 
2001.69 
0.00 
2001.69 
0.00 
1.05 
0.00 
1.05 
118.93 
117,76 
22.26 
2003-04 
2897.40 
1.54 
2895,87 
0.05 
1.29 
0.00 
1.29 
165.22 
146.21 
25.58 
2005-06 
1586.47 
2.35 
1584.12 
0.15 
0,58 
0.00 
0.58 
86.90 
69.52 
14.48 
Source: Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective years. 
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Power sector is contributing about 19 per cent of tlie total implicit budgetary 
subsidies given under entire economic services. 
The implicit budgetary subsidies in energy sector, in which assistance given to co-
operations is excluded was Rs. 440.10 in 1990-91 and increased to Rs. 2895.87 
crore in 2003-04 and decreased to 1584.12 crore in 2005-06. It is registering an 
annual growth of 9.25 per cent. As a per cent of GSDP, these subsidies increased 
from 00.66 per cent to 0.58 per cent during the period. 
Per capita subsidies have an increase from Rs. 33.92 to Rs. 86.90 with an annual 
growth of 6.84 per cent during the period. While at constant prices, per capita 
subsidies have increased from Rs. 68.50 to Rs. 69.50 with an annual growth of 0.10 
per cent during the period. 
Industries and Minerals, whose share is only 2.69 per cent in total subsidies of 
economic services. This sector is divided into two parts, one is Industries, and the 
other is Non-ferrous Mining and Metallurgical Industries, which is surplus producing 
sector through out the study period, because of receipt from mineral concession 
fees, rents, and royalties. So that implicit subsidies occurs only for industries. Table 
5.23 gives the details of cost and recovering in industries. 
Costs of providing services in this sector have 8.66 per cent per annum growth. 
Costs have increased from Rs. 122.58 crore to Rs. 438.00 crore during the period of 
15 years. But as a percent of GSDP, costs have decreased from 0.19 per cent in 
1990-91 to 0.16 per cent in 2005-06. On an average basis, 32.23 per cent of total 
cost has shared by capital cost (Appendix Table A5.23). 
Receipts from providing services to industries is has least growth of 4.54 per cent 
per annum. These have increased from Rs. 2.32 crore to Rs. 4.51 crore, during the 
period. Recovery rate to the cost has decreased from 1.89 per cent to 1.03 per cent 
minimum point in 2005-06 after many ups and down in the intermediatory period. 
In nominal terms, subsidies went up to double from Rs. 120.26 crore in 1990-91 to 
Rs. 233.49 crore in 2005-06, with an annual growth of 8.92 per cent. While in 
relative terms as a per cent of GSDP, subsidies decreased with an annual decline of 
1.13 per cent from 00.19 per cent to 00.16 per cent during the period. 
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Table 5.23 
Implicit Subsidies in Industries 
Costs 
Recoveries 
Subsidies 
Recovery Rate 
Costs as a % of GSDP 
Receipts as a % of GSDP 
Subsidies as a % of GSDP 
Per Capita Subsidies 
Per Capita Subsidies 
at Constant Prices 
(1999-00) 
Share in total Subsidies 
in Economic Services 
01 
o 
c 
•*-» 
c 
OJ u 
lU 
a. 
c 
a: 
Q- c 
1990-91 
122.58 
2.32 
120.26 
1.89 
0.19 
0.00 
0.19 
9.22 
19.61 
3.76 
1993-94 
107.57 
4.33 
103.25 
4.02 
0.13 
0.01 
0.12 
7.37 
11.59 
2.36 
1995-96 
142.72 
11.53 
131.19 
8.08 
0.13 
0.01 
0.12 
8.95 
11.69 
2.32 
1998-99 
205.97 
5.82 
200.16 
2.82 
0.13 
0,00 
0.12 
12.74 
13.02 
2.51 
2001-02 
163.00 
1.71 
161.28 
1.05 
0.09 
0,00 
0.08 
9.58 
9.49 
1.79 
2003-04 
250.56 
6.09 
244.47 
2.43 
0.11 
0.00 
0.11 
13.95 
12.34 
2.16 
2005-06 
438,00 
4.51 
433.49 
1.03 
0.16 
0,00 
0,16 
23,78 
19,02 
3,96 
Source: Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective years. 
Per capita subsidies of this sector are at lower point in economic services, though 
they increased from Rs. 9.22 to Rs. 23.78 with an annual growth on 6.62 per cent. 
While at constant prices they decreased from Rs. 19.61 to Rs. 19.02 with 0.20 per 
cent annual rate of declining during throughout study period. 
Another important sector, which is significant and the implicit budgetary subsidies 
are rising is the Transport sector. Total costs of providing transport facility which 
includes roads and bridges, and road transport services in addition to civil aviation 
and inland water transports, have increased from Rs. 413.72 crore in 1990-91 to Rs, 
1708.47 crore in 2005-06 with an annual grov^h of 10.73 per cent. In relative terms, 
costs have also increased from 0.65 per cent in 1990-91 to 0.70 per cent in 2005-06 
(as indicated in Table 5.24). The share of capital cost in total cost has increased 
from 54.02 per cent to 65.88 per cent. 
Recoveries made in this sector are growing from Rs. 11.93 crore and reached at Rs, 
65.88 crore, during the study period. While percentage of recoveries to the costs 
have decreased because Road Transport Service is a surplus sector in 1998-99, 
2001-02, and 2003-04. There may one reason of these surpluses as transport 
department of the State has deposited some old dues in these years. 
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The implicit budgetary subsidies in transport sector liave increased more than four 
and a half times from Rs. 401.79 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 1842.59 crore in 2005-06 
with an annual growth of 10.69 per cent. As a per cent of GSDP, this growth is only 
00.47 per cent annually. These have increased from 00.63 percent to 00.67 per 
cent. 
Table 5.24 
Implicit Subsidies in Transport Sector 
Costs 
Recoveries 
Subsidies 
Recovery Rate 
Costs as a % of GSDP 
Receipts as a % of GSDP 
Subsidies as a % of GSDP 
Per Capita Subsidies 
Per Capita Subsidies 
at Constant Prices 
(1999-00) 
Share in total Subsidies in 
Economic Services 
1 
! 
s 
i 
if 
1990-91 
413.72 
11.93 
401.79 
2.88 
0.65 
0.02 
0.63 
30.79 
65.51 
12.55 
1993-94 
604.09 
17.92 
586.17 
2.97 
0.72 
0,02 
0.70 
41.86 
65.77 
13.38 
1995-96 
697.74 
17.13 
680.61 
2.45 
0.63 
0.02 
0.61 
46.43 
60.66 
12.06 
1998-99 
945.37 
22.32 
923.06 
2.36 
0.59 
0.01 
0.57 
58.77 
60.03 
11.55 
2001-02 
1168.84 
18.48 
1150.36 
1.58 
0.61 
0.01 
0.60 
68.35 
67,67 
12.79 
2003-04 
1475.66 
41,97 
1433.70 
2.84 
0.66 
0.02 
0.64 
81.80 
72.39 
12.66 
2005-06 
1908.47 
65,88 
1842.59 
3,45 
0.70 
0.02 
0,67 
101.08 
80,86 
16,84 
Source: Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective years. 
Per capita subsidies increased from Rs. 30.79 to Rs 101.08, and 8.25 per cent 
annually, while at constant prices these have increased from Rs. 665.51 crore to Rs. 
80.86 crore with an annual growth of 1.41 per cent. 
Least part (less than unit) of the subsidies in economic services is consumed by 
Other Economic Services. Costs of providing these services have increased by 
6.49 growth of per annum in 15 fifteen year span. As indicated in Table 5.25 costs 
have increased in nominal terms from Rs. 29.86 crore to Rs. 76.72 crore. While in 
relative term, these have decreased from 0.05 per cent to 0.03 percent during the 
period. On an average basis, 29.0 per cent of total cost is shared by capital cost. 
In this sector, recoveries are coming through tax on hotels under tourism, stamping 
weights and measures, patent fee and some other miscellaneous receipts made this 
sector at surplus in some years. 
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In nominal terms, subsidies went up to double from Rs. 23.61 crore in 1990-91 to 
Rs. 74.70 crore in 2005-06, with an annual growth of 7.98 per cent. While in relative 
terms, subsidies decreased with an annual decline of 2.0 per cent from 00.04 per 
cent to 00.03 per cent during the period. 
Table 5.25 
Subsidies in Other Economic Services 
Costs 
Recoveries 
Subsidies 
Recovery Rate 
Costs as a % of GSDP 
Receipts as a % of GSDP 
Subsidies as a % of GSDP 
Per Capita Subsidies 
Per Capita Subsidies 
at Constant Prices 
(1999-00) 
Share in total Subsidies in 
Economic Services 
<D 
O 
u 
I/) 
c 
c 
u 
01 Q. 
c 
c 
£5 
1990-91 
29.86 
6.25 
23.61 
20.93 
0.05 
0.01 
0.04 
1.81 
3.85 
0.74 
1993-94 
35.22 
15.40 
19.83 
43.71 
0.04 
0.02 
0.02 
1.42 
2.22 
0.4S 
1995-96 
45.17 
10.80 
34.36 
23.92 
0.04 
0.01 
0.03 
2.34 
3.06 
0,61 
1998-99 
63.72 
6.54 
57.17 
10.27 
0.04 
0.00 
0.04 
3.64 
3.72 
0.72 
2001-02 
51.58 
5.19 
46.39 
10.06 
0.03 
0.00 
0.02 
2.76 
2.73 
0.52 
2003-04 
64.98 
2.60 
62.38 
4,00 
0.03 
0.00 
0.03 
3.56 
3.15 
0.55 
2005-05 
76.72 
2.02 
74.70 
2.64 
0.03 
0.00 
0.03 
4.10 
3.28 
0.68 
Source: Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesii, Finance Accounts for respective years. 
Per capita subsidies are lowest in this sector in economic services, though they 
increased from Rs. 1.81 to Rs. 4.10 with an annual growth on 5.60 per cent. While 
at constant prices they decreased from Rs. 3.85 to Rs. 3.28 with 1.07 per cent 
annual rate of declining during the throughout study period. 
5.7 Patterns of Surplus 
While in most social and economic goods/services, State is unable to recover costs, 
there are some cases where the States is able to generate surplus. The total 
Surplus generates is Rs. 7.77 crore in 1990-91 and increases to Rs. 345.76 crore in 
2005-06 with a peak to Rs. 4456.36 in 2003-04 and it is just 0.17 per cent in 1990-
91, and 2.18 per cent in 2005-06 of subsidised sector with a peak 2.30 per cent in 
2001-02 . As a per cent of GSDP, surplus sector covers a negligible part. 
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Table 5.26 
Patterns of Surplus 
Surplus Sectors 
Social Services 
Economic Services 
Subsidised Sectors 
Social Services 
Economic Services 
1990-91 
7.77 
0.00 
7.77 
4486.07 
1285.28 
3200.78 
1993-94 
82.23 
000 
82.23 
6089.28 
1706.76 
4382.51 
1995-96 
160.33 
13.03 
147.30 
7831.16 
2186.04 
5645.12 
1998-99 
173.60 
33.65 
139.95 
11082.19 
3092.23 
7989.97 
2001-02 
275.10 
57.62 
217.48 
11969.99 
2976.55 
8993.45 
(In 
2003-04 
423.34 
145.40 
277.93 
14791.00 
3468.79 
11322.21 
Rs. Crore 
2005-06 
346.76 
0.00 
346.76 
15928.39 
4989.88 
10938.50 
Memo items 
Surplus as a percentage 
ofGSDP 
Surplus as a percentage 
of Subsidised sector 
Surplus in Social Services 
as a percentage of 
Subsidises in Social 
Services 
Surplus in Economic 
Services as a percentage 
of Subsidises in Social 
Services 
Share of Social Services in 
Surplus 
Share of Economic 
Services in Surplus 
0.01 
0.17 
0.00 
0.24 
0.00 
100.00 
0.10 
1.35 
0.00 
1.88 
0.00 
100.00 
0.14 
2.05 
0.60 
2.61 
8.13 
91.87 
0.11 
1.57 
1.09 
1.75 
19.38 
80.62 
0.03 
2,30 
1.94 
2.42 
20.94 
79.06 
0.19 
1.88 
4.19 
2.45 
34.35 
65.55 
0.13 
2.18 
0.00 
3.17 
0.00 
100.00 
Source: Basic Data - Governnnent of Utter Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective years. 
These surpluses have been generated mainly in the economic services v\/hich 
account for about 65 per cent to 100 per cent of total surplus and there are no clear-
cut patterns of surplus generation. 
Since the surpluses generated from within the social and economic services 
constitute a very small portion of the subsidies provided in these sectors, it is clear 
that subsidies are mainly financed by tax revenues or borrowings by the State. 
5.8 Summery 
All explicit payments like transfers to individuals and factors of production 
organisations, assistance given to public sector undertakings, co-operatives etc., 
and grants-in-aid to local bodies, are not a part of cost of provision of service and 
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treated as explicit subsidies. So, these payments are excluded from the estimation 
of cost of providing services. 
• In Utter Pradesh, Grants-in-aid have increased more than four times from Rs. 
1941.32 Crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 7842.28 Crore in 2005-06. iVIore than 90 per 
cent of these grants-in-aids are provided under social service, while a little 
amount goes in economic services. 
• Transfer to individuals, v^ /hich constitute direct income to the recipients and 
like a negative tax. 
• Implicit budgetary subsidies in nominal term have gone up from Rs. 4486.07 
crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 15928.39 crore in 2005-06 with 8,81 per cent annual 
growth rate. Economic Services absorbed major part of these subsidies. 
• In social services, subsidies have increased from Rs. 1285.28 crore in 1990-
91 to Rs. 4989.88 crore in 2005-06 with an annual growth rate of 9.46 per 
cent. Major part of these subsidies in social services absorbed by Health and 
Family Welfare followed by Education, "Water Supply and Sanitation' and 
Social Welfare. 
• In economic services, subsidies have increased from Rs. 3200.78 crore to 
Rs. 10938.50 crore over the same period with an annual growth of 8.54 per 
cent. Major part, approximately 33 per cent of subsidies in economic services, 
is covered by Irrigation and Flood Control followed by Energy, Rural 
Development, and Agriculture and Allied services. 
• The overall recovery rate has decreased from 4.78 per cent to 3.19 per cent 
during the period. 
• In Social Services, recovery rate decreased from 3.70 per cent in 1990-91 to 
3.02 per cent in 2005-06. Most of the recoveries are made in Education, 
Sports, Art and Culture sector. 
• Economic services also shows decreasing trend in recovery, and has 
decreased from 5.21 per cent in 1990-01 to 3.28 per cent in 2005-06. Other 
Economic Services, Agriculture and Allied Services, and Irrigations cover 
major part of recoveries. Energy sector shows least recoveries from cost of 
providing services. 
• On an average only 27 per cent of total budgetary subsidies are given under 
Social Services and rest 73 per cent under Economic Services. 
• As a per cent of GSDP, total implicit budgetary subsidies have decreased 
from 7.01 per cent in 1990-91 to 5.82 per cent in 2005-06. 
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• In Social Services, ratio of subsidies to the GSDP is decreased from 2.01 per 
cent in 1990-91 to 1.82 percent in 2005-06. 
• In economic services, subsidies as a percentage of GSDP decreased from 
5.00 per cent in 1990-91 to 4.00 per cent in 2005-06. 
• The Per Capita Subsidies in the State are continuously increasing from Rs. 
343.79 to Rs. 873.80 during the period from 1990-91 to 2005-06. In Social 
Services, per capita subsidies are much lesser than Economic Services. 
• In social services, per capita budgetary subsidies increased from Rs. 98.50 in 
1990-91 to Rs. 273.74 2005-06. 
• In Economic Services, per Capita Budgetary Subsidies are at higher side and 
shoes 6.15 per cent growth of per annum. Per capita subsidies have 
increased from Rs. 245.30 in 1990-91 to Rs, 600.07 in 2005-06. 
• In real term. Per capita Subsidies in the State have decreased from Rs. 
731.48 in 1990-91 to Rs. 699.04 in 2005-06. 
• In Social Services, per capita implicit subsidies at constant prices increased 
marginally from Rs. 209.57 in 1990-91 to Rs. 218.99 in 2005-06. 
• In Economic Services, per capita subsidies in real term rose from Rs. 521.90 
in 1990-91 to Rs. 571.67 in 2003-04 and then decreased to Rs. 480.05 in 
2005-06. 
• Social services covers only about one third of total revenue expenditure and a 
major part is going to other services. In the case of capital expenditure share 
of social services is a little portion of total capital expenditure and it varies 
between 3.53 per cent and 16.52 per cent. 
• The total Surplus generates is Rs. 7.77 crore in 1990-91 and increases to Rs. 
345.76 crore in 2005-06. 
• Asa per cent of GSDP, surplus sector covers a negligible part. 
It is necessary to identify the areas where subsidies can be minimised so that 
surpluses can be generated. The analysis of these services, particularly sectors with 
implicit budgetary subsidies as per their characteristics, would help in identifying the 
services in which the recovery rate can be linked and the role of government can be 
reduced. Therefore, we are classifying various services in different categories like 
Merit I, Merit II, Merit goods with Distributive justice etc. in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 6 
Classification of Implicit 
Budgetary Subsidies 
In Uttar Pradesh 
Whatever may be reform process, with maximum tapping tax base, the government 
of Uttar Pradesh has no other alternative than either limiting its role in provision of 
goods and services or improving the recovery of the costs. Improving the recovery 
rate means improving the quality of services; this will result in an increase in 
expenditures in initial period. Much of the costs in provision of services are on 
maintenance, that to of salaries and wages rather than non-salary operation and 
maintenance. Through implicit budgetary subsidies include un-recovered cost is that 
of current costs. Much of the literature on provision of services suggests that only 
public goods which are identified by the twin characteristics of non-rivalry and non-
excludability and merit goods with high degree of externality need to be financed by 
the government and not all other services. Another argument, which emerges from 
the literature, is the increasing role of government leading to inefficiency. Therefore, 
it is necessary to classify the services provided by the government as per 
characteristics of these goods and services and set the path for reforms in reducing 
the subsidies. 
This chapter, therefore, categorises goods and services based on their 
characteristics and classifies the implicit budgetary subsidies in Uttar Pradesh into 
these categories. The present chapter is organised into three sections. The first 
section focuses on characteristics and classification of goods and services. The 
second section details the classification of budgetary services in the Indian context 
as describes in earlier studies. The third section classifies the implicit budgetary 
subsidies in Uttar Pradesh. 
6.1 Classification of Goods and Services 
Conceptually, goods and services broadly can be classified as Public goods and 
Non-public goods. Public goods are pure and impure. Non-Public goods or Private 
goods are further classified in to merit, private with distributive justice and pure 
private goods. Consumption of merit goods gives rise to externalities. Private goods 
with distributive justice may be considered as a variant of merit goods. Even though 
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there is no significant externality, the consumption of such goods is promoted on the 
basis of distributive justice. Pure private goods are those where externalities and 
non-excludability do exist. 
Private goods, which are rival in nature and individuals can be excluded from 
consuming them, Contrarily, pure public goods are non-rival in nature and are not 
excludable. If another cannot use the goods consumed by a person, then the goods 
are said to be 'rival'. Here, the total consumption is the sum of each individual's 
consumption.^ In contrast, non-rival goods refer to cases when consumption by a 
person does not reduce the quality available to another. There are no additional 
members of the society. Non-rivalry implies individuality and therefore, the larger the 
number of consumers, the lower is the average cost. 
Similarly, if a person can consume goods or services only, when he is permitted to 
consume i.e., usually contingent on his paying the price, it is known as 'exclusion'^". 
When others cannot exclude a person from consuming or getting the benefits arising 
out of the consumption of a good, it is considered to be 'non-excludable' good. In 
this case pricing is not possible. As individual consumer cannot be excluded, one 
tends to 'free-ride' and will not reveal one's own preferences. 
Pure private goods are, therefore, rival and excludable. On the contrary, public 
goods are non-rival and non-excludable. However, some goods are rival but can 
also be non-excludable just as non-rival goods can be excludable. Cullis and Jones 
(1998) classified the goods into four categories of A, B, C, and D (as given in Table 
6.1). Goods in category 'D' are non-rival in consumption and non-excludable: they 
are pure public goods. Goods in category 'A' with the characteristic of excludability 
and rival is a pure private good. 'B' is a good whose consumption is rival but non-
excludable. By contrast, goods in 'C category are non-rival in consumption but 
excludable. A toll booth may exclude traffic from roads unless payment is made, yet 
if the road is not congested one car may utilize it with no loss of benefit even though 
other cars are also consuming the road service. In the case of B, C, and D, 
because of the non-rival or non-excludable or both, market forces do not operate 
efficiently. If a good or service is non-rival but excludable it leads to under 
consumption. If a good is rival but non-excludable, it leads to under supply. These 
Samueison Paul (1955) "Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public Expenditure" 
10 
Review of Economics and Statistics, 1955, 37, 4. pp 350-6. 
R.A. Musgrave and Peggy B. Musgrave: Public Finance in Tlieory and Practice, Cttapter 
3, P.52, 1973, McGraw Hill, USA. 
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properties either of non-rivalry or non-exclusion or both may lead to market failures, 
creating a rationale for the public provision of private goods. 
Table 6.1 
Taxonomy of Goods 
Rival 
Non-rival 
Excludable 
A 
C 
Non-excludable 
B 
D 
Source: Cullis and Jones (1998) 
The basic features of Public goods are; 
• Marginal cost of including additional consumer is zero or negligible, 
• Cost of exclusion/transaction cost is prohibited, 
• If such a good or service is left to private sector - there will be under supply 
or no supply at all. This leads to non-optimal provision, and 
• Market pricing cannot be applied to 'B' and 'D'. In the case of 'C, in principle, 
pricing is possible but it will lead to under-consumption. 
As explained above, private goods which are 'rival in nature' and are excludable. In 
addition, they have the following features-
• Individual benefit arising out of the consumption of private goods is far more 
than any externality. 
• Cost of exclusion is low and marginal cost of providing an additional unit 
goes up with an increase in the number of consumers. 
• Pricing is efficient and is determined purely through market forces. 
• Such goods and services need not to be supported or supplied by the 
government. 
• In case the government provides such goods 100 per cent recovery of cost is 
stipulated. 
Merit goods are also private goods. These goods are usually rival and excludable in 
nature. However, the benefits arising out of the consumption of these goods have 
large externalities. Thus, the consumption benefit is not internalised. Externality is 
non-rival and non-excludable and is like public good. The first part is like a private 
good, pricing is possible, and hence merit goods can be subjected to user charges 
or market prices. But if the prices are left exclusively to market forces consumption 
205 
may fall and lead to decrease in the benefits arising from externalities. Hence, ttnere 
is a need, to partly subsidize such merit goods in order to maximise benefits arising 
out of externalities. 
In some cases of pure private goods, one can observe the two traits viz. rival, and 
excludability, and the specific consumer internalises the benefits. Nevertheless, 
such goods may have to be subsidised to achieve the objective of distributive 
justice. 
Goods and services described above are identified and grouped on the basis of 
sources of financing, in the following manner-
• Public goods are financed exclusively out of budgetary resources. 
• Impure public goods are financed out of budgetary resources. 
• Merit goods and goods with distributive justice objective are partly financed by 
user charges/market prices and partly through subsidies. Extent of subsidies 
should depend upon the degree of externality. In some cases, it can be even 
100 percent. 
• Pure private goods have to depend exclusively on the market prices. 
Goods and services, are again grouped on the basis of stipulations regarding the 
recovery rates -
• The government without any stipulation of financial return provides public 
goods. Impure public goods and merit goods with high degree of 
externalities. 
• In case of merit goods, a partial recovery of cost is stipulated. How much of 
the cost should be recovered, it depends upon individual goods, services, 
and externalities arising out of their consumption. 
• Full recovery of cost is stipulated, in the case of private goods. 
Table 6.2 summarises the characteristics of goods and services, sources of 
financing and stipulation regarding the recovery cost. 
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Table 6.2 
Classification of Goods and Services 
s. 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Goods 
Pure Public 
Goods 
Impure Public 
Goods 
Merit Goods 
Goods with 
Distributive 
Justice 
Pure Private 
Goods 
Nature 
Non-rival, Non-
excludable 
Non-rival / 
Excludable or Rival 
/ Non-excludable 
Rival, Excludable 
with externality 
Rival, Excludable 
(essential goods 
needed to be 
consumed by all) 
Rival, Excludable 
Recovery 
No recovery of cost 
is stipulated 
No recovery of cost 
is stipulated 
Partly recovery of 
cost is stipulated 
Part of the cost is 
stipulated to be 
recovery 
100 per cent 
recovery of cost is 
stipulated 
Mode of Financing 
Tax/ budget 
financed 
Tax/ budget 
financed 
Partly financed by 
the user charges or 
market price, and 
partly by subsidies. 
Depending upon 
the degree of 
externality, 
government can 
even give 100 per 
cent subsidy to 
some goods / 
services. 
Partly financed by 
the user charges or 
market price, and 
partly by subsidies. 
If supplied by 
government, entire 
cost is to be 
recovered. 
Source: Rao and Amar Nath (2003) 
Thus, expenditure on account of public goods, meritorious goods with high degree 
of externality, grants and transfer payments do not stipulate any recovery of cost. 
Expenditure on non-public goods and services do stipulate recovery of cost in 
varying degrees depending upon the type of goods and the extent of externality. 
Thus, the issue of subsidy is closely related to the type of goods/services provided 
by the government and financing of such goods and services. 
This category of expenditure is incurred with a view to providing goods and services 
to ensure goods administrations, protection, security, law and order, and this 
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facilitates not only implementation of socio economic development programmes, but 
also leads to maximisation of benefits from externalities, and, ensures distributive 
justice. Recovery of cost from the expenditure on goods and services very much 
depends upon the nature and characteristics of goods and services. 
Thus, depending upon the characteristics, the goods and services can be classified 
broadly into two groups a) Public goods, b) Non-public goods. As said, entire public 
goods have the characteristics of both non-rivalry and non-excludability and they 
can only be financed by general taxation and not the user charges. In case of public 
goods neither the quality consumed can be measured nor the consumer be 
identified. 
Non-public goods again can be classified into various groups depending on the 
extent of externality or welfare angle attached to them. Some services like primary 
and secondary education, preventive health care, environmental related services 
have large externalities that even the non-consumers get the benefit out of the 
consumption made by others. There are also some non-public goods, consumption 
of which, results in the reduction of inequalities of income and/or reducing regional 
imbalances. Some examples of such goods are public distribution and regional 
specific incentives given for industrial development. 
There are wide range of services, where participation of private sector is nil or 
negligible but it is needed for over all development of the economy, like roads and 
bridges, public works and major development projects. 
There are another set of services where the private sector has an advantage and 
should be left to the private sector and private goods. Earlier studies by Srivastava 
and Amar Nath (2001) and Rao and Amar Nath (2003), have attempted to classify 
the services provided by the government into various categories based on the 
characteristics as stated above. The next section details the classification by these 
studies. 
6.2 Classification of Budgetary Services in India 
The criterion of 'externality' determines whether and to what extent the services 
concerned should be subsidised. In Discussion Paper, 'Government Subsidies in 
India' [Government of India (1997)], governmental provision of services classified 
into merit and non-merit categories. While the merit goods deserve subsidisation, 
there is no case for subsidising non-merit goods. However, even in the case of merit 
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goods, one still needs to determine the desirable degree of subsidisation. Given that 
some services like higher education were put into the non-merit category in the 
earlier classification, which may deserve some subsidisation, the need was felt for 
an intermediate category. Thus, even if elementary education and higher education 
may both require subsidisation, the degree of subsidisation may be higher for 
elementary education. Srivastava and Amar Nath (2001) divided subsidies and 
related services into three categories of Merit I, Merit II, and Non-merit. These 
broadly refer to categories of services with high, intermediate and low (or zero) 
degrees of subsidisation. The distinction between these may be made on the basis 
of the extent of externality associated with the service. The exact degree of 
subsidisation, according to Srivastava and Amar Nath (2001), ultimately needs to be 
determined service-by-service. "Determining the right degree of subsidisation 
depends on the elasticity of social and private demand, the extent of externalities, 
the associated cost (supply) functions, and the relative preferences (weights) are 
given by the society to the distributional objectives. Since quantifying the relevant 
parameters are often prove to be difficult, the society has to exercise a collective 
judgement", say Srivastava and Amar Nath. Three-part classification of government 
services by Srivastava and Amar Nath, given in Table 6.3. 
Table 6.3 
Classification of Goods and Services by Srivastava and Amar Nath 
Merit 1 
Merit II 
Non-Merit 
Elementary education, primary health centres, prevention and control 
of diseases, social welfare and nutrition, soil and water conservation, 
and ecology and environment. 
Education (other than elementary), sports and youth services, family 
welfare, urban development, forestry, agricultural research and 
education, other agricultural programmes, special programmes for 
rural development, land reforms, other rural development 
programmes, special programmes for north-eastern areas, flood 
control and drainage, non-conventional energy, village and small 
industries, ports and light houses, roads and bridges, inland water 
transport, atomic energy research, space research, oceanographic 
research, other scientific research, census surveys and statistics, 
meteorology. 
All others. 
. _ — — 
Source: Compiled from Srivastava and Amar Nath (2001) 
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The degree of subsidisation recommended by tinem varied from 90 per cent in Merit 
I service to zero in non-merit services. Different cost recoveries are suggested liere, 
based on the nature of services and the nature of goods. 
While estimating budgetary subsidies for Karnataka State in 1998-99, Rao and 
Amar Nath classified the non-public goods and services in governmental provision 
into Impure public goods, Merit goods. Merit goods with distributive justice and 
private goods. Though the measurement of externality is impossible, the 
classification of the services was done on comparative basis of degree of 
externalities. The classification of budgetary services by Rao and Amar Nath (2003) 
is given in the Table 6.4. The classification of goods and services by Rao and Amar 
Nath (2003) is better because it is based on broad categorisation, inclusion of too 
many services within public goods and Merit goods, leaves with limited opportunity 
for the government to reduce the subsidies. There is also some overlapping in the 
classification of the services in the sense that two services having similar 
characteristics have been put into two categories. For example. Civil Supplies, 
which is basically public distribution system, and food storage and warehousing 
which enable the public distribution system are classified as Merit goods and Merit 
goods with distributive justice. The major expenditure in the industry sector, mainly 
incentives in various forms, are classifies as merit services and private good. The 
classification by Srivastava and Amar Nath (2001) of central budgetary services 
again is a little bit narrow that one service can jump into other on the assumption of 
degrees of externalities with marginal difference. The distinction here is made on 
relative terms, than exact measurement of externality. 
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Table 6.4 
Classification of Goods and Services by Rao and Amar Nath 
Nature of Services 
Public Goods 
Merit Goods 
Merit Goods with 
Distributive Justice 
Private Goods 
Social Service 
Governmental residential buildings, 
urban developnnent, information 
publicity, labour and employment 
and other social services. 
All Other Social Services. 
Economic Services 
Forestry and wild life, agricultural 
research and education, land 
reforms, other rural development, 
hill areas, flood control, minor 
ports, roads and bridges, other 
scientific research, ecology survey 
and statistics. Meteorology. 
Crop husbandry, soil and water 
conservation, animal husbandry, 
dairy development, fisheries, 
agriculture financial institutions, 
cooperation, other agriculture 
programmes, irrigation, power, 
village and small industries, road 
transport, civil aviation, tourism 
and civil supplies. 
Food storage and warehousing. 
Industry excluding explicit 
incentives, and shipping. 
Source: Compiled fronn Rao and Amar Nath (2003) 
6.3 Classification of Budgetary Subsidies in Uttar Pradesh 
Learning from the two earlier studies, the present study classifies the budgetary 
services on the basis of Rao and Amar Nath (2003), with some modification from 
Srivastava and Amar Nath (2001). Though the categories of services are based on 
the principles followed by the earlier studies, the budgetary services clubbed in each 
of these categories vary from the earlier studies. 
The classification of goods and services, in the present study, categorised into 
impure Public Goods, Merit I Goods, Merit II Goods, Merit Goods with Distributive 
Justice, and Private Goods. Impure public goods, in the present study, are defined 
as those where, the recovery though possible, left mainly to tax financing. The Merit 
goods are those where externalities are not higher, but if left to private sector may 
do more harm to the consumers. Merit goods classified again as Merit I, and Merit II 
categories, suggesting higher recovery of variable costs for the latter services. All 
welfare-augmenting services to reduce the disparities in income and advocating 
21] 
balanced regional development are categorised as goods and services with 
distributive justice. Services where, private sector can perform better, and the 
externalities are not much, treated as private goods. 
The classification of the budgetary subsidies as per the above explanation is given 
in Table 6.5. 
Impure Public Goods are those having high degree of externality and needs to 
finance by the general revenues. Merit I goods are those where partial recovery of 
variable cost is stipulated and Merit II is the category of services in which the 
recovery should be higher than that of Merit I goods and closer to the current costs. 
Government, can subsidies the targeted group by other means such subsidised 
financial assistance or cash coupons. The next category is Merit Goods with 
Distributive Justice, where the services provided by under pricing for the people 
below the poverty line or the underdeveloped regions. The main objective of these 
subsidies is to enhance the consumption of certain services or to attract investment 
in certain backward areas. The last category is Pure Private Goods where the role 
of government should be limited and entire cost should be recovered. Even in these 
services, if government wants to benefit any section of the consumers, the other 
section should cross subsidise the vulnerable sections of the society. Though this 
classification of services varies from individual tastes and opinion, the government 
should bring debate and identify the services, where, recovery rate can be 
enhanced. The present classification forms a basis for any such debate. 
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To classify the implicit budgetary subsidies in tine above categories, one should look 
at detailed break-up of the externalities and receipts into minor head categories as 
given in appendix Table A6.1 to A6.32. This classification only helps in 
understanding the nature of subsidies and overall trend in nominal and as v\/ell as 
relative terms. Implicit budgetary subsidies in Uttar Pradesh are estimated in the 
previous chapter. These implicit budgetary subsidies are classified in different 
categories so that the justification and rationale of the subsidies in Utter Pradesh 
may be examined. Table 6.6 shows the details of category wise classification of 
implicit budgetary subsidies in Utter Pradesh. Details of services with breakup of 
costs and receipts are provided in Table 6.7 to 6.11. Classified implicit budgetary 
subsidies as a per cent of GSDP is given Table 6.14. Implicit budgetary subsidies at 
constant prices are classified in Table 6.15. 
Table 6.6 
Category Wise Classification of Implicit Budgetary Subsidies 
In Uttar Pradesh 
(In Rs, Crorei 
TOTAL 
Impure Public Goods 
Social Services 
Economic Services 
Merit Goods 1 
Social Services 
Economic Services 
Merit Goods II 
Social Sen/ices 
Economic Services 
Merit Goods with 
Distributive Justice 
Social Services 
Economic Services 
Private Goods 
Social Services 
Economic Services 
1990-91 
4486.07 
878.17 
387.09 
491.07 
753.28 
600.20 
153.08 
878.65 
191.11 
587.55 
632.06 
28.26 
603.80 
1343.90 
78.62 
1265.28 
1993-94 
6089.28 
1185.78 
507.48 
678.30 
970.22 
810.87 
159.35 
1298.05 
237.49 
1060.56 
874.56 
43,74 
830.81 
1760.67 
107.19 
1653.49 
1995-96 
7831.16 
1495.19 
694.81 
800.38 
1223.69 
959.29 
264.41 
1549.26 
324.50 
1224.76 
1066.79 
64.74 
1002.05 
2496.23 
142.71 
2353.52 
1998-99 
11082.19 
2111.05 
1000.68 
1110.37 
1635.76 
1233.59 
402.18 
1873.16 
522.60 
1350.56 
2203.13 
143.85 
2059.28 
3259.09 
191.51 
3067.58 
2001-02 
11969.99 
2132.85 
772.61 
1360.24 
1795.21 
1373.84 
421.37 
1634.93 
463.93 
1171.00 
2442.02 
197.55 
2244.47 
3964.99 
168.62 
3796.37 
2003-04 
14791.00 
2589.77 
958.31 
1631.46 
2001.64 
1585.63 
416.01 
1828.11 
600,91 
1227,19 
3255.20 
231.56 
3023.64 
5116.28 
92.37 
5023.91 
2005-06 
15928.39 
3086.31 
1121,94 
1964,37 
2737.55 
2416.10 
321.45 
2669.58 
1158,01 
1511,57 
3599,12 
188.68 
3410,44 
3835.83 
105,15 
3730,68 
Source: Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective years 
The implicit subsidies on most deserving category of Impure Public Goods have 
increased from Rs. 878.17 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 3086.31 crore in 2005-06. Its 
share in total subsidies is 19 per cent. 
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The second most deserving category is Merit I in which the implicit budgetary 
subsidies have increased from Rs. 753 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 2737 crore in 2005-
06 and its share in total implicit budgetary subsidies is 17 per cent. 
While in Merit II goods which has lesser externalities than the impure public goods 
and Merit I category, have increased from Rs. 878 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 2669.58 
crore in 2005-06 and their share in total subsidies is 16.76 per cent in 2005-06 
which have declined from 19.59 per cent in 1990-91. 
In the case of Merit Goods with Distributive Justice, subsidies have increased 
from Rs. 632.06 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 3599.12 crore in 2005-06 and their share in 
total budgetary subsidies has increased to 22.60 per cent from 14.06 per cent during 
the study period. 
In Pure Private Goods, subsidies have gone up from Rs. 1343.90 crore to Rs. 
3885.83 crore during the same period. While the share in total implicit budgetary 
subsidies declined from 29.96 per cent to 24.08 per cent during the study period. 
Major component of private goods in economic services are commercial irrigation 
(major and medium) and power sector. 
Table 6.7 
Classification of Implicit Budgetary Subsidies in Uttar Pradesh - 1990-91 
(In Rs. Crorei 
TOTAL 
Social Services 
Impure Public Goods 
Merit 1 Goods 
Merit II Goods 
Merit Goods with 
Distributive Justice 
Private Goods 
Economic Services 
Impure Public Goods 
Merit 1 Goods 
Merit II Goods 
Merit Goods with 
Distributive Justice 
Private Goods 
Total 
Receipts 
225.26 
49.36 
5.84 
28.83 
7.75 
0.00 
6.94 
175.90 
101.30 
2.14 
20.13 
9.87 
42.46 
Current 
Cost 
3076.67 
1204.48 
372.49 
603.26 
186.18 
0.07 
42.48 
1872.19 
327.55 
142.90 
530.08 
455.86 
415.79 
Capital 
Cost 
1634.66 
130.16 
20.44 
25.77 
12.68 
28.20 
43.08 
1504.49 
264.83 
12.32 
177.59 
157.81 
891.94 
Total 
Cost 
4711.33 
1334.64 
392.93 
629.03 
198.86 
28.26 
85.56 
3376.68 
592.38 
155.22 
707.67 
613.67 
1307.74 
Subsidy 
4486.07 
1285.28 
387.09 
600.20 
191.11 
28.26 
78.62 
3200.78 
491.07 
153.08 
687.55 
603.80 
1265.28 
Recovery 
Rate 
4.78 
3,70 
1.49 
8.21 
3,90 
0.00 
8.12 
5.21 
17.10 
1.38 
2.84 
1.61 
3.25 
Source: (Basic Data): Finance Accounts of Uttar Pradesh for various years. 
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Table 6.8 
Classification of Implicit Budgetary Subsidies in Uttar Pradesh - 1993-94 
(In Rs. Crore) 
TOTAL 
Social Services 
Impure Public Goods 
Merit 1 Goods 
Merit II Goods 
Merit Goods with 
Distributive Justice 
Private Goods 
Economic Services 
Impure Public Goods 
Merit 1 Goods 
Merit II Goods 
Merit Goods w/ith 
Distributive Justice 
Private Goods 
Total 
Receipts 
302.48 
51.09 
12.26 
22.81 
11.59 
Q.OO 
4.43 
251.38 
17.32 
0.00 
44.16 
13.24 
176.67 
Current 
Cost 
4122.09 
1559.93 
486.27 
792.89 
229.00 
0.06 
51.71 
2562.16 
331.04 
154.55 
884.93 
614.08 
577.56 
Capital Cost 
2269.67 
197.93 
33.47 
40.79 
20.07 
43,68 
59.91 
2071.74 
364.58 
4.81 
219.78 
229.97 
1252.60 
Total Cost 
6391.75 
1757.86 
519.74 
833.67 
249.08 
43.74 
111.62 
4633.90 
695.62 
159.35 
1104.71 
844.05 
1830.16 
Subsidy 
6089.28 
1706.76 
507.48 
810.87 
237.49 
43.74 
107.19 
4382.51 
678.30 
159.35 
1060.56 
830.81 
1653.49 
Recovery 
Rate (%; 
4.73 
2.91 
2.36 
2,74 
4,65 
0,00 
3,97 
5.42 
2.49 
0.00 
4.00 
1,57 
9.65 
Source: (Basic Data): Finance Accounts of Uttar Pradesli for various years. 
Table 6.9 
Classification of Implicit Budgetary Subsidies in Uttar Pradesh - 1995-96 
(In Rs, Crore,! 
TOTAL 
Social Services 
Impure Public Goods 
Merit 1 Goods 
Merit II Goods 
Merit Goods with 
Distributive Justice 
Private Goods 
Economic Services 
Impure Public Goods 
Merit 1 Goods 
Merit II Goods 
Merit Goods with 
Distributive Justice 
Private Goods 
Total 
Receipts 
330.37 
72.30 
5.87 
51.32 
8.79 
0.00 
6.33 
258.07 
15.77 
2.32 
82.08 
37.74 
119.16 
Current 
Cost 
4975.46 
1976.03 
656.80 
947.84 
303.73 
0.00 
67.66 
2999.42 
316.29 
252.34 
1041.99 
728.87 
659.93 
Capital 
Cost 
3186.08 
282.31 
43.88 
62.76 
29.56 
64.73 
81.37 
2903.77 
500.86 
14.38 
264.85 
310.93 
1812.75 
Total Cost 
8161.53 
2258.34 
700.68 
1010.60 
333.29 
64.74 
149.03 
5903.19 
817.15 
266.72 
1306.84 
1039.79 
2472.68 
Subsidy 
7831.16 
2186.04 
694.81 
959.29 
324.50 
64.74 
142.71 
5645.12 
800.38 
264.41 
1224.76 
1002.05 
2353.52 
Recovery 
Rate (%) 
4.05 
3.20 
0.84 
5.08 
2,64 
0,00 
0,54 
4.37 
2,05 
0,87 
6,28 
3.63 i 
4.82 ' 
Source: (Basic Data): Finance Accounts of Uttar Pradesh for various years. 
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Table 6.10 
Classification of Implicit Budgetary Subsidies in Uttar Pradesh - 1998-99 
(In Rs, Crore) 
TOTAL 
Social Services 
Impure Public Goods 
Merit 1 Goods 
Merit II Goods 
Merit Goods with 
Distributive Justice 
Private Goods 
Economic Services 
Impure Public Goods 
Merit 1 Goods 
Merit II Goods 
Merit Goods with 
Distributive Justice 
Private Goods 
Total 
Receipts 
456.51 
138.27 
2.31 
110.40 
18.32 
0.00 
7,24 
318.24 
147.97 
0.00 
64.03 
43.11 
63.13 
Current 
Cost 
5872.82 
2680.39 
925.72 
1247.68 
420.44 
0.00 
86.55 
4192.44 
567.51 
385.94 
1112.26 
1607.76 
518.95 
Capital 
Cost 
4665.88 
550.11 
77.26 
96.31 
120.49 
143.85 
112.20 
4115.77 
690.83 
16.23 
302.33 
494.62 
2611.76 
Total Cost 
11538.70 
3230.50 
1002.99 
1343.98 
540.92 
143.85 
198.75 
8308.20 
1258.34 
402.18 
1414.59 
2102.38 
3130.71 
Subsidy 
11082.19 
3092.23 
1000.68 
1233.59 
522.60 
143.85 
191.51 
7989.97 
1110.37 
402.18 
1350.56 
2059.28 
3067.58 
Recovery 
Rate (%! 
3.96 
4.28 
0.23 
8.21 
3,39 
0.00 
3,64 
3.83 
11,76 
0,00 
4,53 
2,05 
2,02 
Source: (Basic Data): Finance Accounts of Uttar Pradesii for various years. 
Table 6.11 
Classification of Implicit Budgetary Subsidies in Uttar Pradesh - 2001-02 
(In Rs, Crore-
TOTAL 
Social Services 
Impure Public Goods 
Merit 1 Goods 
Merit II Goods 
Merit Goods with 
Distributive Justice 
Private Goods 
Economic Services 
Impure Public Goods 
Merit Goods 1 
Merit Goods II 
Merit Goods with 
Distributive Justice 
Private Goods 
Total 
Receipts 
489.19 
140.25 
1.18 
109.40 
15.58 
0.00 
14.09 
348.94 
84.58 
0.00 
108.00 
127.09 
29.27 
Current 
Cost 
7115.63 
2549.75 
688.95 
1383.54 
407.19 
0.00 
70.08 
4565.88 
476.49 
404.68 
984.16 
1728.22 
972.34 
Capital 
Cost 
5343.55 
567.05 
84.84 
99.70 
72.32 
197.55 
112.64 
4776.51 
968.33 
16.69 
294.84 
643.34 
2853.30 
Total Cost 
12459.18 
3116.80 
773.79 
1483.24 
479.51 
197.55 
182.71 
9342.39 
1444.82 
421.37 
1279.00 
2371.56 
3825.64 
Subsidy 
11969.99 
2976.55 
772.61 
1373.84 
463.93 
197,55 
168.62 
8993.45 
1360.24 
421.37 
1171.00 
2244.47 
3796.37 
Recovery 
Rate (%) 
3.93 
4.50 
0,15 
7,38 
3.25 
0,00 
7,71 
3.74 
5.85 
0,00 
8,44 
5,36 
0,77 
Source: (Basic Data): Finance Accounts of Uttar Pradesii for various years. 
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Table 6.12 
Classification of Implicit Budgetary Subsidies in Uttar Pradesh - 2003-04 
In Rs. Crore) 
TOTAL 
Social Services 
Impure Public Goods 
Merit 1 Goods 
Merit 11 Goods 
Merit Goods with 
Distributive Justice 
Private Goods 
Economic Services 
Impure Public Goods 
Merit 1 Goods 
Merit II Goods 
Merit Goods with 
Distributive Justice 
Private Goods 
Total 
Receipts 
676.70 
78.46 
0.00 
46.09 
21,97 
0.00 
10.40 
598.24 
102.75 
0.00 
233.30 
125.86 
136.32 
Current 
Cost 
8588.13 
2837.49 
807.38 
1518.50 
494.06 
0.00 
17.56 
5750.64 
546.35 
395.21 
1063.40 
1793.02 
1952.65 
Capital Cost 
6879.57 
709.76 
150.94 
113.22 
128.82 
231.56 
85.21 
6169.81 
1187.86 
20.80 
397.09 
1356.48 
3207.58 
Total Cost 
15467.70 
3547.25 
958.31 
1631.71 
622.89 
231.56 
102.77 
11920.45 
1734.21 
415.01 
1460.49 
3149.50 
5160.23 
Subsidy 
14791.00 
3468.79 
958.31 
1585.63 
600.91 
231.56 
92.37 
11322.21 
1631.46 
416.01 
1227.19 
3023.64 
5023.91 
Recovery 
Rate (%) 
4.37 
2.21 
0.00 
2.82 
3.53 
0.00 
10,12 
5.02 
5,93 
0,00 
15.97 
4,00 
2,64 
Source: (Basic Data); Finance Accounts of Uttar Pradesh for various years. 
Table 6.13 
Classification of Implicit Budgetary Subsidies in Uttar Pradesh -
(In 
2005-06 
Rs. Crore i 
TOTAL 
Social Services 
Impure Public Goods 
Merit 1 Goods 
Merit II Goods 
Merit Goods with 
Distributive Justice 
Private Goods 
Economic Services 
impure Public Goods 
Merit Goods 1 
Merit Goods II 
Merit Goods with 
Distributive Justice 
Private Goods 
Total 
Receipts 
525.51 
155.13 
19.86 
36.02 
16.03 
0.00 
83.21 
370.39 
55.40 
0.57 
88.43 
36.11 
189.88 
Current 
Cost 
11202.74 
4462.53 
995.84 
2308.04 
1072.69 
0.50 
85.45 
6740.21 
802.68 
304,67 
1253.39 
2115.79 
2263.68 
Capital Cost 
5251.17 
682.48 
145.95 
144.08 
101.35 
188,18 
102,91 
4568.68 
1217.09 
17,36 
346.60 
1330.76 
1656.87 
Total Cost 
16453.90 
5145.01 
1141.80 
2452.13 
1174.05 
188.68 
188.37 
11308.89 
2019.76 
322,02 
1599.99 
3446.55 
3920.56 
Subsidy 
15928.39 
4989.88 
1121.94 
2416.10 
1158.01 
188.68 
105.15 
10938.50 
1964.37 
321.45 
1511.57 
3410.44 
3730.68 
Recovery 
Rate(%) 
3.19 
3.02 
... . 
1.74 
1.47 
1.37 
0.00 
44.18 
3.28 
2.74 
0,18 
5.53 
1.05 
4.84 
Source; (Basic Data); Finance Accounts of Uttar Pradesh for various years. 
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Table 6.14 
Classification of implicit Budgetary Subsidies in Uttar Pradesh 
As a Percentage of GSDP 
Total 
Social Service 
Impure Public Goods 
Merit 1 Goods 
Merit II Goods 
Merit Goods with 
Distributive Justice 
Private Goods 
Economic Services 
]mpure Public Goods 
Merit 1 Goods 
Merit II Goods 
Merit Goods with 
Distributive Justice 
Private Goods 
1990-91 
7.01 
2.01 
0.60 
0.94 
0.30 
0.04 
0.12 
5.00 
0.77 
0.24 
1.07 
0.94 
1.98 
1993-94 
7.23 
2.03 
0.60 
0.96 
0.28 
0.05 
0.13 
5.20 
0.81 
0.19 
1.26 
0.99 
1.96 
1995-96 
7.04 
1.97 
0.62 
0.86 
0.29 
0.06 
0.13 
5.08 
0.72 
0.24 
1.10 
0.90 
2.12 
1998-99 
6.88 
1.92 
0.62 
0.77 
0.32 
0.09 
0.12 
4.96 
0.69 
0.25 
0.84 
1.28 
1.90 
2001-02 
6.29 
1.56 
0.41 
0.72 
0.24 
0.10 
0.09 
4.72 
0.71 
0.22 
0.62 
1.18 
1.99 
2003-04 
6.58 
1.92 
0,62 
0.77 
0.32 
0.09 
0.12 
4.96 
0,69 
0.25 
0.84 
1.28 
1.90 
2005-06 
5,82 
1.82 
0.41 
0.88 
0.42 
0.07 
0.04 
4.00 
0.72 
0,12 
0.55 
1.25 
1.36 
Source; (Basic Data): Finance Accounts of Uttar Pradesh for various years 
Table 6.15 
Classification of Implicit Budgetary Subsidies in Uttar Pradesh 
(At Constant Prices 1999-00) 
(In Rs. Crore) 
Total 
Social Service 
Impure Public Goods 
Merit 1 Goods 
Merit II Goods 
Merit Goods with 
Distributive Justice 
Private Goods 
Economic Service 
Impure Public Goods 
Merit 1 Goods 
Merit II Goods 
Merit Goods with 
Distributive Justice 
Private Goods 
1990-91 
9544,82 
2734.64 
823.60 
1277.02 
406.61 
60.14 
167.27 
6810.18 
1044.84 
325.71 
1462.86 
1284.68 
2692,09 
1993-94 
9567.79 
2681.76 
797.38 
1274.07 
373.16 
68.73 
168.42 
6886.03 
1065.78 
250.39 
1666.40 
1305,42 
2598,04 
1995-95 
10231.77 
2856.16 
907.80 
1253.35 
423.97 
84.58 
186.45 
7375.61 
1045.73 
345.46 
1600.21 
1309.23 
3074,98 
1998-99 
11320.30 
3158.67 
1022.18 
1260.09 
533.83 
146.94 
195.62 
8161.63 
1134,23 
410,82 
1379.58 
2103.52 
3133.49 
2001-02 
11851.48 
2947.08 
764.96 
1360.23 
459.34 
195,60 
166,95 
8904.40 
1346.77 
417.20 
1159.41 
2222,25 
3758.78 
2003-04 
13089.38 
3069.72 
848.06 
1403.21 
531.78 
204.92 
81,75 
10019.66 
1443.77 
368.15 
1086,01 
2675,79 
4445,93 
2005-06 
12742.71 
3991,91 
897,55 
1932,88 
926,41 
150,94 
84,12 
8750,80 
1571,49 
257,16 
1209.25 
2728.35 
2984,54 
Source: (Basic Data): Finance Accounts of Uttar Pradesh for various years. 
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Figure 6.1 and 6.2 presents the trend of subsidies under different categories of 
social and economic services at constant prices of 1999-00. In social services, 
subsidies in Merit I Goods are high and increased tremendously after 2003-04, 
Within economic services, subsidies are high in Private Goods in comparison to 
other categories. 
Over a period of last fifteen years relative importance of implicit subsidies in Social 
and Economic services of different categories have changed. This change can be 
observed by examining Figure 6.3A and 6.3B for social services and Figure 6.4A 
and 6.4B for economic services. 
With in social services share of Impure Public Goods (which shows high degree of 
externalities) has declined from 30 per cent in 1990-91 to 23 per cent in 2005-06 
Share of Merit II Goods (shows higher recoveries than Merit I Goods) has increased 
from 15 per cent in 1990-91 to 23 per cent in 2005-06. Participation of government 
in providing Private Goods has declined from 6 per cent to 2 per cent during the 
same period. 
In economic services share of subsidies in Impure Public Goods have increased by 
3 per cent during 1990-91 to 2005-06. While in Merit I Goods, share has declined 
from 5 per cent to 3 per cent during the same period. Major changes has occurred in 
Merit II Goods, Merit Goods with Distributive Justice and Private Goods. Share of 
subsidies under Merit II Goods has declined from 21 per cent to 14 per cent and 
under Private Goods from 6 per cent to 2 per cent during 1990-91 to 2005-06. While 
in Merit Goods with Distributive justice it has increased from 19 per cent to 31 per 
cent during the same period. 
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Figure 6.3A 
Social Services 1990-91 
• Impure Public Goods 
H Merit Goods I 
u Merit Goods II 
• Merit Goods with 
Distributive Justice 
• Private Goods 
Figure 6.3B 
i ^ "^'^  
Social sevices 2005-06 
4 % ^ 
1 ^ i 
1 / 
^ H | 48% 
• Impure Public Goods 
• Merit Goods 1 
U Merit Goods II 
• Merit Goods with 
Distributive Justice 
• Private Goods 
Source: Computed From Appendix Table A6.29 
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Figure 6.4A 
Economic Services 1990-91 
19% 
I Impure Public 
Goods 
I Merit Goods I 
y Merit Goods II 
• Merit Goods with 
Distributive Justice 
• Private Goods 
Figure 6.4B 
Economic Services 2005-06 
X 
31% 
I Impure Public 
Goods 
I Merit Goods I 
H Merit Goods II 
• Merit Goods with 
Distributive Justice 
• Private Goods 
Source : Computed from Appendix Table A6.30 
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Main Observations: 
• Social Services 
i. In Impure Public Goods major share are chunk by Rural Health 
Services followed by Public Health and Elementary Education. 
ii. In Merit I Goods major Share are taken by Urban Health Services 
followed by Family Welfare, Water Supply and Secondary Education. 
While lowest share is of Art and Culture. 
iii. Medical Education Research and Training Followed by Labour and 
Employment, University and Higher Education, 'Sports and Youth 
Welfare' and Urban Development are sharing major part of Merit 11 
Goods. While least part is shared by Broadcasting. 
iv. Welfare of SC, ST, and OBC, followed by Housing for Urban Poor are 
the main components of Merit Goods with Distributive Justice. 
V. In Private Goods major Share goes to Technical Education and 
Government Residential Buildings. 
• Economic Services 
i. Forestry Followed by Flood Control are the main component of 
Impure Public Goods, 
ii. In Merit I Goods, major part of subsidies is shared by Soil and Water 
Conservation followed by Command area Development & Extension 
and Training Program in Farming. While least part is covered by 
Extension and Training Program in Fisheries, 
iii. Miner Irrigation and Crop Husbandry (Excluding Extension and 
Training Program in Farming) are sharing major part of Merit II 
Goods. This is followed by Animal Husbandry and Village and Small 
Industries, 
iv. Within Merit Goods with Distributive Justice, major part of subsidies is 
shared by Other Rural Development Programs. This is followed by 
Hill areas (UPP Upto 1998-99) then Food Storage, Other Irrigation 
and Other Special area Programs. 
V. Power and Commercial Irrigation are the main components of Private 
Goods. This is followed by industry. Co-operation is the smallest 
component of the Private Goods. 
Too much concentration of government expenditure is in health services (rural and 
urban), water supply, and medical education (training and research) under social 
services and roads and bridges, rural development programmes, commercial 
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irrigation and, power under economic services. If tliese trends persist in \he long 
run, overall development of the economy is doubtful. 
6. 4 Policy Issues 
Goods and services here are classified as impure public goods, Merit I goods, IVlerit 
II goods. Merit goods with distributive justice, and private goods. In social services 
only Merit II goods and Merit goods with distributive justice (mainly consists welfare 
programmes) have shown a substantial increase. The share of impure public goods 
(which result into building social infrastructure) in total implicit subsidies have 
declined. In economic services, the share of Merit goods with distributive justice has 
increased. While the share of other categories has declined. 
There should be a debate among the intelligentsia, policy makers and stakeholders 
on what to subsidies; how to subsidies; and how much to subsidies. The present 
classification of goods and services at least forms the basis for such debate. 
The next chapter in the present study makes concluding observations and raises 
certain issues in general, related to subsidies based on the conclusions drawn from 
this study in addition to suggesting certain policy issues. 
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Chapter 7 
Findings and Policy Imperatives 
Budgetary subsidies arise when the government fails to recover the cost of providing 
the services from the user charges by such means as fees, tariffs, and user 
charges. Subsidies also arise when government procures a commodity from sellers, 
and then sells it at prices that do not cover the procurement prices and cost of 
storage, handling, transmission, etc. such is the case of food subsidies in India. 
Apart from being costly and cumbersome, widespread, intervention by the 
government in the market impedes to respond to changing situations. 
Although the issue of equity and efficiency has to be considered keeping in view the 
impact of entire fiscal and regulatory system (taxes, subsidies, fiscal deficit, 
government expenditures, administered prices), subsidies in India have a significant 
impact on equity and efficiency of fiscal regime because of their size and spread. If 
excess subsidisation is financed through distortionary taxation, efficiency of the 
system is doubly compromised. An appropriate degree of subsidisation may lead to 
better alignment of market prices to the structure of social demands; but excessive 
subsidisation would distort their alignment leading to waste of scarce resources, and 
regressive outcomes. Achieving the right balance is, therefore, the key question in 
achieving the equity and efficiency objectives of fiscal interventions. 
Misguided sectoral policies particularly weak cost recovery, and, a policy and 
regulatory framework, which have been not conducive to private sector participation, 
has contributed to fiscal imbalances and poor provision of infrastructure. The 
subsidies both implicit and explicit have important sources of pressure on budget 
that has lead to inefficient use of critical inputs and inefficiencies in the public sector. 
Uttar Pradesh, is the largest State of the India and populous enough to be the fifth 
largest country in the world. As per population census 2001, Uttar Pradesh, with its 
16,605 crore strong population, continued to be the most populous State in the 
country and accounts for 16.17 per cent of India's 102.70 crore population. 
Resource-wise Uttar Pradesh is rich region with its fertile soils, good climate, plenty 
of surface and ground water and diverse flora and fauna and thus State presents 
highly favourable conditions for agricultural development. However, the economic 
performance of the State over the years has fallen behind the rest of the country. 
The result of poor overall economic activity and high population grov\rth is reflected 
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in extremely slow growth in per capita income as compared to all-India growth 
figure. The structure of State income shows that the contribution of primary sector 
has declined to 41 per cent of the State income though the sector still sustain 73 per 
cent of the total working force. This shows the continued pressure of working 
population in the primary sector. The share of secondary sector, on the other hand, 
has gone up to 20 per cent of the total State income which now employ 9 per cent of 
the total workers in the State. 
Uttar Pradesh is at the tail end when compared to major States in terms of fiscal 
indicators. Expenditure allocation strategy is directed more towards welfare 
schemes and committed expenditure (on both interest payments and salaries) than 
operation and maintenance expenditure. This has also resulted Utter Pradesh being 
behind other major States in terms of growth of income and certain socio-economic 
indicators 
Though contribution of tax revenues has shown slight improvement but the 
contribution of non-tax revenues in revenue receipts of the State are continuously 
decaling during the study period. Shortage in revenues from time-to-time has 
resulted in cut down of expenditure on socio-economic infrastructure. 
The present chapter, concluding in nature, summerises major findings in this 
exercise, raises certain issues in administration of subsidies and suggests certain 
policy issues. The chapter is organised into three sections. First section summanses 
the finding of the study. The second section raises issues in the policy of subsidies 
and the third section discusses about certain policy suggestions and explores the 
areas for further research. 
Main Findings 
It is clear that Central budgetary subsidies both implicit and explicit have increased 
during last two decades. Food subsidies are around 40 per cent of total explicit 
subsidies followed by fertiliser. Subsidies have not only increased in current prices 
but also in real terms. Raito of subsidies to fiscal deficit is also significantly high. 
There is an increasing trend with some fluctuations in different years. Increasing 
subsidies at alarming rate have generated burden on fiscal condition of the country. 
Per capita subsidies have also increased during last one and half decade. 
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• In nominal term, aggregate explicit subsidies of the Central government have 
increased from Rs. 10728 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 60181 crore in 2006-07 
(RE). 
• Explicit subsidies of Central government as a percentage of GDP have 
declined from 2.08 per cent in 1990-91 to 1.59 per cent in 2006-07 (RE). 
• The growth of subsidy was much higher between 1990-91 and 1999-00 
compared to the period of 2000-01 to 2006-07 (RE). 
• Per capita explicit subsidies have increased from Rs. 12.79 in 1990-91 to Rs. 
53.64 in 2006-07 (RE). 
• Over the period, the relative importance of major subsidies given by the 
Central government like food, fertiliser, agriculture, power, and petroleum 
have changed. 
• The per capita food subsidy has increased around ten times from Rs. 2.92 to 
Rs. 21.57, which is a significant increase in last 15 years. 
• The burden of fertiliser subsidies is growing and the RPS has generally been 
the main cause of ballooning fertiliser subsidy bill. 
• At constant prices, agriculture subsidies of the Centre have risen from Rs, 
164 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 362 crore in 2006-07(RE) with an annual growth 
of about five per cent in real term. 
• Because of transmission and distribution to rural electrifications, power 
subsidies increased tremendously after 2004-05. 
• There are two reasons, why explicit petroleum subsidies are decreasing 
sharply; i) decontrolled of the prices; ii) losses are shown outside of the 
budgets. 
• Fiscal indicators of major States are showing that Utter Pradesh is at the tail 
end. 
• The share of revenue deficit in fiscal deficit, which is indicative of the quality 
of fiscal deficit, has also sharply deteriorated. In 1990-91, nearly 40 per cent 
of fiscal deficit was claimed by revenue deficit. 
• Average primary deficit as a percentage of GSDP is more than the difference 
between real growth and the real interest rate. The primary deficit continued 
to be positive. 
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The debt in Uttar Pradesh is relatively expensive with higher interest rates as 
compared to other States. 
From 1990-91 to the period prior to reorganisation, the TGR of total own tax 
revenues was 12.78 per cent and over the penod 2000-01 to 2007-08 was 
14.55 percent. 
There is also considerable volatility in the year-to-year growth in almost all 
taxes. 
For the period from 1990-91 to 2006-07 Uttar Pradesh's buoyancy of own tax 
revenues is more than unity and highest among all major States 
Share of interest receipts in non-tax revenues has declined significantly from 
50.92 per cent in 1987-88 to 12.69 per cent in 2006-07. 
The structure of revenue expenditure has undergone a significant change 
during 1987-88 to 2007-08. 
Social sector covers only about one third of total revenue expenditure and a 
major part is going to other services. In the case of capital expenditure share 
of social services cover only a little portion of total capital expenditure and it 
varies between 3.53 per cent and 16.52 per cent. 
There is sharp increase in the ratio of interest payments to total revenue 
expenditure in post-division years. 
In Utter Pradesh, Grants-in-aid have increased more than four times from 
Rs. 1941.32 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 7842.28 crore in 2005-06. More than 90 
per cent of these grants-in-aids are provided under social services, while a 
little amount goes in economic services. 
Transfer to individuals, which constitute direct income to the recipients and 
like a negative tax. 
Implicit budgetary subsidies in nominal term have gone up from Rs. 4486.07 
crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 15928.39 crore in 2005-06 with 8.81 per cent annual 
growth rate. Economic Services absorbed major part of these subsidies. 
In social services, it has increased from Rs. 1285.28 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 
4989.88 crore in 2005-06 with an annual growth rate of 9.46 per cent. Major 
part of the subsidies in social services absorbed by Health and Family 
Welfare followed by Education, 'Water Supply and Sanitation' and Social 
Welfare. 
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In Economic Services, subsidies increased from Rs. 3200.78 crore to Rs. 
10938.50 crore over the same period with an annual growth of 8.54 per cent. 
Major part, approximately 33 per cent of subsidies in economic services is 
covered by Irrigation and Flood Control followed by Energy, Rural 
Development, and Agriculture and Allied services. 
The overall recovery rate has decreased from 4.78 per cent to 3.19 per cent 
during the period. 
In Social Services, recovery rate decreased from 3.70 per cent in 1990-91 to 
3.02 per cent in 2005-06. iVIost of the recoveries are made in Education, 
Sports, Art and Culture sector. 
Economic Services also show decreasing trend in recoveries. These have 
decreased from 5.21 per cent in 1990-01 to 3.28 per cent in 2005-06. Other 
Economic Services, Agriculture and Allied Services, and Irrigation cover 
major recoveries. Energy sector shows least recoveries from cost of 
providing services. 
On an average only 27 per cent of total budgetary subsidies is give under 
Social Services and rest 73 per cent under Economic Services. 
As a per cent of GSDP, total implicit budgetary subsidies have increased 
from 7.01 per cent in 1990-91 to 5.82 per cent in 2005-06. 
In Social Services, ratio of subsidies to the GSDP has decreased from 2.01 
per cent in 1990-91 to 1.82 per cent in 2005-06. 
In economic services, subsidies as a percentage of GSDP decreased from 
5.00 per cent in 1990-91 to 4.00 per cent in 2005-06. 
The Per Capita Subsidies in the State are continuously increasing from Rs. 
343.79 to Rs. 873.80 during the period from 1990-91 to 2005-06. In Social 
Services, it is much lesser than Economic Services. 
In social services, per capita budgetary subsidies increased from Rs. 98.50 
in 1990-91 to Rs. 273.742005-06 to. 
In Economic Services, per Capita Budgetary Subsidies are at higher side 
with 6.15 per cent growth of per annum. They have increases from Rs. 
245.30 in 1990-91 to Rs. 600.07 in 2005-06. 
In real term, per capita subsidies in the State have decreased from Rs. 
731.48 in 1990-91 to Rs. 699.04 in 2005-06. 
231 
• In Social Services, per capita implicit subsidies at constant prices increased 
marginally from Rs. 209.57 in 1990-91 to Rs. 218.99 in 2005-06. 
• In Economic Services, per capita subsidies in real term rose from Rs. 521.90 
in 1990-91 to Rs. 571.67 in 2003-04 and then decreased to Rs. 480,05 in 
2005-06. 
• The total surplus generated is Rs. 7.77 crore in 1990-91 and increased to 
Rs. 345.76 crore in 2005-06. 
• As a per cent of GSDP, surplus sector covers a negligible part. 
• Too much concentration of government expenditure is in health services 
(rural and urban), v^ater supply, medical education (training and research) 
under social services and roads and bridges, rural development 
programmes, commercial irrigation and, power under economic services are 
caused neglecting other sectors will no longer result in over all development 
of the State. 
• The present study makes it dear that there is an overestimation of implicit 
budgetary subsidies by the earlier studies. Over estimation of subsidies by 
the earlier studies is due to overestimation of costs by not converting the 
capital stock into real terms and inclusion of grants-in-aid to local bodies in 
the cost of provision of services. 
increasing burden of subsidies both implicit and explicit subsidies need to be 
revised in view of the State facing disturbing and fluctuating finances. An inter-
State comparison shows that Uttar Pradesh is at the tail end in terms of growth of 
State's income and in many other development indicators. The State should 
reorient itself in modifying and directing its policies towards higher growth 
injecting sectors. Identifying the right sectors is itself a challenging task in the 
situation of weak finances. For the justification of the subsidies, goods and 
services are categorized into five categories Impure Public, Merit I, Merit II, Merit 
with Distributive Justice, and Private Goods. It is quite possible that 
categorisation of these governmental services and goods, not commonly 
agreeable, at least form the basis for a debate on prioritisation of the services. 
• in social services only Merit II goods and Merit goods with distributive justice 
(mainly consists welfare programmes) have shown a substantial increase. 
The share of Impure public goods (which result into building social 
infrastructure) in total implicit subsidies have declined. In economic services, 
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the share of Merit goods with distributive justice has increased. While the 
share of other categories have declined. 
Broad Issues in Subsidies 
Subsidies are justified for all those goods and services, which have positive 
externalities, as the benefit to the society is more than the sum of individual benefit 
and welfare is improved by inducing a higher level of demand through subsidies, 
which lower the relative prices.''^ 
Subsidies are justifiable on the argument of infant industry and distributional 
objectives. The example of distributional objective is the public distributional system. 
Infant industry argument is given for small-scale industries. But these subsidies 
could only be valid for temporary periods and should be well administered^^. 
Subsidies can have a major impact in augmenting welfare of the society provided 
these are designed and administered efficiently to serve a clearly stated set of 
objectives. However, subsidies can also be very costly if they are poorly designed 
and inefficiently administered. Subsidies in areas such as education, health and 
environment are advocated on grounds that their benefits are spread well beyond 
the immediate recipients, and are shared by the population at large, present and 
future. Subsidies are also used with redistributive objectives, particularly for 
ensuring minimum consumption levels of food and other basic needs^^. 
There are some subsidies like incentives given to employees in addition to usual 
pay and inflationary adjustment in pay without any valid reason. Some examples of 
such subsidies are free travel concession given to employees in the transport 
sectors like railways and road transport. 
There are many subsidies, which, cannot be justified on the grounds of insignificant 
externalities. 
"Subsidies can be detrimental to environment, efficiency, and growth. Excessive 
subsidization harm growth prospects in both micro and macro terms, by affecting 
relative prices as well as by putting pressure on interest rates." Srivastava and Rao 
(2001). 
" Srivastava and Amar Nath (2001) 
Srivastava and Rao (2003) 
" Srivastava and Rao (2003) 
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In some service minded sectors like health and education, the degree of 
subsidisation (rate of recovery) may be high but volume of subsidisation is low. This 
situation arises due to low priority given for these sectors in spending priorities of the 
governments. If the services in these sectors is bad, the recovery may fall. 
Therefore, there is a need for increasing allocation on operation and maintenance of 
the services in such sectors in addition to investment as per changing technologies. 
Subsidies should be more transparent and explicitly stated. 
Some specific sectors should be identified, where without an additional burden to 
the State exchequer, subsidies can be financed through cross subsidiesation. It is 
often possible to distinguish between different classes of consumers for a good or a 
range of goods, such as domestic and commercial or agricultural use of electricity. 
Similarly, within the broad group of petroleum products distinction can be made 
between kerosene and diesel vis-a-vis petrol and turbine fuel. If a particular sector 
with one or more products is subjected to an administered price regime, it is 
possible to charge some consumers (product-wise) or use wise) a price, which is 
more than cost so as to finance a subsidy given to other consumers, by charging 
them a lower prices, which is lees than cost. Such intra-sectoral financing of a 
subsidy involves cross subsidisation. In such cases, if a net subsidy is still left after 
cross-subsidisation, it will be charged on the general budget. Some instances of 
important cross-subsidisation in Utter Pradesh relate to power sector. But, over a 
period of time, cross-subsidisation results in to captive generation by the high price 
paying consumers and entire subsidy burden falling on the exchequer of the 
government. 
Better targeting is the key to lowering the volume of subsidy, while continuing to 
satisfy the objectives of subsidisation. Examination of alternative delivery 
mechanisms is therefore very important. The delivery mechanism should be cost-
efficient, and should maximize the quality of delivery to the intended beneficiaries. 
An alternative delivery mechanism in the case of both food and power could be 
coupon system. 
The discussions point out the need for grater transparency in subsidy regime. This 
requires making subsidies as explicit as possible that are generated through 
administered price regimes and those that are kept off the budget. Targeting 
assumes utmost importance, wile subsidies are made explicit, and their budgetary 
burden is kept under control. 
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One more aspect which requires consideration is that subsidies should be treated as 
short-term measures. They cannot be considered as an all-time phenomenon. Their 
operation as well as utility should be frequently reviewed and those outlived or 
misused should be weeded out. An important principle to be kept in mind is that 
consumers do not hesitate to pay for the good quality service provided the quality of 
services is good, supply is regular and dependable. 
Budgetary subsidies provide the interface between the two sides of the budget, viz., 
expenditures and non-tax revenues. Policy reforms affecting subsidies will have to 
address both these budgetary dimensions. The main objectives that should guide 
the formulation of a subsidy reform strategy may be listed as: lower volume, higher 
recoveries, better service focus, improved targeting, removal of inefficiencies, and 
promoting budgetary transparency. 
The case of justified subsidisation through budgetary support is limited to Merit 
goods and services. These services are characterised by positive externalities 
where social benefits are more than private benefits. Among these, the Merit I 
services like elementary education and primary health deserve a high degree of 
subsidisation because of large positive externalities. Merit II services like secondary 
and higher education, other health services, and water supply and sanitation would 
also require budgetary subsidisation albeit of a lower order. Although in different 
cases, the extent of subsidisation relative to costs may differ, a subsidisation of 90 
percent or above may be justified for Merit I and 40 to 60 percent for Merit II 
services. 
Suggestions 
Subsidy reforms should aim at (i) reducing their volume relative to revenue receipts 
of the Central and the State governments, (ii) administering subsidies more directly 
to the targeted beneficiaries, thereby eliminating input-subsidies and focusing more 
on transfers as compared to price subsidies, (iii) making these subsidies transparent 
by showing them explicitly in the budget, and (iv) avoiding multiple subsidies to 
serve the same policy objective. 
Costs of service provision and/or low negligible recoveries through user charges are 
the two critical sides of subsidisation. Unit costs need to be reduced, wherever 
desirable and viable. Surplus employment and other operational inefficiencies must 
be reduced. 
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Subsidy reforms, in the first instance, need to focus on selected sectors, which 
would yield maximum results and for those services for which there is considerable 
scope for higher recovery in the non-Merit category. In the case of Centre, the 
immediate focus of reform should be on food and fertiliser subsidies, and for State, it 
is important to attend to power and irrigation subsidies, while reforming the overall 
subsidy regime. The following are the sectors, where subsidy reforms, should focus 
in the first instance. 
Power Subsidies - Power subsidies largely subsidies inefficiencies. There is a need 
to reduce T&D losses, make subsidies more explicit, overhaul the Electricity Act and 
drastically prune staff strength in the SEBs. The power subsidy should be 
administered explicitly by making the farmers pay the regular tariff and claim the 
subsidy from State's Department of Agriculture. A change of this nature in Kerala 
has reduced not only the subsidy bill but also the wastage of power, as farmers 
become conscious of payments made by them to the Electricity Authority. 
Subsidies for only impure public goods. Merit I and Merit II categories are justified. 
Elementary education, primary and preventive health care are deserving cases, and 
even in these cases, subsidies should be administered to the intended beneficiary 
as far as possible. 
Users cannot be persuaded to pay higher costs unless they are assured of 
reasonable quality of services provided by the public authorities. The term quality 
can be used in a broad sense covering multiple attributes of services: accessability, 
reasonable waiting period, regularity, and adequacy. For example, quality provision 
of power means regular supply of electricity without frequent breakdowns or 
stoppages, and without undue voltage fluctuations. In health services, quality means 
access of service with minimum waiting time, availability of medicines, cleanliness of 
hospitals, etc. Cost recovery is closely linked to the quality of services. On the other 
hand, quality deteriorates without adequate finances. This creates a vicious circle. 
Unless adequate quality is assured, people would not be willing to pay and unless 
they pay, quality cannot be maintained. 
The rigidity leading to non-revision of user charges comes from the absence of 
suitable institutional mechanisms which could deal with the related issues of quality, 
inefficiency, increase in costs, and extent of subsidisation according to service 
categories. Any increase in user charges requires explicit public decision by 
legislative/executive authorities who are very reluctant to increase user charges. 
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Necessary institutional meclianism would involve setting up of autonomous bodies 
wlio can undertake objective and independent deliberations and mal<e 
recommendations to the government with regular periodicity with a view to 
protecting both the consumers' interest and the need to cover costs. These bodies 
should also evaluate the quality of service, and quantify the inefficiencies in the 
public provision of private goods. 
Untargeted subsidies waste scarce resources and distort the incidence profile of 
fiscal intervention which consists both of tax and subsidy policies. Properly targeted 
subsidies economise on budgetary resources. Since, the beneficiary of a subsidy is 
reached through a commodity market, the incidence of the benefit of a subsidy 
becomes difficult to control. The problem is further accentuated, if these are 
administered through inputs. IVlany subsidies in India are administered through 
inputs like fertilisers, power, and irrigation water. Even when a final good like food is 
involved, the subsidy regime remains poorly targeted. The same is true of 
educational and medical subsidies. It is because of these reasons that the 
distributional pattern of subsidies shows a regressive pattern. The benefits of many 
subsidies in agriculture, industries, and other sectors are distributed according to the 
pattern of consumption of the concerned products which reflects the pattern of 
income. Thus, segments of population with a higher purchasing power are able to 
get relatively larger benefits. Subsidies lead to lower prices and price reduction has 
a substitution effect (increasing the demand for the subsidised good, the price of 
which has gone down, relative to others) and an income effect (increasing the 
demand for the concerned good as also that of others). It is because of the income 
effect, that the targeting of subsidies becomes absolutely essential. If the demand 
of a subsidised good is inelastic with respect to price/income, any income effect 
through subsidisation would lead to an increase in demand for goods other than the 
subsidised good. 
Subsidy as a budgetary instrument of promoting social welfare has been overused, 
and sometimes abused, leading to inefficiencies. The cost of subsidies has 
generally been underestimated because most subsidies are hidden or implicit. In 
State budgets, only a very small fraction of subsidies is shown explicitly as 
subsidies. The State government should explicitly show its subsidies in the budget 
as much as possible, so that their volumes and continued validity may be discussed 
each year in the legislature. Many subsidies arise because the government may be 
participating in the provision of purely private goods where its presence is not 
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warranted either economically or technologically. In the few areas like health and 
education, where subsidies are justified because of large externalities, government 
should rationalise the subsidy structure, so that subsidies are given more to the 
economically poorer sections. Subsidies should have specific time span, after which 
its utility should be reassessed, and the duration revised; it should be withdrawn in 
stages. Subsidy reforms should be approached from both the expenditure and 
revenue sides. On the expenditure side, reducing costs of providing services by 
reducing operational inefficiency could reduce subsidies without affective service 
levels. On the receipt side, one has to target higher recovery rates by linking prices 
(user charges) to costs. At first, these linkages may be fixed with reference to 
current costs. Input-linked use charges, partial privatisation of generation and 
distribution (in electricity), proper metering, setting up bodies for autonomous tariff 
revisions in power and transport, fees for health and education, should lead to better 
cost recoveries, and lower implicit subsidies. The subsidy regime should lead to 
better cost recoveries, and lower implicit subsidies. The subsidy regime should be 
limited, transparent, and poorly targeted. 
Issues before the State Government 
• To enable a debate on categorisation of services as per the externalities 
involved in consumption of goods and services. 
• To reduce the cost of provision of service by improving efficiency. 
• To revise the user charges regularly on the basis of inflation. 
• To specify the duration for which subsidy is given. 
• Subsidies to be limited to the intended beneficiaries and targeted groups. 
• Independent authorities to be set up to periodically review the quality of 
services and the user charges in various services. 
• More transparency in stating the burden of subsidies to the exchequer of the 
State. 
• If not reducing the subsidies, at least reorient them towards creating socio-
economic infrastructure and proper maintenance than high salary component 
in the cost of provision of services. 
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• A mere concentration in to sectors like social welfare, power, irrigation, roads 
and bridges can help the government in generating and directing surpluses 
towards income and employment generating sectors. 
• Higher allocation for non-salary maintenance expenditure. 
Conclusions 
The comprehensive analysis of the estimated values of the subsidies clearly shows 
that there is an increasing trend in the volume of subsidies in Utter Pradesh. Implicit 
budgetary subsidies have increased from Rs. 4486.07 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 
15928.39 crore in 2005-06. Per capita subsidies in Utter Pradesh have also 
increased from Rs. 343.79 in 1990-91 to Rs. 873.80 in 2005-06. Recoveries have 
declined and costs have increased that shows inefficiency on the part of the 
government. Economic Services absorbed major parts, around 73 per cent of total 
subsidies in the State. Social Services are given much lesser subsidies, which is 
more welfare generating sector. Most of the subsidies are implicit, whereas explicit 
subsidies are negligible. This shows that subsidies in Utter Pradesh are not 
transparent and poorly targeted. 
Therefore, hypothesis formulated in this study is rejected here. As the result shows 
that, there are no serious efforts as a part of fiscal correction measures by the 
Government of Uttar Pradesh to rationalise the subsidies. 
Agenda for Further Research 
In this study we have constructed a discrete time series of estimated values of 
implicit subsidies for Utter Pradesh only. There is a need to compute the subsidies 
for other major State in India to analyse the inter-State variations in the volume of 
subsidies and policies of their rationalisation. 
There are certain expenditures, which are completely or partially borne by the Union 
government in the form of Central and Centrally sponsored schemes. In such 
schemes sum part of the expenditure is shared by the State. Therefore, there is a 
need to take into account the State's share. 
For the justification of subsidies, services are classifies into broad categories as per 
the relative degree of externalities involved in their provision. But the main problem 
with the externalities is how to measure it. Therefore, there is a need to develop a 
suitable methodology for the measurement of the extent of externalities. 
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There should be a debate among the intelligentsia, policy makers and stakeholders 
on what to subsidi5e,how to subsidise and how much to subsidisA^The present 
classification of goods and services at least forms the basis for such debate. 
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Appendices 
Table A1.1 
Interest Rate 
Year 
1990-91 
1993-94 
1995-96 
1998-99 
2001-02 
2003-04 
2005-06 
Interest Payment 
119560.09 
191406.64 
300385.13 
505923.89 
761974.68 
1003102.33 
900673.02 
Outstanding 
1281159.41 
2038868.97 
2656282.29 
4000745.22 
6204889.03 
7950808.47 
10447575.92 
Interest Rate 
9.33 
9.39 
11.31 
12.65 
12.28 
12.62 
8.62 
Source: Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective years. 
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Table A5,1 
Sectoral Share within the Social and Economic Service 
(In per cent) 
Details 
Total Subsidised Sector 
Social Services 
Education, Sports, Art and 
Culture 
Health and Family Welfare 
Water Supply, Sanitation, 
Housing and Urban 
Development 
Social Welfare and Welfare of 
SC, ST, OBC 
Other Social Services 
Economic Services 
Agriculture And Allied 
Services 
Rural Development 
Irrigation and Flood Control 
Energy 
Industries And Minerals 
Transport 
Other Economic Services 
1990-91 
100.00 
28.65 
24.59 
48.45 
20.28 
5.61 
1.07 
71.35 
12.83 
16.76 
40.23 
13.12 
3.76 
12.55 
0.74 
1993-94 
100.00 
28.03 
22.67 
55.40 
15.50 
5.37 
1.06 
71.97 
15.02 
16.86 
35.94 
15.99 
2.36 
13.38 
0.45 
1995-96 
100.00 
27.91 
29.13 
48.35 
16.24 
5.09 
1.18 
72.09 
11.21 
16.40 
37.91 
19.50 
2.32 
12.06 
0.61 
1998-99 
100.00 
27.90 
29.37 
42.44 
20.39 
6.78 
1.01 
72.10 
12.08 
21.21 
32.60 
19.34 
2.51 
11.55 
0.72 
2001-02 
100.00 
24.87 
21.28 
47.78 
21.41 
8.66 
0.86 
75.13 
12.96 
19.88 
29.80 
22.26 
1.79 
12.79 
0.52 
2003-04 
100.00 
23.45 
19.49 
52.24 
18.54 
9.14 
0.60 
76.55 
14.74 
16.99 
27.32 
25.58 
2.16 
12.66 
0.55 
2005-06 
100.00 
31.33 
24,02 
53.48 
15.96 
5.95 
0.58 
68.67 
16.31 
23.23 
24.49 
14,48 
3,96 
16.84 
0,68 
Source: Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective years. 
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Table A5.2 
Recoveries Made in Social Services 
Major 
head 
Details 
SOCIAL SERVICES 
Education, Sports, Art and Culture 
2202 
01 
02 
03 
04 
05 
80 
2203 
2204 
2205 
General Education 
Elementary Education 
Secondary Education 
University Higher 
Education 
Adult Education 
Language Development 
General 
Technical Education 
Sports & Youth Welfare 
Art & Culture 
Health and Family Welfare 
2210 
01+02 
03+04 
05 
06 
80 
2211 
Medical & Public Health 
Urban health Services 
Rural Health Services 
Medical Education Training 
And Research 
Public Health 
General 
Family Welfare 
Water Supply, Sanitation, Housing and 
Urban Development 
2215 
01 
02 
2216 
01 
02 
03 
80 
2217 
Water Supply & Sanitation 
i) Water Supply 
ii) Sewerage & Sanitation 
Housing 
Government Residential 
Buildings 
Urban Housing for urban poor 
Rural Housing 
General 
Urban Development 
Social Welfare and Welfare of SC, ST, 
OBC 
2225 
2230 
2235 
01 
02 
03 
Welfare of SCs, STs, OBCs 
Labour & Employment 
Social Security & Welfare 
Rehabilitation 
Social Welfare 
Other Social Security Schemes 
Other Social Services 
2220 
2221 
2250 
2252 
Information & Publicity 
Broadcasting 
Other social services 
Social Services • Surplus Sector 
Education, Sports, Art and Culture 
2202 
04 
80 
2203 
General Education 
Adult Education 
General 
Technical Education 
Other Social Services 
2250/52 Other social sen/ices 
1990-91 
49.36 
33.90 
29.76 
5.38 
20.04 
4.17 
0.00 
0.00 
0.17 
4.13 
0.01 
0.00 
9.28 
7.81 
7.30 
0.00 
0.05 
0.46 
0.00 
1.47 
2.87 
0.02 
0.02 
0.00 
2.82 
2.82 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.04 
2.88 
0.00 
2.88 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.42 
0.42 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
1993-94 
51.09 
29.94 
29.49 
1.10 
19.99 
8.39 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.26 
0.15 
0.05 
13.89 
12.75 
1.55 
0.00 
0.04 
11.16 
0.00 
1.14 
4.31 
0.08 
0.08 
0.00 
4.17 
4.17 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.05 
2,72 
0.00 
2.72 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.23 
0.23 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
1995-96 
72.30 
49.38 
48.12 
2.71 
45.02 
0.38 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.40 
0.61 
0.25 
9.15 
7.86 
4.68 
0.00 
0.04 
3.15 
0.00 
1.28 
6.62 
0.08 
0.08 
0.00 
5.93 
5.93 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.61 
6.74 
0.00 
6.74 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.41 
0.41 
0.00 
0.00 
17.60 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
17.60 
17.60 
1998-99 
138.27 
101.34 
90.60 
0.19 
88.38 
1.98 
0.00 
0.00 
0.06 
3.93 
0.20 
6.61 
17.54 
6.75 
4.47 
0.00 
0.16 
2.12 
0.00 
10.79 
3.50 
0.15 
0.15 
0.00 
3.31 
3.31 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.04 
12.40 
0.00 
12.40 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
3.49 
3,49 
0.00 
0.00 
40.07 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
40.07 
40.07 
2001-02 
140.25 
85.15 
77.61 
1.03 
76.57 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
6.17 
0.18 
1.19 
31.63 
31.14 
30.99 
0.01 
0.00 
0.15 
0.00 
0.49 
14.77 
0.16 
0.16 
0.00 
7.92 
7.92 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
6.59 
8.54 
0.00 
8.54 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.17 
0.17 
0.00 
0.00 
101.58 
52.51 
0.61 
51.91 
0.00 
0.00 
49.07 
49.07 
(In 
2003-04 
78.46 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
43.18 
42.69 
42.69 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.49 
25.45 
2.90 
2.90 
0.00 
10.40 
10.40 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
12.15 
9.44 
0.00 
9.44 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.38 
0.38 
0.00 
0.00 
245.29 
227.68 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
227.68 
17.61 
17.61 
Rs. Crore) 
2005-06 
155.13 
79.28 
0.44 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.43 
63.31 
1.13 
14.40 
40.63 
39.63 
18.91 
0.86 
0.86 
18.99 
0.00 
1.02 
13.55 
1.70 
0.00 
0.00 
10.99 
10.99 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.86 
12,67 
0.00 
12.67 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
9,05 
0.09 
0.00 
8.99 
0.00 
Source; Basic Data - Government of Utter Pradesh, Finance Accounts for Various Years. 
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Table A5.3 
Costs of Providing Services in Social Services 
Major 
head 
Details 
SOCIAL SERVICES 
Education, Sports, Art and Culture 
2202 
01 
02 
03 
04 
05 
80 
2203 
2204 
2205 
General Education 
Elementary Education 
Secondary Education 
University Higher Education 
Adult Education 
Language Development 
General 
Technical Education 
Sports & Youth Welfare 
Art & Culture 
Health and Family Welfare 
2210 
01+02 
03+04 
05 
06 
80 
2211 
Medical & Public Health 
Urban health Services 
Rural Health Services 
Medical Education Training 
And Research 
Public Health 
General 
Family Welfare 
Water Supply, Sanitation, Housing and 
Urban Development 
2215 
01 
02 
2216 
01 
02 
03 
80 
2217 
Water Supply & Sanitation 
i) Water Supply 
11) Sewerage & Sanitation 
Housing 
Government Residential 
Buildings 
Urban Housing for urban poor 
Rural Housing 
General 
Urban Development 
Social Welfare and Welfare of SC, ST, 
OBC 
2225 
2230 
2235 
01 
02 
03 
Welfare of SCs, STs and OBCs 
Labour & Employment 
Social Security & Welfare 
Rehabilitation 
Social Welfare 
Other Social Security Schemes 
Other Social Services 
2220 
2221 
2250 
2252 
Information & Publicity 
Broadcasting 
Other social services 
Social Services - Surpius Sector 
Education, Sports, Art and Culture 
2202 
04 
80 
2203 
General Education 
Adult Education 
General 
Technical Education 
Other Social Services 
2250 
2252 Other social sen/ices 
1990-91 
1334.64 
349.93 
284.33 
110.30 
119.15 
17.65 
18.51 
14.93 
3.80 
37.89 
21.50 
6,20 
631.95 
490.24 
170.79 
151.04 
59.28 
108.77 
0.36 
141.71 
263.52 
195.49 
191,18 
4.31 
56.55 
36.38 
11.17 
0.16 
8.84 
11.48 
75.05 
16.40 
58.12 
0.53 
0.22 
0.03 
0.28 
14.20 
11.66 
0.08 
2.45 
0.00 
0.00 
1993-94 
1757.86 
416.93 
316.65 
101,03 
169.99 
16.70 
6.25 
17.92 
4.75 
54,15 
35,90 
10,23 
959.52 
719,16 
235,50 
243,30 
82,64 
156,93 
0,80 
240,35 
268.88 
189,84 
177,60 
12,23 
57,92 
53,49 
13.31 
0.15 
0.97 
11,12 
94.29 
28,89 
64,00 
1,40 
0.30 
0.82 
0,28 
18.24 
15,16 
0.08 
3.00 
0.00 
1995-96 
2258.34 
686.17 
555,01 
220,78 
241,21 
30,61 
2.79 
23.63 
35.99 
74.76 
41.80 
14.60 
1066.18 
841.30 
299.56 
271.12 
93.54 
177,01 
0,07 
224,87 
361.72 
259,34 
230,36 
28,98 
93,04 
73.11 
18,67 
0.10 
1.16 
9.34 
118.03 
44,03 
72,06 
1.93 
0.32 
1.29 
0,33 
26.24 
25,14 
0.09 
4.57 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
4.57 
4.57 
1998-99 
3230.50 
1009.68 
834.05 
281,71 
404,55 
24,84 
11,31 
40,77 
70.86 
101.53 
56.03 
18.06 
1329.91 
1098.60 
377.10 
399.24 
112.96 
208,26 
1.04 
231,31 
634.07 
415,43 
312,96 
102,47 
125.42 
94.81 
28.10 
0.10 
2,40 
93,22 
222.16 
113,13 
106,50 
2.53 
0,41 
1,70 
0,42 
34.69 
34,59 
0,10 
6.42 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
6.42 
6.42 
2001-02 
3116.80 
718.53 
555,56 
177,33 
280,37 
57,01 
0,00 
40,84 
0,00 
84,23 
53,43 
25,30 
1453.94 
1190,66 
435,52 
455,63 
170,55 
127,73 
1,23 
263,28 
668.48 
468.26 
362.83 
105,43 
116,13 
102,77 
13,28 
0.07 
0.00 
84.10 
266.40 
172,20 
91,40 
2.80 
0,33 
2.19 
0.28 
25.82 
25,72 
0,09 
43.96 
36.28 
0.08 
36.21 
0.00 
0.00 
7.68 
7.68 
(In 
2003-04 
3547.25 
675.94 
567,90 
121,05 
305.24 
67.32 
0.08 
39.88 
34.34 
0.00 
62.29 
45.75 
1855.26 
1489,24 
551.88 
564.46 
203.98 
157.28 
1,53 
366,02 
668.48 
468.26 
362.83 
105.43 
116.13 
102.77 
13.28 
0.07 
0.00 
84.10 
326.45 
215.10 
108.24 
3.10 
0.29 
2.37 
0.45 
21.12 
21.02 
0.10 
99.89 
91.12 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
91.12 
8.77 
8.77 
Rs. Crore) 
2005-06 
5145.01 
1277.95 
1008.08 
127.38 
691.93 
81.14 
0.06 
52.42 
55.15 
86,97 
72.77 
110,13 
2709,42 
2270.19 
697.50 
599.00 
695.68 
176.35 
1.55 
439.23 
828,18 
570.47 
513.34 
139.00 
98.20 
88.50 
9.05 
0.55 
0.00 
59.50 
309.65 
175.47 
130.58 
3.51 
0.22 
2.87 
0.51 
37.95 
25.08 
0.07 
12.79 
0.00 
Source: Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective years. 
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Table A5.4 
Implicit Budgetary Subsidies in Social Services 
Major 
head 
Details 
SOCIAL SERVICES 
Education, Sports, Art and Culture 
2202 
01 
02 
03 
04 
05 
80 
2203 
2204 
2205 
General Education 
Elementary Education 
Secondary Education 
University Higher Education 
Adult Education 
Language Development 
General 
Technical Education 
Sports & Youth Welfare 
Art & Culture 
Health and Family Welfare 
2210 
01+02 
03+04 
05 
06 
80 
2211 
Medical & Public Health 
Urban health Services 
Rural Health Services 
Med. Edu. Trng. And Research 
Public Health 
General 
Family Welfare 
Water Supply, Sanitation, Housing and 
Urban Development 
2215 
01 
02 
2216 
01 
02 
03 
80 
2217 
Water Supply & Sanitation 
i) Water Supply 
11) Sewerage & Sanitation 
Housing 
Government Residential 
Buildings 
Urban Housing for urban poor 
Rural Housing 
General 
Urban Development 
Social Welfare and Welfare of SC, ST, 
OBC 
2225 
2230 
2235 
01 
02 
03 
Welfare of SCs, STs and OBCs 
Labour & Employment 
Social Security & Welfare 
Rehabilitation 
Social Welfare 
Other Social Security Schemes 
Other Social Services 
2220 
2221 
2250 
2252 
Information & Publicity 
Broadcasting 
Other social services 
Social Services - Surplus Sector 
Education, Sports, Art and Culture 
2202 
04 
80 
2203 
General Education 
Adult Education 
General 
Teciinical Education 
Other Social Services 
22S0 
22S2 Other social services 
1990-91 
1285.28 
316.03 
254.58 
104.92 
99.11 
13.48 
18,51 
14.93 
3.63 
33.76 
21.48 
6.20 
622.67 
482,43 
163.49 
151,04 
59.23 
108.31 
0.35 
140,24 
260.65 
195,48 
191,17 
4.31 
53,73 
33,56 
11,17 
0,16 
8.84 
11,44 
72.17 
16,40 
55,23 
68,96 
0,22 
0,03 
0,28 
13.77 
11.24 
0.08 
2,45 
0.00 
1993-94 
1706.76 
386.99 
287,16 
99.93 
150.00 
8.31 
6.25 
17.92 
4.75 
53.90 
35.75 
10,18 
945.62 
706.41 
233,94 
243.30 
82.60 
145,77 
0,80 
239,21 
264.57 
189,76 
177,52 
12.23 
63,75 
49,32 
13,31 
0,15 
0,97 
11.07 
91.57 
28,89 
61.28 
1,40 
0,30 
0,82 
0,28 
18.01 
14,93 
0,08 
3,00 
0.00 
1995-95 
2186.04 
636.79 
506,89 
218.07 
196,19 
30,23 
2,78 
23.63 
35,99 
74,36 
41,19 
14,35 
1057.03 
833.44 
294,88 
271,12 
93,51 
173,86 
0,07 
223,59 
355.10 
259,25 
230,28 
28.98 
87,12 
57,18 
18.67 
0.10 
1.16 
8.73 
111.28 
44,03 
65.32 
1,93 
0,32 
1,29 
0,33 
25.82 
25.73 
0.09 
-13.03 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
-13.03 
-13.03 
1998-99 
3092.23 
908.34 
743,46 
281,53 
316,19 
22,87 
11,31 
40,77 
70,80 
97.60 
55.83 
11,44 
1312.37 
1091,85 
372,62 
399,24 
112,80 
206,14 
1,04 
220,52 
630.57 
415,28 
312,81 
102,47 
122,11 
91,51 
28,10 
0,10 
2,40 
93,18 
209.76 
113,13 
94,11 
2,53 
0.41 
1.70 
0,42 
31.20 
31,09 
0.10 
-33.65 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
-33.65 
-33.65 
2001-02 
2976.55 
633.37 
477,96 
176.31 
203,80 
57,01 
0,00 
40,84 
0,00 
78,06 
53,25 
24,10 
1422.31 
1159,52 
404,53 
455.62 
170,55 
127,58 
1,23 
252,79 
668.77 
523,13 
478,61 
13.10 
113,11 
89,98 
22,48 
0,08 
0,58 
32,53 
257.86 
172,20 
82.86 
2.80 
0,33 
2,19 
0,28 
25.65 
25,56 
0,09 
-57.62 
-16.23 
-0.53 
-15.70 
0.00 
0.00 
-41.39 
-41.39 
(In 
2003-04 
3468.79 
675.94 
567,90 
121,06 
305,24 
67.32 
0.08 
39,88 
34,34 
62,29 
45.75 
1812.08 
1446,55 
509,19 
564,46 
203,98 
157,28 
1.53 
355.53 
643.03 
465.35 
359.92 
105,43 
105,73 
92,37 
13,28 
0,07 
0,00 
71,95 
317.00 
215,10 
98,80 
3,10 
0,29 
2,37 
0,45 
20.74 
20,64 
0,10 
-145.40 
-136.56 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
-136.56 
-8.84 
-8.84 
Rs. Crore) 
2005-06 
4989.88 
1198.66 
1007.54 
127.38 
691.93 
81.14 
0.05 
52.42 
54.72 
71.64 
95.73 
2668.78 
2230.56 
678.58 
698.14 
694.82 
157.36 
1.65 
438.21 
814.63 
668.77 
513.34 
139,00 
87.21 
77.61 
9.05 
0.55 
0.00 
58,64 
296.98 
175,47 
117.91 
3.61 
0.22 
2.87 
0.51 
28.95 
24.99 
0.07 
3.89 
0.00 
Source; Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective years. 
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Table A5.5 
Recovery Rate in Provisions of Services in Social Services 
(In Percent) 
Major 
head Details 
SOCIAL SERVICES 
Education, Sports, Art and Culture 
2202 
01 
02 
03 
04 
05 
80 
2203 
2204 
2205 
General Education 
Elementary Education 
Secondary Education 
University Higher 
Education 
Adult Education 
Language Development 
General 
Technical Education 
Sports & Youth Welfare 
Art & Culture 
Health and Family Welfare 
2210 
01+02 
03+04 
05 
06 
80 
2211 
Medical & Public Health 
Urban health Services 
Rural Health Services 
Med. Edu. Trng. And 
Research 
Public Health 
General 
Family Welfare 
Water Supply, Sanitation, Housing 
and Urban Development 
2215 
01 
02 
2216 
01 
02 
03 
80 
2217 
Water Supply &. 
Sanitation 
Water Supply 
Sewerage & Sanitation 
Housing 
Government Residential 
Buildings 
Urban Housing for urban 
poor 
Rural Housing 
General 
Urban Development 
Social Welfare and Welfare of SC, 
ST, OBC 
2225 
2230 
2235 
01 
02 
03 
Welfare of SCs, STs and 
OBCs 
Labour & Employment 
Social Security & Welfare 
Rehabilitation 
Social Welfare 
Other Social Security 
Schemes 
Other Social Services 
2220 
2221 
2250 
2252 
Source: 
Information & Publicity 
Broadcasting 
Other social services 
Basic Data - Governme 
1990-91 
3.70 
9.69 
10.47 
4.87 
16.82 
23.62 
0.00 
0.00 
4.53 
10.89 
0.06 
0.00 
1.47 
1.59 
4.27 
0.00 
0.09 
0.42 
0.00 
1.04 
1.09 
0.01 
0.01 
0.00 
4.98 
7.74 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.35 
3.84 
0.00 
4.96 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
2.98 
3.62 
0,00 
0.00 
'nt of Uttc 
1993-94 
2.91 
7.18 
9.31 
1.09 
11.76 
50.25 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.47 
0.42 
0.47 
1.45 
1.77 
0.66 
0.00 
0.05 
7.11 
0.00 
0.47 
1.60 
0.04 
0.04 
0.00 
6.15 
7.80 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.49 
2.88 
0.00 
4.24 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
1.27 
1.53 
0.00 
0.00 
ir Prades 
1995-96 
3.20 
7.20 
8.67 
1.23 
18.67 
1.24 
0.15 
0.00 
0.00 
0.54 
1.45 
1.70 
0.86 
0.93 
1.56 
0.00 
0.04 
1.78 
0.00 
0.57 
1.83 
0.03 
0.04 
0.00 
6.37 
8.11 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
6.52 
5.71 
0.00 
9.36 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
1.57 
1.58 
0,00 
0.00 
h, Financ 
1998-99 
4.28 
10.04 
10.86 
0.07 
21.85 
7.95 
0.00 
0.00 
0.08 
3.87 
0.35 
36.62 
1.32 
0.61 
1.19 
0.00 
0.14 
1.02 
0.00 
4.66 
0.55 
0.04 
0.05 
0.00 
2,64 
3.49 
0.00 
0.00 
0.12 
0.05 
5.58 
0.00 
11.64 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
10.06 
10.09 
0.00 
0,00 
e Accoun 
2001-02 
4.45 
11.85 
13.97 
0.58 
27.31 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
7.33 
0.34 
4.72 
2.18 
2.62 
7.12 
0.00 
0.00 
0.12 
0.00 
0.18 
2.16 
0.03 
0.03 
0.00 
6.54 
8.09 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
17.05 
3.20 
0.00 
9.34 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.64 
0,64 
0.00 
0.00 
ts for res 
2003-04 
2.21 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
2.33 
2.87 
7.74 
0.00 
0.00 
0,00 
0.00 
0.13 
3.81 
0.62 
0.80 
0.00 
8.96 
10.12 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
14.45 
2.89 
0.00 
8.73 
0,00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
1.80 
1.81 
0.00 
0.00 
pective y 
2005-06 
3.01 
6.20 
0.04 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
17.17 
0.00 
0.78 
72.80 
1.55 
13,07 
1.50 
1,75 
2.71 
0.12 
0.12 
10.77 
0,00 
0,23 
1.64 
0,25 
0,00 
0,00 
11.19 
12.40 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
1.44 
4.09 
0,00 
9,70 
0,00 
0.00 
0,00 
0,00 
23.85 
0,35 
0,00 
59.62 
ears. 
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Table A5.6 
Recoveries in 
Major 
head 
Details 
SOCIAL SERVICES 
Education, Sports, Art and Culture 
2202 
01 
02 
03 
04 
05 
80 
2203 
2204 
2205 
General Education 
Elementary Education 
Secondary Education 
University Higher Education 
Adult Education 
Language Development 
General 
Technical Education 
Sports & Youth Welfare 
Art & Culture 
Health and Family Welfare 
2210 
01+02 
03+04 
05 
06 
80 
2211 
Medical & Public Health 
Urban health Services 
Rural Health Services 
Medical Education Training 
And Research 
Public Health 
General 
Family Welfare 
Water Supply, SatAitation, Housmg and 
Urban Development 
2215 
01 
02 
2216 
01 
02 
03 
80 
2217 
Water Supply & Sanitation 
i) Water Supply 
ii) Sev\/erage & Sanitation 
Housing 
Government Residential 
Buildings 
Urban Housing for urban poor 
Rural Housing 
General 
Urban Development 
Social Welfare and Welfare of SC, ST, 
OBC 
2225 
2230 
2235 
01 
02 
03 
Welfare of SCs, STs and OBCs 
Labour & Employment 
Social Security & Welfare 
Rehabilitation 
Social Welfare 
Other Social Security Schemes 
Other Social Services 
2220 
2221 
2252 
Source 
Information & Publicity 
Broadcasting 
Other social services 
Basic Data - Governme 
Social Services as a 
1990-
91 
0.08 
0.05 
0.05 
0.01 
0.03 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0,01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
nt of Utta 
1993-
04 
0.06 
0.04 
0.04 
0.00 
0.02 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0,00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
r Prades 
1995-
96 
0.07 
0.04 
0,04 
0.00 
0.04 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.01 
0,00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0,00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0,00 
0,00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
T, Financ 
per cent of GSDP 
1998-
99 
0.09 
0.05 
0.05 
0.00 
0.05 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0,00 
0.00 
0,00 
0,00 
0.01 
0,00 
0,01 
0,00 
0,00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
3 Accoun 
2001-
02 
0.07 
0.04 
0.04 
0.00 
0.04 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.02 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0.00 
0.00 
0,00 
0.00 
0.00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
ts for res 
2003-
04 
0.03 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.02 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
pective y 
2005-
06 
0.06 
0.03 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0,02 
0.00 
0,01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0,00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0,00 
0.00 
0,00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0,00 
0.00 
0.00 
0,00 
0.00 
0,00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0,00 
0,00 
0.00 
0.00 : 
0.00 \ 
3ars. 
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Table A5.7 
Major 
head 
Costs in Social Services as a per cent of GSDP 
Details 
SOCIAL SERVICES 
Education, Sports, Art and Culture 
2202 
01 
02 
03 
04 
05 
80 
2203 
2204 
2205 
General Education 
Elementary Education 
Secondary Education 
University Higher 
Education 
Adult Education 
Language Development 
General 
Technical Education 
Sports & Youth Welfare 
Art & Culture 
Health and Family Welfare 
2210 
01+02 
03+04 
05 
06 
80 
2211 
Medicals Public Health 
Urban health Services 
Rural Health Services 
Med. Edu. Trng. And 
Research 
Public Health 
General 
Family Welfare 
Water Supply, Sanitation, Housing 
and Urban Development 
2215 
01 
02 
2216 
01 
02 
03 
80 
2217 
Water Supply & 
Sanitation 
i) Water Supply 
ii) Sewerage & Sanitation 
Housing 
Government Residential 
Buildings 
Urban Housing for urban 
poor 
Rural Housing 
General 
Urban Development 
Social Welfare and Welfare of SC, 
ST, OBC 
2225 
2230 
2235 
01 
02 
03 
Welfare of SCs, STs and 
OBCs 
Labour & Employment 
Social Security & Welfare 
Rehabilitation 
Social Welfare 
Other Social Security 
Schemes 
Other Social Services 
2220 
2221 
2250 
2252 
Information & Publicity 
Broadcasting 
Other social services 
1990-
91 
2.09 
0.55 
0.44 
0.17 
0.19 
0.03 
0.03 
0.02 
0.01 
0.06 
0.03 
0.01 
0.99 
0.77 
0.27 
0.24 
0.09 
0.17 
0.00 
0.22 
0.41 
0.31 
0.30 
0.01 
0.09 
0.06 
0.02 
0.00 
0.01 
0.02 
0.12 
0.03 
0.09 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
1993-
04 
2.09 
0.50 
0.38 
0.12 
0.20 
0.02 
0.01 
0,02 
0.01 
0.06 
0.04 
0.01 
1.14 
0.85 
0.28 
0.29 
0.10 
0.19 
0.00 
0.29 
0.32 
0.23 
0.21 
0.01 
0.08 
0.06 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.11 
0.03 
0.08 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
1995-
96 
2.03 
0.62 
0.50 
0.20 
0.22 
0.03 
0.00 
0,02 
0.03 
0.07 
0.04 
0.01 
0.96 
0.75 
0.27 
0.24 
0.08 
0.16 
0.00 
0.20 
0.33 
0.23 
0.21 
0.03 
0.08 
0.07 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.11 
0.04 
0.06 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0,02 
0.00 
0.00 
1998-
99 
2.01 
0.63 
0.52 
0.17 
0.25 
0.02 
0.01 
0.03 
0.04 
0,06 
0.03 
0.01 
0.83 
0.68 
0,23 
0.25 
0.07 
0.13 
0.00 
0.14 
0.39 
0.26 
0.19 
0.06 
0.08 
0.06 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.05 
0.14 
0.07 
0.07 
0.00 
0.00 
0,00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
2001-
02 
1.65 
0.38 
0.29 
0.09 
0.15 
0.03 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.04 
0.03 
0.01 
0.76 
0.63 
0.23 
0,24 
0,09 
0.07 
0.00 
0.14 
0.36 
0.27 
0.25 
0.01 
0.06 
0.05 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.14 
0.09 
0.05 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
2003-
04 
1,58 
0.30 
0,25 
0,05 
0.14 
0.03 
0.00 
0.02 
0.02 
0.00 
0.03 
0.02 
0.83 
0.66 
0.25 
0.25 
0.09 
0.07 
0.00 
0.15 
0.30 
0.21 
0.16 
0.05 
0.05 
0.05 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.04 
0.15 
0.10 
0.05 
0.00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0.01 
0,01 
0,00 
0,00 
2005- ; 
06 i 
1.89 
0.47 
0.37 
0.05 
0,25 
0,03 \ 
0.00 ! 
0.02 
0.02 
0.03 
0,03 
0,04 
0.99 
0,83 
0.25 
0,25 
0,25 
0,06 
0.00 
0,16 
0.30 
0,24 
0,19 
0,05 
0.04 
0.03 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0,02 
0.11 
0.06 
0,05 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0.01 
0,01 
0,00 
0,00 
Source; Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective years. 
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Table A5.8 
Subsidies in 
Major 
head Details 
SOCIAL SERVICES 
Education, Sports, Art and Culture 
2202 
01 
02 
03 
04 
05 
80 
2203 
2204 
2205 
General Education 
Elementary Education 
Secondary Education 
University Higher 
Education 
Adult Education 
^Language Development 
General 
Technical Education 
Sports & Youth Welfare 
Art & Culture 
Health and Family Welfare 
2210 
01+02 
03+04 
05 
06 
80 
2211 
Medical & Public Health 
Urban health Services 
Rural Health Services 
Med. Edu. Trng. And 
Research 
Public Health 
General 
Family Welfare 
Water Supply, Sanitation, Housing 
and Urban Development 
2215 
01 
02 
2216 
01 
02 
03 
80 
2217 
Water Supply & 
Sanitation 
Water Supply 
Sewerage & Sanitation 
Housing 
Government Residential 
Buildings 
Urban Housing for urban 
poor 
Rural Housing 
General 
Urban Development 
Social Welfare and Welfare of SC, 
ST, OBC 
2225 
2230 
2235 
01 
02 
03 
Welfare of SCs, STs and 
OBCs 
Labour & Employment 
Social Security & Welfare 
Rehabilitation 
Social Welfare 
Other Social Security 
Schemes 
Other Social Services 
2220 
2221 
2250 
2252 
Information & Publicity 
Broadcasting 
Other social services 
Social Services as a per cent 
1990-
91 
2.01 
0.49 
0.40 
0.16 
0.15 
0.02 
0.03 
0.02 
0.01 
0.05 
0.03 
0.01 
0.97 
0.75 
0.26 
0.24 
0.09 
0.17 
0.00 
0.22 
0.41 
0.31 
0.30 
0.01 
0.08 
0.05 
0.02 
0.00 
0.01 
0.02 
0.11 
0.03 
0.09 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
1993-
04 
2.03 
0.46 
0.34 
0.12 
0.18 
0.01 
0.01 
0.02 
0.01 
0.06 
0.04 
0.01 
1.12 
0.84 
0.28 
0.29 
0.10 
0.17 
0.00 
0.28 
0.31 
0.23 
0.21 
0.01 
0.08 
0.06 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.11 
0.03 
0.07 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
1995-
96 
1.97 
0.57 
0.46 
0.20 
0.18 
0.03 
0.00 
0.02 
0.03 
0.07 
0.04 
0.01 
0.95 
0.75 
0.27 
0.24 
0.08 
0.16 
0,00 
0,20 
0.32 
0,23 
0,21 
0,03 
0,08 
0.06 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.10 
0.04 
0.06 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.02 
0.00 
0,00 
1998-
99 
1.92 
0.56 
0,46 
0,17 
0.20 
0.01 
0.01 
0.03 
0.04 
0,06 
0,03 
0,01 
0.81 
0,68 
0,23 
0.25 
0,07 
0.13 
0,00 
0,14 
0.39 
0,26 
0,19 
0,06 
0,08 
0.06 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.06 
0.13 
0.07 
0.06 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.02 
0,00 
0,00 
t Of GSDP 
2001-
02 
1.58 
0.33 
0,25 
0.09 
0.11 
0.03 
0.00 
0,02 
0,00 
0,04 
0,03 
0,01 
0.75 
0.61 
0.21 
0.24 
0.09 
0.07 
0.00 
0.14 
0.35 
0.27 
0.25 
0.01 
0.06 
0.05 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0,02 
0.14 
0.09 
0,04 
0,00 
0,00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
2003-
04 
1.54 
0.30 
0.25 
0.05 
0.14 
0.03 
0.00 
0.02 
0.02 
0,00 
0,03 
0,02 
0.81 
0,64 
0,23 
0,25 
0,09 
0.07 
0.00 
0.16 
0.29 
0.21 
0.16 
0.05 
0,05 
0,04 
0,01 
0.00 
0,00 
0,03 
0.14 
0.10 
0,04 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
2005-
06 
1.83 
0.44 
0.37 
0.05 1 
0,25 
0,03 
0,00 ' 
0,02 
0.02 
0.01 
0.03 . 
0,03 
0,97 
0.81 
0.25 
0.25 
0.25 
0.06 
0.00 
0.16 
0.30 
0.24 
0.19 
0.05 
0.03 
0,03 
0,00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.11 
0.06 
0.04 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.01 
0.00 
0.001 
Source: Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective years. 
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Table A5.9 
Par Capita Subsidies in Social Services 
In Rs.j 
Major 
Head Details 
SOCIAL SERVICES 
Education, Sports, Art and Culture 
2202 
01 
02 
03 
04 
05 
80 
2203 
2204 
2205 
General Education 
Elementary Education 
Secondary Education 
University Higher 
Education 
Adult Education 
Language Development 
General 
Technical Education 
Sports & Youth Welfare 
Art & Culture 
Health and Family Welfare 
2210 
01+02 
03+04 
05 
06 
80 
2211 
Medicals Public Health 
Urban health Services 
Rural Health Sen/ices 
(Vied. Edu. Trng. And 
Research 
Public Health 
General 
Family Welfare 
Water Supply, Sanitation, Housing 
and Urban Development 
2215 
01 
02 
2216 
01 
02 
03 
80 
2217 
Water Supply & 
Sanitation 
Water Supply 
Sewerage & Sanitation 
Housing 
Government Residential 
Buildings 
Urban Housing for urban 
poor 
Rural Housing 
General 
Urban Development 
Social Welfare and Welfare of SC, 
ST, OBC 
2225 
2230 
2235 
01 
02 
03 
Welfare of SCs, STs and 
OBCs 
Labour & Employment 
Social Security & Welfare 
Rehabilitation 
Social Welfare 
Other Social Security 
Schemes 
Other Social Services 
2220 
2221 
2250 
2252 
Information & Publicity 
Broadcasting 
Other social services 
1990-
91 
98.50 
24.22 
19,51 
8.04 
7.60 
1.03 
1.42 
1.14 
0.28 
2.59 
1.65 
0.48 
47.72 
36.97 
12.53 
11.58 
4.54 
8.30 
0.03 
10.75 
19.97 
14.98 
14.65 
0.33 
4.12 
2.57 
0.86 
0.01 
0.68 
0.88 
5.53 
1.26 
4.23 
0.04 
0.02 
00.00 
0.02 
1.06 
0.86 
0.01 
0.19 
1993-
94 
121.89 
27.64 
20.51 
7.14 
10.71 
0.59 
0.45 
1.28 
0.34 
3.85 
2.55 
0.73 
67.53 
50.45 
16.71 
17,38 
5.90 
10.41 
0,06 
17,08 
18.89 
13,55 
12,68 
0,87 
4.55 
3.52 
0.95 
0.01 
0.07 
0.79 
6.54 
2,06 
4.38 
0.10 
0.02 
0.06 
0,02 
1.29 
1.07 
0.01 
0.21 
1995-
96 
149.12 
43.44 
34.58 
14.88 
13,38 
2.06 
0.19 
1.61 
2.46 
5.07 
2.81 
0.98 
72.10 
56.85 
20.12 
18.49 
6,38 
11,86 
0,00 
15,25 
24.22 
17,68 
15,71 
1.98 
5,94 
4,58 
1,27 
0.01 
0.08 
0.60 
7.59 
3,00 
4,46^ 
0,13 
0.02 
0.09 
0,02 
1.76 
1.76 
0.01 
0.00 
1998-
99 
196.89 
57.83 
47.34 
17,93 
20,13 
1.46 
0,72 
2,50 
4,51 
6,21 
3,56 
0.73 
83.56 
69.52 
23.73 
25.42 
7,18 
13,13 
0,07 
14,04 
40.15 
26,44 
19.92 
6.52 
7,77 
5.83 
1.79 
0.01 
0.15 
5,93 
13.36 
7,20 
5.99 
0,16 
0,03 
0.11 
0,03 
1.99 
1.98 
0.01 
0,00 
2001-
02 
178.72 
37.63 
28.40 
10.48 
12.11 
3.39 
0.00 
2.43 
0.00 
4.64 
3.16 
1.43 
84.51 
68.90 
24.04 
27.07 
10,13 
7,58 
0.07 
15,61 
39.74 
31,08 
28.44 
0.78 
6.72 
5.35 
1.34 
0.00 
0.03 
1.93 
15.32 
10.23 
4.92 
0.17 
0.02 
0.13 
0.02 
1.52 
1.52 
0.01 
0.00 
2003-
04 
197.91 
38.57 
32.40 
6.91 
17,42 
3,84 
0,00 
2,28 
1,96 
0,00 
3,55 
2,61 
103.39 
82.53 
29.05 
32.21 
11,64 
9,54 
0.09 
20,86 
36.69 
26.55 
20.54 
6.02 
6.03 
5.27 
0.76 
0.00 
0.00 
4.11 
18.09 
12,27 
5.64 
0.18 
0,02 
0,14 
0,03 
1.18 
1.18 
0.01 
0.00 
2005-
06 
274.73 
65.76 
55,28 
6,99 
37,95 
4,45 
0,00 
2,88 
3,00 
1.30 
3,93 
5,25 
146.40 
122,36 
37,23 
38,30 
38,12 
8,63 
0,09 
24,04 
44.69 
36,69 
28,16 
7.63 
4,78 
4,26 
0,50 
0,03 
0,00 
3,22 
16.29 
9,63 
5.47 
0,20 
0,01 
0.16 
0,03 
1.59 
1.37 
0,00 
0.21 
Source: Basic Data -Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective years. 
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Table A5.10 
Par Capita Subsidies in Social Services 
(At Constant Prices 1999-00) 
In Rs 
Major 
head Details 
SOCIAL SERVICES 
Education, Sports, Art and Culture 
2202 
01 
02 
03 
04 
05 
80 
2203 
2204 
2205 
General Education 
Elementary Education 
Secondary Education 
University Higher 
Education 
Adult Education 
Language Development 
General 
Technical Education 
Sports & Youth Welfare 
Art & Culture 
Health and Family Welfare 
2210 
01+02 
03+04 
05 
06 
80 
2211 
Medical & Public Health 
Urban health Services 
Rural Health Services 
Med. Edu. Trng. And 
Research 
Public Health 
General 
Family Welfare 
Water Supply, Sanitation, Housing 
and Urban Development 
2215 
01 
02 
2216 
01 
02 
03 
80 
2217 
Water Supply & 
Sanitation 
Water Supply 
Sewerage & Sanitation 
Housing 
Government Residential 
Buildings 
Urban Housing for urban 
poor 
Rural Housing 
General 
Urban Development 
Social Welfare and Welfare of SC, 
ST, OBC 
2225 
2230 
2235 
01 
02 
03 
Welfare of SCs, STs and 
OBCs 
Labour & Employment 
Social Security & Welfare 
Rehabilitation 
Social Welfare 
Other Social Security 
Schemes 
Other Social Services 
2220 
2221 
2250 
2252 
Information & Publicity 
Broadcasting 
Other social services 
1990-
91 
209.57 
51.53 
41.51 
17.11 
16.16 
2.20 
3.02 
2.43 
0.59 
5.51 
3.50 
1.01 
101.53 
78.66 
26.66 
24.63 
9.66 
17.66 
0.06 
22.87 
42.50 
31.87 
31.17 
0.70 
8.76 
5.47 
1.82 
0.03 
1.44 
1.87 
11.77 
2.67 
9.01 
0.09 
0.04 
0.01 
0.05 
2,25 
1.83 
0.01 
0.40 
1993-
94 
191.51 
43.42 
32.22 
11.21 
16.83 
0.93 
0.70 
2.01 
0.53 
6.05 
4.01 
1.14 
106.11 
79.27 
26,25 
27.30 
9.27 
16.36 
0.09 
26.84 
29.69 
21.29 
19.92 
1.37 
7.15 
5.53 
1.49 
0.02 
0.11 
1.24 
10.28 
3.24 
6.88 
0.16 
0.03 
0.09 
0.03 
2.02 
1.68 
0.01 
0.34 
1995-
96 
194.83 
56.75 
45.18 
19.44 
17.48 
2.69 
0.25 
2.11 
3.21 
6.63 
3.67 
1.28 
94.21 
74.28 
26.28 
24.16 
8.33 
15.50 
0.01 
19.93 
31.65 
23.11 
20,52 
2.58 
7.76 
5,99 
1.66 
0.01 
0.10 
0.78 
9.92 
3.92 
5.82 
0.17 
0.03 
0.11 
0.03 
2.30 
2.29 
0.01 
0.00 
1998-
99 
201.12 
59.08 
48.35 
18.31 
20.56 
1,49 
0.74 
2.65 
4.51 
6.35 
3.63 
0.74 
85.36 
71.01 
24,24 
25.97 
7.34 
13.41 
0.07 
14.34 
41.01 
27.01 
20.35 
6,66 
7,94 
5.95 
1.83 
0.01 
0.16 
6.06 
13.64 
7.36 
6.12 
0.16 
0,03 
0,11 
0,03 
2.03 
2.02 
0.01 
0.00 
2001-
02 
176.95 
37.26 
28.12 
10.37 
11.99 
3.35 
0.00 
2.40 
0.00 
4.59 
3.13 
1.42 
83.67 
68.21 
23.80 
26.80 
10,03 
7,51 
0,07 
15,45 
39.34 
30,77 
28.16 
0.77 
6.65 
5.29 
1.32 
0.00 
0.03 
1.91 
15.17 
10.13 
4,87 
0.16 
0.02 
0.13 
0.02 
1.51 
1,50 
0.01 
0.00 
2003-
04 
175.14 
34.13 
28.67 
6.11 
15.41 
3.40 
0,00 
2,01 
1,73 
0,00 
3,15 
2,31 
91.49 
73.04 
25.71 
28,50 
10.30 
8,45 
0,08 
18,46 
32.47 
23.50 
18,17 
5,32 
5.34 
4,66 
0,67 
0,00 
0,00 
3.53 
16.01 
10.86 
4.99 
0.16 
0.01 
0.12 
0,02 
1.05 
1,04 
0,00 
0.00 
2005- 1 
06 : 
219.78 1 
52.61 
44,22 
5.59 
30.37 , 
3.55 
0.00 
2.30 
2.40 
1.04 
3.14 
4.20 
117,12 
97.89 
29.78 
30.64 
30,49 
6.91 
0,07 
19,23 i 
35.75 • 
29,35 
22,53 
6,10 
3,83 
3,41 
0.40 
0.02 
0,00 
2.57 
13.03 
7.70 
5.17 
0.15 
0.01 
0.13 
0.02 
1.27 
1.10 
0.00 
0.00 
Source: Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective years. 
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Table A5.11 
Sectoral Shares of Implicit Budgetary Subsidies within Social Services 
Major 
head Details 
Education, Sports, Art and Culture 
2202 
01 
02 
03 
04 
05 
80 
2203 
2204 
2205 
General Education 
Elementary Education 
Secondary Education 
University Higher 
Education 
Adult Education 
Language Development 
General 
Technical Education 
Sports & Youth Welfare 
Art & Culture 
Health and Family Welfare 
2210 
01+02 
03+04 
05 
06 
80 
2211 
Medicals Public Health 
Urban health Services 
Rural Health Services 
Med. Edu. Trng. And 
Research 
Public Health 
General 
Family Welfare 
Water Supply, Sanitation, Housing 
and Urban Development 
2215 
01 
02 
2216 
01 
02 
03 
80 
2217 
Water Supply & 
Sanitation 
i) Water Supply 
11) Sewerage & Sanitation 
Housing 
Government Residential 
Buildings 
Urban Housing for urban 
poor 
Rural Housing 
General 
Urban Development 
Social Welfare and Welfare of SC, 
ST, OBC 
2225 
2230 
2235 
01 
02 
03 
Welfare of SCs, STs and 
OBCs 
Labour & Employment 
Social Security & Welfare 
Rehabilitation 
Social Welfare 
Other Social Security 
Schemes 
Other Social Services 
2220 
2221 
2250 
2252 
Information & Publicity 
Broadcasting 
Other social services 
1990-
91 
100.00 
24.59 
19.81 
8.16 
7.71 
1.05 
1.44 
1.16 
0,28 
2.63 
1.67 
0.48 
48.45 
37.54 
12.72 
11.75 
4.61 
8.43 
0.03 
10.91 
20.28 
15.21 
14.87 
0.34 
4.18 
2.61 
0.87 
0,01 
0.69 
0.89 
5.61 
1.28 
4.30 
0.04 
0.02 
0.00 
0.02 
1.07 
0.87 
0.01 
0.19 
1993-
94 
100.00 
22.67 
16,82 
5.85 
8.79 
0.49 
0.37 
1,05 
0.28 
3.16 
2,09 
0.60 
55.40 
41,39 
13,71 
14.26 
4.84 
8.54 
0.05 
14.02 
15.50 
11.12 
10.40 
0.72 
3,73 
2.89 
0.78 
0.01 
0.06 
0.65 
5.37 
1.69 
3.59 
0.08 
0.02 
0.05 
0.02 
1.06 
0.87 
0.00 
0.18 
1995-
96 
100.00 
29.13 
23.19 
9.98 
8.97 
1.38 
0.13 
1.08 
1.65 
3.40 
1.88 
0.56 
48.35 
38.13 
13.49 
12.40 
4.28 
7.95 
0.00 
10.23 
16.24 
11.86 
10.53 
1.33 
3.99 
3.07 
0.85 
0.00 
0.05 
0.40 
5.09 
2.01 
2.99 
0.09 
0.01 
0.06 
0.01 
1.18 
1.18 
0.00 
0.00 
1998-
99 
100.00 
29.37 
24.04 
9.10 
10.23 
0.74 
0.37 
1,32 
2.29 
3.16 
1.81 
0.37 
42.44 
35.31 
12.05 
12.91 
3.65 
6.67 
0.03 
7.13 
20.39 
13.43 
10.12 
3.31 
3,95 
2.96 
0,91 
0.00 
0.08 
3.01 
6.78 
3,66 
3.04 
0.08 
0,01 
0.05 
0.01 
1.01 
1.01 
0.00 
0.00 
2001-
02 
100.00 
21.06 
15.89 
5.86 
6.78 
1.90 
0.00 
1.36 
0.00 
2.60 
1.77 
0.80 
47.28 
38.55 
13.45 
15.15 
5.67 
4.24 
0.04 
8.74 
22.23 
17.39 
15.91 
0.44 
3.05 
2.66 
0,38 
0.00 
0.00 
1.08 
8.57 
5.72 
2.75 
0.09 
0.01 
0.07 
0.01 
0.85 
0.85 
0.00 
0.00 
2003-
04 
100.00 
19.49 
16.37 
3.49 
8.80 
1.94 
0.00 
1.15 
0.99 
0.00 
1.80 
1,32 
52.24 
41,70 
14,68 
16.27 
5.88 
4.82 
0.05 
10.54 
18.54 
13.42 
10.38 
3.04 
3.05 
2.66 
0.38 
0.00 
0.00 
2.07 
9.14 
6.20 
2.85 
0,09 
0,01 
0,07 
0,01 
0.60 
0,60 
0.00 
0.00 
2005-
06 
100,00 
23.94 
20,12 
2.54 
13.82 
1.62 
0.00 
1.05 
1,09 
0,47 
1.43 
1.91 
53.29 
44.54 
13.55 
13.94 
13.87 
3.14 
0.03 
8.75 
16.27 
13.35 
10.25 
2.78 
1.74 
1.55 
0.18 
0.01 
0.00 
1.17 
5.93 
3.50 
2.35 
0.07 
0.00 
0.06 
0,01 
0.58 
0.50 
0.00 
0.08 
Source: Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective years. 
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Table A5.13 
Recoveries Made in Economic Services 
Major 
head Details 
Economic Services Subsidised 
Sectors 
Agriculture And Allied Services 
2401 
2402 
2403 
2404 
2405 
2406 
2407 
2408 
2415 
2416 
2425 
2435 
Crop Husbandry 
Soil and Water 
Conservation 
Animal Husbandry 
Dairy Development 
Fisheries 
Forestry & Wild Life 
Plantations 
Food Storage & 
Warehousing 
Agr. Research & Education 
Investment In Agri. Fin. 
Instl. 
Co-operation 
Other Agricultural 
Programmes 
Rural Development 
2501 
2505 
2515 
2551 
2575 
Spl. Programmes for Rural 
Dev. 
Rural Employment 
Other Rural Dev. 
Programmes 
Hill Areas 
Other Special Area 
Programmes 
Irrigation and Flood Control 
2701 
2702 
2705 
2711 
Major & Medium Irrigation 
Minor Irrigation 
Command Area 
Development 
Flood Control 
Energy 
2801 
2810 
Power 
Non-conventional Energy 
Sources 
Industries And IVIinerals 
2851 
2852 
2875/ 
85 
Village & Small Scale 
Industries 
Industries 
Other Industries 
1990-91 
175.90 
102.50 
8.47 
1.40 
2.54 
0.09 
0.56 
88.09 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
1.33 
0.00 
9.12 
0.00 
0.00 
6.60 
2.52 
0.00 
43.77 
35.03 
6.59 
0.73 
1.42 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
2.32 
1.74 
0.45 
0.13 
1993-94 
251.38 
22.77 
15.61 
0.00 
3.22 
0.10 
1.03 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
1.47 
1.35 
7.82 
0.00 
0.00 
5.78 
2.00 
0.04 
183.14 
161.23 
21.91 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
4.33 
1.84 
0.83 
1.66 
1995-96 
258.07 
38.48 
21.23 
2.32 
5.61 
3.18 
1.54 
0.75 
0.00 
0.20 
0,00 
0.00 
3.62 
0.03 
35.59 
0.00 
0.00 
32.57 
2.37 
0.65 
144.54 
103.95 
40.58 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
11.53 
9.74 
1.64 
0.14 
1998-99 
318.24 
158.53 
17.57 
0.00 
6.77 
1.43 
1.73 
125.91 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
2.27 
2.87 
40.77 
0.00 
0.00 
31.10 
8.00 
1.67 
84.21 
49.13 
35.09 
0.00 
0.00 
0.04 
0.04 
0.00 
5.82 
1.20 
2.58 
2.04 
2001-02 
348.94 
166.26 
75.77 
0.00 
8.13 
0.70 
1.91 
68.31 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
11.43 
0.00 
23.80 
0.00 
0.00 
23.71 
0.06 
0.03 
133.49 
115.76 
17.73 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
1.71 
1.53 
0.03 
0.15 
(InRs. 
2003-04 
598.24 
270.97 
195.68 
0.00 
8.55 
0.32 
2.56 
60.96 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.43 
2.46 
120.45 
0.00 
0.00 
45.18 
0.00 
75.27 
154.62 
136.10 
18.53 
0.00 
0.00 
1.54 
0.00 
1.54 
6.09 
5.95 
0.05 
0.08 
Crore) 
2005-06 
370.39 
63.40 
40.81 
0.00 
10.61 
2.37 
2.35 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
4.26 
3.00 
33.51 
0.00 
0.00 
33.14 
0.00 
0.37 
198.71 
177.50 
20.64 
0.57 
0.00 
2.35 
0.00 
2.35 
4.51 
3.43 
1.00 
0.07 
Continued. 
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Table A5.13 Continued 
Recoveries Made in Economic Services 
?*T 1 Details head | 1990-91 1993-94 1995-96 1998-99 2001-02 
(InRs. 
2003-04 
Crore) 
2005-06 
Economic Services Subsidised Sectors 
Transport 
3053 
3054 
3055 
3056 
3075 
Civil Aviation 
Roads & Bridges 
Road Transport Services 
Inland Water Transport 
Other Transport Services 
Other Economic Services 
3425 
3452 
3453 
3454 
3455 
3456 
3465 
3475 
Other Scientific Research 
Tourism 
Foreign Trade/Export 
Promotion 
Census, Surveys & Statistics 
Meteorology 
Civil Supplies 
Gen. Fin. & Trading 
Institutions 
Other Gen. Eco. Services 
11.93 
0.12 
11.79 
0.01 
0.02 
0.00 
6.25 
0.00 
2.77 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.74 
0.00 
2.74 
17.92 
0.45 
17.32 
0.16 
0.00 
0.00 
15.40 
0.00 
6.32 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
5.41 
0.00 
3.66 
17.13 
0.19 
16.02 
0.91 
0.00 
0.00 
10.80 
0.00 
3.58 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
1.95 
0.00 
5.27 
22.32 
0.25 
22.06 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
6.54 
0.00 
4.21 
0.00 
0.00 
Q.QQ 
2.34 
0.00 
0.00 
18.48 
2.22 
16.27 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
5.19 
0.00 
1.99 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
3.20 
0.00 
0.00 
41.97 
0.17 
41.79 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
2.60 
0.00 
0.40 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
2.20 
0.00 
0.00 
65.88 
1.30 
55.40 
9,19 
0,00 
0,00 
2.02 
0,00 
0,31 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
1.72 
0.00 
0,00 
Economic Services - Surplus Sector 
Economic Services - Surplus Sector 
Agriculture And Allied Services 
2406 
2435 
Forestry & Wild Life 
Otiier Agricultural 
Programmes 
Energy 
2810 Non-conventional Energy Sources 
Industries And l\/linerals 
2853 Non-ferrous Mining and 
Metall. Ind. 
Transport 
3055 
3056 
Road Transport Services 
Inland Water Transport 
Other Economic Services 
3453 
3465 
3475 
Foreign Trade/Export 
Promotion 
Gen. Fin. & Trading 
Institutions 
Other Gen. Eco. Services 
14.81 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
14.81 
14.81 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
185.23 
121.16 
121.16 
0.00 
0.02 
0.02 
61.20 
61.20 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
2.8S 
0.19 
2.66 
0.00 
248.87 
100.33 
100.33 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
148.54 
148.54 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
161.86 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
146.80 
146.80 
0.99 
0.99 
0.00 
14.07 
0.00 
0.00 
14.07 
277.60 
6.32 
0.00 
6.32 
0.03 
0.03 
190.20 
190.20 
61.86 
61.80 
0.06 
19.20 
0.00 
0.00 
19.20 
375.89 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
251.05 
251.05 
103.60 
103.60 
0.00 
21.24 
0.00 
0.00 
21.24 
536.42 
161.98 
161.98 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
35540.32 
3554032 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
19.04 
0.00 
a 00 
19.04 
Source: Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective years. 
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Table A5.14 
Cost of Providing Services in Economic Services 
Major 
head 
Details 
Economic Services Subsidised 
Sectors 
Agriculture Arjd Allied Services 
2401 
2402 
2403 
2404 
2405 
2406 
2407 
2408 
2415 
2416 
2425 
2435 
Crop Husbandry 
Soil and Water 
Conservation 
Animal Husbandry 
Dairy Development 
Fisheries 
Forestry & Wi ld Life 
Plantations 
Food Storage & 
Warehousing 
Agr. Research & Education 
Investment in Agri. Fin. 
Insti. 
Co-operat ion 
Other Agricultural 
Programmes 
Rural Development 
2501 
2505 
2515 
2551 
2575 
Spl. Programmes for Rural 
Dev. 
Rural Employment 
Other Rural Dev. 
Programmes 
Hill Areas 
Other Special Area 
Programmes 
Irrigation and Flood Control 
2701 
2702 
2705 
2711 
Major & Med ium Irrigation 
Minor Irr igation 
Command Area 
Development 
Flood Control 
Energy 
2801 
2810 
Power 
Non-convent ional Energy 
Sources 
Industries And Minerals 
2851 
2852 
2875/ 
85 
Village & Small Scale 
Industries 
Industries 
Other Industries 
1990-91 
3376.68 
513.22 
162.54 
71.80 
66.54 
8.51 
5.37 
99.17 
6,87 
51.44 
18.24 
0.00 
19,60 
3,14 
545.67 
0,65 
0,00 
249,71 
286.71 
8.60 
1331.53 
836.64 
384,47 
44.21 
66.21 
420,10 
420.09 
0.00 
122.58 
83,44 
21,18 
17,97 
1993-94 
4633.90 
680.94 
351,62 
64,92 
103.73 
22.32 
12,02 
0,00 
6,73 
62,51 
11,74 
0,00 
42 .71 
2.63 
746.92 
15.65 
0.01 
342,94 
378,34 
9.99 
1758.33 
1073,54 
564,60 
35,24 
84.96 
700.82 
700,82 
0,00 
107.57 
82,77 
10,10 
14,70 
1995-96 
5903,19 
671.17 
295.81 
122.30 
117.15 
14.69 
9,50 
12,06 
8,29 
46,87 
12,61 
0,30 
27,65 
3,93 
961.21 
9.89 
0.01 
431.01 
492,20 
28.09 
2284.44 
1305.74 
821.35 
58.14 
99.21 
1100.75 
1100.75 
0.00 
142.72 
103.58 
11.82 
27,32 
1998-99 
8308,20 
1124.05 
436,93 
174,08 
153,71 
15,14 
11,47 
180.70 
11.41 
72.15 
13.78 
0.34 
49.13 
5.22 
1735.45 
4.92 
0.01 
840,03 
815,50 
75,00 
2688.69 
1658,66 
850,52 
55.10 
124.40 
1544.95 
1544,95 
0.00 
205.97 
93.73 
18.08 
94.16 
2001-02 
9342.39 
1331.72 
573.56 
281.72 
134.33 
16.96 
17.09 
164.91 
9.74 
82.61 
11.60 
1.36 
37.84 
0.00 
1811.82 
4.98 
0,01 
1242,89 
424,70 
139,23 
2813.74 
2153.44 
491,94 
66,82 
101,54 
2001.69 
2001,69 
0.00 
163.00 
94,62 
48,73 
19,65 
(InRs. 
2003-04 
11920,45 
1940,33 
671.11 
248.37 
193.14 
17.29 
16,27 
125,76 
3,15 
602,56 
16,38 
0.32 
40.34 
5.53 
2044.05 
6.98 
0.01 
1357.74 
438.38 
240.94 
3247.46 
2555.75 
470.14 
99.21 
122.35 
2897.40 
2885,44 
11.97 
250.56 
119.12 
113,08 
18,36 
Crore) 
2005-06 
11404.93 
1847.05 
772.68 
185.32 
187.95 
18.14 
24.74 
11.62 
4.35 
573.97 
17.78 
0.22 
43.98 
5,30 
2574,77 
10.88 
0.01 
1933,53 
334.13 
296.22 
2973,45 
2200,47 
536.34 
102,15 
134,50 
1586.87 
1574.99 
11.48 
438,00 
144.47 
267,12 
26.41 
Continued. 
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Table A5.14 Continued 
Cost of Providing Services in Economic Services 
Major 
head 
Details 
Transport 
3053 
3054 
3055 
3056 
3075 
Civil Aviation 
Roads & Bridges 
Road Transport Services 
Inland Water Transport 
Other Transport Services 
Other Economic Services 
3425 
3452 
3453 
3454 
3455 
3456 
3465 
3475 
Other Scientific Research 
Tourism 
Foreign Trade/Export 
Promotion 
Census, Surveys & Statistics 
Meteorology 
Civil Supplies 
Gen. Fin. & Trading 
Institutions 
Other Gen. Eco. Services 
Economic Services - Surplus Sector 
Agriculture And Allied Services 
2406 
2435 
Forestry & Wild Life 
Other Agricultural 
Programmes 
Energy 
2810 Non-conventional Energy Sources 
Industries And Minerals 
2853 Non-ferrous Mining and Me tall. Ind. 
Transport 
3055 
3056 
Road Transport Services 
Inland Water Transport 
Other Economic Services 
3453 
3465 
3475 
Source: 
Foreign Trade/Export 
Promotion 
Gen. Fin. & Trading 
Institutions 
Other Gen. Eco. Services 
Basic Data - Government of Ut 
1990-91 1993-94 1995-96 1998-99 
Economic Services Subsidised Sectors 
413.72 
0.85 
412.38 
0.48 
0.02 
0.00 
29.86 
1.14 
3.81 
0.60 
13.29 
0.19 
4.62 
0.95 
5.27 
Econom 
7.04 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
7.04 
7.04 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
tar Pradesh 
604.09 
1.28 
601.76 
1.00 
0.00 
0.06 
35.22 
1.07 
7.36 
0.00 
7.65 
0.19 
6.86 
0.00 
12.10 
c Services -
103.00 
98.77 
98.77 
0.00 
0.01 
0.01 
0.00 
4.13 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.04 
0.00 
0.04 
0.00 
1 Finance Ac 
697.74 
2.63 
693.62 
1.34 
0.08 
0.07 
45.17 
1.82 
14.17 
0.00 
10.22 
0.23 
8.97 
0.04 
9.73 
Surplus Se( 
101.57 
96.43 
96.43 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
5.14 
5.14 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
counts for t 
945.37 
8.09 
937.11 
0.00 
0.09 
0.07 
63.72 
1.76 
24.41 
0.40 
14.14 
0.23 
16.21 
6.57 
0.00 
tor 
21.91 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
7.97 
7.97 
0.12 
0.12 
0.00 
13.82 
0.00 
0.00 
13.82 
espective y 
2001-02 
1168.84 
8.03 
1159.91 
0.00 
0.00 
0.90 
51.58 
0.66 
28.73 
0.00 
17.58 
0.22 
4.35 
0.05 
0.00 
60.11 
5.03 
0.00 
5.03 
0.00 
0.00 
14.12 
14.12 
27.27 
27.27 
0.00 
13.69 
0.00 
0.00 
13.69 
ears. 
(InRs. 
2003-04 
1475.66 
10.35 
1463.57 
0.00 
0.00 
1.73 
64.98 
0.67 
37.46 
0.00 
21.62 
0.22 
4.96 
0.05 
0.00 
97.95 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
18.21 
18.21 
62.97 
62.97 
0.00 
16.78 
0.00 
0.00 
16.78 
Crore) 
2005-06 
1908.47 
13.34 
1840.57 
48.15 
0.00 
6.41 
76.72 
0.18 
36.97 
0.91 
32.73 
0.17 
5.72 
0.03 
0.00 
189.66 
151.97 
151.97 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
1914.42 
1914.42 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
18.54 
0.00 
0.00 
18.54 
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Table A5. 15 
Implicit Budgetary Subsidies in Economic Services 
Major 
head 
Details 
Economic Services Subsidised 
Sectors 
Agriculture And Allied Services 
2401 
2402 
2403 
2404 
2405 
2406 
2407 
2408 
2415 
2416 
2425 
2435 
Crop Husbandry 
Soil and Water 
Conservation 
Animal Husbandry 
Dairy Development 
Fisheries 
Forestry & Wild Life 
Plantations 
Food Storage & 
Warehousing 
Agr. Research & 
Education 
Investment in Agri. Fin. 
Insti. 
Co-operation 
Other Agricultural 
Programmes 
Rural Development 
2501 
2505 
2515 
2551 
2575 
Spl. Programmes for 
Rural Dev. 
Rural Employment 
Other Rural Dev. 
Programmes 
Hill Areas 
Other Special Area 
Programmes 
Irrigation and Flood Control 
2701 
2702 
2705 
2711 
Major & Medium 
Irrigation 
Minor Irrigation 
Command Area 
Development 
Flood Control 
Energy 
2801 
2810 
Power 
Non-conventional 
Energy Sources 
Industries And Minerals 
2851 
2852 
2875/ 
85 
Village & Small Scale 
Industries 
Industries 
Other Industries 
1990-91 
3200.78 
410.72 
154.07 
70.40 
63.99 
8.42 
4.82 
11.08 
6.S7 
51.43 
18.24 
0.00 
18.26 
3.14 
536.55 
0.65 
0.00 
243.11 
284.19 
8.60 
1287.76 
801.61 
377.88 
43.48 
64.80 
420.10 
420.09 
0.00 
120.26 
81.69 
20.73 
17.84 
1993-94 
4382.51 
658.17 
336.02 
64,92 
100.51 
22.22 
10.99 
0.00 
6.73 
62.51 
11.74 
0.00 
41.23 
1.29 
739.09 
15.65 
0.01 
337.16 
376.34 
9.95 
1575.19 
912.31 
542.69 
35.24 
84.96 
700.82 
700.82 
0.00 
103.25 
80.93 
9.28 
13.04 
1995-96 
5645.12 
632.68 
274.57 
119.99 
111.54 
11.52 
7.96 
11.30 
8.29 
46.67 
12.61 
0.30 
24.03 
3.90 
925.61 
9.89 
0.01 
398.44 
489.82 
27.44 
2139.91 
1201.79 
780.77 
58.14 
99.21 
1100.75 
1100.75 
0.00 
131.19 
93.83 
10.18 
27.18 
1998-99 
7989.97 
965.51 
419.36 
174,08 
146.94 
13,71 
9,74 
54.79 
11.41 
72.15 
13.78 
0.34 
45.86 
2.35 
1694.68 
4.92 
0.01 
808,93 
807.50 
73.33 
2604.47 
1609.54 
815.44 
55.10 
124,40 
1544.91 
1544,91 
0,00 
200.16 
92,53 
15,50 
92.12 
2001-02 
8993.45 
1165.46 
497.79 
281.72 
126.20 
15.25 
15.18 
96.60 
9.74 
82.61 
11.50 
1.35 
25.41 
0.00 
1788.01 
4.98 
0.01 
1219.17 
424.64 
139.20 
2680.25 
2037.58 
474.21 
56.82 
101.54 
2001.69 
2001.69 
0.00 
161.28 
93.09 
48,69 
19.50 
(InRs 
2003-04 
11322.21 
1669.36 
475.42 
248,37 
184.59 
16.98 
13.70 
64.80 
3.16 
602.56 
16.38 
0.32 
39.91 
3.17 
1923.60 
6,98 
0,01 
1312,56 
438.38 
165.66 
3092.84 
2419.66 
451.61 
99.21 
122.36 
2895.87 
2885.44 
10.43 
244.47 
113.15 
113.03 
18.28 
Crore) 
2005-06 
11034,54 
1783.65 
731,88 
186,32 
177,34 
15,77 
22.39 
11,62 
4.35 
573,97 
17,78 
0.22 
39,72 
2,30 
2541.26 
10.88 
0,01 
1900,39 
334.13 
295,86 
2774.74 
2022,96 
515.70 
101.57 
134.50 
1584.12 
1574.99 
9.13 
433.49 
141.04 
266.12 
26.34 
Continued. 
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Table A5.15 Continued 
Implicit Budgetary Subsidies in Economic Services 
Major head Details 1990-91 1993-94 1995-96 1998-99 
( InRs 
2001-02 
Crore) 
2003-04 
Economic Services Subsidised Sectors 
Transport 
3053 
3054 
3055 
3056 
3075 
Civil Aviation 
Roads & Bridges 
Road Transport Services 
Inland Water Transport 
Other Transport 
Services 
Other Economic Services 
3425 
3452 
3453 
3454 
3455 
3456 
3465 
3475 
Other Scientific 
Research 
Tourism 
Foreign Trade/Export 
Promotion 
Census, Surveys & 
Statistics 
Meteorology 
Civil Supplies 
Gen. Fin. & Trading 
Institutions 
Other Gen. Eco. 
Services 
401.79 
0.73 
400.59 
0.47 
0.00 
0.00 
23.61 
1.14 
1.03 
0.60 
13.29 
0.19 
3.89 
0.95 
2.53 
586.17 
0.83 
584.44 
0.84 
0.00 
0.06 
19.83 
1.07 
1.04 
0.00 
7.65 
0.19 
1.45 
0.00 
8.43 
r 680.61 
2.44 
677.60 
0.43 
0.07 
0.07 
34.36 
1.82 
10.59 
0.00 
10.22 
0.23^ 
7.02 
0.04 
4.45 
923.06 
7.84 
915.05 
0.09 
0.07 
57.17 
1.76 
20.20 
0.40 
14.14 
0.23 
13.87 
6.57 
1150.36 
5.82 
1143.65 
0.90 
46.39 
0.56 
26.74 
0.00 
17.58 
0.22 
1.14 
0.05 
1433.70 
10.18 
1421.78 
0.00 
1.73 
62.38 
0.67 
37.06 
0.00 
21.62 
0.22 
2.76 
0.05 
1842.59 
12,05 
1785,17 
0,00 
6,41 
74.70 
0.18 
36.67 
0.91 
32,73 
0,17 
4.00 
0,03 
Economic Services - Surplus Sector 
Economic Services - Surplus 
Sector 
Agriculture And Allied Services 
2406 
2435 
Forestry & Wild Life 
Other Agricultural 
Programmes 
Energy 
2810 Non-conventional 
Energy Sources 
Industries And Minerals 
2853 Non-ferrous Mining and 
Metall. Ind. 
Transport 
3055 
3056 
Road Transport Services 
Inland Water Transport 
Other Economic Services 
3453 
3465 
3475 
Sourc 3: 
Foreign Trade/Export 
Promotion 
Gen. Fin. & Trading 
Institutions 
Other Gen. Eco. 
Services 
Basic Data - Goverr 
-7.77 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
-7.77 
-7.77 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
iment of U 
-82.23 
-22.39 
-22.39 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
-61.20 
-57.03 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
-2.82 
-0.19 
-2.63 
0.00 
ttar Prade 
-147.30 
-3.90 
-3.90 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
-143.40 
-143.40 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
sh, Financ 
-139.95 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
-138.83 
-138.83 
-0.87 
-0.87 
0.00 
-0.24 
0.00 
0.00 
-0.24 
:e Accoun 
-217.48 
-1.28 
0.00 
-1.28 
-0.03 
-0.03 
-176.08 
-176.08 
-34.59 
-34.53 
-0.06 
-5.50 
0.00 
0.00 
-5.50 
ts for resp 
-277.93 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
-232.84 
-232.84 
•40.63 
-40.63 
0.00 
-4.47 
0.00 
0.00 
-4.47 
ective yea 
-346.76 
-10.01 
-10.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
-336.26 
-336.26 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
-0.50 
0.00 
0.00 
-0.50 
rs. 
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Table A5.16 
Recovery Rate in Provisions of Services i n Economic Services 
(In Per Cent) 
Major 
head Details 
Economic Services Subsidised Sectors 
Agriculture And Allied Services 
2401 
2402 
2403 
2404 
2405 
2406 
2407 
2408 
2415 
2416 
2425 
2435 
Crop Husbandry 
Soil and Water Conservation 
Animal Husbandry 
Dairy Development 
Fisheries 
Forestry & Wild Life 
Plantations 
Food Storage & Warehousing 
Agr. Research & Education 
Investment in Agri. Fin. Insti. 
Co-operation 
Other Agricultural 
Programmes 
Rural Development 
2501 
2505 
2515 
2551 
2575 
Spl. Programmes for Rural 
Dev, 
Rural Employment 
Other Rural Dev. Programmes 
Hill Areas 
Other Special Area 
Programmes 
Irrigation and Flood Control 
2701 
2702 
2705 
2711 
Major & Medium Irrigation 
Minor Irrigation 
Command Area Development 
Flood Control 
Energy 
2801 
2810 
Power 
Non-conventional Energy 
Sources 
Industries And Minerals 
2851 
2852 
2875/85 
Village & Small Scale 
Industries 
Industries 
Other Industries 
Transport 
3053 
3054 
3055 
3055 
3075 
Civil Aviation 
Roads & Bridges 
Road Transport Services 
Inland Water Transport 
Other Transport Services 
Other Economic Services 
3425 
3452 
3453 
3454 
3455 
3456 
3465 
3475 
Other Scientific Research 
Tourism 
Foreign Trade/Export 
Promotion 
Census, Surveys & Statistics 
Meteorology 
Civil Supplies 
Gen. Fin. & Trading 
Institutions 
Other Gen. Eco. Services 
1990-91 
5.21 
19.97 
5.21 
1.95 
3.82 
1.02 
10,36 
88.83 
0.00 
0.03 
0.00 
0.00 
6.80 
0.00 
1.67 
0.00 
0.00 
2.64 
0.88 
0.00 
3.29 
4.19 
1.72 
1.66 
2.14 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
1.89 
2.09 
2.13 
0.72 
2.88 
13.79 
2.86 
1.30 
98.16 
0.00 
20.93 
0.00 
72.85 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
15.96 
0.00 
51.99 
1993-94 
5.42 
3.34 
4.44 
0.00 
3.11 
0.43 
8.56 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
3.45 
51.07 
1.05 
0.00 
0.00 
1.69 
0.53 
0.40 
10.42 
15.02 
3.88 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
4.02 
2.23 
8.18 
11.28 
2.97 
35.06 
2.88 
15.69 
80.49 
0.00 
43.71 
0.00 
85.87 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
78.89 
0.00 
30.28 
1995-96 
4.37 
5.73 
7.18 
1.89 
4.79 
21,62 
16.20 
6.25 
0.00 
0.42 
0.00 
0.00 
13.10 
0.84 
3.70 
0.00 
0.00 
7.56 
0.48 
2.32 
6.33 
7.96 
4.94 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
8.08 
9.41 
13.91 
0.51 
2.45 
7.31 
2.31 
1.00 
2.00 
3.00 
23.92 
0.00 
25.25 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
21.76 
0.00 
54.22 
1998-99 
3.83 
14.10 
4.02 
0.00 
4.40 
9.45 
15.05 
69.68 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
4.61 
54.98 
2.35 
0.00 
0.00 
3.70 
0.98 
2.23 
3.13 
2.96 
4.13 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
31.29 
2.82 
1.28 
14.26 
2.17 
2.36 
3.14 
2.35 
1.00 
2.00 
10.27 
0.00 
17.24 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
14.41 
0.00 
0.00 
2001-02 
3.74 
12.48 
13.21 
0.00 
6.06 
4.15 
11,18 
41.42 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
30.20 
0.00 
1.31 
0.00 
0.00 
1.91 
0.01 
0.02 
4.74 
5.38 
3.60 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
1.05 
1.62 
0.07 
0.76 
1.58 
27.60 
1.40 
0.00 
0.00 
10.06 
0.00 
6.92 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
73.68 
0.00 
0.00 
2003-04 
5.02 
13.97 
29.16 
0.00 
4.43 
1.84 
15.77 
48,47 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
1.07 
43.75 
5.89 
0.00 
0.00 
3.33 
0.00 
31.24 
4.76 
5.33 
3.94 
0.00 
0.00 
0.05 
0.00 
12.83 
2.43 
5.00 
0.05 
0.45 
2.84 
1.67 
2.86 
0.00 
0.00 
4.00 
0.00 
1.08 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
44.31 
0.00 
0.00 
2005-06 
3.25 
3.43 
5.28 
0.00 
5.65 
13.08 
9.52 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0.00 
0.00 
9.68 
56.59 
1.30 
0.00 
0.00 
1.71 
0.00 
0.12 
6.68 
8.07 
3.85 
0.56 
0.00 
0.15 
0.00 
20.47 
1.03 
2,38 
0,38 
0.26 
3.45 
9.71 
3.01 
0,00 
0,00 
2.64 
0,00 
0,83 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
30,00 
0,00 
0,00 
Source: Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective years. 
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TableA5.17 
Recoveries in Economic Services as a per Cent of GSDP 
Major 
head Details 
Economic Services Subsidised Sectors 
Agriculture And Allied Services 
2401 
2402 
2403 
2404 
2405 
2406 
2407 
2408 
2415 
2416 
2425 
2435 
Crop Husbandry 
Soil and Water Conservation 
Animal Husbandry 
Dairy Development 
Fisheries 
Forestry & Wi ld Life 
Plantations 
Food Storage & Warehousing 
Agr. Research & Education 
Investment in Agrl. Fin. Insti. 
Co-operat ion 
Other Agricultural Programme 
Rural Development 
2501 
2505 
2515 
2551 
2575 
Spl. Prog, for Rural Dev. 
Rural Employment 
Other Rural Dev. Programmes 
Hill Areas 
Other Spl. Area Programme 
Irrigation and Flood Control 
2701 
2702 
2705 
2711 
Major & Med ium Irrigation 
M inor Irr igation 
Command Area Development 
Flood Control 
Energy 
2801 
2810 
Power 
Non-convent ional Energy 
Sources 
Industries And Minerals 
2851 
2852 
2853 
2875/ 
85 
Village & Small Scale 
Industries 
Industries 
Non-ferrous Min ing and 
Meta l l . Ind. 
Other Industries 
Transport 
3053 
3054 
3055 
3056 
3075 
Civil Aviat ion 
Roads & Bridges 
Road Transport Services 
Inland Water Transport 
Other Transport Services 
Other Economic Services 
3425 
3452 
3453 
3454 
3455 
3456 
3465 
3475 
Other Scientific Research 
Tour ism 
Foreign Trade/Export 
Promot ion 
Census, Surveys & Statistics 
Meteoro logy 
Civil Supplies 
Gen. Fin. & Trading 
Inst i tut ions 
Other Gen. Eco. Services 
1990-91 
0.27 
0.16 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.14 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0,00 
O.OQ 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0,00 
0.07 
O.OS 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.02 
0,00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
1993-94 
0.30 
0.03 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.22 
0.19 
0.03 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
1995-96 
0.23 
0.03 
0.02 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.03 
0.00 
0.00 
0.03 
0.00 
0.00 
0.13 
0.09 
0.04 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
1998-99 
0.20 
0.10 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.08 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.03 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
O.OS 
0.03 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
2001-02 
0.18 
0.09 
0.04 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.04 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.07 
0.06 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
2003-04 
0.27 
0.12 
0.09 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.03 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.05 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.03 
0.07 
0.06 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
2005-06 
0.14 
0.02 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0,01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.07 
0.06 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0,00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.02 
0,00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Source: Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective years. 
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TableA5.18 
Major 
head 
Costs in Economic Services as a per 
Details 
Economic Services Subsidised Sectors 
Agriculture And Allied Services 
2401 
2402 
2403 
2404 
2405 
2406 
2407 
2408 
2415 
2416 
2425 
2435 
Crop Husbandry 
Soil and Water Conservation 
Animal Husbandry 
Dairy Development 
Fisheries 
Forestry & Wild Life 
Plantations 
Food Storage &. Warehousing 
Agr. Research & Education 
Investment in Agri. Fin. Insti. 
Co-operation 
Other Agricultural Programmes 
Rural Development 
2501 
2505 
2515 
2551 
2575 
Spl. Programmes for Rural Dev. 
Rural Employment 
Other Rural Dev. Programmes 
Hill Areas 
Other Special Area Programmes 
Irrigation and Flood Control 
2701 
2702 
2705 
2711 
Major & Medium Irrigation 
Minor Irrigation 
Command Area Development 
Flood Control 
Energy 
2801 
2810 
Power 
Non-conventional Energy Sources 
Industries And Minerals 
2851 
2852 
2853 
2875/85 
Village & Small Scale Industries 
Industries 
Non-ferrous Mining and Metall. 
Ind. 
Other Industries 
Transport 
3053 
3054 
3055 
3056 
3075 
Civil Aviation 
Roads & Bridges 
Road Transport Services 
Inland Water Transport 
Other Transport Services 
Other Economic Services 
3425 
3452 
3453 
3454 
3455 
3456 
3465 
3475 
Other Scientific Research 
Tourism 
Foreign Trade/Export Promotion 
Census, Surveys & Statistics 
Meteorology 
Civil Supplies 
Gen. Fin. & Trading Institutions 
Other Gen. Eco. Services 
1990-
9 1 
5.28 
0.80 
0.25 
0.11 
0.10 
0.01 
0.01 
0.15 
0.01 
0.08 
0.03 
0.00 
0.03 
0.00 
0.85 
0.00 
0.00 
0.39 
0.45 
0.01 
2.08 
1.31 
0.60 
0.07 
0.10 
0.66 
0.66 
0.00 
0.19 
0.13 
0,03 
0.00 
0.03 
0.65 
0.00 
0.64 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.05 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
1993-
94 
5.50 
0.81 
0.42 
0.08 
0.12 
0.03 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
0.07 
0.01 
0.00 
0.05 
0.00 
0.89 
0.02 
0.00 
0.41 
0.45 
0.01 
2.09 
1.27 
0.67 
0.04 
0.10 
0.83 
0.83 
0.00 
0.13 
0.10 
0.01 
0.00 
0.02 
0.72 
0.00 
0.71 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.04 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
1995-
96 
5.31 
0.60 
0.27 
0.11 
0.11 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.04 
0.01 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.86 
0.01 
0.00 
0.39 
0.44 
0.03 
2.05 
1.17 
0.74 
0.05 
0.09 
0.99 
0.99 
0.00 
0.13 
0,09 
0.01 
0.00 
0.02 
0.63 
0.00 
0.62 
0.00 
0 . 0 ^ 
0.00 
0.04 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
Cent of GSDP 
1998-
99 
5.16 
0.70 
0.27 
0.11 
0.10 
0.01 
0.01 
0.11 
0.01 
0,04 
0.01 
0.00 
0.03 
0.00 
1.08 
0.00 
0.00 
0.52 
0.51 
0.05 
1.67 
1.03 
0.53 
0.03 
0.08 
0.96 
0.96 
0.00 
0.13 
0,06 
0,01 
0.00 
0.06 
0.59 
0.01 
0.58 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.04 
0,00 
0.02 
0.00 
0,01 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
2001-
02 
4.91 
0.70 
0.30 
0.15 
0.07 
0.01 
0.01 
0.09 
0.01 
0.04 
0.01 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.95 
0.00 
0.00 
0.65 
0.22 
0.07 
1.48 
1.13 
0.26 
0.04 
0.05 
1.05 
1,05 
0.00 
0.09 
0.05 
0.03 
0.00 
0.01 
0.61 
0.00 
0.61 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.03 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0,01 
0,00 
0,00 
0.00 
0.00 
2003-
04 
5.30 
0.86 
0.30 
0.11 
0.09 
0.01 
0.01 
0.06 
0.00 
0.27 
0.01 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.91 
0,00 
0.00 
0.60 
0.19 
0.11 
1.44 
1.14 
0.21 
0.04 
0.05 
1.29 
1.28 
0.01 
0.11 
0,05 
0,05 
0.00 
0.01 
0.66 
0.00 
0.55 
0.00 
0.00 
0,00 
0.03 
0,00 
0,02 
0.00 
0.01 
0,00 
0,00 
0.00 
0.00 
2005-
06 
4,17 
0,67 
0.28 
0.07 
0.07 
0.01 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.21 
0.01 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.94 
0.00 
0.00 
0.71 
0.12 
0.11 
1,09 
0.80 
0.20 
0.04 
0.05 
0,58 
0.58 
0.00 
0.16 
0.05 
0,10 
0,00 
0,01 
0.70 
0.00 
0.67 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0,03 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0,01 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
Source: Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective years. 
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Table A5. 19 
Subsidies in Economic Services as a per Cent of GSDP 
Major 
head Details 
Economic Services Subsidised Sectors 
Agriculture And Allied Services 
2401 
2402 
2403 
2404 
2405 
2406 
2407 
2408 
2415 
2416 
2425 
2435 
Crop Husbandry 
Soil and Water Conservation 
Animal Husbandry 
Dairy Development 
Fisheries 
Forestry & Wild Life 
Plantations 
Food Storage & Warehousing 
Agr. Research & Education 
Investn^ent in Agri. Fin. Insti. 
Co-operation 
Other Agricultural Programmes 
Rural Development 
2501 
2505 
2515 
2551 
2575 
Spl. Programmes for Rural Dev. 
Rural Employment 
Other Rural Dev. Programmes 
Hill Areas 
Other Special Area Programmes 
Irrigation and Flood Control 
2701 
2702 
2705 
2711 
Major & Medium Irrigation 
Minor Irrigation 
Command Area Development 
Flood Control 
Energy 
2801 
2810 
Power 
Non-conventional Energy Sources 
Industries And Minerals 
2851 
2852 
2875/85 
Village & Small Scale Industries 
Industries 
Other Industries 
Transport 
3053 
3054 
3055 
3056 
3075 
Civil Aviation 
Roads & Bridges 
Road Transport Services 
Inland Water Transport 
Other Transport Services 
Other Economic Services 
3425 
3452 
3453 
3454 
3455 
3456 
3465 
3475 
Other Scientific Research 
Tourism 
Foreign Trade/Export Promotion 
Census, Surveys & Statistics 
Meteorology 
Civil Supplies 
Gen. Fin. & Trading Institutions 
Other Gen. Eco. Services 
1990-91 
5.00 
0.64 
0.24 
0.11 
0.10 
0.01 
0.01 
0.02 
0.01 
0.08 
0.03 
0.00 
0.03 
0.00 
0.84 
0.00 
0.00 
0.38 
0.44 
0.01 
2.01 
1.25 
0.59 
0.07 
0.10 
0.66 
0.66 
0.00 
0.19 
0.13 
0.03 
0.03 
0.63 
0.00 
0.63 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.04 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
1993-94 
5.20 
0.78 
0.40 
Q.08 
0.12 
0.03 
Q.Ol 
0.00 
0.01 
0.07 
0.01 
0.00 
0.05 
0.00 
0.88 
0.02 
0.00 
0.40 
0.45 
0.01 
1.87 
1.08 
0.64 
0.04 
0.10 
0.83 
0.83 
0.00 
0.12 
0.10 
0.01 
0.02 
0.70 
0.00 
0.69 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
1995-96 
5.08 
0.57 
0.25 
0.11 
0.10 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.04 
0.01 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.83 
0.01 
0.00 
0.36 
0.44 
0.02 
1.92 
1.08 
0.70 
0.05 
0.09 
0.99 
0.99 
0.00 
0.12 
0.08 
0.01 
0.02 
0.61 
0.00 
0.61 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.03 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
1998-99 
4.96 
0.60 
0,26 
0.11 
0.09 
0.01 
0,01 
0,03 
0,01 
0,04 
0,01 
0,00 
0.03 
0.00 
1.05 
0.00 
0.00 
0,50 
0.50 
0.05 
1.62 
1.00 
0.51 
0.03 
0.08 
0.96 
0.96 
0.00 
0.12 
0.06 
0.01 
0.06 
0.57 
0.00 
0.57 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.04 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
2001-02 
4.72 
0.61 
0,26 
0.15 
0.07 
0,01 
0.01 
0,05 
0,01 
0.04 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.94 
0.00 
0.00 
0.64 
0.22 
0.07 
1.41 
1.07 
0.25 
0.04 
0.05 
1.05 
1.05 
0.00 
0.08 
0.05 
0.03 
0.01 
0.60 
0.00 
0.60 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
2003-04 
5.04 
0.74 
0.21 
0,11 
0,08 
0,01 
0,01 
0,03 
0.00 
0.27 
0,01 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.86 
0.00 
0.00 
0.58 
0.19 
0.07 
1.38 
1.08 
0.20 
0.04 
0.05 
1.29 
1.28 
0.00 
0.11 
0.05 
0.05 
0.01 
0.64 
0.00 
0.63 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.03 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.01 
0,00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
2005-06 
4.03 
0.65 
0.27 
0.07 
0,06 
0.01 
0.01 
0.00 
0,00 
0,21 
0,01 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.93 
0.00 
0.00 
0,69 
0,12 
0.11 
1.01 
0.74 
0.19 
0.04 
0.05 
0.58 
0.58 
0.00 
0.16 
0.05 
0.10 
0.01 
0.67 
0,00 
0.65 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.03 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Source: Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective years. 
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Table A5.20 
Par Capita Subsidies in Economic Services 
(In Rs. 
Major 
head Details 
Economic Services Subsidised Sectors 
Agriculture And Allied Services 
2401 
2402 
2403 
2404 
2405 
2406 
2407 
2408 
2415 
2416 
2425 
2435 
Crop Husbandry 
Soil and Water Conservation 
Animal Husbandry 
Dairy Development 
Fisheries 
Forestry & Wild Life 
Plantations 
Food Storage & Warehousing 
Agr. Research & Education 
Investment in Agri. Fin. Insti. 
Co-operation 
Other Agricultural Programmes 
Rural Development 
2501 
2505 
2515 
2551 
2575 
Spl. Programmes for Rural Dev. 
Rural Employment 
Other Rural Dev. Programmes 
Hill Areas 
Other Special Area Programmes 
Irrigation and Flood Control 
2701 
2702 
2705 
2711 
Major & Medium Irrigation 
Minor Irrigation 
Command Area Development 
Flood Control 
Energy 
2801 
2810 
Power 
Non-conventional Energy Sources 
Industries And Minerals 
2851 
2852 
2875/85 
Village & Small Scale Industries 
Industries 
Other Industries 
Transport 
3053 
3054 
3055 
3056 
3075 
Civil Aviation 
Roads & Bridges 
Road Transport Services 
Inland Water Transport 
Other Transport Services 
Other Economic Services 
3425 
3452 
3453 
3454 
3455 
3456 
3465 
3475 
Other Scientific Research 
Tourism 
Foreign Trade/Export Promotion 
Census, Surveys & Statistics 
Meteorology 
Civil Supplies 
Gen. Fin. & Trading Institutions 
Other Gen. Eco. Services 
1990-91 
245.30 
31.48 
11.81 
5.40 
4.90 
0.65 
0.37 
0.85 
0.53 
3.94 
1.40 
0.00 
1.40 
0.24 
41.12 
0.05 
0.00 
18.63 
21.78 
0.66 
98.69 
61.43 
28.96 
3.33 
4.97 
32.19 
32.19 
0.00 
9.22 
5.26 
1,59 
1.37 
30.79 
0.06 
30.70 
0.04 
0.00 
0.00 
1.81 
0.09 
0.08 
0.05 
1.02 
0.01 
0.30 
0.07 
0.19 
1993-94 
312.97 
47.00 
24.00 
4.64 
7.18 
1.59 
0.79 
0.00 
0.48 
4.46 
0.84 
0.00 
2.94 
0.09 
52.78 
1.12 
0.00 
24.08 
26.88 
0.71 
112.49 
65.15 
38.76 
2.52 
6.07 
50.05 
50.05 
0.00 
7.37 
5.78 
0,66 
0.93 
41.86 
0.06 
41.74 
0.06 
0.00 
0.00 
1.42 
0.08 
0.07 
0.00 
0.55 
0.01 
0.10 
0.00 
0.60 
1995-96 
38S.08 
43.16 
18.73 
8.18 
7.61 
0.79 
0.54 
0.77 
0.57 
3.18 
0.86 
0.02 
1.64 
0.27 
63.14 
0.67 
0.00 
27.18 
33.41 
1.87 
145.97 
81.98 
53.26 
3.97 
6.77 
75.09 
75.09 
0.00 
8.95 
6.40 
0,69 
1.85 
46.43 
0.17 
46.22 
0.03 
0.01 
0.00 
2.34 
0.12 
0.72 
0.00 
0.70 
0.02 
0.48 
0.00 
0.30 
1998-99 
508.73 
61.48 
26.70 
11.08 
9.36 
0.87 
0.62 
3.49 
0.73 
4.59 
0.88 
0.02 
2.98 
0.15 
107.90 
0.31 
0.00 
51.51 
51.41 
4.67 
165.83 
102.48 
51.92 
3.51 
7.92 
98.37 
98.37 
0.00 
12.74 
5.89 
0,99 
5.87 
58.77 
0.50 
58.26 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
3.64 
0.11 
1.29 
0.03 
0.90 
0.01 
0.88 
0.42 
0.00 
2001-02 
534.36 
69.25 
29.58 
16.74 
7.50 
0.97 
0.90 
5.74 
0.58 
4.91 
0.69 
0.08 
1.57 
0.00 
106.24 
0.30 
0.00 
72.44 
25.23 
8.27 
159.25 
121.07 
28.18 
3.97 
6.03 
118.93 
118.93 
0.00 
9.58 
5.53 
2,89 
1.15 
68.35 
0.35 
67.95 
0.00 
0.00 
0.05 
2.76 
0.04 
1.59 
0.00 
1.04 
0.01 
0.07 
0.00 
0.00 
2003-04 
645.98 
95.24 
27.13 
14.17 
10.53 
0.97 
0.78 
3.70 
0.18 
34.38 
0.93 
0.02 
2,28 
0.18 
109.75 
0.40 
0.00 
74.89 
25.01 
9.45 
176.46 
138.05 
25.77 
5.66 
6.98 
165.22 
164.63 
0.60 
13.95 
6.46 
6,45 
1.04 
81.80 
0,58 
81,12 
0.00 
0,00 
0,10 
3.56 
0.04 
2,11 
0.00 
1.23 
0.01 
0.16 
0.00 
0.00 
2005-06 
605.34 i 
97,85 
40,15 
10,22 
9.73 
0.87 
1.23 
0.64 
0,24 
31.49 
0,98 
0.01 
2,18 
0.13 
139,41 
0.60 
0,00 
104.25 
18.33 
16.23 
152.22 
110.98 
28.29 
5,57 
7.38 
86.90 
78.40 
0.50 
23.78 
7,74 
14.60 
1.44 
101.08 
0.66 
97.93 
2.14 
0,00 
0,35 
4.10 
0.01 
2.01 
0.05 
1.80 
0.01 
0.22 
0.00 
0.00 
Source: Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective years 
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Table A5.21 
Major 
head 
Par Capita Subsidies in Economic Services (At Constant Price 1999-00} 
Details 
Economic Services Subsidised Sectors 
Agriculture And Allied Services 
2401 
2402 
2403 
2404 
2405 
2406 
2407 
2408 
2415 
2416 
2425 
2435 
Crop Husbandry 
Soil and Water Conservation 
Animal Husbandry 
Dairy Development 
Fisheries 
Forestry & Wild Life 
Plantations 
Food Storage & Warehousing 
Agr. Research & Education 
Investment in Agri. Fin. Insti. 
Co-operation 
Other Agricultural Programmes 
Rural Development 
2501 
2505 
2515 
2551 
2575 
Spl. Programmes for Rural Dev. 
Rural Employment 
Other Rural Dev. Programmes 
Hill Areas 
Other Special Area Programmes 
Irrigation and Flood Control 
2701 
2702 
2705 
2711 
Major & Medium Irrigation 
Minor Irrigation 
Command Area Development 
Flood Control 
Energy 
2801 
2810 
Power 
Non-conventional Energy Sources 
Industries And Minerals 
2851 
2852 
2875/85 
Village & Small Scale Industries 
Industries 
Other Industries 
Transport 
3053 
3054 
3055 
3056 
3075 
Civil Aviation 
Roads & Bridges 
Road Transport Services 
Inland Water Transport 
Other Transport Services 
Other Economic Services 
3425 
3452 
3453 
3454 
3455 
3456 
3465 
3475 
Other Scientific Research 
Tourism 
Foreign Trade/Export Promotion 
Census, Surveys & Statistics 
Meteorology 
Civil Supplies 
Gen. Fin. & Trading Institutions 
Other Gen. Eco, Services 
1990-91 
521.90 
66.97 
25.12 
11.48 
10.43 
1.37 
0.79 
1.81 
1.12 
8.39 
2,97 
0.00 
2.98 
0.51 
87.49 
0.11 
0.00 
39.64 
46.34 
1.40 
209.98 
130.71 
61.61 
7.09 
10.57 
68.50 
68.50 
0.00 
19.61 
13.32 
3.38 
2.91 
65.51 
0.12 
65.32 
0.08 
0.00 
0.00 
3,85 
0.19 
0.17 
0.10 
2.17 
0.03 
0.63 
0.16 
0,41 
1993-94 
491.75 
73.85 
37.70 
7.28 
11.28 
2.49 
1.23 
0.00 
0.76 
7.01 
1.32 
0.00 
4.63 
0.14 
82.93 
1.76 
0.00 
37.83 
42.23 
1.12 
176.75 
102.37 
60.89 
3.95 
9.53 
78.64 
78.64 
0.00 
11.59 
9.08 
1.04 
1.46 
65.77 
0.09 
65.58 
0.09 
0.00 
0.01 
2.22 
0.12 
0.12 
0,00 
0.86 
0.02 
0.16 
0.00 
0.95 
1995-96 
503.12 
56.39 
24.47 
10.69 
9.94 
1.03 
0.71 
1.01 
0.74 
4.16 
1,12 
0.03 
2.14 
0.35 
82.50 
0.88 
0.00 
35.51 
43.66 
2.45 
190.72 
107.11 
69.59 
5.18 
8.84 
98.10 
98.10 
0.00 
11.69 
8.36 
0.91 
2.42 
60.66 
0.22 
60.39 
0.04 
0.01 
0.01 
3.06 
0.16 
0.94 
0,00 
0,91 
0.02 
0.63 
0.00 
0.40 
1998-99 
519.66 
62.80 
27.27 
11.32 
9.56 
0.89 
0.63 
3.56 
0.74 
4.69 
0.90 
0.02 
3.05 
0.15 
110.22 
0.32 
0.00 
52.61 
52.52 
4.77 
169.39 
104.68 
53.04 
3.58 
8.09 
100.48 
100.48 
0.00 
13.02 
6.02 
1.01 
5.99 
60.03 
0.51 
59.51 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
3.72 
0.11 
1.31 
0.03 
0.92 
0.02 
0.90 
0.43 
0.00 
2001-02 
529.07 
68.56 
29.28 
16,57 
7,42 
0.96 
0.89 
5.68 
0.57 
4.86 
0.68 
0.08 
1.55 
0.00 
105.19 
0.29 
0.00 
71.72 
24.98 
8.19 
157.68 
119.87 
27.90 
3,93 
5.97 
117.76 
117.76 
0.00 
9.49 
5.48 
2.86 
1.15 
67.67 
0.34 
67.28 
0.00 
0.00 
0.05 
2.73 
0.04 
1.57 
0,00 
1,03 
0,01 
0.07 
0,00 
0,00 
2003-04 
571.67 
84.29 
24.00 
12,54 
9,32 
0,86 
0,69 
3,27 
0,16 
30,42 
0,83 
0,02 
2,02 
0,16 
97.12 
0,35 
0,00 
66,27 
22,13 
8.36 
156.16 
122.17 
22.80 
5,01 
6.18 
146.21 
145.69 
0.53 
12.34 
5.71 
5.71 
0,92 
72.39 
0.51 
71.79 
0,00 
0,00 
0,09 
3.15 
0,03 
1,87 
0,00 
1,09 
0,01 
0,14 
0,00 
0,00 
2005-06 
484.27 
78,28 
32.12 
8,18 
7.78 
0.69 
0,98 
0,51 
0.19 
25.19 
0,78 
0,01 
1.74 
0,10 
111,53 
0.48 
0,00 
83.40 
14.66 
12.98 
121,77 
88,78 
22,63 
4,46 
5,90 
69.52 
69.12 
0.40 
19,02 
6,19 
11,68 
1.16 
80,86 
0,53 
78,34 
1,71 
0.00 
0,28 
3.28 
0,01 
1.61 
0,04 
1,44 
0,01 
0.18 
0,00 
0,00 
Source: Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective years 
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Table A5. 22 
Sectoral Shares of Implicit Budgetary Subsidies within Economic Services 
Major 
head 
Details 
Economic Services Subsidised Sectors 
Agriculture And Allied Services 
2401 
2402 
2403 
2404 
2405 
2406 
2407 
2408 
2415 
2416 
2425 
2435 
Crop Husbandry 
Soil and Water Conservation 
Aninnal Husbandry 
Dairy Development 
Fisheries 
Forestry & Wild Life 
Plantations 
Food Storage & Warehousing 
Agr. Research & Education 
Investment in Agri. Fin. Insti. 
Co-operation 
Other Agricultural Programmes 
Rural Development 
2501 
2505 
2515 
2551 
2575 
Spl. Programmes for Rural Dev. 
Rural Employment 
Other Rural Dev. Programmes 
Hill Areas 
Other Special Area Programmes 
Irrigation and Flood Control 
2701 
2702 
2705 
2711 
Major & Medium Irrigation 
Minor Irrigation 
Command Area Development 
Flood Control 
Energy 
2801 
2810 
Power 
Non-conventional Energy Sources 
Industries And Minerals 
2851 
2852 
2875/85 
Village & Small Scale Industries 
Industries 
Other Industries 
Transport 
3053 
3054 
3055 
3056 
3075 
Civil Aviation 
Roads & Bridges 
Road Transport Services 
Inland Water Transport 
Other Transport Services 
Other Economic Services 
3425 
3452 
3453 
3454 
3455 
3456 
3465 
3475 
Other Scientific Research 
Tourism 
Foreign Trade/Export Promotion 
Census, Surveys & Statistics 
Meteorology 
Civil Supplies 
Gen. Fin. & Trading Institutions 
Other Gen. Eco. Services 
1990-91 
70.28 
12.83 
4.81 
2.20 
2.00 
0.26 
0.15 
0.35 
0.21 
1.61 
0.57 
0.00 
0.57 
0.10 
16.76 
0.02 
0.00 
7.60 
8.88 
0.27 
40.23 
25.04 
11.81 
1.36 
2.02 
13.12 
13.12 
0.00 
3.76 
2.55 
0.65 
0.56 
12.55 
0.02 
12.52 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.74 
0.04 
0.03 
0.02 
0.42 
0.01 
0.12 
0.03 
0.08 
1993-94 
71.97 
15.02 
7.67 
1.48 
2.29 
0.51 
0.25 
0.00 
0.15 
1.43 
0.27 
0.00 
0.94 
0.03 
16.86 
0.36 
0.00 
7.69 
8.59 
0.23 
35.94 
20.82 
12.38 
0.80 
1.94 
15.99 
15.99 
0.00 
2.36 
1.85 
0.21 
0.30 
13.38 
0.02 
13.34 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.45 
0.02 
0.02 
0.00 
0.17 
0.00 
0.03 
0.00 
0.19 
1995-96 
72.09 
11.21 
4.86 
2.13 
1.98 
0.20 
0.14 
0.20 
0.15 
0.83 
0.22 
0.01 
0.43 
0.07 
16.40 
0.18 
0.00 
7.06 
8.68 
0.49 
37.91 
21.29 
13.83 
1.03 
1.76 
19.50 
19.50 
0.00 
2.32 
1.66 
0.18 
0.48 
12.06 
0.04 
12.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.61 
0.03 
0.19 
0.00 
0.18 
0.00 
0.12 
0.00 
0.08 
1998-99 
72.10 
12.08 
5.25 
2.18 
1.84 
0.17 
0.12 
0.69 
0.14 
0.90 
0.17 
0.00 
0.59 
0.03 
21.21 
0.06 
0.00 
10.12 
10.11 
0.92 
32.60 
20.14 
10.21 
0.69 
1.56 
19.34 
19.34 
0.00 
2.51 
1.16 
0.19 
1.15 
11.55 
0.10 
11.45 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.72 
0.02 
0.25 
0.00 
0.18 
0.00 
0.17 
0.08 
0.00 
2001-02 
75.62 
12.96 
5.54 
3.13 
1.40 
0.18 
0.17 
1.07 
0.11 
0.92 
0.13 
0.02 
0.29 
0.00 
19.88 
0.06 
0.00 
13.56 
4.72 
1.55 
29.80 
22.66 
5.27 
0.74 
1.13 
22.26 
22.26 
0.00 
1.79 
1.04 
0.54 
0.22 
12.79 
0.06 
12.72 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.52 
0.01 
0.30 
0.00 
0.20 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
2003-04 
76.55 
14.74 
4.20 
2.19 
1.63 
0.15 
0.12 
0.57 
0.03 
5.32 
0.14 
0.00 
0.35 
0.03 
16.99 
0.06 
0.00 
11.59 
3.87 
1.46 
27.32 
21.37 
3.99 
0.88 
1.08 
25.58 
25.48 
0.09 
2.16 
1.00 
1.00 
0.16 
12.66 
0.09 
12.56 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.55 
0.01 
0.33 
0.00 
0.19 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
2005-06 
68.78 
16.16 
6.53 
1.69 
1.61 
0.14 
0,20 
0.11 
0,04 
5.20 
0.16 
0.00 
0,36 
0,02 
23.03 
0,10 
0,00 
17,22 
3,03 
2,68 
25.15 
18,33 
4,67 
0,92 
1,22 
14.36 
14,27 
0,08 
3.93 
1,28 
2,41 
0,24 
16.70 
0.11 
16.18 
0.35 
0,00 
0,06 
0.68 
0,00 
0,33 
0,01 
0,30 
0,00 
0.04 
0.00 
0.00 
Source: Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective years. 
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Table A6.1 
Implicit Budgetary Subsidies in Social Services 
Classified as per Externalities Involved - 1990-91 
(In Rs. Crore 
Total - Social Service 
Impure Public Goods 
Elementary Education 
Adult Education 
Rural Health Services 
Public Health 
Sewerage and Sanitation 
Merit 1 Goods 
Secondary Education 
Art and Culture 
Urban Health Services 
Family Welfare 
Water Supply 
Merit 11 Goods 
University and Higher Education 
Language Development 
General Education 
Sports and Youth Welfare 
Medical Education - Training and 
Research 
General health 
Urban Development 
Information and Publicity 
Broadcasting 
Labour and Employment 
Merit Goods with 
Distributive Justice 
Rural Housing 
Housing for urban Poor 
Welfare of SC, ST, OBC 
Social Security and Welfare 
Private Goods 
Technical Education 
Government Residential 
Buildings 
Housing Gen 
Other social Services 
Total 
Receipts 
49.36 
5.84 
5.38 
0.00 
0.00 
0.46 
0.00 
28.83 
20.04 
0.00 
7.30 
1.47 
0.02 
7.75 
4.17 
0.00 
0.17 
0.01 
0.05 
0.00 
0.04 
0.42 
0.00 
2.88 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
6.94 
4.13 
2.82 
0.00 
0.00 
Current 
Cost 
1204.48 
372.49 
109.84 
18.44 
132.72 
108.77 
2.71 
603.26 
112.72 
6.06 
159.20 
135.16 
190.12 
186.18 
16.65 
14.93 
3.80 
17.24 
54.75 
0.33 
9.60 
10.77 
0.00 
58.12 
0.07 
0.07 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
42.48 
32.09 
0.94 
8.80 
0.65 
Capital Cost 
130.16 
20.44 
0.46 
0.07 
18.32 
0.00 
1.60 
25.77 
6.42 
0.15 
11.59 
6.55 
1.05 
12.68 
1.00 
0.00 
0.00 
4.26 
4,54 
0.03 
1.88 
0.89 
0.08 
0.00 
28.20 
0.09 
11.17 
15.40 
0.53 
43.08 
5.80 
35.44 
0.03 
1.80 
Total Cost 
1334.64 
392.93 
110.30 
18.51 
151.04 
108,77 
4,31 
629.03 
119.15 
6.20 
170.79 
141.71 
191.18 
198.86 
17.65 
14.93 
3.80 
21.50 
59.28 
0.36 
11,48 
11,66 
0,08 
58,12 
28.26 
0,16 
11,17 
16,40 
0,53 
85.56 
37,89 
36,38 
8,84 
2,45 
Subsidy 
1285.28 
387.09 
104,92 
18,51 
151,04 
108.31 
4,31 
600.20 
99,11 
6,20 
163,49 
140,24 
191,17 
191.11 
13,48 
14,93 
3,63 
21,48 
59,23 
0,36 
11,44 
11,24 
0,08 
55,23 
28.26 
0,16 
11,17 
16,40 
0,53 
78.62 
33,76 
33,56 
8,84 
2,45 
Recovery 
Rate (%) 
3,70 
1.49 
4,87 
0,00 
0.00 
0,42 
0,00 
4.58 
16,82 
0,00 
4,27 
1,04 
0,01 
3.90 
23,62 
0.00 
4.53 
0.06 
0,09 
0.00 
0,35 
3.62 
0.00 
4,96 
0.00 
0.00 
0,00 
0.00 
0,00 
8.12 
10,89 
7,74 
0,00 
0,00 
Source : Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective Years 
287 
Table A6.2 
Implicit Budgetary Subsidies in Social Services 
Classified as per Externalities Involved - 1993-94 
(In Rs. Crorej 
Total - Social Service 
Impure Public Goods 
Elementary Education 
Adult Education 
Rural Health Services 
Public Health 
Sewerage and Sanitation 
Merit 1 Goods 
Secondary Education 
Art and Culture 
Urban Health Services 
Family Welfare 
Water Supply 
Merit II Goods 
University and Higher Education 
Language Development 
General Education 
Sports and Youth Welfare 
Medical Education - Training and Research 
General health 
Urban Development 
Information and Publicity 
Broadcasting 
Labour and Employment 
Merit Goods with Distributive Justice 
Rural Housing 
Housing for urban Poor 
Welfare of SC, ST, OBC 
Social Security and Welfare 
Private Goods 
Technical Education 
Government Residential Buildings 
Housing Gen 
Other social Services 
Total 
Receipts 
51.09 
12.26 
1.10 
0.00 
0.00 
11.16 
0.00 
22.81 
19.99 
0.05 
1.55 
1.14 
0.08 
11.59 
8.39 
0.00 
0.00 
0.15 
0.04 
0.00 
0.05 
0.23 
0.00 
2.72 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
4.43 
0.26 
4.17 
0.00 
0.00 
Current 
Cost 
1559.93 
486.27 
100.34 
6.18 
214.21 
155.21 
10.32 
792.89 
159.76 
9.89 
217.89 
229.22 
176.13 
229.00 
10.75 
17.92 
4.75 
29.65 
77.21 
0.80 
8.89 
15.04 
0.00 
64.00 
0.06 
0.06 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
51.71 
40.13 
9.96 
0.94 
0.67 
Capital 
Cost 
197.93 
33.47 
0.69 
0.07 
29.09 
1,72 
1.91 
40.79 
10.23 
0.35 
17.61 
11.13 
1.47 
20.07 
5.95 
0.00 
0.00 
6.25 
5.43 
0.00 
2.23 
0.12 
0.08 
0.00 
43.68 
0.08 
13,31 
28.89 
1,40 
59.91 
14.02 
43.53 
0.03 
2,33 
Total Cost 
1757.86 
519.74 
101.03 
6,25 
243.30 
156.93 
12.23 
833.67 
169.99 
10.23 
235.50 
240.35 
177.60 
249.08 
16.70 
17.92 
4.75 
35.90 
82,64 
0.80 
11.12 
15.16 
0,08 
64.00 
43.74 
0,15 
13.31 
28.89 
1.40 
111.62 
54.15 
53.49 
0.97 
3.00 
Subsidy 
1706.76 
507.48 
99.93 
6.25 
243,30 
145.77 
12.23 
810.87 
150.00 
10,18 
233.94 
239.21 
177.52 
237.49 
8,31 
17,92 
4,75 
35,75 
82,60 
0,80 
11,07 
14.93 
0,08 
61,28 
43.74 
0.15 
13,31 
28,89 
1,40 
107.19 
53.90 
49,32 
0.97 
3.00 
Recovery 
Rate (%) 
2.91 
2.36 
1,09 
0,00 
0,00 
7,11 
0,00 
2.74 
11,76 
0,47 
0,56 
0,47 
0,04 
4.65 
50.25 
0,00 
0,00 
0,42 
0,05 
0,00 
0,49 
1.53 
0,00 
4,24 
0.00 
0.00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
3.97 
0.47 
7.80 
0.00 
0.00 
Source : Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective Years. 
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Table A6.3 
Implicit Budgetary Subsidies in Social Services 
Classified as per Externalities Involved - 1995-96 
(In Rs. Crore) 
TOTAL 
Impure Public Goods 
Elementary Education 
Adult Education 
Rural Health Services 
Public Health 
Sewerage and Sanitation 
Merit 1 Goods 
Secondary Education 
Art and Culture 
Urban Health Services 
Family Welfare 
Water Supply 
Merit II Goods 
University and Higher Education 
Language Development 
General Education 
Sports and Youth Welfare 
Medical Education - Training and Research 
General health 
Urban Development 
Information and Publicity 
Broadcasting 
Labour and Employment 
Merit Goods with Distributive Justice 
Rural Housing 
Housing for urban Poor 
Welfare of SC, ST, OBC 
Social Security and Welfare 
Private Goods 
Technical Education 
Government Residential Buildings 
Housing Gen 
Other social Services 
Total 
Receipts 
72.30 
5.87 
2.71 
0.00 
0.00 
3.15 
0.00 
51.32 
45.02 
0.25 
4.68 
1.28 
0.08 
8.79 
0.38 
0.00 
0.00 
0.61 
0.04 
0.00 
0.61 
0.41 
0.00 
6.74 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
6.33 
0.40 
5.93 
0.00 
0.00 
Current 
Cost 
1976.03 
656.80 
219.91 
2.71 
232.40 
174.97 
26.81 
947.84 
226.94 
13.52 
273.19 
205.68 
228.52 
303.73 
21.76 
23.63 
35.99 
32.21 
87.29 
0.04 
5.67 
25.07 
0.00 
72.06 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
67.66 
53,90 
12.64 
1.12 
0.00 
Capital 
Cost 
282.31 
43.88 
0.87 
0.08 
38.72 
2.04 
2.17 
62.76 
14.27 
1.08 
26.37 
19.20 
1.84 
29.56 
8.86 
0.00 
0.00 
9.59 
6.25 
0.03 
3.67 
1.07 
0.09 
0.00 
64.73 
0.10 
18.67 
44.03 
1.93 
81.37 
20.87 
60.46 
0.04 
0.00 
Total Cost 
2258.34 
700.68 
220.78 
2,79 
271.12 
177.01 
28.98 
1010.60 
241.21 
14.60 
299.56 
224.87 
230.35 
333.29 
30.61 
23.63 
35.99 
41.80 
93.54 
0.07 
9.34 
26.14 
0.09 
72.06 
64.74 
0.10 
18.67 
44.03 
1.93 
149.03 
74.76 
73.11 
1.16 
0.00 
Subsidy 
2186.04 
694.81 
218.07 
2,78 
271,12 
173,86 
28,98 
959.29 
196.19 
14.35 
294,88 
223,59 
230.28 
324.50 
30.23 
23.63 
35.99 
41.19 
93.51 
0.07 
8.73 
25.73 
0.09 
65.32 
64.74 
0.10 
18.67 
44.03 
1.93 
142.71 
74.36 
67.18 
1.16 
0.00 
Recovery 
Rate (%) 
3.20 
0.84 
1.23 
0.15 
0.00 
1.78 
0,00 
5.08 
18,67 
1.70 
1.56 
0.57 
0.04 
2.64 
1,24 
0,00 
0.00 
1,45 
0,04 
0,00 
6,52 
1,58 
0,00 
9.36 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0,00 
4.25 
0.54 
8.11 
0.00 
0.00 
Source : Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective Years. 
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Table A6.4 
Implicit Budgetary Subsidies in Social Services 
Classified as per Externalities Involved - 1998-99 
Total - Social Service 
Impure Public Goods 
Elementary Education 
Adult Education 
Rural Health Services 
Public Health 
Sewerage and Sanitation 
Merit 1 Goods 
Secondary Education 
Art and Culture 
Urban Health Services 
Family Welfare 
Water Supply 
Merit II Goods 
University and Higher Education 
Language Development 
General Education 
Sports and Youth Welfare 
IVIedical Education - Training and 
Research 
General health 
Urban Development 
Information and Publicity 
Broadcasting 
Labour and Employment 
Merit Goods with Distributive 
Justice 
Rural Housing 
Housing for urban Poor 
Welfare of SC, ST, OBC 
Social Security and Welfare 
Private Goods 
Technical Education 
Government Residential Buildings 
Housing Gen 
Other social Services 
Total 
Receipts 
138.27 
2.31 
0.19 
0.00 
0.00 
2.12 
0.00 
110.40 
88.38 
6.61 
4.47 
10.79 
0.15 
18.32 
1,98 
0.00 
0.06 
0.20 
0.16 
0.00 
0.04 
3.49 
0.00 
12.40 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
7.24 
3.93 
3.31 
0.00 
0.00 
Current 
Cost 
2680.39 
925.72 
280.50 
11.22 
337.49 
203.10 
93.41 
1247.68 
382.67 
16.12 
338.67 
209.29 
300.93 
420.44 
8,52 
40.77 
70.12 
41.52 
105.05 
1.00 
13.61 
33.36 
0,00 
106,50 
0.00 
0,00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
86.55 
73.73 
11.72 
1.10 
0.00 
Capital Cost 
550.11 
77.26 
1,21 
0,08 
61,75 
5,16 
9,06 
96.31 
21.89 
1.94 
38.43 
22.02 
12.03 
120.49 
16.33 
0.00 
0.74 
14.51 
7.91 
0.04 
79.62 
1.23 
0.10 
0.00 
143.85 
0.10 
28.10 
113.13 
2.53 
112.20 
27.80 
83,10 
1.31 
0.00 
Total Cost 
3230.50 
1002.99 
281.71 
11.31 
399.24 
208.26 
102.47 
1343.98 
404.56 
18.06 
377.10 
231.31 
312.96 
540.92 
24.84 
40.77 
70.86 
56.03 
112.96 
1.04 
93.22 
34.59 
0.10 
106.50 
143.85 
0.10 
28.10 
113.13 
2.53 
198.75 
101.53 
94.81 
2.40 
0.00 
Subsidy 
3092.23 
1000.68 
281.53 
11.31 
399.24 
206.14 
102.47 
1233.59 
316.19 
11.44 
372.62 
220.52 
312.81 
522.60 
22.87 
40.77 
70.80 
55.83 
112.80 
1.04 
93.18 
31,09 
0,10 
94,11 
143.85 
0.10 
28.10 
113,13 
2.53 
191.51 
97.60 
91.51 
2.40 
0.00 
(In Rs. Cr 
Recovery 
Rate (%) 
4.28 
0.23 
0.07 
0.00 
0.00 
1.02 
0.00 
8.21 
21,85 
36,62 
1,19 
4.66 
0,05 
3.39 
7,95 
0,00 
0,08 
0,35 
0.14 
0.00 
0.05 
10.09 
0.00 
11.64 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
3.64 
3.87 
3.49 
0.12 
0.00 
Source : Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective Years. 
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Table A6.5 
Implicit Budgetary Subsidies in Social Services 
Classified as per Externalities Involved - 2001-02 
In Rs. Crore) 
Total - Social Service 
Impure Public Goods 
Elementary Education 
Adult Education 
Rural Health Services 
Public Health 
Sewerage and Sanitation 
Merit 1 Goods 
Secondary Education 
Art and Culture 
Urban Health Services 
Family Welfare 
Water Supply 
Merit II Goods 
University and Higher Education 
Language Development 
General Education 
Sports and Youth Welfare 
Medical Education - Training and 
Research 
General health 
Urban Development 
Information and Publicity 
Broadcasting 
Labour and Employment 
Merit Goods with Distributive 
Justice 
Rural Housing 
Housing for urban Poor 
Welfare of SQ ST, OBC 
Social Security and Welfare 
Private Goods 
Technical Education 
Government Residential Buildings 
Housing Gen 
Other social Services 
Total 
Receipts 
140.25 
1.18 
1.03 
0.00 
0.01 
0.15 
0.00 
109.40 
75.57 
1.19 
30.99 
0.49 
0.16 
15.58 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.18 
0.00 
0.00 
6,69 
0.17 
0.00 
8.54 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
14.09 
6.17 
7.92 
0.00 
0.00 
Current 
Cost 
2549.75 
688.95 
175.72 
0.00 
378.95 
122.93 
11.35 
1383.54 
253.32 
22.75 
392.05 
242,11 
473.32 
407.19 
37.71 
40.84 
0.00 
37,42 
163.20 
1.16 
10.78 
24.67 
0.00 
91.40 
0.00 
0,00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
70.08 
56.21 
^ 13.87 
0.00 
0.00 
Capital Cost 
567.05 
84.84 
1.62 
0.00 
76.67 
4.80 
1.76 
99.70 
27.06 
2.55 
43.47 
21.17 
5,45 
72.32 
19.30 
0.00 
0.00 
16.01 
7,36 
0.07 
28,43 
1.06 
0.09 
0.00 
197.55 
0.08 
22,48 
172,20 
2,80 
112.64 
28,03 
84,03 
0,58 
0,00 
Total Cost 
3116.80 
773.79 
177,33 
0,00 
455,63 
127,73 
13,10 
1483.24 
280,37 
25,30 
435,52 
263,28 
478,77 
479.51 
57,01 
40.84 
0.00 
53.43 
170.55 
1.23 
39.22 
25.72 
0.09 
91.40 
197.55 
0.08 
22.48 
172,20 
2,80 
182.71 
84,23 
97,90 
0,58 
0,00 
Subsidy 
2976.55 
772.61 
176,31 
0,00 
455,52 
127,58 
13,10 
1373.84 
203,80 
24,10 
404,53 
262,79 
478,51 
463.93 
57,01 
40,84 
0,00 
53,25 
170,55 
1,23 
32,53 
25.56 
0.09 
82.86 
197.55 
0.08 
22.48 
172.20 
2.80 
168.62 
78.06 
89.98 
0.58 
0.00 
Recovery 
Rate 
4.50 
0.15 
0.58 
0.00 
0.00 
0,12 
0,00 
7.38 
27,31 
4,72 
7,12 
0,18 
0,03 
3.25 
0,01 
0,00 
0,00 
0.34 
0,00 
0.00 
17,05 
0,64 
0,00 
9,34 
0.00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0.00 
7.71 
7.33 
8.09 
0.00 
0,00 
Source : Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective Years. 
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Table A6. 6 
Implicit Budgetary Subsidies in Social Services 
Classified as per Externalities involved - 2003-04 
(In Rs. Crore) 
Total - Social Service 
Impure Public Goods 
Elementary Education 
Adul t Education 
Rural Health Services 
Public Health 
Sewerage and Sanitation 
Merit 1 Goods 
Secondary Education 
Art and Culture 
Urban Health Services 
Family Wel fare 
Water Supply 
Merit II Goods 
University and Higher Education 
Language Development 
General Education 
Sports and Youth Welfare 
Medical Education - Training and 
Research 
General health 
Urban Development 
Informat ion and Publicity 
Broadcasting 
Labour and Employment 
Merit Goods with Distributive 
Justice 
Rural Housing 
Housing for urban Poor 
Wel fare of SC, ST, OBC 
Social Security and Welfare 
Private Goods 
Technical Education 
Government Residential Buildings 
Housing Gen 
Other social Services 
Total 
Receipts 
78.46 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
46.09 
0.00 
0.00 
42.69 
0.49 
2.90 
21.97 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
12.15 
0.38 
0.00 
9.44 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
10.40 
0.00 
10.40 
0.00 
0,00 
Current 
Cost 
2837.49 
807.38 
119.33 
0.00 
482.02 
162.39 
43.64 
1518.50 
272.83 
36.98 
511.48 
344.43 
352.76 
494.06 
45.42 
39.88 
31.06 
44.76 
196.13 
1.55 
6.10 
20.93 
0.00 
108.24 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0,00 
0.00 
17.56 
0.00 
17.56 
0.00 
0.00 
Capital 
Cost 
709.76 
150.94 
1.73 
0.08 
82.45 
4.89 
61.79 
113.22 
32.40 
8.76 
40.40 
21.59 
10.06 
128.82 
21.90 
0.00 
3.28 
17,54 
7.85 
0.08 
78.00 
0.10 
0.10 
0.00 
231.56 
0.07 
13.28 
215.10 
3.10 
85.21 
0.00 
85.21 
0.00 
0.00 
Total Cost 
3547.25 
958.31 
121.06 
0.08 
564.46 
167.28 
105.43 
1631.71 
305.24 
45.75 
551.88 
366.02 
362.83 
622.89 
67.32 
39.88 
34.34 
62,29 
203.98 
1.63 
84.10 
21.02 
0.10 
108.24 
231.56 
0.07 
13.28 
215.10 
3.10 
102.77 
0.00 
102.77 
0.00 
0.00 
Subsidy 
3468.79 
958.31 
121.06 
0.08 
564.46 
167.28 
105.43 
1585.63 
305.24 
45.75 
509.19 
365.53 
359.92 
600.91 
67.32 
39.88 
34.34 
62.29 
203.98 
1,63 
71,95 
20,64 
0,10 
98,80 
231.56 
0,07 
13.28 
215.10 
3.10 
92.37 
0.00 
92.37 
0.00 
0.00 
Recovery 
Rate (%) 
2.21 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
2.82 
0,00 
0.00 
7.74 
0.13 
0.80 
3.53 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
14.45 
1.81 
0.00 
8.73 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Q.QO 
10.12 
0.00 
10,12 
0.00 
Q.OQ 
Source : Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective Years. 
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Table A6. 7 
Implicit Budgetary Subsidies in Social Services 
Classified as per Externalities Involved - 2005-06 
(In Rs, Crore) 
Total - Social Service 
Impure Public Goods 
Elementary Education 
Adult Education 
Rural Health Services 
Public Health 
Sewerage and Sanitation 
Merit 1 Goods 
Secondary Education 
Art and Culture 
Urban Health Services 
Family Welfare 
Water Supply 
Merit 11 Goods 
University and Higher Education 
Language Development 
General Education 
Sports and Youth Welfare 
Medical Education - Training and 
Research 
General health 
Urban Development 
Information and Publicity 
Broadcasting 
Labour and Employment 
Merit Goods with Distributive 
Justice 
Rural Housing 
Housing for urban Poor 
Welfare of SC, ST, OBC 
Social Security and Welfare 
Private Goods 
Technical Education 
Government Residential Buildings 
Housing Gen 
Other social Services 
Total 
Receipts 
155.13 
19.86 
0.00 
0.01 
0.86 
18.99 
0.00 
36.02 
0.00 
14.40 
18.91 
1.02 
1.70 
16.03 
0.00 
0.00 
0.43 
1.13 
0.86 
0.00 
0.86 
0.09 
0,00 
12.67 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
83.21 
63.31 
10.99 
0.00 
8.91 
Current 
Cost 
4462.53 
995.84 
125.71 
0.00 
606.65 
172.57 
90.92 
2308.04 
660.58 
95.66 
644.17 
422.53 
485.10 
1072.69 
62.39 
52.42 
51.45 
55.31 
687.81 
1.60 
6.82 
24.32 
0,00 
130.58 
0.50 
0.50 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
85.45 
61.02 
17.88 
0.00 
6.55 
Capital Cost 
682.48 
145.95 
1,67 
0.06 
92.36 
3.78 
48.08 
144.08 
31.35 
14.46 
53,33 
16.70 
28.24 
101.35 
18.75 
0.00 
3.70 
17.47 
7.87 
0.06 
52.69 
0.76 
0,07 
0.00 
188.18 
0.05 
9.05 
175.47 
3.61 
102.91 
25.95 
70.72 
0.00 
6.24 
Total Cost 
5145.01 
1141.80 
127.38 
0.06 
699,00 
176.35 
139.00 
2452.13 
691.93 
110.13 
697.50 
439.23 
513,34 
1174.05 
81.14 
52.42 
55.15 
72.77 
695.68 
1.66 
59.50 
25.08 
0.07 
130.58 
188.68 
0.55 
9.05 
175.47 
3.61 
188.37 
86.97 
88.60 
0.00 
12.79 
Subsidy 
4989.88 
1121.94 
127.38 
0.05 
698,15 
157.36 
139.00 
2416.10 
691.93 
95.73 
678.58 
438.21 
511.64 
1158.01 
81.14 
52.42 
54.72 
71.64 
694.82 
1.66 
58.54 
24.99 
0,07 
117,91 
188.68 
0.55 
9.05 
175.47 
3.61 
105.15 
23.65 
77.61 
0.00 
3.89 
Recovery 
Rate {%) 
3.02 
1.74 
0.00 
17.17 
0.12 
10.77 
0.00 
1.47 
0.00 
13,07 
2.71 
0.23 
0.33 
1.37 
0.00 
0.00 
0.78 
1.55 
0.12 
0.00 
1.44 
0.35 
0,00 
9.70 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
44.18 
72.80 
12.40 
0.00 
69.62 
Source : Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective Years. 
293 
Table A6. 8 
Implicit Budgetary Subsidies in Social Services as a Per Cent of GSDP 
Classified as per Externalities Involved - 1990-91 
(In Percent) 
Total - Social Service 
Impure Public Goods 
Elementary Education 
Adult Education 
Rural Health Services 
Public Health 
Sewerage and Sanitation 
Merit 1 Goods 
Secondary Education 
Art and Culture 
Urban Health Services 
Family Welfare 
Water Supply 
Merit II Goods 
University and Higher Education 
Language Development 
General Education 
Sports and Youth Welfare 
Medical Education - Training and 
Research 
General health 
Urban Development 
Information and Publicity 
Broadcasting 
Labour and Employment 
Merit Goods with Distributive 
Justice 
Rural Housing 
Housing for urban Poor 
Welfare of SC, ST, OBC 
Social Security and Welfare 
Private Goods 
Technical Education 
Government Residential Buildings 
Housing Gen 
Other social Services 
Total 
Receipts 
0.08 
0.01 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.05 
0.03 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Current 
Cost 
1.88 
0.58 
0.17 
0.03 
0.21 
0.17 
0.00 
0.94 
0.18 
0.01 
0.25 
0.21 
0.30 
0.29 
0.03 
0.02 
0.01 
0.03 
0.09 
0.00 
0.02 
0.02 
0.00 
0.09 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.07 
0.05 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
Capital Cost 
0.20 
0.03 
0.00 
0.00 
0.03 
0.00 
0.00 
0.04 
0.01 
0.00 
0.02 
0.01 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.04 
0.00 
0.02 
0.03 
0.00 
0.07 
0.01 
0.05 
0.00 
0.00 
Total Cost 
2.09 
0.61 
0.17 
0.03 
0.24 
0.17 
0.01 
0.98 
0.19 
0.01 
0.27 
0.22 
0.30 
0.31 
0.03 
0.02 
0.01 
0.03 
0.09 
0.00 
0.02 
0.02 
0.00 
0.09 
0.04 
0.00 
0.02 
0.03 
0.00 
0.13 
0.06 
0.06 
0.01 
0.00 
Subsidy 
2.01 
0.60 
0.16 
0.03 
0.24 
0.17 
0.01 
0.94 
0.15 
0.01 
0.26 
0.22 
0.30 
0.30 
0,02 
0.02 
0.01 
0.03 
0.09 
0.00 
0.02 
0.02 
0.00 
0.09 
0.04 
0.00 
0.02 
0.03 
0.00 
0.12 
0.05 
0.05 
0.01 
0.00 
Recovery 
Rate 
3.70 
1.49 
4.87 
0.00 
0.00 
0.42 
0.00 
4.58 
16.82 
0.00 
4.27 
1.04 
0.01 
3.90 
23.62 
0.00 
4.53 
0.05 
0.09 
0.00 
0.35 
3.52 
0,00 
4.96 
0.00 
0.00 
^ 0.00 
0.00 
0,00 
8.12 
10,89 
7.74 
0,00 
0,00 
Source : Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective Years. 
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Table A6. 9 
Implicit Budgetary Subsidies in Social Services as a Per Cent of GSDP 
Classified as per Externalities Involved - 1993-94 
(In Per Cent; 
Total - Social Service 
Impure Public Goods 
Elementary Education 
Adult Education 
Rural Health Services 
Public Health 
Sewerage and Sanitation 
Merit 1 Goods 
Secondary Education 
Art and Culture 
Urban Health Services 
Family Welfare 
Water Supply 
Merit II Goods 
University and Higher Education 
Language Development 
General Education 
Sports and Youth Welfare 
Medical Education - Training and 
Research 
General health 
Urban Development 
Information and Publicity 
Broadcasting 
Labour and Employment 
Merit Goods with Distributive 
Justice 
Rural Housing 
Housing for urban Poor 
Welfare of SC, ST, OBC 
Social Security and Welfare 
Private Goods 
Technical Education 
Government Residential 
Buildings 
Housing Gen 
Other social Services 
Total 
Receipts 
0.06 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.03 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Current 
Cost 
1.85 
0.58 
0,12 
0.01 
0,25 
0,18 
0,01 
0.94 
0.19 
0.01 
0.26 
0.27 
0,21 
0.27 
0,01 
0,02 
0,01 
0.04 
0.09 
0.00 
0.01 
0.02 
0,00 
0.08 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.06 
0,05 
0,01 
0,00 
0,00 
Capital 
Cost 
0.24 
0.04 
0,00 
0.00 
0,03 
0,00 
0,00 
0.05 
0.01 
0.00 
0.02 
0,01 
0,00 
0.02 
0,01 
0,00 
0,00 
0.01 
0.01 
0.00 
0,00 
0,00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.05 
0.00 
0.02 
0.03 
0.00 
0.07 
0.02 
0.05 
0.00 
0.00 
Total Cost 
2.09 
0.62 
0.12 
0.01 
0.29 
0.19 
0.01 
0.99 
0,20 
0,01 
0,28 
0.29 
0.21 
0.30 
0.02 
0.02 
0.01 
0.04 
0.10 
0.00 
0.01 
0,02 
0,00 
0,08 
0.05 
0,00 
0,02 
0,03 
0,00 
0.13 
0,06 
0,06 
0,00 
0,00 
Subsidy 
2.03 
0.60 
0.12 
0.01 
0.29 
0.17 
0.01 
0,96 
0.18 
0,01 
0,28 
0,28 
0,21 
0.28 
0,01 
0,02 
0,01 
0.04 
0.10 
0.00 
0.01 
0.02 
0.00 
0,07 
0.05 
0.00 
0.02 
0,03 
0.00 
0.13 
0,06 
0.06 
0.00 
0.00 
Recovery 
Rate 
2.91 
2.36 
1.09 
0.00 
0.00 
7.11 
0.00 
2.74 
11.76 
0.47 
0.66 
0.47 
0.04 
4,65 
50.25 
0.00 
0.00 
0.42 
0.05 
0.00 
0.49 
1.53 
0.00 
4.24 
0,00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
3,97 
0.47 
7.80 
0.00 
0.00 
Source : Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective Years, 
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Table A6.10 
Implicit Budgetary Subsidies in Social Services as a Per Cent of GSDP 
Classified as per Externalities Involved - 1995-96 
(In Per Cent; 
TOTAL 
Impure Public Goods 
Elementary Education 
Adult Education 
Rural Health Services 
Public Health 
Sewerage and Sanitation 
Merit I Goods 
Secondary Education 
Art and Culture 
Urban Health Services 
Family Welfare 
Water Supply 
Merit II Goods 
University and Higher 
Education 
Language Development 
General Education 
Sports and Youth Welfare 
Medical Education - Training 
and Research 
General health 
Urban Development 
Information and Publicity 
Broadcasting 
Labour and Employment 
Merit Goods with Distributive 
Justice 
Rural Housing 
Housing for urban Poor 
Welfare of SC, ST, OBC 
Social Security and Welfare 
Private Goods 
Technical Education 
Government Residential 
Buildings 
Housing Gen 
Other social Services 
Total 
Receipts 
0.07 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.05 
0.04 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
Current 
Cost 
1.78 
0.59 
0.20 
0.00 
0.21 
0.16 
0.02 
0.85 
0.20 
0.01 
0.25 
0.18 
0.21 
0.27 
0.02 
0.02 
0.03 
0.03 
0.08 
0.00 
0.01 
0.02 
0.00 
0.06 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.06 
0.05 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
Capital 
Cost 
0.25 
0.04 
0.00 
0.00 
0.03 
0.00 
0,00 
0.06 
0.01 
0.00 
0.02 
0.02 
0.00 
0.03 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.06 
0.00 
0.02 
0.04 
0.00 
0.07 
0.02 
0.05 
0.00 
0.00 
Total Cost 
2.03 
0.63 
0.20 
0.00 
0.24 
0.16 
0.03 
0.91 
0.22 
0.01 
0.27 
0.20 
0.21 
0.30 
0.03 
0.02 
0.03 
0.04 
0.08 
0.00 
0.01 
0.02 
0.00 
0.06 
0.06 
0.00 
0.02 
0.04 
0.00 
0.13 
0.07 
0.07 
0.00 
0,00 
Subsidy 
1.97 
0.62 
0,20 
0.00 
0.24 
0,16 
0.03 
0.86 
0.18 
0,01 
0.27 
0.20 
0.21 
0.29 
0.03 
0,02 
0,03 
0,04 
0,08 
0,00 
0,01 
0,02 
0,00 
0.06 
0.06 
0.00 
0.02 
0,04 
0,00 
0.13 
0,07 
0,06 
0.00 
0,00 
Recovery 
Rate 
3.20 
0.84 
1,23 
0.15 
0,00 
1,78 
0,00 
5.08 
18.67 
1,70 
1,56 
0,57 
0,04 
2.64 
1,24 
0.00 
0,00 
1.45 
0,04 
0,00 
6.52 
1,58 
0,00 
9,36 
0.00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
4.25 
0.54 
8.11 
0.00 
0,00 
Source : Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective Years. 
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Table A6.11 
Implicit Budgetary Subsidies in Social Services as a Per Cent of GSDP 
Classified as per Externalities Involved - 1998-99 
(in Per Cent) 
Total - Social Service 
Impure Public Goods 
Elementary Education 
Adult Education 
Rural Health Services 
Public Health 
Sewerage and Sanitation 
Merit 1 Goods 
Secondary Education 
Art and Culture 
Urban Health Services 
Family Welfare 
Water Supply 
Merit II Goods 
University and Higher Education 
Language Development 
General Education 
Sports and Youth Welfare 
Medical Education - Training and 
Research 
General health 
Urban Development 
Information and Publicity 
Broadcasting 
Labour and Employment 
Merit Goods with Distributive 
Justice 
Rural Housing 
Housing for urban Poor 
Welfare of SC, ST, OBC 
Social Security and Welfare 
Private Goods 
Technical Education 
Government Residential Buildings 
Housing Gen 
Other social Services 
Total 
Receipts 
0.09 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.07 
0.05 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Current 
Cost 
1.66 
0.57 
0.17 
0.01 
0.21 
0.13 
0.06 
0.77 
0.24 
0.01 
0.21 
0.13 
0.19 
0.26 
0.01 
0.03 
0.04 
0.03 
0.07 
0.00 
0.01 
0.02 
0.00 
0.07 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.05 
0.05 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
Capital Cost 
0.34 
0.05 
0.00 
0.00 
0.04 
0.00 
0.01 
0.06 
0.01 
0,00 
0.02 
0,01 
0,01 
0.07 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.05 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.09 
0,00 
0,02 
0,07 
0,00 
0.07 
0.02 
0.05 
0.00 
0.00 
Total Cost 
2.01 
0.62 
0.17 
0.01 
0.25 
0.13 
0,06 
0.83 
0.25 
0.01 
0.23 
0.14 
0.19 
0.34 
0.02 
0.03 
0.04 
0.03 
0.07 
0,00 
0,06 
0,02 
0,00 
0.07 
0.09 
0.00 
0.02 
0.07 
0.00 
0.12 
0.06 
0.06 
0.00 
0.00 
Subsidy 
1.92 
0.62 
0,17 
0,01 
0.25 
0.13 
0.06 
0.77 
0,20 
0,01 
0,23 
0,14 
0,19 
0.32 
0.01 
0.03 
0.04 
0,03 
0,07 
0.00 
0.06 
0.02 
0.00 
0.06 
0.09 
0.00 
0,02 
0,07 
0,00 
0.12 
0,06 
0.06 
0.00 
0.00 
Recovery 
Rate 
4.28 
0.23 
0.07 
0.00 
0,00 
1.02 
0.00 
8.21 
21.85 
36.62 
1.19 
4.66 
0,05 
3.39 
7.95 
0.00 
0.08 
0.35 
0.14 
0.00 
0,05 
10,09 
0,00 
11.64 
0.00 
0,00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
3.64 
3,87 
3,49 
0.12 
0,00 
Source : Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective Years, 
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TableA6.12 
Implicit Budgetary Subsidies in Social Services as a Per Cent of GSDP 
Classified as per Externalities Involved - 2001-02 
(In Percent) 
Total - Social Service 
Impure Public Goods 
Elementary Education 
Adult Education 
Rural Health Services 
Public Health 
Sewerage and Sanitation 
Merit 1 Goods 
Secondary Education 
Art and Culture 
Urban Health Services 
Family Welfare 
Water Supply 
Merit II Goods 
University and Higher 
Education 
Language Development 
General Education 
Sports and Youth Welfare 
Medical Education - Training 
and Research 
General health 
Urban Development 
Information and Publicity 
Broadcasting 
Labour and Employment 
Merit Goods with Distributive 
Justice 
Rural Housing 
Housing for urban Poor 
Welfare of SC, ST, OBC 
Social Security and Welfare 
Private Goods 
Technical Education 
Government Residential 
Buildings 
Housing Gen 
Other social Services 
Total 
Receipts 
0.07 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.06 
0.04 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0,00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Current 
Cost 
1.34 
0.36 
0.09 
0.00 
0.20 
0.06 
0.01 
0.73 
0.13 
0.01 
0.21 
0.13 
0.25 
0.21 
0.02 
0.02 
0.00 
0.02 
0.09 
0.00 
0.01 
0.01 
0.00 
0.05 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.04 
0.03 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
Capital 
Cost 
0.30 
0.04 
0.00 
0.00 
0.04 
0.00 
0.00 
0.05 
0.01 
0.00 
0.02 
0.01 
0.00 
0.04 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.10 
0.00 
0.01 
0.09 
0.00 
0.06 
0.01 
0.04 
0.00 
0.00 
Total Cost 
1.64 
0.41 
0.09 
0.00 
0.24 
0.07 
0.01 
0.78 
0.15 
0.01 
0.23 
0.14 
0.25 
0.25 
0.03 
0.02 
0.00 
0.03 
0.09 
0,00 
0.02 
0,01 
0.00 
0.05 
0.10 
0.00 
0.01 
0.09 
0.00 
0.10 
0.04 
0.05 
0.00 
0.00 
Subsidy 
1.56 
0.41 
0.09 
0.00 
0.24 
0.07 
0.01 
0.72 
0.11 
0.01 
0.21 
0.14 
0.25 
0.24 
0.03 
0.02 
0.00 
0.03 
0.09 
0,00 
0.02 
0,01 
0.00 
0.04 
0.10 
0.00 
0.01 
0.09 
0.00 
0.09 
0.04 
0.05 
0.00 
0.00 
Recovery 
Rate 
4.50 
0.15 
0.58 
0.00 
0.00 
0.12 
0.00 
7.38 
27,31 
4.72 
7.12 
0.18 
0.03 
3.25 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.34 
0.00 
0.00 
17.05 
0.64 
0.00 
9.34 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
7.71 
7.33 
8.09 
0.00 
0.00 
Source : Basic Data - Government of Uttar Praidesh, Finance Accounts for respective Years. 
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Table A6.13 
Implicit Budgetary Subsidies in Social Services as a Per Cent of GSDP 
Classified as per Externalities Involved - 2003-04 
(In Percent) 
Total - Social Service 
Impure Public Goods 
Elementary Education 
Adult Education 
Rural Health Services 
Public Health 
Sewerage and Sanitation 
Merit 1 Goods 
Secondary Education 
Art and Culture 
Urban Health Services 
Family Welfare 
Water Supply 
Merit II Goods 
University and Higher Education 
Language Development 
General Education 
Sports and Youth Welfare 
Medical Education - Training 
and Research 
General health 
Urban Development 
Information and Publicity 
Broadcasting 
Labour and Employment 
Merit Goods with Distributive 
Justice 
Rural Housing 
Housing for urban Poor 
Welfare of SC, ST, OBC 
Social Security and Welfare 
Private Goods 
Technical Education 
Government Residential 
Buildings 
Housing Gen 
Other social Services 
Total 
Receipts 
0.03 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Current 
Cost 
1.26 
0.36 
0.05 
0.00 
0.21 
0.07 
0.02 
0.68 
0.12 
0.02 
0.23 
0.15 
0.16 
0.22 
0.02 
0.02 
0.01 
0.02 
0.09 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.05 
O.QQ 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
Capital 
Cost 
0.32 
0.07 
0.00 
0.00 
0.04 
0.00 
0.03 
0.05 
0.01 
0.00 
0.02 
0.01 
0.00 
0.06 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.03 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.10 
0.00 
0.01 
0.10 
0.00 
0.04 
0.00 
0.04 
0.00 
0.00 
Total Cost 
1.58 
0.43 
0.05 
0.00 
0.25 
0.07 
0.05 
0.73 
0.14 
0.02 
0.25 
0.16 
0.16 
0.28 
0.03 
0.02 
0.02 
0.03 
0.09 
0.00 
0.04 
0.01 
0.00 
0.05 
0.10 
0.00 
0.01 
0.10 
0.00 
0.05 
0.00 
0.05 
0.00 
0.00 
Subsidy 
1.54 
0.43 
0.05 
0.00 
0.25 
0.07 
0.05 
0.71 
0.14 
0.02 
0.23 
0.16 
0.16 
0.27 
0.03 
0.02 
0.02 
0.03 
0.09 
0.00 
0.03 
0.01 
0.00 
0.04 
0.10 
0.00 
0.01 
0.10 
0.00 
0.04 
0.00 
0.04 
0.00 
0.00 
Recovery 
Rate 
2.21 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0,00 
2.82 
0,00 
0.00 
7,74 
0.13 
0.80 
3.53 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0,00 
0.00 
0.00 
14.45 
1.81 
0.00 
8.73 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
10.12 
0.00 
10.12 
0.00 
0.00 
Source : Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective Years. 
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Table A6.14 
Implicit Budgetary Subsidies in Social Services as a Per Cent of GSDP 
Classified as per Externalities Involved - 2005-06 
(In Percent) 
Total - Social Service 
Impure Public Goods 
Elementary Education 
Adult Education 
Rural Health Services 
Public Health 
Sewerage and Sanitation 
Merit 1 Goods 
Secondary Education 
Art and Culture 
Urban Health Services 
Family Welfare 
Water Supply 
Merit II Goods 
University and Higher Education 
Language Development 
General Education 
Sports and Youth Welfare 
Medical Education - Training and 
Research 
General health 
Urban Development 
Information and Publicity 
Broadcasting 
Labour and Employment 
Merit Goods with Distributive 
Justice 
Rural Housing 
Housing for urban Poor 
Welfare of SC, ST, OBC 
Social Security and Welfare 
Private Goods 
Technical Education 
Government Residential Buildings 
Housing Gen 
Other social Services 
Total 
Receipts 
0.06 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
0,00 
0.01 
0.01 
0,00 
0.00 
0.01 
0,00 
0,00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.03 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Current 
Cost 
1.63 
0.36 
0.05 
0.00 
0.22 
0.06 
0.03 
0.84 
0.24 
0.03 
0.24 
0.15 
0.18 
0.39 
0.02 
0.02 
0.02 
0.02 
0.25 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.05 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.03 
0.02 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
Capital Cost 
0.25 
0.05 
0.00 
0,00 
0,03 
0.00 
0,02 
0.05 
0.01 
0,01 
0.02 
0,01 
0,01 
0.04 
0,01 
0,00 
0.00 
0,01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.07 
0.00 
0.00 
0.06 
0.00 
0.04 
0.01 
0,03 
0.00 
0,00 
Total Cost 
1.88 
0.42 
0,05 
0,00 
0.26 
0.06 
0,05 
0.90 
0.25 
0.04 
0,25 
0.16 
0.19 
0.43 
0.03 
0.02 
0.02 
0.03 
0,25 
0.00 
0.02 
0.01 
0.00 
0.05 
0.07 
0.00 
0.00 
0.06 
0.00 
0.07 
0,03 
0.03 
0,00 
0,00 
Subsidy 
1.82 
0.41 
0.05 
0.00 
0,25 
0,06 
0,05 
0.88 
0.25 
0,03 
0,25 
0,15 
0,19 
0.42 
0.03 
0.02 
0.02 
0,03 
0.25 
0,00 
0,02 
0,01 
0,00 
0.04 
0.07 
0.00 
0.00 
0.06 
0.00 
0.04 
0.01 
0.03 
0.00 
0,00 
Recovery 
Rate 
3.02 
1.74 
0,00 
17,17 
0.12 
10.77 
0,00 
1.47 
0,00 
13.07 
2,71 
0,23 
0,33 
1.37 
0,00 
0,00 
0,78 
1,55 
0.12 
0,00 
1.44 
0,35 
0,00 
9,70 
0.00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
44.18 
72,80 
12,40 
0.00 
69,62 
Source : Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective Years. 
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TableA6.15 
Implicit Budgetary Subsidies in Economic Services 
Classified as per Externalities Involved - 1990-91 
(In Rs. Crore) 
Total - Economic Service 
Impure Public Goods 
Forestry 
Wild Life 
Flood Control 
Roads and Bridges 
Other Scientific Researcli 
Ecology and Environment 
Census Survey and Statistics 
Meteorology 
Merit 1 Goods 
Soil and Water Conservation 
Agriculture Research and Education 
Command Area Development 
Extension and Training in Farming 
Extension and Training in Fisheries 
Merit II Goods 
Crop Husbandry (Excluding extension/training) 
Animal Husbandry 
Dairy Development 
Fisheries (Excluding extension/training) 
Major & Medium - Non Commercial Irrigation 
Miner Irrigation 
Non Conventional Energy Sources 
Village and Small Industries 
Civil Aviation 
Inland Water Transport 
Merit Goods vt/ith Distributive Justice 
Hill Areas 
Food Storage and w/arehouses 
Rural employment 
Special Programmes For Rural Development 
Other Rural Dev. Programmes 
Other Special Area Programmes 
Other Irrigation 
Civil Supplies 
Private Goods 
Plantations 
Co-operation 
Investments in Agri. Fin. Inst. 
Other Agriculture Programmes 
Commercial Irrigation 
Power 
Industry 
Road transport 
Other Transport Services 
Tourism 
Foreign Trade and Export Promotion 
Gen. Financial Trading Institutes 
Other Gen. Economic Services 
Total 
Receipts 
175.90 
101.30 
87.22 
0.87 
1.42 
11.79 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
2.14 
1.40 
0.00 
0.73 
0.00 
0.00 
20.13 
8.47 
2.54 
0.09 
0.56 
0.00 
6.59 
0.00 
1.74 
0.12 
0.02 
9.87 
2.52 
0,01 
0.00 
0.00 
6.60 
0.00 
0.00 
0.74 
42.46 
0.00 
1.33 
0.00 
0.00 
35.03 
0.00 
0.58 
0.01 
0.00 
2.77 
0.00 
0.00 
2.74 
Current 
Cost 
1872.19 
327.55 
94.01 
4.92 
24.84 
189,36 
1,13 
0.00 
13.29 
0.00 
142.90 
70.21 
15.33 
36.40 
20.96 
0.01 
530.08 
129.79 
63,60 
6.13 
4.97 
14.67 
237.39 
0.00 
73.14 
0.39 
0.02 
455.86 
174.47 
25.23 
0.00 
0.65 
241.61 
8.60 
0.58 
4.62 
415.79 
6.87 
14.92 
0.00 
3.08 
368.43 
0.01 
14.49 
0.48 
0.00 
1.70 
0.60 
0.00 
5.23 
Capital 
Cost 
1504.49 
264.83 
0.11 
0.13 
41.38 
223.02 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.19 
12.32 
1.59 
2,91 
7,81 
0,00 
0.00 
177.59 
11.79 
2.94 
2,38 
0,40 
2.24 
147.08 
0.00 
10.30 
0.46 
0,00 
157.81 
112.24 
26,21 
0.00 
0.00 
8.11 
0.00 
11.26 
0.00 
891.94 
0.00 
4.68 
0.00 
0.06 
439.36 
420.09 
24.66 
0.00 
0.00 
2.11 
0.00 
0.95 
0.04 
Total Cost 
3376.68 
592.38 
94.13 
5.04 
65.21 
412.38 
1.14 
0.00 
13.29 
0.19 
155.22 
71.80 
18.24 
44.21 
20.96 
0.01 
707.67 
141.58 
56.54 
8.51 
5.37 
16.91 
384.47 
0.00 
83.44 
0.85 
0.02 
613.67 
286.71 
51.44 
0.00 
0.55 
249.71 
8.60 
11.94 
4.62 
1307.74 
6.87 
19.60 
0.00 
3.14 
807.79 
420.09 
39.15 
0.48 
0.00 
3.81 
0.60 
0.95 
5.27 
Subsidy 
3200.78 
491.07 
6.90 
4.17 
64.80 
400.59 
1.14 
0.00 
13.29 
0.19 
153.08 
70.40 
18.24 
43.48 
20.96 
0.01 
687.55 
133.11 
53.99 
8.42 
4.81 
16.91 
377.88 
0.00 
81.69 
0.73 
0.00 
603.80 
284.19 
51.43 
0.00 
0.65 
243.11 
8.60 
11.94 
3,89 
1265.28 
6.87 
18,26 
0.00 
3.14 
772.77 
420.09 
38.57 
0.47 
0.00 
1.03 
0.60 
0.95 
2.53 
Recovery 
Rate (%) 
5.21 
17.10 
92,67 
17,27 
2.14 
2.86 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
1.38 
1.95 
0.00 
1.66 
0.00 
0.00 
2.84 
5,21 
3.82 
1.02 
10.37 
0,00 
1.72 
0.00 
2.09 
13.79 
98.16 
1.61 
0.88 
0.03 
0.00 
0.00 
2.64 
0.00 
0.00 
15.96 
3.25 
0.00 
6.80 
0.00 
0.00 
33.50 
0.00 
0.03 
1.30 
0.00 
72.85 
0.00 
0.00 
51.99 
Source : Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective Years. 
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TableA6.16 
Implicit Budgetary Subsidies in Economic Services 
Classified as per Externalities Involved - 1993-94 
(In Rs. Crore) 
TOTAL 
Impure Public Goods 
Forestry 
Wild Life 
Flood Control 
Roads and Bridges 
Other Scientific Research 
Ecology and Environment 
Census Survey and Statistics 
IVleteorology 
Merit t Goods 
Soil and Water Conservation 
Agriculture Research and Education 
Command Area Development 
Extension and Training in Farming 
Extension and Training in Fisheries 
Merit II Goods 
Crop Husbandry 
(Excluding extension/training) 
Animal Husbandry 
Dairy Development 
Fisheries (Excluding extension/training) 
Major & Medium - Non Commercial Irrigation 
Miner Irrigation 
Non Conventional Energy Sources 
Village and Small Industries 
Civil Aviation 
Inland Water Transport 
Merit Goods with Distributive Justice 
Hill Areas 
Food Storage and warehouses 
Rural employment 
Special Programmes For Rural Development 
Other Rural Dev. Programmes 
Other Special Area Programmes 
Other Irrigation 
Civil Supplies 
Private Goods 
Plantations 
Co-operation 
Investments in Agri. Fin. Inst. 
Other Agriculture Programmes 
Commercial Irrigation 
Power 
Industry 
Road transport 
Other Transport Services 
Tourism 
Foreign Trade and Export Promotion 
Gen. Financial Trading Institutes 
Other Gen. Economic Services 
Total 
Receipts 
251.38 
17.32 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
17.32 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
44.16 
15.61 
3.22 
0.10 
1.03 
0.00 
21.91 
0.00 
1.84 
0.45 
0.00 
13.24 
2.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
5.78 
0.04 
0.00 
5.41 
176.67 
0.00 
1.47 
0.00 
1.35 
161.23 
0.00 
2.48 
0.16 
0.00 
6.32 
0.00 
0.00 
3.66 
Current 
Cost 
2562.16 
331.04 
0.00 
0.00 
39.23 
283.11 
1.06 
0.00 
7.65 
0.00 
154.55 
64.02 
7.84 
35.24 
47.44 
0.01 
884.93 
281.38 
98.92 
18.65 
11.62 
11.52 
392.32 
0.00 
69.88 
0.63 
0.00 
614.08 
205.52 
45.17 
0.00 
15.65 
328.88 
0.00 
12.01 
6.86 
577.56 
6.73 
37.55 
0.00 
2.58 
504.57 
0.00 
9.87 
0.48 
0.00 
3.73 
0.00 
0.00 
12.06 
Capital 
Cost 
2071.74 
364.58 
0.00 
0.00 
45.73 
318.65 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.19 
4.81 
0.90 
3.90 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
219.78 
22.79 
4.82 
3.67 
0.40 
2.30 
172.28 
0.00 
12.88 
0.64 
0.00 
29.97 
172.82 
17.35 
0.01 
0.00 
14.06 
9.99 
15.75 
0.00 
1252.60 
0.00 
5.16 
0.00 
0.06 
527.39 
700.82 
14.94 
0.51 
0.06 
3.63 
0.00 
0.00 
0.04 
Total 
Cost 
4633.90 
695.62 
0.00 
0.00 
84.96 
601.76 
1.07 
0.00 
7.65 
0.19 
159.35 
64.92 
11.74 
35.24 
47.45 
0.01 
1104.71 
304.17 
103.73 
22.32 
12.02 
13.82 
564.60 
0.00 
82.77 
1.28 
0.00 
844.05 
378.34 
62.51 
0.01 
15.65 
342,94 
9.99 
27.76 
6.86 
1830.16 
6.73 
42.71 
0.00 
2.63 
1031.96 
700.82 
24.81 
1.00 
0.06 
7.36 
0.00 
0.00 
12.10 
Subsidy 
4382.51 
678.30 
0.00 
0.00 
84.96 
584.44 
1.07 
0.00 
7.65 
0.19 
159.35 
64.92 
11.74 
35.24 
47.45 
0.01 
1060.56 
288,57 
100.51 
22.22 
10.99 
13.82 
542,69 
0.00 
80,93 
0,83 
0.00 
830.81 
376.34 
62.51 
0.01 
15.65 
337,16 
9.95 
27.76 
1.45 
1653.49 
6,73 
41,23 
0,00 
1,29 
870,73 
700,82 
22,32 
0.84 
0.06 
1.04 
0.00 
0,00 
8,43 
Recovery 
Rate 
5.42 
2.49 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
2.88 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0,00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
4.00 
5.13 
3.11 
0,43 
8,56 
0,00 
3,88 
0.00 
2,23 
35.06 
80.49 
1.57 
0.53 
0.00 
0,00 
0,00 
1,69 
0,40 
0,00 
78,89 
9.65 
0,00 
3.45 
0,00 
51,07 
15,62 
0,00 
10,02 
15.69 
0.00 
85.87 
0,00 
0,00 
30.28 
Source : Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective Years. 
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TableA6.17 
Implicit Budgetary 
Classified as per 
Subsidies in Economic Services 
Externalities Involved -1995-96 
(In Rs. Crorei 
TOTAL 
Impure Public Goods 
Forestry 
Wild Life 
Flood Control 
Roads and Bridges 
Other Scientific Research 
Ecology and Environment 
Census Survey and Statistics 
Meteorology 
Merit 1 Goods 
Soil and Water Conservation 
Agriculture Research and Education 
Command Area Development 
Extension and Training in Farming 
Extension and Training in Fisheries 
Merit II Goods 
Crop Husbandry 
(Excluding extension / training) 
Animal Husbandry 
Dairy Development 
Fisheries (Excluding extension/training) 
Major & Medium - Non Commercial Irrigation 
Miner Irrigation 
Non Conventional Energy Sources 
Village and Small Industries 
Civil Aviation 
Inland Water Transport 
Merit Goods with Distributive Justice 
Hill Areas 
Food Storage and warehouses 
Rural employment 
Special Programmes For Rural Development 
Other Rural Dev. Programmes 
Other Special Area Programmes 
Other Irrigation 
Civil Supplies 
Private Goods 
Plantations 
Co-operation 
Investments in Agri. Fin. Inst. 
Other Agriculture Programmes 
Commercial Irrigation 
Power 
Industry 
Road transport 
Other Transport Services 
Tourism 
Foreign Trade and Export Promotion 
Gen. Financial Trading Institutes 
Other Gen. Economic Services 
Total 
Receipts 
258.07 
16.77 
0.00 
0.75 
0.00 
16.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
2.32 
2.32 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
82.08 
21.23 
5.61 
3.18 
1.54 
0.00 
40.58 
0.00 
9.74 
0.19 
0.00 
37.74 
2.37 
0.20 
0.00 
0.00 
32.57 
0.65 
0.00 
1.95 
119.16 
0.00 
3.62 
0.00 
0.03 
103.95 
0.00 
1.78 
0.91 
0.00 
3.58 
0.00 
0.00 
5.27 
Current 
Cost 
2999.42 
316.29 
0.00 
11.91 
42.82 
249.51 
1.81 
0.00 
10.22 
0.01 
252.34 
121.30 
7.54 
49.83 
73.66 
0.01 
1041.99 
202.21 
110.53 
9.43 
9.04 
13.05 
609.72 
0.00 
86.82 
1.13 
0.08 
728.87 
255.96 
44.34 
0.00 
9.89 
407.74 
0.97 
1.00 
8.97 
659.93 
8.29 
17.72 
0.00 
3.86 
597.56 
0.00 
14,83 
0.73 
0.00 
7.20 
0.00 
0.00 
9.73 
Capital 
Cost 
2903.77 
500.86 
0.00 
0.14 
56.39 
444.11 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.22 
14.38 
1.00 
5.06 
8.32 
0.00 
0.00 
264.85 
19.94 
6.63 
5.27 
0.45 
2.68 
211.63 
0.00 
16.75 
1.50 
0.00 
310.93 
236.24 
2.53 
0.01 
0.00 
23.27 
27.13 
21.75 
0.00 
1812.75 
0.00 
9.93 
0.30 
0.07 
669.70 
1100.75 
24.31 
0.61 
0.07 
6.96 
0.00 
0.04 
0.00 
Total Cost 
5903.19 
817.15 
0.00 
12.06 
99.21 
693.62 
1.82 
0.00 
10.22 
0.23 
266.72 
122.30 
12.61 
58.14 
73.66 
0.01 
1306.84 
222.14 
117.15 
14.69 
9.49 
15.73 
821.35 
0.00 
103.58 
2.63 
0.08 
1039.79 
492.20 
46.87 
0.01 
9.89 
431.01 
28.09 
22.75 
8.97 
2472.68 
8.29 
27.65 
0.30 
3.93 
1267.26 
1100.75 
39.14 
1.34 
0.07 
14.17 
0.00 
0.04 
9.73 
Subsidy 
5645.12 
800.38 
0.00 
11.30 
99.21 
677.60 
1.82 
0.00 
10.22 
0.23 
264.41 
119.99 
12.61 
58.14 
73.66 
0.01 
1224.76 
200.91 
111.54 
11.52 
7.95 
15.73 
780.77 
0.00 
93.83 
2.44 
0.07 
1002.05 
489.82 
46.67 
0.01 
9.89 
398.44 
27.44 
22.75 
7.02 
2353.52 
8.29 
24.03 
0.30 
3.90 
1163.31 
1100.75 
37.36 
0.43 
0.07 
10.59 
0.00 
0.04 
4.45 
Recovery 
Rate 
4.37 
2.05 
0.00 
6.25 
0.00 
2.31 
0.00 
0.00; 
0.00 
0.00 
0.87 
1.89 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
6.28 
9.56 
4.79 
21.62 
16.21 
0.00 
4.94 
0.00 
9.41 
7.31 
5.03 
3.63 
0.48 
0.42 
0.00 
0.00 
7.56 
2.32 
0.00 
21.76 
4.82 
0.00 
13.10 
0.00 
0.84 
8.20 
0.00 
4.56 
68.03 
0.00' 
25.25 
0.00: 
0.00 
54.22 
Source : Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective Years. 
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Table A6.18 
Implicit Budgetary Subsidies in Economic Services 
Classified as per Externalities Involved - 1998-99 
(In Rs. Crore) 
Total - Economic Service 
Impure Public Goods 
Forestry 
Wild Life 
Flood Control 
Roads and Bridges 
Otiier Scientific Researcii 
Ecology and Environment 
Census Survey and Statistics 
Meteorology 
Merit 1 Goods 
Soil and Water Conservation 
Agriculture Researcti and Education 
Command Area Development 
Extension and Training in Farming 
Extension and Training in Fisheries 
Merit II Goods 
Crop Husbandry 
Animal Husbandry 
Dairy Development 
Fisheries (Excluding extension / training) 
Major & Medium - Non Commercial Irrigation 
Miner Irrigation 
Non Conventional Energy Sources 
Village and Small Industries 
Civil Aviation 
Inland Water Transport 
Merit Goods with Distributive Justice 
Hill Areas 
Food Storage and warehouses 
Rural employment 
Special Programmes For Rural Development 
Other Rural Dev. Programmes 
Other Special Area Programmes 
Other Irrigation 
Civil Supplies 
Private Goods 
Plantations 
Co-operation 
Investments in Agri. Fin. Inst. 
Other Agriculture Programmes 
Commercial Irrigation 
Power 
Industry 
Road transport 
Other Transport Services 
Tourism 
Foreign Trade and Export Promotion 
Gen. Financial Trading Institutes 
Other Gen. Economic Services 
Total 
Receipts 
318.24 
147.97 
124.72 
1.19 
0.00 
22.06 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
64.03 
17.57 
6.77 
1.43 
1.73 
0.00 
35.09 
0.00 
1.20 
0.25 
0.00 
43.11 
8.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
31.10 
1.67 
0.00 
2.34 
63.13 
0.00 
2.27 
0.00 
2.87 
49.13 
0.04 
4.62 
0.00 
0.00 
4.21 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Current 
Cost 
4192.44 
567.51 
168.21 
12.09 
57.14 
314.27 
1.68 
0.00 
14.14 
0,00 
385.94 
172.99 
8.29 
45.47 
159.19 
0.01 
1112.26 
257.88 
142.30 
6.90 
10.97 
1.15 
621.72 
0.00 
70.15 
1.09 
0.09 
1607.76 
466.62 
64.72 
0.00 
4.92 
803.39 
0.29 
251.62 
16.21 
518.95 
11.41 
25.12 
0.00 
5.14 
450.96 
0.00 
16.73 
0.00 
0.00 
9.19 
0.40 
0.00 
0.00 
Capital 
Cost 
4115.77 
690.83 
0.08 
0.33 
67.26 
622.84 
0.07 
0.00 
0.00 
0.23 
16.23 
1.09 
5.49 
9.64 
0.01 
0.00 
302.33 
19.84 
11.40 
8.23 
0.49 
2.97 
228.80 
0.00 
23,59 
7.00 
0.00 
494.62 
348.88 
7.44 
0.01 
0.00 
36.64 
74.71 
26.95 
0.00 
2611.76 
0.00 
24.00 
0.34 
0.08 
925.01 
1544.95 
95.51 
0.00 
0.07 
15,22 
0,00 
6.57 
0.00 
Total 
Cost 
8308.20 
1258.34 
168.29 
12,41 
124,40 
937.11 
1.76 
0.00 
14.14 
0.23 
402.18 
174.08 
13.78 
55.10 
159.20 
0.01 
1414.59 
277.73 
153.71 
15.14 
11.46 
4.12 
850.52 
0.00 
93.73 
8.09 
0.09 
2102.38 
815.50 
72.15 
0.01 
4.92 
840.03 
75.00 
278.57 
16.21 
3130.71 
11.41 
49.13 
0.34 
5.22 
1375.97 
1544.95 
112.24 
0.00 
0.07 
24.41 
0.40 
6.57 
0.00 
Subsidy 
7989.97 
1110.37 
43.57 
11.22 
124.40 
915.05 
1.76 
0.00 
14.14 
0.23 
402.18 
174.08 
13.78 
55.10 
159.20 
0.01 
1350.56 
260.16 
146.94 
13.71 
9.73 
4.12 
815.44 
0.00 
92.53 
7.84 
0.09 
2059.28 
807.50 
72.15 
0.01 
4.92 
808.93 
73.33 
278.57 
13.87 
3067.58 
11.41 
46.86 
0.34 
2.35 
1326.85 
1544.91 
107.62 
0.00 
0,07 
20,20 
0.40 
6.57 
0.00 
Recovery 
Rate 
3.83 
11.76 
74.11 
9.59 
0.00 
2.35 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
4.53 
4,02 
4,40 
9,45 
15,07 
0,00 
4,13 
31,29 
1,28 
3,14 
0,11 
2.05 
0.98 
0.00 
0.00 
0,00 
3,70 
2,23 
0,00 
14,41 
2.02 
0,00 
4,61 
0,00 
54.98 
3.57 
0.00 
4.11 
0.00 
0.00 
17.24 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Source : Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective Years. 
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Table A6.19 
Implicit Budgetary Subsidies in Economic Services 
Classified as per Externalities Involved - 2001-02 
(In Rs, Crorej 
Total - Economic Service 
Impure Public Goods 
Forestry 
Wild Life 
Flood Control 
Roads and Bridges 
Other Scientific Research 
Ecology and Environment 
Census Survey and Statistics 
Meteorology 
Merit 1 Goods 
Soil and Water Conservation 
Agriculture Research and Education 
Command Area Development 
Extension and Training in Farming 
Extension and Training in Fisheries 
Merit II Goods 
Crop Husbandry 
(Excluding extension/training) 
Animal Husbandry 
Dairy Development 
Fisheries (Excluding extension / training) 
Major & Medium - Non Commercial Irrigation 
Miner Irrigation 
Non Conventional Energy Sources 
Village and Small Industries 
Civil Aviation 
Inland Water Transport 
Merit Goods with Distributive Justice 
Hill Areas 
Food Storage and w/arehouses 
Rural employment 
Special Programmes For Rural Development 
Other Rural Dev. Programmes 
Other Special Area Programmes 
Other Irrigation 
Civil Supplies 
Private Goods 
Plantations 
Co-operation 
Investments in Agri. Fin. Inst. 
Other Agriculture Programmes 
Commercial Irrigation 
Power 
Industry 
Road transport 
Other Transport Services 
Tourism 
Foreign Trade and Export Promotion 
Gen. Financial Trading Institutes 
Other Gen. Economic Services 
Total 
Receipts 
348.94 
84.58 
68.31 
0.00 
0.00 
16.27 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
108.00 
75.77 
8.13 
0.70 
1.91 
0.00 
17.73 
0.00 
1.53 
2.22 
0.00 
127.09 
0.06 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
23.71 
0.03 
100.08 
3,20 
29.27 
0.00 
11.43 
0.00 
0.00 
15.68 
0.00 
0.18 
0.00 
0.00 
1.99 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Current 
Cost 
4565.88 
476.49 
154.89 
9.63 
23.24 
271.14 
0.00 
0.00 
17.58 
0.00 
404.68 
280.72 
4.80 
57.93 
61.01 
0.21 
984.16 
487.94 
121.53 
10.48 
16.42 
0.94 
276.20 
0.00 
69.84 
0.81 
0.00 
1728.22 
0.00 
66.35 
0.00 
4.98 
1206.06 
0.00 
446.48 
4.35 
972.34 
9.74 
25.39 
0.00 
0.00 
533.26 
350.00 
47.70 
0.00 
0.00 
6.25 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Capital 
Cost 
4776.51 
968.33 
0.08 
0.31 
78.30 
888.77 
0.66 
0.00 
0.00 
0.22 
16.69 
1.00 
6.80 
8.88 
0.01 
0.00 
294.84 
24.60 
12.80 
6.48 
0.46 
2.77 
215.74 
0.00 
24.78 
7.23 
0,00 
643.34 
424.70 
16.26 
0.01 
0.00 
36.83 
139.23 
26.31 
0.00 
2853.30 
0.00 
12.46 
1.36 
0.00 
1143.69 
1651.69 
20.68 
0.00 
0.90 
22.48 
0.00 
0.05 
0.00 
Total 
Cost 
9342.39 
1444.82 
154.97 
9.94 
101.54 
1159.91 
0.66 
0.00 
17,58 
0.22 
421.37 
281.72 
11,60 
66,82 
61,02 
0.21 
1279.00 
512.54 
134,33 
16,96 
16,87 
3,71 
491,94 
0.00 
94.62 
8.03 
0.00 
2371.56 
424.70 
82,61 
0,01 
4.98 
1242,89 
139,23 
472,79 
4.35 
3825.64 
9.74 
37.84 
1.36 
0.00 
1676.95 
2001.69 
68.38 
0.00 
0.90 
28.73 
0.00 
0,05 
0,00 
Subsidy 
8993.45 
1360.24 
86.66 
9.94 
101.54 
1143.65 
0.66 
0.00 
17.58 
0.22 
421.37 
281,72 
11,60 
66,82 
61.02 
0.21 
1171.00 
436.77 
126.20 
16.25 
14,96 
3,71 
474,21 
0.00 
93.09 
5.82 
0.00 
2244.47 
424.64 
82.61 
0.01 
4.98 
1219.17 
139.20 
372.70 
1.14 
3796.37 
9.74 
26.41 
1.36 
0,00 
1661,27 
2001,69 
68,20 
0.00 
0.90 
26.74 
0.00 
0.05 
0.00 
Recovery 
Rate 
3.74 
5.85 
44,08 
0,00 
0.00 
1.40 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0.00 
0,00 
0.00 
0.00 
0,00 
0,00 
8.44 
14.78 
5,06 
4.15 
11,32 
0,00 
3.60 
0,00 
1.62 
27.60 
0.00 
5.36 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
1.91 
0.02 
21,17 
73,68 
0.77 
0.00 
30.20 
0.00 
0.00 
0,93 
0.00 
0.27 
0.00 
0.00 
5.92 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Source : Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective Years. 
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Table A6.20 
Implicit Budgetary Subsidies in Economic Services 
Classified as per Externalities Involved - 2003-04 
(In Rs. Crore) 
Total - Economic Service 
Impure Public Goods 
Forestry 
Wild Life 
Flood Control 
Roads and Bridges 
Other Scientific Research 
Ecology and Environment 
Census Survey and Statistics 
Meteorology 
Merit 1 Goods 
Soil and Water Conservation 
Agriculture Research and Education 
Command Area Development 
Extension and Training in Farming 
Extension and Training in Fisheries 
Merit II Goods 
Crop Husbandry (Excluding extension/training) 
Animal Husbandry 
Dairy Development 
Fisheries (Excluding extension / training) 
Major & Medium - Non Commercial Irrigation 
Miner Irrigation 
Non Conventional Energy Sources 
Village and Small Industries 
Civil Aviation 
Inland Water Transport 
Merit Goods with Distributive Justice 
Hill Areas 
Food Storage and warehouses 
Rural employment 
Special Programmes For Rural Development 
Other Rural Dev. Programmes 
Other Special Area Programmes 
Other Irrigation 
Civil Supplies 
Private Goods 
Plantations 
Co-operation 
Investments in Agri. Fin. Inst. 
Other Agriculture Programmes 
Commercial Irrigation 
Pow/er 
Industry 
Road transport 
Other Transport Services 
Tourism 
Foreign Trade and Export Promotion 
Gen. Financial Trading Institutes 
Other Gen. Economic Services 
Total 
Receipts 
598.24 
102.75 
60.96 
0.00 
0.00 
41.79 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
233.30 
195.68 
8.55 
0.32 
2.56 
0.00 
18.53 
1.54 
5.95 
0.17 
0.00 
125.86 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
45.18 
75.27 
3.21 
2.20 
136.32 
0.00 
0.43 
0.00 
2.46 
132.89 
0.00 
0.14 
0.00 
0.00 
0.40 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Current 
Cost 
5750.64 
546.35 
108.57 
9.75 
29.82 
376.59 
0.00 
0.00 
21.62 
0.00 
395.21 
247.34 
7.71 
88.11 
51.93 
0.12 
1063.40 
508.78 
178.34 
10.34 
15.68 
0.35 
245.05 
11.96 
91.40 
1.50 
0.00 
1793.02 
0.00 
76.52 
0.00 
6.98 
1207.86 
27.00 
469.71 
4.95 
1952.65 
2.28 
29.18 
0.00 
5.56 
647.37 
1149.32 
112.28 
0.00 
0.00 
6.67 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Capital 
Cost 
6169.81 
1187.86 
7.05 
0.38 
92.54 
1086.98 
0.67 
0.00 
0.00 
0.22 
20.80 
1.03 
8.67 
11.10 
0.01 
0.00 
397.09 
110.39 
14.80 
6.96 
0.46 
2.82 
225.09 
0.00 
27.71 
8.85 
0.00 
1356.48 
438.38 
526.04 
0.01 
0.00 
149.89 
213.94 
28.22 
0.00 
3207.58 
0.88 
11.17 
0.32 
0.07 
1407.29 
1736.12 
19.16 
0.00 
1.73 
30.79 
0.00 
0.05 
0.00 
Total Cost 
11920.45 
1734.21 
115.63 
10.13 
122.36 
1463.57 
0.67 
0.00 
21.62 
0.22 
416.01 
248.37 
16.38 
99.21 
51.94 
0.12 
1460.49 
619.17 
193.14 
17.29 
16.15 
3.17 
470.14 
11.97 
119.12 
10.35 
0.00 
3149.50 
438.38 
602.56 
0.01 
6.98 
1357.74 
240.94 
497.93 
4.96 
5160.23 
3.16 
40.34 
0.32 
5.63 
2054.66 
2885.44 
131.44 
0.00 
1.73 
37.46 
0.00 
0.05 
0.00 
Subsidy 
11322.21 
1631.46 
54.67 
10.13 
122.36 
1421.78 
0.67 
0.00 
21.62 
0.22 
416.01 
248.37 
16.38 
99.21 
51.94 
0.12 
1227.19 
423.49 
184.59 
16.98 
13.58 
3.17 
451.61 
10.43 
113.16 
10.18 
0.00 
3023.64 
438.38 
602.56 
0.01 
6.98 
1312.56 
165.66 
494.71 
2.76 
5023.91 
3.16 
39.91 
0.32 
3.17 
1921.77 
2885.44 
131.31 
0.00 
1.73 
37.06 
0.00 
0.05 
0.00 
Recovery 
Rate 
5.02 
5.93 
52.72 
0.00 
0.00 
2.86 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
15.97 
31.50 
4.43 
1.84 
15.88 
0.00 
3.94 
12.83 
5.00 
1.57 
0.00 
4.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
3.33 
31.24 
0.54 
44.31 
2.64 
0.00 
1.07 
0.00 
43.75 
6.47 
0.00 
0.10 
0.00 
0.00 
1.08 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Source : Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective Years. 
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Table A6.21 
Implicit Budgetary Subsidies in Economic Services 
Classified as per Externalities Involved - 2005-06 
(In Rs. Crorei 
Total - Economic Service 
Impure Public Goods 
Forestry 
Wild Life 
Flood Control 
Roads and Bridges 
Other Scientific Research 
Ecology and Environment 
Census Survey and Statistics 
Meteorology 
Merit 1 Goods 
Soil and Water Conservation 
Agriculture Research and Education 
Command Area Development 
Extension and Training in Farming 
Extension and Training in Fisheries 
Merit II Goods 
Crop Husbandry (Excluding extension /training) 
Animal Husbandry 
Dairy Development 
Fisheries (Excluding extension / training) 
Major & Medium - Non Commercial Irrigation 
Miner Irrigation 
Non Conventional Energy Sources 
Village and Small Industries 
Civil Aviation 
Inland Water Transport 
Merit Goods with Distributive Justice 
Hill Areas 
Food Storage and warehouses 
Rural employment 
Special Programmes For Rural Development 
Other Rural Dev. Programmes 
Other Special Area Programmes 
Other Irrigation 
Civil Supplies 
Private Goods 
Plantations 
Co-operation 
Investments in Agr, Fin. Insti 
Other Agriculture Programmes 
Commercial Irrigation 
Pow/er 
Industry 
Road transport 
Other Transport Services 
Tourism 
Foreign Trade and Export Promotion 
Gen. Financial Trading Institutes 
Other Gen. Economic Services 
Total 
Receipts 
370.39 
55.40 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
55.40 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.57 
0.00 
0.00 
0.57 
0.00 
0.00 
88.43 
40.81 
10.61 
2.37 
2.35 
4.57 
20.64 
2.35 
3.43 
1.30 
0.00 
36.11 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
33.14 
0.37 
0.88 
1.72 
189.88 
0.00 
4.26 
0.00 
3.00 
172,06 
0.00 
1.07 
9.19 
0.00 
0.31 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Current 
Cost 
6740.21 
802.68 
0.00 
10.68 
34,50 
724.76 
0.00 
0.00 
32.73 
0.00 
304.67 
185.56 
7.30 
0.00 
111.59 
0.21 
1253.39 
553.63 
175.13 
13.33 
24.17 
0.47 
350.08 
11.48 
124.09 
1.01 
0.00 
2115.79 
0.00 
83.05 
0.00 
10.88 
1698.25 
49.50 
268.39 
5.72 
2263.68 
2.54 
33.72 
0.00 
5.25 
642.41 
1389.57 
147.30 
32.36 
0.00 
9.62 
0.91 
0.00 
0.00 
Capital 
Cost 
4568.68 
1217.09 
0.00 
0,93 
100,00 
1115.80 
0.18 
0.00 
0.00 
0,17 
17.36 
0.76 
10.48 
6.11 
0.01 
0.00 
346.60 
107.45 
12.82 
4.81 
0.36 
2.18 
186.26 
0.00 
20.39 
12.33 
0.00 
1330.76 
334.13 
490.92 
0.01 
0.00 
235.28 
246.72 
23.70 
0.00 
1656.87 
1.81 
10.26 
0.22 
0.05 
1263,31 
185.42 
145.22 
15.79 
6.41 
27.35 
0.00 
0.03 
0.00 
Total Cost 
11308.89 
2019.76 
0.00 
11.62 
134.50 
1840.57 
0.18 
0.00 
32.73 
0.17 
322.02 
186.32 
17.78 
6.11 
111.50 
0.21 
1599.99 
661.08 
187.95 
18.14 
24.53 
2.65 
536.34 
11,48 
144.47 
13.34 
0.00 
3446.55 
334.13 
573.97 
0.01 
10.88 
1933.53 
296.22 
292.09 
5.72 
3920.56 
4.35 
43.98 
0.22 
5.30 
1905.72 
1574.99 
293.53 
48.15 
5.41 
36.97 
0.91 
0.03 
0.00 
Subsidy 
10938.50 
1964.37 
0.00 
11.62 
134.50 
1785.17 
0.18 
0.00 
32.73 
0.17 
321.45 
186.32 
17.78 
5.54 
111.60 
0.21 
1511.57 
620.28 
177.34 
15.77 
22.17 
-1.91 
515.70 
9.13 
141.04 
12.05 
0.00 
3410.44 
334,13 
573,97 
0.01 
10.88 
1900.39 
295.86 
291.21 
4.00 
3730.68 
4.35 
39.72 
0.22 
2.30 
1733.67 
1574.99 
292.45 
38,96 
6.41 
36.67 
0.91 
0.03 
0.00 
Recovery 
Rate 
3.28 
2.74 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
3.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.18 
0.00 
0.00 
9.40 
0.00 
0.00 
5.53 
6.17 
5.65 
13.08 
9.60 
172.01 
3,85 
20,47 
2,38 
9.71 
#DIV/0! 
1.05 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0.00 
1.71 
0.12 
0.30 
30,00 
4.84 
0.00 
9.68 
0.00 
56.59 
9.03 
0.00 
0.37 
19.08 
0.00 
0.83 
0.00 
0,00 
0,00 
Source : Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective Years. 
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Table A6.22 
Implicit Budgetary Subsidies in Economic Services as a Per Cent of GSDP 
Classified as per Externalities Involved - 1990-91 
(In Percent) 
Total - Economic Service 
Impure Public Goods 
Forestry 
Wild Life 
Flood Control 
Roads and Bridges 
Other Scientific Researcfi 
Ecology and Environment 
Census Survey and Statistics 
Meteorology 
Merit 1 Goods 
Soil and Water Conservation 
Agriculture Research and Education 
Command Area Development 
Extension and Training in Farming 
Extension and Training in Fisheries 
Merit II Goods 
Crop Husbandry (Excluding extension/training) 
Animal Husbandry 
Dairy Development 
Fisheries (Excluding extension/training) 
IVlajor & Medium - Non Commercial Irrigation 
Miner Irrigation 
IMon Conventional Energy Sources 
Village and Small Industries 
Civil Aviation 
Inland Water Transport 
Merit Goods with Distributive Justice 
Hill Areas 
Food Storage and warehouses 
Rural employment 
Special Programmes For Rural Development 
Other Rural Dev. Programmes 
Other Special Area Programmes 
Other Irrigation 
Civil Supplies 
Private Goods 
Plantations 
Co-operation 
Investments in Agr. Fin. Insti 
Other Agriculture Programmes 
Commercial Irrigation 
Power 
Industry 
Road transport 
Other Transport Services 
Tourism 
Foreign Trade and Export Promotion 
Gen. Financial Trading Institutes 
Other Gen. Economic Services 
Total 
Receipts 
0.27 
0.16 
0.14 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.03 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.07 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.05 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Current 
Cost 
2.93 
0.51 
0.15 
0.01 
0.04 
0.30 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.22 
0.11 
0.02 
0.06 
0.03 
0.00 
0.83 
0.20 
0.10 
0.01 
0.01 
0.02 
0.37 
0.00 
0.11 
0.00 
0.00 
0.71 
0.27 
0.04 
0.00 
0.00 
0.38 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
0.65 
0.01 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.58 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
Capital 
Cost 
2.35 
0.41 
0.00 
0.00 
0.06 
0.35 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.28 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.23 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.25 
0.18 
0.04 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
1.39 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.69 
0.65 
0.04 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Total Cost 
5.28 
0.93 
0.15 
0.01 
0.10 
0.64 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.24 
0.11 
0.03 
0.07 
0.03 
0.00 
1.11 
0.22 
0.10 
0.01 
0.01 
0.03 
0.60 
0.00 
0.13 
0.00 
0.00 
0.96 
0.45 
0.08 
0.00 
0.00 
0.39 
0.01 
0.02 
0.01 
2.04 
0.01 
0.03 
0.00 
0.00 
1.26 
0.66 
0.06 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
Subsidy 
5.00 
0.77 
0.01 
0.01 
0.10 
0.63 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.24 
0.11 
0.03 
0.07 
0.03 
0.00 
1.07 
0.21 
0.10 
0.01 
0.01 
0,03 
0.59 
0.00 
0.13 
0.00 
0.00 
0.94 
0.44 
0.08 
0.00 
0.00 
0.38 
0.01 
0.02 
0.01 
1.98 
0.01 
0.03 
0.00 
0.00 
1.21 
0.66 
0.06 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Recovery 
Rate 
5.21 
17.10 
92.67 
17.27 
2.14 
2.85 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
1.38 
1.95 
0.00 
1.55 
0.00 
0.00 
2.84 
5.21 
3,82 
1,02 
10,37 
0,00 
1,72 
0,00 
2,09 
13.79 
98,16 
1.61 
0.88 
0,03 
0,00 
0,00 
2,54 
0,00 
0,00 
15,95 
3.25 
0.00 
6.80 
0.00 
0.00 
33.50 
0.00 
0,03 
1,30 
0.00 
72.85 
0.00 
0.00 
51,99 
Source : Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective Years. 
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Table A6.23 
Implicit Budgetary Subsidies in Economic Services as a Per Cent of GSDP 
Classified as per Externalities Involved -1993-94 
(In Percent) 
TOTAL 
Impure Public Goods 
Forestry 
Wild Life 
Flood Control 
Roads and Bridges 
Other Scientific Research 
Ecology and Environment 
Census Survey and Statistics 
Meteorology 
Merit 1 Goods 
Soil and Water Conservation 
Agriculture Research and Education 
Command Area Development 
Extension and Training in Farming 
Extension and Training In Fisheries 
Merit II Goods 
Crop Husbandry (Excluding extension/training) 
Animal Husbandry 
Dairy Development 
Fisheries (Excluding extension/training) 
Major & Medium - Non Commercial Irrigation 
Miner Irrigation 
Non Conventional Energy Sources 
Village and Small Industries 
Civil Aviation 
Inland Water Transport 
Merit Goods with Distributive Justice 
Hill Areas 
Food Storage and warehouses 
Rural employment 
Special Programmes For Rural Development 
Other Rural Dev. Programmes 
Other Special Area Programmes 
Other Irrigation 
Civil Supplies 
Private Goods 
Plantations 
Co-operation 
Investments in Agri. Fin. Inst. 
Other Agriculture Programmes 
Commercial Irrigation 
Power 
Industry 
Road transport 
Other Transport Services 
Tourism 
Foreign Trade and Export Promotion 
Gen. Financial Trading Institutes 
Other Gen. Economic Services 
Total 
Receipts 
0.30 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.05 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.03 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.21 
0,00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.19 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Current 
Cost 
3.04 
0.39 
0.00 
0.00 
0.05 
0.34 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.18 
0.08 
0.01 
0.04 
0.06 
0.00 
1.05 
0.33 
0.12 
0.02 
0.01 
0.01 
0.47 
0.00 
0.08 
0.00 
0.00 
0.73 
0.24 
0.05 
0.00 
0.02 
0.39 
0.00 
0.01 
0.01 
0.69 
0.01 
0.04 
0.00 
0,00 
0.60 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
Capital 
Cost 
2.46 
0.43 
0.00 
0.00 
0.05 
0.38 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.26 
0.03 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.20 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.27 
0.21 
0.02 
0,00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.01 
0.02 
0.00 
1.49 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.63 
0.83 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Total 
Cost 
5.50 
0.83 
0.00 
0.00 
0.10 
0.71 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.19 
0.08 
0.01 
0.04 
0.06 
0.00 
1.31 
0.36 
0.12 
0.03 
0.01 
0.02 
0,67 
0.00 
0.10 
0.00 
0.00 
1.00 
0.45 
0.07 
0,00 
0,02 
0,41 
0,01 
0,03 
0,01 
2.17 
0.01 
0.05 
0.00 
0.00 
1.23 
0.83 
0.03 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
Subsidy 
5.20 
0.81 
0.00 
0.00 
0.10 
0.69 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.19 
0.08 
0.01 
0.04 
0.06 
0.00 
1.26 
0.34 
0.12 
0.03 
0.01 
0.02 
0.64 
0.00 
0.10 
0.00 
0.00 
0.99 
0.45 
0.07 
0.00 
0.02 
0.40 
0.01 
0.03 
0.00 
1.96 
0.01 
0.05 
0.00 
0.00 
1.03 
0.83 
0.03 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Recovery 
Rate 
5.42 
2.49 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
2.88 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
4.00 
5.13 
3.11 
0.43 
8.56 
0.00 
3.88 
0.00 
2.23 
35.06 
80.49 
1.57 
0.53 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
1.59 
0.40 
0.00 
78.89 
9.65 
0.00 
3.45 
0.00 
51.07 
15,62 
0.00 
10.02 
15.69 
0.00 
85.87 
0.00 
0.00 
30.28 
Source : Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective Years. 
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Table A6.24 
Implicit Budgetary Subsidies in Economic Services as a Per Cent of GSDP 
Classified as per Externalities Involved - 1995-96 
(In Percent) 
TOTAL 
Impure Public Goods 
Forestry 
Wild Life 
Flood Control 
Roads and Bridges 
Other Scientific Research 
Ecology and Environment 
Census Survey and Statistics 
Meteorology 
Merit 1 Goods 
Soil and Water Conservation 
Agriculture Research and Education 
Command Area Development 
Extension and Training in Farming 
Extension and Training in Fisheries 
Merit II Goods 
Crop Husbandry 
(Excluding extension/training) 
Animal Husbandry 
Dairy Development 
Fisheries (Excluding extension/training) 
Major & Medium - Non Commercial Irrigation 
Miner Irrigation 
Non Conventional Energy Sources 
Village and Small Industries 
Civil Aviation 
Inland Water Transport 
Merit Goods with Distributive Justice 
Hill Areas 
Food Storage and warehouses 
Rural employment 
Special Programmes For Rural Development 
Other Rural Dev. Programmes 
Other Special Area Programmes 
Other Irrigation 
Civil Supplies 
Private Goods 
Plantations 
Co-operation 
Investments in Agri. Fin. Insti 
Other Agriculture Programmes 
Commercial Irrigation 
Power 
Industry 
Road transport 
Other Transport Services 
Tourism 
Foreign Trade and Export Promotion 
Gen. Financial Trading Institutes 
Other Gen. Economic Services 
Total 
Receipts 
0.23 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0,00 
0.00 
0.07 
0.02 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.04 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.03 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.03 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.11 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.09 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Current 
Cost 
2.70 
0.28 
0.00 
0.01 
0.04 
0.22 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.23 
0.11 
0.01 
0.04 
0.07 
0.00 
0.94 
0.18 
0.10 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.55 
0.00 
0.08 
0.00 
0.00 
0.66 
0,23 
0.04 
0.00 
0.01 
0.37 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.59 
0.01 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.54 
0.00 
0.01 
0,00 
0,00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
Capital 
Cost 
2.61 
0.45 
0.00 
0.00 
0.05 
0,40 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0,00 
0,01 
0,00 
0,00 
0.24 
0.02 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0,19 
0,00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.28 
0,21 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,02 
0,02 
0,02 
0,00 
1.63 
0,00 
0,01 
0,00 
0,00 
0,60 
0,99 
0,02 
0,00 
0,00 
0,01 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
Total 
Cost 
5.3X 
0.73 
0,00 
0,01 
0,09 
0,62 
0,00 
0,00 
0,01 
0,00 
0.24 
0,11 
0,01 
0,05 
0,07 
0,00 
1.18 
0,20 
0,11 
0,01 
0,01 
0.01 
0.74 
0.00 
0.09 
0.00 
0.00 
0.93 
0.44 
0.04 
0.00 
0.01 
0,39 
0,03 
0,02 
0,01 
2.22 
0,01 
0,02 
0,00 
0,00 
1,14 
0,99 
0,04 
0,00 
0,00 
0,01 
0,00 
0.00 
0,01 
Subsidy 
5.08 
0.72 
0,00 
0.01 
0,09 
0,61 
0,00 
0,00 
0,01 
0,00 
0.24 
0,11 
0,01 
0,05 
0,07 
0,00 
1.10 
0,18 
0,10 
0,01 
0,01 
0.01 
0.70 
0.00 
0.08 
0.00 
0,00 
0.90 
0.44 
0,04 
0,00 
0.01 
0.36 
0.02 
0.02 
0.01 
2.12 
0.01 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
1.05 
0.99 
0.03 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Recovery 
Rate 
4.37 
2.05 
0.00 
6.25 
0.00 
2.31 
0.00 
0.00 
0,00 
0.00 
0.87 
1.89 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
6.28 
9.56 
4.79 
21,62 
16,21 
0,00 
4.94 
0.00 
9.41 
7.31 
5.03 
3.63 
0.48 
0.42 
0.00 
0.00 
7.56 
2.32 
0,00 
21,76 
4.82 
0.00 
13.10 
0.00 
0.84 
8.20 
0.00 
4.55 
68.03 
0.00 
25.25 
0.00 
0.00 
54,22 
Source : Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective Years, 
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Table A6.25 
Implicit Budgetary Subsidies in Economic Services as a Per Cent of GSDP 
Classified as per Externalities Involved -1998-99 
(In Percent) 
Total - Economic Service 
Impure Public Goods 
Forestry 
Wild Life 
Flood Control 
Roads and Bridges 
Other Scientific Research 
Ecology and Environment 
Census Survey and Statistics 
Meteorology 
Merit 1 Goods 
Soil and Water Conservation 
Agriculture Research and Education 
Command Area Development 
Extension and Training in Farming 
Extension and Training in Fisheries 
Merit II Goods 
Crop Husbandry (Excluding extension/training) 
Animal Husbandry 
Dairy Development 
Fisheries (Excluding extension/training) 
Major & Medium - Non Commercial Irrigation 
Miner Irrigation 
Non Conventional Energy Sources 
Village and Small Industries 
Civil Aviation 
Inland Water Transport 
Merit Goods with Distributive Justice 
Hill Areas 
Food Storage and warehouses 
Rural employment 
Special Programmes For Rural Development 
Other Rural Dev. Programmes 
Other Special Area Programmes 
Other Irrigation 
Civil Supplies 
Private Goods 
Plantations 
Co-operation 
Investments in Agri. Fin. Inst. 
Other Agriculture Programmes 
Commercial Irrigation 
Power 
Industry 
Road transport 
Other Transport Services 
Tourism 
Foreign Trade and Export Promotion 
Gen. Financial Trading Institutes 
Other Gen. Economic Services 
Total 
Receipts 
0.20 
0.09 
0.08 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.04 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.03 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.04 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.03 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Current 
Cost 
2.60 
0.35 
0.10 
0.01 
0.04 
0.20 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.24 
0.11 
0.01 
0.03 
0.10 
0.00 
0.69 
0.16 
0.09 
0.00 
0.01 
Q.OQ 
0.39 
0.00 
0.04 
0.00 
0.00 
1.00 
0.29 
0.04 
0.00 
0.00 
0.50 
0.00 
0.16 
0.01 
0.32 
0.01 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.28 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Capital 
Cost 
2.56 
0.43 
0.00 
0.00 
0,04 
0.39 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.19 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.14 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.31 
0.22 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.05 
0.02 
0.00 
1.62 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.57 
0.96 
0.06 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Total Cost 
5.16 
0.78 
0.10 
0.01 
0.08 
0.58 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.25 
0.11 
0.01 
0.03 
0.10 
0.00 
0.88 
0.17 
0.10 
0.01 
0.01 
0.00 
0.53 
0.00 
0.06 
0.01 
0.00 
1.31 
0.51 
0.04 
0.00 
0.00 
0.52 
0.05 
0.17 
0.01 
1.94 
0.01 
0.03 
0.00 
0.00 
0.85 
0.96 
0.07 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Subsidy 
4.96 
0.69 
0.03 
0.01 
0.08 
0.57 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.25 
0.11 
0.01 
0.03 
0.10 
0.00 
0.84 
0.16 
0.09 
0.01 
0.01 
0.00 
0.51 
0.00 
0.06 
0.00 
0.00 
1.28 
0.50 
0.04 
0.00 
0.00 
0.50 
0.05 
0.17 
0.01 
1.90 
0.01 
0.03 
0.00 
0.00 
0.82 
0.96 
0.07 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Recovery 
Rate 
3.83 
11.76 
74.11 
9.59 
0.00 
2.35 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
4.53 
4,02 
4.40 
9.45 
15.07 
0,00 
4.13 
31.29 
1.28 
3,14 
0.11 
2.05 
0.98 
0.00 
0,00 
0.00 
3.70 
2.23 
0.00 
14.41 
2.02 
0.00 
4.61 
0.00 
54.98 
3.57 
0.00 
4,11 
0.00 
0.00 
17.24 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Source : Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective Years. 
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Table A6.26 
Implicit Budgetary Subsidies in Economic Services as a Per Cent of GSDP 
Classified as per Externalities Involved - 2001-02 
(In Percent) 
Total - Economic Service 
Impure Public Goods 
Forestry 
Wild Life 
Flood Control 
Roads and Bridges 
Other Scientific Research 
Ecology and Environment 
Census Survey and Statistics 
Meteorology 
Merit 1 Goods 
Soil and Water Conservation 
Agriculture Research and Education 
Command Area Development 
Extension and Training in Farming 
Extension and Training in Fisheries 
Merit II Goods 
Crop Husbandry (Excluding 
extension/training) 
Animal Husbandry 
Dairy Development 
Fisheries (Excluding extension/training) 
Major & Medium - Non Commercial Irrigation 
Miner Irrigation 
Non Conventional Energy Sources 
Village and Small Industries 
Civil Aviation 
Inland Water Transport 
Merit Goods with Distributive Justice 
Hill Areas 
Food Storage and warehouses 
Rural employment 
Special Programmes For Rural Development 
Other Rural Dev. Programmes 
Other Special Area Programmes 
Other Irrigation 
Civil Supplies 
Private Goods 
Plantations 
Co-operation 
Investments in Agri. Fin. Inst. 
Other Agriculture Programmes 
Commercial Irrigation 
Power 
Industry 
Road transport 
Other Transport Services 
Tourism 
Foreign Trade and Export Promotion 
Gen. Financial Trading Institutes 
Other Gen. Economic Services 
Total 
Receipts 
0.18 
0.04 
0.04 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.06 
0.04 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.07 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.05 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Current 
Cost 
2.40 
0.25 
0.08 
0.01 
0.01 
0.14 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.21 
0.15 
0.00 
0.03 
0.03 
0.00 
0.52 
0.26 
0.06 
0.01 
0.01 
0.00 
0.15 
0.00 
0.04 
0.00 
0.00 
0.91 
0.00 
0.03 
0.00 
0.00 
0.63 
0.00 
0.23 
0.00 
0.51 
0.01 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.28 
0.18 
0.03 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Capital 
Cost 
2.51 
0.51 
0.00 
0.00 
0.04 
0.47 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.15 
0.01 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.11 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.34 
0.22 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.07 
0.01 
0.00 
1.50 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.60 
0.87 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Total 
Cost 
4.91 
0.76 
0.08 
0.01 
0.05 
0.61 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.22 
0.15 
0.01 
0.04 
0.03 
0.00 
0.67 
0.27 
0.07 
0.01 
0.01 
0.00 
0.26 
0.00 
0.05 
0.00 
0.00 
1.25 
0.22 
0.04 
0.00 
0.00 
0.65 
0.07 
0.25 
0.00 
2.01 
0.01 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.88 
1.05 
0.04 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Subsidy 
4.72 
0.71 
0.05 
0.01 
0.05 
0.60 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.22 
0.15 
0.01 
0.04 
0.03 
0.00 
0.62 
0.23 
0.07 
0.01 
0.01 
0.00 
0.25 
0.00 
0.05 
0.00 
0.00 
1.18 
0.22 
0.04 
0.00 
0.00 
0.64 
0.07 
0.20 
0.00 
1.99 
0.01 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.87 
1.05 
0.04 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Recovery 
Rate 
3.74 
5.85 
44.08 
0.00 
0.00 
1.40 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
8.44 
14,78 
6.06 
4.15 
11.32 
0.00 
3.60 
0.00 
1.62 
27.60 
0,00 
5.36 
0,01 
0,00 
0.00 
0.00 
1,91 
0.02 
21.17 
73,68 
0.77 
0,00 
30,20 
0,00 
0,00 
0,93 
0,00 
0.27 
0,00 
0,00 
6.92 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Source : Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective Years. 
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Table A6.27 
Implicit Budgetary Subsidies in Economic Services as a Per Cent of GSDP 
Classified as per Externalities Involved - 2001-02 
(In Per Cent! 
Total - Economic Service 
Impure Public Goods 
Forestry 
Wild Life 
Flood Control 
Roads and Bridges 
Other Scientific Research 
Ecology and Environment 
Census Survey and Statistics 
Meteorology 
Merit 1 Goods 
Soil and Water Conservation 
Agriculture Research and Education 
Command Area Development 
Extension and Training in Farming 
Extension and Training in Fisheries 
Merit II Goods 
Crop Husbandry (Excluding extension/training) 
Animal Husbandry 
Dairy Development 
Fisheries (Excluding extension/training) 
Major & Medium - Non Commercial Irrigation 
Miner Irrigation 
Non Conventional Energy Sources 
Village and Small Industries 
Civil Aviation 
Inland Water Transport 
Merit Goods with Distributive Justice 
Hill Areas 
Food Storage and warehouses 
Rural employment 
Special Programmes For Rural Development 
Other Rural Dev. Programmes 
Other Special Area Programmes 
Other Irrigation 
Civil Supplies 
Private Goods 
Plantations 
Co-operation 
Investments in Agr. Fin. Insti 
Other Agriculture Programmes 
Commercial Irrigation 
Power 
Industry 
Road transport 
Other Transport Services 
Tourism 
Foreign Trade and Export Promotion 
Gen. Financial Trading Institutes 
Other Gen. Economic Services 
Total 
Receipts 
0.27 
0.05 
0.03 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0,10 
0.09 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.06 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.03 
0.00 
0.00 
0.06 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.06 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Current 
Cost 
2.56 
0.24 
0.05 
0.00 
0.01 
0.17 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.18 
0.11 
0.00 
0.04 
0.02 
0.00 
0.47 
0.23 
0.08 
0,00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.11 
0.01 
0.04 
0.00 
0.00 
0.80 
0.00 
0.03 
0.00 
0.00 
0.54 
0.01 
0.21 
0.00 
0.87 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.29 
0.51 
0.05 
0.00 
0,00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Capital 
Cost 
2.74 
0.53 
0.00 
0.00 
0.04 
0.48 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.18 
0.05 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.10 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.60 
0.19 
0.23 
0.00 
0.00 
0.07 
0.10 
0.01 
0.00 
1.43 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.63 
0.77 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Total 
Cost 
5.30 
0.77 
0.05 
0.00 
0.05 
0.65 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.19 
0.11 
0.01 
0.04 
0.02 
0.00 
0.65 
0.28 
0.09 
0.01 
0.01 
0.00 
0.21 
0.01 
0.05 
0.00 
0.00 
1.40 
0.19 
0.27 
0.00 
0.00 
0.60 
0.11 
0.22 
0.00 
2.29 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.91 
1.28 
0.06 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Subsidy 
5.04 
0.73 
0.02 
0.00 
0.05 
0.63 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.19 
0.11 
0.01 
0.04 
0.02 
0.00 
0.55 
0.19 
0.08 
0.01 
0.01 
0.00 
0.20 
0.00 
0.05 
0.00 
0.00 
1.34 
0.19 
0.27 
0.00 
0.00 
0.58 
0.07 
0.22 
0.00 
2.23 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0,00 
0,85 
1.28 
0.06 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Recovery 
Rate 
5.02 
5,93 
52.72 
0.00 
0.00 
2.86 
0.00 
0.00 
0,00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
15.97 
31.60 
4.43 
1.84 
15.88 
0.00 
3.94 
12.83 
5.00 
1.57 
0.00 
4,00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
3,33 
31,24 
0.54 
44.31 
2.64 
0.00 
1.07 
0.00 
43.75 
6.47 
0.00 
0.10 
0.00 
0.00 
1.08 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Source : Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective Years, 
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Table A6.28 
Implicit Budgetary Subsidies in Economic Services as a Per Cent of GSDP 
Classified as per Externalities Involved - 2005-06 
(In Rs. Crorei 
Total - Economic Service 
Impure Public Goods 
Forestry 
Wild Life 
Flood Control 
Roads and Bridges 
Other Scientific Research 
Ecology and Environment 
Census Survey and Statistics 
Meteorology 
Merit 1 Goods 
Soil and Water Conservation 
Agriculture Research and Education 
Command Area Development 
Extension and Training in Farming 
Extension and Training in Fisheries 
Merit II Goods 
Crop Husbandry (Excluding extension/training) 
Animal Husbandry 
Dairy Development 
Fisheries (Excluding extension/training) 
Major & Medium - Non Commercial Irrigation 
Miner Irrigation 
Non Conventional Energy Sources 
Village and Small Industries 
Civil Aviation 
Inland Water Transport 
Merit Goods vi/jth Distributive Justice 
Hill Areas 
Food Storage and warehouses 
Rural employment 
Special Programmes For Rural Development 
Other Rural Dev. Programmes 
Other Special Area Programmes 
Other Irrigation 
Civil Supplies 
Private Goods 
Plantations 
Co-operation 
Investments in Agr. Fin. Insti 
Other Agriculture Programmes 
Commercial Irrigation 
Power 
Industry 
Road transport 
Other Transport Services 
Tourism 
Foreign Trade and Export Promotion 
Gen. Financial Trading Institutes 
Other Gen. Economic Services 
Total 
Receipts 
0.14 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0,00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.03 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.07 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.06 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Current 
Cost 
2.46 
0.29 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0,26 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.11 
0.07 
0.00 
0.00 
0.04 
0.00 
0.46 
0.20 
0.06 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.13 
0.00 
0.05 
0.00 
0,00 
0.77 
0.00 
0.03 
0.00 
0.00 
0.52 
0.02 
0.10 
0.00 
0.83 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.23 
0.51 
0.05 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Capital 
Cost 
1.67 
0.44 
0.00 
0.00 
0.04 
0.41 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0,00 
0,00 
0.00 
0.13 
0,04 
0,00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.07 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.49 
0.12 
0.18 
0.00 
0.00 
0.09 
0.09 
0.01 
0.00 
0.61 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0,00 
0.46 
0.07 
0.05 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Total 
Cost 
4.13 
0.74 
0.00 
0.00 
0.05 
0.67 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0,12 
0.07 
0.01 
0.00 
0.04 
0.00 
0.58 
0.24 
0,07 
0,01 
0,01 
0.00 
0.20 
0.00 
0.05 
0.00 
0.00 
1.26 
0.12 
0.21 
0.00 
0.00 
0.71 
0.11 
0.11 
0.00 
1.43 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.70 
0.58 
0.11 
0.02 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Subsidy 
4.00 
0.72 
0.00 
0.00 
0.05 
0.65 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.12 
0.07 
0.01 
0.00 
0.04 
0.00 
0.55 
0.23 
0.06 
0.01 
0.01 
0.00 
0.19 
0.00 
0.05 
0.00 
0.00 
1.25 
0.12 
0.21 
0.00 
0.00 
0.69 
0.11 
0.11 
0.00 
1.36 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.63 
0.58 
0.11 
0,01 
0,00 
0,01 
0,00 
0.00 
0.00 
Recovery 
Rate 
3.28 
2.74 
0.00 
0,00 
0.00 
3,01 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0.18 
0,00 
0,00 
9,40 
0.00 
0,00 
5.53 
6,17 
5.65 
13.08 
9,60 
172,01 
3,85 
20.47 
2.38 
9,71 
1.05 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0,00 
1,71 
0,12 
0,30 
30,00 
4.84 
0.00 
9.68 
0.00 
56,59 
9.03 
0.00 
0.37 
19.08 
0.00 
0.83 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Source : Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective Years 
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Table A6.29 
Share of Subsidies witliin Social Services in Uttar Pradesh 
In Per Cent) 
Total - Social Service 
Impure Public Goods 
Elementary Education 
Adult Education 
Rural Health Services 
Public Health 
Sewerage and Sanitation 
Merit 1 Goods 
Secondary Education 
Art and Culture 
Urban Health Services 
Family Welfare 
Water Supply 
Merit II Goods 
University and Higher Education 
Language Development 
General Education 
Sports and Youth Welfare 
Medical Education -
Training and Research 
General health 
Urban Development 
Information and Publicity 
Broadcasting 
Labour and Employment 
Merit Goods with Distributive 
Justice 
Rural Housing 
Housing for urban Poor 
Welfare of SC, ST, OBC 
Social Security and Welfare 
Private Goods 
Technical Education 
Government Residential Buildings 
Housing Gen 
Other social Services 
Source : Basic Data - Governme 
1990-91 
100.00 
30.12 
8.16 
1.44 
11.75 
8.43 
0.34 
46.70 
7.71 
0.48 
12.72 
10.91 
14.87 
14.87 
1.05 
1.16 
0.28 
1.67 
4.61 
0.03 
0.89 
0.87 
0.01 
4.30 
2.20 
0.01 
0.87 
1.28 
0.04 
6.12 
2.53 
2.61 
0.69 
0.19 
'nt Of Utt< 
1993-94 
100.00 
29.73 
5.85 
0.37 
14.26 
8.54 
0.72 
47.51 
8.79 
0.60 
13.71 
14.02 
10.40 
13.91 
0.49 
1.05 
0.28 
2.09 
4.84 
0.05 
0.65 
0.87 
0.00 
3.59 
2.56 
0,01 
0.78 
1.69 
0.08 
6.28 
3.16 
2.89 
0.06 
0.18 
ar Prades 
1995-96 
100.00 
31.78 
9.98 
0.13 
12.40 
7.95 
1.33 
43.88 
8.97 
0.66 
13.49 
10.23 
10.53 
14.84 
1.38 
1.08 
1.65 
1.88 
4.28 
0.00 
0.40 
1.18 
0.00 
2.99 
2.96 
0.00 
0.85 
2.01 
0.09 
6.53 
3.40 
3.07 
0.05 
0.00 
h, Financ 
1998-99 
100.00 
32.36 
9.10 
0.37 
12.91 
6.67 
3.31 
39.89 
10.23 
0.37 
12.05 
7.13 
10.12 
16.90 
0.74 
1.32 
2.29 
1.81 
3,65 
0.03 
3.01 
1,01 
0,00 
3.04 
4.65 
0.00 
0,91 
3.65 
0.08 
6.19 
3.15 
2.96 
0.08 
0,00 
e Accoun 
2001-02 
100.00 
25.96 
5.92 
0.00 
15.31 
4.29 
0.44 
46.16 
6.85 
0.81 
13.59 
8.83 
16.08 
15.59 
1.92 
1.37 
0.00 
1.79 
5.73 
0.04 
1.09 
0.86 
0.00 
2.78 
6.64 
0.00 
0.76 
5.79 
0.09 
5.66 
2.52 
3.02 
0.02 
0.00 
ts for res 
2003-04 
100.00 
27.63 
3.49 
0.00 
15.27 
4,82 
3.04 
45.71 
8.80 
1,32 
14,68 
10.54 
10.38 
17.32 
1.94 
1,15 
0,99 
1,80 
5,88 
0.05 
2,07 
0,50 
0.00 
2.85 
6.68 
0,00 
0.38 
5,20 
0,09 
2.66 
0,00 
2.66 
0.00 
0.00 
aective Y 
2005-06 
100.00 
22.48 
2,55 
0,00 
13,99 
3,15 
2,79 
48.42 
13,87 
1,92 
13,60 
8,78 
10,25 
23.21 
1.63 
1,05 
1.10 
1.44 
13.92 
0.03 
1,18 
0,50 
0,00 
2,36 
3.78 
0.01 
0,18 
3,52 
0.07 
2.11 
0,47 
1,56 
0.00 
0,08 
aars. 
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Table A6.30 
Share of Subsidies within Economic Services in Uttar Prades 
Total - Economic Service 
Impure Public Goods 
Forestry 
Wild Life 
Flood Control 
Roads and Bridges 
Other Scientific Research 
Ecology and Environment 
Census Survey and Statistics 
Meteorology 
Merit 1 Goods 
Soil and Water Conservation 
Agriculture Research and Education 
Command Area Development 
Extension and Training in Farming 
Extension and Training in Fisheries 
Merit II Goods 
Crop Husbandry 
(Excluding extension/training) 
Animal Husbandry 
Dairy Development 
Fisheries 
(Excluding extension/training) 
Major & Medium Non Commercial 
Irrigation 
Miner Irrigation 
Non Conventional Energy Sources 
Village and Small Industries 
Civil Aviation 
Inland Water Transport 
Merit Goods with Distributive Justice 
Hill Areas 
Food Storage and warehouses 
Rural employment 
Special Programmes 
For Rural Development 
Other Rural Dev. Programmes 
Other Special Area Programmes 
Other Irrigation 
Civil Supplies 
Private Goods 
Plantations 
Co-operation 
Investments in Agri. Fin. Inst. 
Other Agriculture Programmes 
Commercial Irrigation 
Power 
Industry 
Road transport 
Other Transport Services 
Tourism 
Foreign Trade and Export Promotion 
Gen. Financial Trading Institutes 
Other Gen. Economic Services 
1990-91 
100.00 
15.34 
0.22 
0.13 
2.02 
12.52 
0.04 
0.00 
0.42 
0.01 
4.78 
2.20 
0.57 
1.36 
0.65 
0.00 
21.48 
4.16 
2.00 
0,26 
0.15 
0.53 
11.81 
0.00 
2.55 
0.02 
0.00 
18.86 
8.88 
1.61 
0.00 
0.02 
7.60 
0.27 
0.37 
0.12 
39.53 
0.21 
0.57 
0.00 
0.10 
24.14 
13.12 
1.20 
0.01 
0.00 
0.03 
0.02 
0.03 
0.08 
1993-94 
100.00 
15.48 
0.00 
0.00 
1.94 
13.34 
0.02 
0.00 
0.17 
0.00 
3.64 
1.48 
0.27 
0.80 
1.08 
0.00 
24.20 
6.58 
2.29 
0.51 
0.25 
0.32 
12.38 
0.00 
1.85 
0.02 
0.00 
18.96 
8.59 
1.43 
0.00 
0.36 
7.69 
0.23 
0.63 
0.03 
37.73 
0.15 
0.94 
0.00 
0.03 
19.87 
15.99 
0.51 
0.02 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.19 
1995-96 
100.00 
14.18 
0.00 
0.20 
1.76 
12.00 
0.03 
0.00 
0.18 
0.00 
4.68 
2.13 
0.22 
1.03 
1.30 
0.00 
21.70 
3.56 
1.98 
0.20 
0.14 
0.28 
13.83 
0.00 
1.66 
0.04 
0.00 
17.75 
8.68 
0.83 
0.00 
0.18 
7.06 
0.49 
0.40 
0.12 
41.69 
0.15 
0.43 
0.01 
0.07 
20.61 
19.50 
0.66 
0.01 
0.00 
0.19 
0.00 
0.00 
0.08 
1998-99 
100.00 
13.90 
0.55 
0.14 
1.56 
11.45 
0.02 
0.00 
0.18 
0.00 
5.03 
2.18 
0.17 
0.69 
1.99 
0.00 
16.90 
3.26 
1.84 
0.17 
0.12 
0.05 
10.21 
0.00 
1.16 
0.10 
0.00 
25.77 
10.11 
0.90 
0.00 
0.06 
10.12 
0.92 
3.49 
0.17 
38.39 
0.14 
0.59 
0.00 
0.03 
16.61 
19.34 
1.35 
0.00 
0.00 
0.25 
0.00 
0.08 
0.00 
2001-02 
100.00 
15.12 
0.96 
0.11 
1.13 
12.72 
0.01 
0.00 
0.20 
0.00 
4.69 
3.13 
0.13 
0.74 
0.68 
0.00 
13.02 
4.86 
1.40 
0.18 
0.17 
0.04 
5.27 
0.00 
1.04 
0.06 
0.00 
24.96 
4.72 
0.92 
0.00 
0.06 
13.56 
1.55 
4.14 
0.01 
42.21 
0.11 
0.29 
0.02 
0.00 
18.47 
22.26 
0.76 
0.00 
0.01 
0.30 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
2003-04 
100.00 
14.41 
0.48 
0.09 
1.08 
12.56 
0.01 
0.00 
0.19 
0.00 
3.67 
2.19 
0.14 
0.88 
0.46 
0.00 
10.84 
3.74 
1.63 
0.15 
0.12 
0.03 
3.99 
0.09 
1.00 
0.09 
0.00 
26.71 
3.87 
5.32 
0.00 
0.06 
11.59 
1.46 
4.37 
0.02 
44.37 
0.03 
0.35 
0.00 
0.03 
16.97 
25.48 
1.16 
0.00 
0.02 
0.33 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
h 
In Per Ce 
2005-06 
100.00 
17.96 
0.00 
0.11 
1.23 
16.32 
0.00 
0.00 
0.30 
0.00 
2.94 
1.70 
0.16 
0.05 
1.02 
0.00 
13.82 
5.57 
1.62 
0.14 
0.20 
-0.02 
4.71 
0.08 
1.29 
0.11 
0.00 
31.18 
3.05 
5.25 
0.00 
0.10 
17.37 
2.70 
2.56 
0.04 
34.11 
0.04 
0.36 
0.00 
0.02 
15.85 
14.40 
2.67 
0.36 
0.06 
0,34 
0,01 
0.00 
0.00 
nt) 
Source : Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective Years. 
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Table A6.31 
Classification of Implicit Budgetary Subsidies of Social Services 
(At constant Prices 1999-00) 
(In Rs. Crorei 
Total - Social Service 
Impure Public Goods 
Elementary Education 
Adult Education 
Rural Health Services 
Public Health 
Sewerage and Sanitation 
Merit 1 Goods 
Secondary Education 
Art and Culture 
Urban Health Services 
Family Welfare 
Water Supply 
Merit II Goods 
University and Higher Education 
Language Development 
General Education 
Sports and Youth Welfare 
Medical Education - Training and 
Research 
General health 
Urban Development 
Information and Publicity 
Broadcasting 
Labour and Employment 
Merit Goods with Distributive 
Justice 
Rural Housing 
Housing for urban Poor 
WelfareofSC, ST, OBC 
Social Security and Welfare 
Private Goods 
Technical Education 
Government Residential Buildings 
Housing Gen 
Other social Services 
1990-91 
2734.64 
823.60 
223.24 
39.38 
321.36 
230.45 
9.17 
1277.02 
210.86 
13.20 
347.85 
298.38 
406.74 
406.61 
28.68 
31.76 
7.72 
45.71 
126.02 
0.77 
24.34 
23.91 
0.17 
117.52 
60.14 
0.34 
23.77 
34.89 
1.14 
167.27 
71.84 
71.41 
18.80 
5.22 
1993-94 
2681.76 
797.38 
157.01 
9.82 
382.29 
229.03 
19.22 
1274.07 
235.69 
16.00 
367.59 
375.86 
278.93 
373.16 
13.06 
28.15 
7.47 
56.18 
129.79 
1.25 
17.39 
23.46 
0.13 
96.29 
68.73 
0.23 
20.91 
45.39 
2.20 
168.42 
84.68 
77.49 
1.53 
4.71 
1995-96 
2856.16 
907.80 
284.92 
3.64 
354.23 
227.15 
37.86 
1253.35 
256.32 
18.75 
385.28 
292.13 
300.87 
423.97 
39.50 
30.87 
47.02 
53.82 
122.17 
0.10 
11.41 
33.62 
0.12 
85.35 
84.58 
0.13 
24.40 
57.53 
2.52 
186.45 
97.16 
87.78 
1.52 
0.00 
1998-99 
3158.67 
1022.18 
287.57 
11.55 
407.82 
210.57 
104.67 
1260.09 
322.98 
11.69 
380.63 
225.26 
319.53 
533.83 
23.36 
41.65 
72.33 
57.03 
115.23 
1.06 
95.18 
31.76 
0.10 
96.13 
146.94 
0.10 
28.70 
115.56 
2.58 
195.62 
99.70 
93.47 
2.45 
0.00 
2001-02 
2947.08 
764.96 
174.56 
0.00 
451.11 
126.32 
12.97 
1360.23 
201.79 
23.86 
400.53 
260.19 
473.87 
459.34 
56.44 
40.44 
0.00 
52.72 
168.86 
1.22 
32.21 
25.31 
0.09 
82.04 
195.60 
0.07 
22.25 
170.49 
2.77 
166.95 
77.29 
89.09 
0.57 
0.00 
2003-04 
3069.72 
848.06 
107.13 
0.07 
499.52 
148.04 
93.30 
1403.21 
270.12 
40.48 
450.61 
323.48 
318.52 
531.78 
59.57 
35.29 
30.39 
55.13 
180.51 
1.44 
63.67 
18.27 
0.08 
87.43 
204.92 
0.06 
11.75 
190.36 
2.75 
81.75 
0.00 
81.75 
0.00 
0.00 
2005-06 
3991.91 
897.55 
101.90 
0.04 
558.52 
125.89 
111.20 
1932.88 
553.55 
76.58 
542.87 
350.57 
409.32 
926.41 
64.91 
41.94 
43.77 
57.32 
555.86 
1.33 
46.92 
19.99 
0.06 
94.32 
150.94 
0.44 
7.24 
140,38 
2.88 
84.12 
18.92 
62.09 
0.00 
3.11 
Source : Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective Years. 
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Table A6.32 
Classification of Implicit Budgetary Subsidies of Economic Services 
(At constant Prices 1999-00) 
(In Rs. Crore 
Total - Economic Service 
Impure Public Goods 
Forestry 
Wi ld Life 
Flood Control 
Roads and Bridges 
Other Scientific Research 
Ecology and Environment 
Census Survey and Statistics 
IVJeteorology 
Merit 1 Goods 
Soil and Water Conservation 
Agricul ture Research and Education 
Command Area Development 
Extension and Training in Farming 
Extension and Training in Fisheries 
Merit II Goods 
Crop Husbandry 
Animal Husbandry 
Dairy Development 
Fisheries (Excluding extension/training) 
Major and Med ium Non Commercial 
Irr igation 
Miner Irr igation 
Non Conventional Energy Sources 
Village and Small Industries 
Civil Aviat ion 
Inland Water Transport 
Merit Goods with Distributive Justice 
Hill Areas 
Food Storage and warehouses 
Rural employment 
Special Programmes For Rural 
Development 
Other Rural Dev. Programmes 
Other Special Area Programmes 
Other Irr igation 
Civil Supplies 
Private Goods 
Plantations 
Co-operation 
Investments in Agr. Fin. Insti 
Other Agriculture Programmes 
Commercial Irr igation 
Power 
Industry 
Road t ransport 
Other Transport Services 
Tourism 
Foreign Trade and Export Promot ion 
Gen. Financial Trading Institutes 
Other Gen. Economic Services 
1990-91 
6810.18 
1044.84 
14.69 
8.88 
137.86 
852.32 
2.42 
0.00 
28.27 
0.40 
325.71 
149.78 
38.81 
92.50 
44.60 
0.01 
1462.86 
283.21 
136.16 
17.92 
10.23 
35.98 
803.99 
0.00 
173.82 
1.55 
0.00 
1284.68 
604.65 
109.42 
0.00 
1.38 
517.26 
18.31 
25.40 
8.27 
2692.09 
14.61 
38.86 
0.00 
6.68 
1644.18 
893.82 
82.06 
1.00 
0.00 
2.20 
1.27 
2.03 
5.38 
1993-94 
6886.03 
1065.78 
0.00 
0.00 
133.49 
918.30 
1.68 
0.00 
12.02 
0.30 
250.39 
102.00 
18.44 
55.38 
74.56 
0.01 
1656.40 
453.41 
157.93 
34.92 
17.26 
21.72 
852.70 
0.00 
127.15 
1.30 
0.00 
1305.42 
591.32 
98.23 
0.01 
24.58 
529.76 
15.63 
43.61 
2.28 
2598.04 
10.57 
64.79 
0.00 
2.03 
1368.13 
1101.16 
35.07 
1.32 
0.09 
1.63 
0.00 
0.00 
13.25 
1995-96 
7375.61 
1045.73 
0.00 
14.77 
129.62 
885.32 
2.38 
0.00 
13.35 
0.30 
345.46 
156.77 
16.47 
75.97 
96.25 
0.01 
1600.21 
262.50 
145.73 
15.05 
10.39 
20.55 
1020.11 
0.00 
122.60 
3.19 
0.10 
1309.23 
639.98 
60.98 
0.01 
12.93 
520.58 
35.86 
29.73 
9.17 
3074.98 
10.83 
31.40 
0.39 
5.10 
1519.91 
1438.18 
48.81 
0.56 
0.09 
13.83 
0.00 
0.06 
5.82 
1998-99 
8161.63 
1134.23 
44.51 
11.47 
127.07 
934.71 
1.79 
0.00 
14.44 
0.24 
410.82 
177.82 
14.07 
56.29 
162.62 
0.01 
1379.58 
265.75 
150.10 
14.00 
9.94 
4.21 
832.96 
0.00 
94.52 
8.01 
0.10 
2103.52 
824.85 
73.70 
0.01 
5.02 
826.31 
74.91 
284.55 
14.17 
3133.49 
11.65 
47.87 
0.34 
2.40 
1355.35 
1578.10 
109.94 
0.00 
0.08 
20.64 
0.41 
6.71 
0.00 
2001-02 
8904.40 
1346.77 
85.80 
9.84 
100.53 
1132.32 
0.65 
0.00 
17.41 
0.22 
417.20 
278.93 
11.49 
66.15 
60.42 
0.21 
1159.41 
432.44 
124.95 
16.09 
14.82 
3.67 
469.51 
0.00 
92.16 
5.76 
0.00 
2222.25 
420.44 
81.79 
0.01 
4.93 
1207.10 
137.82 
369.01 
1.13 
3758.78 
9.65 
26.15 
1.35 
0.00 
1644.82 
1981,87 
67,52 
0.00 
0.89 
26.48 
0.00 
0.04 
0.00 
2003-04 
10019.66 
1443.77 
48.38 
8.97 
108.28 
1258.21 
0.60 
0.00 
19.14 
0.20 
368.15 
219.80 
14.49 
87.80 
45.96 
0.11 
1086.01 
374.77 
163.36 
15.02 
12.02 
2.81 
399.66 
9.23 
100.14 
9.01 
0.00 
2675.79 
387.95 
533.24 
0.01 
6.18 
1161.56 
146.61 
437.80 
2.44 
4445.93 
2.79 
35.32 
0.28 
2.80 
1700.68 
2553.48 
116.20 
0.00 
1.53 
32.79 
0.00 
0.04 
0.00 
2005-06 
8750.80 
1571.49 
0.00 
9.29 
107.60 
1428.14 
0.14 
0.00 
26,18 
0.14 
257.16 
149.05 
14.22 
4.43 
89.28 
0.17 
1209.25 
496.22 
141.87 
12,62 
17,74 
-1,53 
412,56 
7,31 
112,83 
9,64 
0,00 
2728.35 
267.30 
459.18 
0.01 
8,70 
1520,31 
236,69 
232,97 
3,20 
2984.54 
3.48 
31.77 
0.18 
1.84 
1386,93 
1259,99 
233,96 
31,17 
5,13 
29,33 
0,73 
0.03 
0.00 
Source : Basic Data - Government of Uttar Pradesh, Finance Accounts for respective Years. 
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